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Since 2005, the United States (US) has shifted its justification for the militarization 
of the African continent to the more humanitarian security-development discourse. 
This apparent paradigmatic shift presents the United States African Command as 
more benign than it may be. However, the response to the emergence of United 
States Africa Command (AFRICOM) has ranged from wholesale condemnation to 
selective criticism of US policy. Skeptics of AFRICOM cite previous US military 
forays in Africa which led to a disproportionate development of military institutions 
relative to instruments of civilian rule. Others see AFRICOM as a naked attempt to 
exert American control over Africa’s valuable natural resources (Taguem, 2010, 
Esterhuyse, 2008, Isike, Uzodike and Gilbert, 2008, 2009). 
On 11th July 2009, while addressing Ghana’s Parliament, President Barack Obama 
remarked that Africa is not the crude caricature of a continent at war but nonetheless, 
for far too many Africans, conflict is a part of life, as constant as the sun. He 
reiterated that America has responsibility to ameliorate the deplorable human 
security condition of Africans not just in words, but with support that strengthens 
Africans’ capacity (President Obama’s address to Ghana’s Parliament July 11, 2009). 
In his 2010 National Security Strategy (NNS), President Obama called for 
partnership with African nations as they grow their economies, and strengthen their 
democratic institutions and governance. In June 2012, he approved Presidential 
policy directives that outline his vision for sub- Saharan Africa.  The stated pillars of 
US strategy towards Africa are to strengthen democratic institutions, to spur 
economic growth, trade and investment, advancement of peace and security, and the 
promotion of opportunities and development by promoting food security and 
transforming Africa’s public health system (US.Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, 
2012). The achievement of these stated goals is incumbent on the third goal which 
AFRICOM is expected to spearhead. 
Africans predominantly see Washington’s profession of concern for development 
and security as transparent cover for hegemonic assertions of “Imperialist power” 
(Stevenson, 2011:28). However, these debates have been based on conjectures 
informed by a historical review of major power involvement with Africa. There is a 




need to move from these conjectural debates to provide empirical details of 
AFRICOM activities and their consequences for human security in Africa. This 
study therefore contributes to this debate by investigating AFRICOM’s activities 
since its formation in 2007. The series of activities by AFRICOM on the continent 
and its intervention in security situations in Libya, Mali, Nigeria and Somalia makes 
this study very promising in light of the study’s engagement with the strategic 
possibilities of AFRICOM through a critical review of the objective security 
conditions in Africa within a changing global security context. The research 
identifies the nexus between AFRICOM and human security in Africa. By doing so, 
it articulates the security concerns of African States and contributes to discussions 
on, and practices of, alternative ways of providing human security to African 
people(s). 
 This study argues that the lopsided power relationship between the United States of 
America and Africa engendered the imposition of AFRICOM on Africans without 
due consultation with the African Union (AU), while the multi-faceted challenges of 
poverty, inter-ethnic conflicts, religious intolerance, trans-border crimes and terrorist 
attacks in Africa induced the US government to categorize the continent as zone of 
conflicts from whence threats to US stability emanate.  The thesis also argues that the 
successful securitization of these threats by United States government engendered 
the creation of USAFRICOM. The study constructs the above arguments on 
historical, exploratory, descriptive and critical foundations.  The research contains a 
substantial amount of fieldwork data on which it bases an empirical evaluation and 
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There has been a growing interest in Africa by the United States of America (USA). 
This interest is generated and shaped by its strategic concerns, most importantly, the 
growing demand for natural resources, especially oil, and an increase in terrorism 
threats on the continent. The continent’s profile received further boost during the 
George W. Bush administration, who declared that: “Africa is increasingly vital to 
our strategic interest; we have seen that conditions on the other side of the world can 
have a direct impact on our own security” (Mboup, Mihalka and Lathrop, 2009:18). 
In his 2002 National Security Strategy, President George W. Bush opines that 
In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, 
war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the 
United States, preserving human dignity – and a strategic priority – 
combating global terror. American interests and American 
principles, therefore lead in the same direction. We will work with 
others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace and 
growing prosperity. Together with European allies, we must help 
strengthen Africa’s fragile states; help build indigenous capability 
to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforcement 
and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorist (US 
NSS, 2002). 
This reputedly increasing strategic geo-political and economic significance of Africa 
to the USA induced the Bush administration to create an exclusive hybrid unified 
combatant command for Africa known as AFRICOM in 2007. Until then, the 
continent had previously been Balkanized and put under the European Command 
(EUCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM) and Central Command (CENTCOM) 
predominantly as a peripheral area of importance (McFate, 2008).     
AFRICOM is one of the nine unified combatant commands of the US Department of 
Defense (DoD).  As one of the six that are regionally focused, it is devoted solely to 
Africa.  AFRICOM is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for US military 




relations with 54 African countries excluding Egypt. It supports US government 
objectives through the delivery and sustenance of effective security cooperation 
programs that assist African nations build their security capability to enable them to 
better provide for their own defence (US Africa Command: 2009a). AFRICOM was 
created by Presidential Order in 2007 and was officially activated on October 1, 
2008, with General William E. ‘Kip’ Ward serving as its first commander. According 
to President Bush,  
This creation of AFRICOM is to engender multifaceted 
development that will be mutually beneficial to the U.S. 
Government and Africans. The new command will strengthen 
our security cooperation with Africa and help to create new 
opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in 
Africa. African Command will enhance our efforts to bring 
peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our 
common goals of development, health, education, democracy, 
and economic growth in Africa. (Bush, 2006). 
 
AFRICOM is structured to support transnational institutions and governments and, 
irrespective of its status as a combatant command, it is unique compared to other 
Unified Combatant Commands (UCC) because it does not appear to have an armed 
combat orientation (Carmel, 2009:4). AFRICOM Commander’s Intent states that the 
purpose of AFRICOM is twofold. These are one: to protect the US homeland, 
American citizens abroad, and United States National Interests from transnational 
threats emanating from Africa. Two, through sustained engagement, it is to enable 
African partners to create a security environment that promotes stability, improved 
governance, and continued development1. The Commander’s intent further states 
“that should preventive or enabling efforts fail, AFRICOM must always be prepared 
to prevail against any individual or organization that poses a threat to the United 
States, her national interests, or her allies and partners” (US Africa Command, 
2008b). 
President Barack Obama in his presidential address to Ghana’s Parliament on July 
11, 2009 remarked that Africa is not the crude caricature of a continent at war but 
nonetheless, for far too many Africans, conflict is a part of life, as constant as the 
                                         
1 The AFRICOM’s Commander Intent is a set of prioritized goals that need to be accomplished by the 
commander within a given period. 




sun. He reiterated that America has responsibility to ameliorate the deplorable human 
security condition of Africans not just in words, but with support that strengthens 
Africans capacity (President Obama’s address to Ghana’s Parliament July 11, 2009). 
In his 2010 National Security Strategy, President Obama called for partnership with 
African nations as they grow their economies, and strengthen their democratic 
institutions and governance. In June 2012, he approved Presidential policy directives 
that outline his vision for sub- Saharan Africa.  The stated pillars of the United States 
(US) strategy towards Africa are to strengthen democratic institutions, to spur 
economic growth, trade and investment, advancement of peace and security and, the 
promotion of opportunities and development by promoting food security and 
transforming Africa’s public health system2. The achievement of these stated goals is 
incumbent on the third goal which AFRICOM is expected to spearhead.  
The response to the emergence of AFRICOM has ranged from wholesale 
condemnation to selective criticism of US policy. Skeptics of AFRICOM cite 
previous US military forays in Africa which led to a disproportionate development of 
military institutions relative to instruments of civilian rule. Others see AFRICOM as 
a naked attempt to exert American control over Africa’s valuable natural resources 
(Taguem, 2010; Esterhuyse, 2008; Isike, Uzodike and Gilbert, 2008; 2009). 
According to Jeremy Keenan of the University of London, Africans predominantly 
see Washington’s profession of concern for development and security as transparent 
cover for hegemonic assertions of “Imperialist power” (cited in Stevenson, 2011:28). 
However, in the face of multifaceted security challenges of inter-ethnic conflicts, 
regional instability and the inability of most African governments to provide 
effective leadership, manage conflict and allocate resources equitably for the 
common good of their people, the need for human security enhancement cannot be 
underplayed.  
The creation of AFRICOM is perceived by some scholars as signaling the 
militarization of US policy toward Africa. They argue that it is a short-sighted and 
self-destructive vision of US interests, namely, to expand the Global War on Terror, 
                                         
2 U.S.STRATEGY toward SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 2012 at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2012/06/14/fact-sheet-new-strategy-toward-sub-saharan-africa (Accessed 14th December, 
2011). 




to undermine China’s growing influence in the continent and to satiate America’s 
hunger for oil and other resources which will inevitably exacerbate the human 
insecurity situation in Africa (Isike, Uzodike and Gilbert, 2009). As various 
Washington sources state openly, AFRICOM was created to counter the growing 
presence of China in Africa.  China’s successes are on the increase. For example, the 
Chinese government has secured long-term economic agreements for raw materials 
from Africa in exchange for Chinese aid and production sharing agreements and 
royalties. By informed accounts, China has been far shrewder than the West. Instead 
of offering savage IMF-dictated austerity and economic chaos as the West has, China 
is offering large credits and soft loans to build roads and schools in order to create 
good will (Engdahl, 2011:26). 
 Peter Pham, a leading Washington insider and an advisor of the US State and 
Defense Departments, states openly that among the aims of the new AFRICOM, is 
the objective of, “protecting access to hydrocarbons and other strategic resources 
which Africa has in abundance ... a task which includes ensuring against the 
vulnerability of those natural riches and ensuring that no other interested third 
parties, such as China, India, Japan, or Russia, obtain monopolies or preferential 
treatment.” (Pham, 2011:31). In testimony before the US Congress supporting 
creation of AFRICOM in 2007, Pham, who is closely associated with the neo-
conservative think-tank, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, stated: 
This natural wealth makes Africa an inviting target for the 
attentions of the People’s Republic of China, whose 
dynamic economy, averaging 9 percent growth per annum 
over the last two decades, has an almost insatiable thirst 
for oil as well as a need for other natural resources to 
sustain it. China is currently importing approximately 2.6 
million barrels of crude per day, about half of its 
consumption;…roughly a third of its imports come from 
African sources…perhaps no other foreign region rivals 
Africa as the object of Beijing’s sustained strategic interest 
in recent years.. many analysts expect that Africa—
especially the states along its oil-rich western coastline—
will increasingly becoming a theatre for strategic 
competition between the United States and its only real 
near-peer competitor on the global stage, China, as both 
countries seek to expand their influence and secure access 
to resources (Pham, 2011). 




In a groundbreaking analysis, Canadian geopolitical analyst, Mahdi Darius 
Nazemroaya writes, “The map used by Washington for combating terrorism under 
the Pan-Sahel Initiative says a lot. The range or area of activity for the terrorists, 
within the borders of Algeria, Libya, Niger, Chad, Mali, and Mauritania according to 
Washington’s designation, is very similar to the boundaries or borders of the colonial 
territorial entity which France attempted to sustain in Africa in 1957” (Nazemroaya 
and Teil, 2011:39). The French called it the Common Organization of the Saharan 
Regions (Organisation commune des regions sahariennes, OCRS). It comprised the 
inner boundaries of the Sahel and Saharan countries of Mali, Niger, Chad, and 
Algeria. Paris used it to control the resource-rich countries for French exploitation of 
such raw materials as oil, gas, and uranium. 
1.2 Statement of Research Problem          
The US Government’s argument that the creation of a Unified Combatant Command3 
that is regionally based and exclusively designed for Africa is a panacea for human 
security needs in Africa is viewed by many African scholars as contradictory to the 
tenets of human security.  There is a shared concern among Africans that western-
oriented state-based approaches to security will not address the human security needs 
of the continent. African policymakers are concerned with maintaining domestic 
security through state-building and establishing secured systems for dealing with 
food, health, trade, terrorism and environmental degradation. Human security 
approach has identified various threats as sources of insecurity in Africa and these 
threats require different prescriptions and specialized attention. Considering the fact 
that human security paradigm emerged to challenge and ameliorate the inadequacies 
of the militaristic, state-centric security approach by repositioning the individual 
human being as the referent object of security, the creation of AFRICOM, a 
component of DOD to militate against these threats, is both contradictory and 
questionable.  
More over, the United States’ post 9/11 heightened interests in Africa that contrasts 
with decades of relative disinterest has raised debate over the actual motivations of 
this unprecedented attention. The presentation of a Unified Combatant Command 
                                         
3 A Unified Combatant Command (UCC) is a United States Department of Defense command that is 
composed of forces from at least two Military Departments and has a broad and continuing mission. 




(UCC) in the mode of AFRICOM as a hybrid benign organization that is geared 
toward the promotion of human security on the continent, is pure obfuscation and 
puts U.S efforts to “strengthen democratic institutions” at the top of the list. Beyond 
these idealist declarations of good intentions, some foreign policy experts consider 
the turnaround in the United States’ Africa policy to be the consequence of the rising 
strategic value of the continent for tangible American economic and security interests 
(Kansteiner, 2004:3). Despite the official rhetoric, they hold the actual objectives of 
the agenda of the United States in Africa to be, firstly, to secure its access to energy 
sources; secondly, to counter global terrorism, and thirdly, to contain the growing 
influence of China (Ellis cited in Mboup, 2008:7).  
 African security analysts have questioned the security interest AFRICOM has been 
designed to address. While US government sees failed states as the major threat to 
security because they can provide hideouts to terrorist networks (US NSS, 2002), 
African security analysts see violations of human rights, economic injustice, and 
political oppression as major threats to human security in Africa. 
Moreover, the recent UN/NATO military intervention in the Libyan uprising under 
the guise of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine as articulated in the U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 1973, (2011) has evoked suspicion among African 
political leaders, pundits and peace advocates. The Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn 
in Libya was initiated by AFRICOM. The African Union (AU) opposed the military 
intervention, but rather preferred a political solution to the Libyan crisis while the US 
government insisted on regime change.  
The proliferation of weaponry covertly transported from depots in Libya into 
neighboring countries has invigorated illicit arms smuggling across Africa, 
particularly in the Northwest. The Sahel ranks among the world’s principal 
smuggling routes and is maintained by militants from local Tuareg tribes who assist 
in trafficking arms. After the collapse of the Qadhafi regime in Libya, hundreds of 
looted missiles, Kalashnikov rifles, rocket propelled grenades, and small weapons 
were sold throughout the Sahel. Additionally, experts estimate Libya had as many as 
20,000 first-generation man-portable air defence systems before the uprising, at least 
some of which are likely in the hands of terrorist organizations and militias seeking 




to incite further instability in Africa and the Middle East. Armed Tuaregs fighting for 
Qadhafi returned to homelands in Mali and Niger and smuggled weapons that fuelled 
the Mali rebellion and Boko Haram onslaught in northern Nigeria, further 
destabilizing the region and reinforcing a safe haven for al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (Rodriguez, 2013). 
In the final analysis, the central argument of the study is that there could be 
convergence of interests between the US interests in Africa vis-a-vis the 
establishment of AFRICOM and the enhancement of human security in Africa.  
1.3 Aim, objectives and research questions of the study 
This section presents aim, specific objectives and the research questions that guided 
the study. 
1.3.1 The aim of the study 
The general aim of this study is to investigate the set objectives, activities, prospects 
and challenges of AFRICOM for human security in Africa through a critical review 
of the objective security conditions in Africa within a changing global security 
context. 
1.3.2 Specific objectives of the study 
  
 To critically evaluate the United States national security policy and strategy 
in Africa. 
 To determine the place of AFRICOM in the US National Security Strategy 
towards Africa. 
 To determine the nature and scope of AFRICOM activities on the continent. 
 To establish the likely effect of AFRICOM’s activities on human security in 
Africa. 
  To critically examine the relationship between AFRICOM and human 
security in Africa  
1.3.3 Research questions 
  
 What are the implications of AFRICOM for human security in Africa? 




 What are the U.S. National Security interests and Strategy in Africa? 
 Whose security interests will AFRICOM serve? 
 Will increased US military activities in Africa assist the AU’s strategic 
objective of promoting peace and human security or will it contribute to 
instability? 
 How can AFRICOM intervention in Africa ameliorate the human insecurity 
in Africa? 
1.4 The significance of the study 
Most studies on AFRICOM have focused on the organization, roles and purpose of 
AFRICOM. From the reviewed literature, two opposing groups have emerged. The 
proponents of AFRICOM, who see it as the right prescription to tackle the 
continent’s human security and development needs (Carmel 2009, Stevenson 2010, 
Stevenson 2011), and the opponents of AFRICOM who argue that AFRICOM has 
adverse consequences that will throw the continent into turmoil, chaos and 
pandemonium (Volman 2008,Volman and Klare 2004, Schaefer 2007, Okumu 2007, 
Mesfin 2009). However, the debates have been based on conjectures informed by a 
historical review of major power involvement with Africa.  
This study moves beyond these conjectural debates by providing empirical details of 
AFRICOM activities and their consequences for human security in Africa. The study 
critically reviewed the activities of AFRICOM since its formation in 2007 within a 
changing global security context. The series of activities, operations and exercises by 
AFRICOM on the continent and its intervention in security situations in Libya, Mali, 
Nigeria, Somalia and Central African Republic are not systematically investigated in 
the extant literature.  This is a neglected area to which the current research makes a 
significant contribution. . The study articulates the security concerns and demands of 
African states and engaged the strategic possibilities of AFRICOM to meet those 
demands. Finally, the study establishes that there is a nexus between human security 
and AFRICOM as military-to-military training with African partners enhances the 
capacity of African military to effectively and timely respond to crises situations in 
the continent hence, averts humanitarian catastrophes.  




1.5 Broader issues of the study  
The study addresses the militarization of U.S foreign policy towards Africa and 
securitization of the humanitarian pathologies in the continent. The longitudinal 
insecurity challenges in Africa were engendered by perennial disorder caused by her 
asymmetric relationship with the Western world. This relationship unduly integrated 
Africa into global capitalism and dislodged her from her traditional value system 
which was rooted in communalism. The study argues that the solutions to these 
challenges lie in an inclusive institutional framework that respects rule of law and 
gives priority to human development in accordance with African mores.  
1.6 Scope and limitations of the study 
This study focuses on human security in Africa within the purview of AFRICOM 
and U.S strategic interests in Africa. The study examines the causes and 
consequences of human (in)security in Africa, AFRICOM’s activities (training, 
exercises and operations) in Africa and the convergence of interests between 
AFRICOM activities and human security promotion in Africa. It has been eight years 
since AFRICOM was established and thus it deserves to be considered a relatively 
new organization and a work in progress however, it has broadened the scope of its 
operations significantly. 
The major limitation of this study is the enormous challenges faced in involving 
many AFRICOM staff and other stakeholders through surveys or interviews. The 
researcher was able to reach out to few highly placed AFRICOM staff. AFRICOM’s 
involvement provided additional information from an insider’s perspective about the 
real motives of the Command in Africa while the views of the other stakeholders, 
especially African senior military commanders in strategic command positions, 
provided useful insights. This thesis assumes that the African continent will remain 
strategically imperative to the American government in the foreseeable future and 
AFRICOM will continue to play a significant role in advancing U.S. interests. If this 
assumption is true, the U.S govenment will need to summon the political will and 
economic means to support AFRICOM in accomplishing its mission effectively.   
During the investigation the researcher faced the following challenges:  
 




 The researcher faced serious challenges in getting ethical clearance letter 
from Stellenbosch University regardless of the fact that due process was 
followed. 
  Data collection and the pace of returning the questionnaires were slow. The 
researcher followed up with the respondents several times and was eventually 
able to collect sufficient completed copies of the questionnaires to reach a 
percentage that made the analyses of the data feasible. 
 Some of the research interviewees were skeptical about the recording of the 
interview session. However, the researcher managed to convince them that 
the interviews are for academic purposes and that their identities will be 
concealed and protected.  
  The researcher was not able to carry out the study in all the institutions 
designated in the proposal due to financial and other constraints, although he 
managed to conduct it in ten institutions across South Africa and Nigeria.  
1.7 Research methodology and methods  
Creswell (2012:7) defines research methodology as a strategy or plan of action that 
links methods to outcomes and governs our choice and use of methods (e.g., 
experimental research, survey research, ethnography, etc.)  Methods (as distinct from 
methodology) are techniques and procedures we propose to use (e.g., questionnaire, 
interview. focus group, etc.). Quantitative method was applied to the analysis of 
questionnaires while the interviews were analysed by the use of qualitative method 
1.7.1 Research design 
Research design is the overall plan for obtaining answers to the questions being 
studied and for handling some of the difficulties encountered during the research 
process. Research design is the set of logical steps taken by the researcher to answer 
the research question. It forms the blueprint for the study and sets out the 
methodology used by the researcher to obtain sources of information, such as 
participants, elements and units of analysis, to collect and analyze the data, and to 
interpret the results (Brink, van der Walt and Van Rensburg 2012:96). Burns and 
Grove (2010:223) define research design as the blueprint for conducting the study 




that maximizes control over factors that could interfere with the validity of the 
findings. 
The study made use of qualitative and quantitative research methods. Payne and 
Payne (2004:176) opine that the qualitative method captures the intricacies of social 
life and “treats actions as part of holistic social process and context, rather than as 
something that can be extracted and studied in isolation”. The qualitative method 
lends itself to the investigation of complex social phenomena without predetermining 
or delimiting the paths that such investigation should follow. Further, the strength of 
the qualitative method lies in its unassailable explanatory power and in providing 
detailed information on the subject matter of research thus providing in-depth 
understanding of human/organizational behaviour and of social interactions as well 
as the rationale for such interactions. McNabb (2009:108) posits that quantitative 
research method helps political scientists to make effective decisions about their 
research proposals. He argues that the proper utilization of numbers, statistics with 
words makes communicating easier, faster and far more effective than the use of 
words alone.  
1.7.2 Area of the study 
The study was conducted in South Africa and Nigeria. Within South Africa, 
respondents and interviewees were drawn from key institutions such as the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal Pietermaritzburg campus, Stellenbosch University, 
Institute of Security Studies Pretoria, South African Defence Academy Sardana, and 
South African Institute of International Affairs Johannesburg.  In Nigeria, 
interviewees and respondents were drawn from the University of Ibadan, ECOWAS 
headquarter, Nigerian Naval headquarter, National Defence College, Nigerian 
Defence Headquarter, United States embassy (all in Abuja), and Nigerian Institute of 
International Affairs Lagos. 
1.7.3 Population of the study 
 Polit and Hungler (1999:37) refer to the population as an aggregate or totality of all 
the objects, subjects or members that conform to a set of specifications. Identifying 
the target population requires specifying the criteria that determine which individuals 
are included and which individuals are not included. In other words, what 




characteristics must an individual have to be included in the target population? Due 
to the specificity of the study the researcher considered the following characteristics:  
 Age 
 Academic qualification 
 Specialization 
 Institutional Affiliation   
In this study the populations were as follows: military officers in Nigeria and South 
Africa as well as senior military officers from several African countries who were 
randomly selected; AFRICOM’s staff; scholars, security experts, diplomats, policy 
makers; staff and postgraduate students in the Disciplines of Politics, International 
Relations, Strategic Studies, Policy and Development studies.  
1.7.4 The eligibility criteria 
 The eligibility criteria were that the participants had to 
• be informed on international politics, U.S foreign policy especially in Africa and 
African affairs. 
 Considering the fact that most of AFRICOM’s activities revolve around 
security/military cooperation with African partners, large number of the 
respondents were drawn from military institutions in Africa while 
AFRICOM staff were equally considered. 
  Members of both governmental and non-governmental institutions were 
interviewed. 
 Security and foreign policy scholars and postgraduate students were equally 
considered. 
1.7.5 Sample 
A sample is a subset of a population selected to participate in the study: it is a 
fraction of the whole, selected to participate in the research project (Brink 1996:133; 
Polit & Hungler 1999:227).  Once the target population has been identified,  the 
researcher needs to select individuals from the target population to be part of the 
sample that participates in the research,  In this survey, a subset of three hundred 
(300) respondents and fourteen (14) interviewees were selected.  




1.7.6 Data collection and instruments used 
Polit and Hungler (1999:267) define data as information obtained in a course of a 
study. In this study the researcher used a combination of data collection methods 
known as methodological triangulation, that is the use of two or more independent 
sources of data or data collection methods within one study in order to help ensure 
that the data are telling you what you think they are telling you (Saunders, Lewis and 
Thomhill, 2003). The combination of the methods is to bridge the gap between 
qualitative and quantitative paradigms in order to answer research questions 
holistically. Survey method was employed to collect data from primary and 
secondary sources. 
1.7.7 Interviews 
Primary data was drawn from in-depth interviews based on unstructured questions as 
well as the administration of questionnaire. Bauer and Gaskell (2000:51) define 
interview process as conversation between two or more friends with the aim of 
eliciting data.  Mc Nabb (2009:138) argues that interview is used in an exploratory 
research; the personal interview is used to collect the basic data for gaining an 
understanding of the relationship between the people in the study and the larger 
social group about which the study is focused. It should be noted that radical social 
constructionists faulted this method on the ground that it cannot provide a mirror 
reflection of the reality that exist in social world as elucidated by Miller and Glassner 
(1997:99), However, this study agrees with the views expressed by Harding and 
Latour (cited in Miller and Glassner, 1997:99) that information about social worlds is 
achievable through in-depth interviewing. Oral face to face interviews were 
conducted with fourteen (14) interviewees. The interviewees included: AFRICOM 
Spokesperson in AFRICOM’s Military Liaison Office at the ECOWAS headquarters, 
Abuja; Department of Defense personnel assigned as Senior Official/Defense 
Attaché (SDO/DATT) in the United States Embassy in Nigeria; Officials in the 
Office of Security Cooperation in Nigeria and South Africa. Interviews were also 
conducted with stakeholders in various strategic command positions within the 
Nigerian Armed Forces, South African Armed Forces, Institute of Strategic Studies, 
Pretoria, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, Nigerian 
Institute of International Affairs Lagos, ECOWAS, African Union Standby Force 




and security experts in the academic community. The unstructured interviews 
afforded the interviewees the freedom to discuss the topic holistically. 
1.7.8 Questionnaires 
According to Jupp (2006:27), questionnaire can be defined as a set of carefully 
designed questions given in exactly the same form to a group of people in order to 
collect data about some topic(s) in which the researcher is interested. McNabb (2009: 
150) defines questionnaire as a set of open or closed-end questions that respondents 
are asked to answer. Three hundred (300) copies of questionnaires were administered 
to respondents in South Africa and Nigeria. The essence of the questionnaire is to 
determine what people know, what they think or how they plan to act in regard to 
AFRICOM. The questionnaires measured both Africans and non-Africans factual 
knowledge, opinions, attitudes and motives towards AFRICOM. The questionnaires 
consisted mainly of structured questions with a few open-ended questions. 
1.7.9 Secondary data 
Secondary data was collected from libraries at the University of KwaZulu-Natal 
Pietermaritzburg and Howard campuses, South Africa. University of Ibadan, 
National Institute of International Affairs Lagos, ECOWAS headquarters and 
National Defence College, Abuja, executive summaries, memoranda available 
through open sources, reports of periodicals and information retrieved from U.S. 
Government Accountability Offices (GAO), AFRICOM posture statements, and 
Commander’s intent and relevant literatures on various United States Agencies, 
including the US Congress. The internet served as an invaluable source of 
information for the study given the contemporary nature of this research.  
1.7.10 Methods of data analysis  
The methods of data analysis were multi-dimensional. An intrinsic case study 
method was applied to the analysis of AFRICOM. Bennet and Elman (2008:705) 
opine that case studies are usually employed to confirm the presumed causal 
processes that lie beneath larger studies. The basic rationale for using case study 
method is to investigate the attitudes of AFRICOM, its interactions and relationship 
with African Partners, and its level of responsiveness to its mandated objectives of 
security enhancement and conflict prevention in Africa. 




The unstructured questions were appraised by coding system and the textual material 
of the data was evaluated and explained with the use of Computer-Assisted 
Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS). Strauss (1987: 29) defines coding as 
a process in which codes are given to parts of sentences, whole sentences or 
paragraphs. In this study, the goal of coding is not to count things, but to "fracture" 
the data and rearrange them into categories that facilitate comparison between things 
in the same category and that aid in the development of theoretical concepts" 
(Maxwell, 2005:96). 
The questionnaires were grouped into categories and classes and later translated in 
numerical form for counting and additional statistical analysis with the use of SPSS 
version 18. Content analysis was applied to data collected from secondary sources. 
Hosti (1996:85) defines content analysis as any technique for making inferences by 
objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics within a text. 
Numerical figures were assessed and statistically analyzed. Findings are represented 
in tables and charts.  
1.8 Ethical considerations 
Ethical considerations have become a cornerstone for conducting effective and 
meaningful research. As such, the ethical behavior of individual researchers is under 
unprecedented scrutiny (Best and Kahn, 2006; Trimble and Fisher, 2006). In today’s 
society, any concerns regarding ethical practices will negatively influence attitudes 
about science, and the abuses committed by a few are often the ones that receive 
widespread publicity (Mauthner, Birch, Jessop, and Miller, 2003). 
The researcher meticulously followed the research ethics policy of University of 
KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN 2013). Respondents were informed of the purpose and 
procedures of the research study prior to the data collection commencing. A consent 
form was attached and signed by all respondents in the study areas before they 
engaged with the study. The following basic principles were strictly observed by the 
researcher: 
 No pressure on individuals to participate 
 Respect individual autonomy 
 Avoid causing harm 




 Maintain anonymity and confidentiality 
 Take particular care in research with all the research groups. 
1.9 Structure of dissertation 
The study is organized into seven chapters. 
 Chapter one:  General introduction 
This chapter provides the background to the study. It contains the statement of the 
problem, research questions, aim and objectives of the study, significance of the 
study, scope of the study and limitation. It also highlights the existing gap in the 
literature and explains the methodology. 
 Chapter two: Literature review and theoretical framework 
This chapter reviews relevant literature on AFRICOM, security and human security. 
It contains conceptual clarifications and explores the aim, objectives, modalities, 
processes, and implications of AFRICOM for Africa.   It also defines and elaborates 
the study’s theoretical framework.  
 Chapter three: An overview of the causes and consequences of human 
insecurity in Africa.  
This chapter analyses the Human Security situation in selected African countries, its 
evolution and dynamics and various initiatives by the African Union (A.U) and sub-
regional bodies in mitigating the insecurity challenges in Africa. 
 Chapter four: Human security challenges in the Sahel region and the Horn of 
Africa 
This chapter examines human insecurity in selected African countries especially the 
countries in the Sahel region and Horn of Africa.  
 Chapter five:  U.S foreign policy in Africa and the emergence of AFRICOM 
This chapter explores United States foreign policy toward Africa vis-à-vis the 
emergence of AFRICOM, its programs, activities and exercises in Africa 
 Chapter six: Data presentation and analysis 
This chapter contains the presentation and analyses of all the data collected through 
the interview processes and the questionnaires. 




 Chapter seven: Conclusion, summary of findings and recommendations 
This chapter contains the conclusion, findings and Policy recommendation on how to 






















LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Historically, the concept of security has been most closely associated with national 
security and has its roots in the situation in Europe before, during and immediately 
after the thirty years war (1618-1648). Prior to this war, the dominant form of 
political organization in Europe was feudalism. Feudal society was based on a 
hierarchical structure of social relations. Two parallel hierarchies existed in Europe, 
the sacred and the temporal. The former consisted of the Pope at the apex with 
cardinals, archbishops, bishops and priests below him in descending order (Nnoli, 
2006:2). This structure was referred to as sacred, clerical or ecclesiastical system. On 
the temporal side, the Holy Roman Emperor occupied the apex of the hierarchy 
followed, in descending order, by the monarch, the greater nobles, the lesser nobles, 
and the serfs. In between, were the artisans, craftsmen, merchants and slave. There 
was a complex system of interwoven relationships among the hierarchies.  
This complexity in social relations contained seeds of conflicts, which erupted into 
war in 1618. In the course of the war a new situation emerged with the following 
features. The central army that had suppressed all local centers of power including 
the powers and authorities of the Holy Roman Emperor and Pope, the emergence of a 
central bureaucracy within a given territorial area, the institution of government, and 
population which transferred their loyalty to the new center of power, to which they 
now turned for their livelihood and solution of their most pressing and difficult 
challenges (Nnoli, 2006:8). This transference of loyalty led to the development of 
cohesion within the population. Over time, they became culturally, socially, 
economically and militarily impermeable to other groups and peoples. The treaty of 
Westphalia that ended the war in 1648 led to the emergence of modern state by 
ratifying the territorial units as the only actors in international relations. The Treaty 
provided that: (a) these states are sovereign. (b) Only states have the monopoly of the 
use of force. (c). States are equal in international law and relations. (d) States must 
have defined geographical territories with definite populations and functional 




governments. The Westphalia system later evolved to contemporary international 
system with its projection of security from a state-centric view (Nnoli, 2006:19). The 
emergent nation-states were units of powers unfettered by any restrictions from 
within and outside their territories. Inter-state relations comprised a system of one 
power jockeying with another power. All aspects of international relations depended 
on how much power each state could muster. The safety of a state, its population and 
the integrity of its boundaries can only be guaranteed by this power. In this chapter, 
the study will review the extant literature on security, its origin, trend and 
evolutionary processes that engendered the emergence of human security paradigm, 
The chapter will also review the sequence of events that led to the creation of the 
United States African Command (USAFRICOM) for Africa.  
2.1 State-centric Approach to Security 
The traditional conceptualization of security equates security with the survival of the 
state and the promotion of its national interests. National interests are specifically 
measured in terms of power, classically defined by Hans Morgenthau (1948:25) as, 
“anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over minds and actions 
of others”. And the state is seen as a container of security, ensuring the security of 
the people within its borders.  Security is narrowly defined within the purview of 
state-centrism as, “the study of the threat, use and control of military force (Walt, 
1991:26). The realist paradigm retains hegemonic status in the academic and policy 
spheres, emphasizing the state as the referent object of security and the military as 
the primary threat and tool in its maintenance (Williams, 2006). 
The realists constructed the state as a necessary unit for wellbeing and survival of 
any human group within the anarchical international environment. The international 
situations that shaped the realists’ world view were based on the assumptions that 
state possesses a will to survive and a will to power. States live in fear of losing their 
possessions to others and are tempted by opportunities of acquiring new possession 
as elucidated by Hobbes (1787) that all states were equally and constantly driven by 
fear that their survival, the most cherished of their state possessions might be 
threatened.  




Therefore, security was premised on power calculus. Both the military and the 
diplomats played a critical role in the coalition building that guaranteed security 
while international trade acted as a barometer of peace, goodwill and mutually 
assured security between states.  However, the end of the Cold War and the events of 
11 September, 2001 have seen the traditional statist, militarist and zero sum approach 
to security  receding in the minds of policy-makers and analysts. Strategic studies 
have been transformed into security studies, bipolarity has been replaced by 
unipolarity and there has been a fundamental decline in inter-state wars while intra-
state conflicts have escalated to alarming proportions. There are also human induced 
climatic changes, growing incidents of terrorism and the spread of endemic diseases 
which have informed national policy and global nuances (Gaan, 2010:2). 
Furthermore, the growing paradigmatic shift in the nature of security imperatives 
faced by states has exposed the weakness of the realist world view in addressing 
contemporary security challenges (Gilbert, Uzodike and Isike, 2009:267). 
Rahman (2005:5) traces the contemporary theoretical debate over the “security” 
question to the early 1980s, a period of heightened Cold War tensions. He posits that 
the origins of the movement to expand the definition and scope of security issues 
away from the predominantly military‐strategic focus of the Cold War were to be 
found in Europe,  the geographical heart of renewed superpower animosities and the 
centre of the most immediate nuclear dangers at that time. The end of the Cold War 
hastened the trend towards refashioning the agenda of international security analysis 
towards new and expanding emphases upon challenges to the well‐being not only of 
the state, but also of individuals and communities at a sub‐state level and, beyond the 
level of the state, of security at the regional and even global levels. The academic 
discipline of strategic studies began to give way to a corresponding growth in so‐
called “security studies,” either rationalized as a necessary expansion to the 
narrowness of (military) focus of traditional strategic studies or promoted as an 
entirely new sub‐field within the study of International Relations. 
2.2 Conceptual Clarification of Security 
 
The concept of security has been much contested. Hence, there are a plethora of 
definitions of security, not least because the very nature of security defies the pursuit 




of an agreed general definition. There are various typologies in security discourse. 
For example, job security, spiritual security, emotional security, social security, 
psychological security, among others. Each typology is actuated towards a particular 
threat. However, this study will be looking at security within the ambit of politics 
cum international relations. Many scholars have defined security in various ways 
depending on their intellectual predilections and ideological proclivities. This chapter 
will provide and examine some these definitions through a critical review of existing 
literature   Ken Booth in his work “Reflections of a Fallen Realist” succinctly states 
that ‘`Security' is what we make it. It is an epiphenomenon, inter-subjectively created 
(Booth, 1994:18). Different world views and discourses about politics deliver 
different views and discourses about security. 
According to Liotta (2002:477) the word security is derived from se (without) + cura 
(care) - the quality or state of being secure or as a freedom from danger (freedom 
from fear or according to the most popular etymological interpretation, the term 
security derives from Latin secures, safe, secure, anxiety). In the classical sense 
security - from the Latin Securitas, refers to tranquillity and freedom of care, or what 
Cicero termed the absence of anxiety upon which the fulfilled life depends. 
Two major approaches had dominated security thinking until 1980s. The realist 
approach which sees security as derivative of power and the idealist approach which 
argues that security is beyond the realist notions of armies, guns and war. The 
idealists see security as a consequence of peace. Stephen Walt (1991:212) sees 
security as, “the study of the threat, use and control of military force.” Arnold 
Wolfers (1962:150) sees security from both objective and subjective senses. 
Objective sense of security measures the absence of threats to acquired values while 
subjective sense of security measures the absence of fear that such values will be 
attacked. For Hartland-Thunberg (1982:50) security is the ability of a nation to 
pursue successfully its national interests, as it sees them, any place in the world. 
Huysmans (2006:44) sees security as a political technology, which “interlocks 
system of knowledge, representations, practices, and institutional forms that imagine, 
direct and act upon bodies, spaces, and flows in certain ways”. Post-structural 
scholarship argues that the political technology of security links sovereignty, 
discipline, and government under the bio-power of governmentality which seeks to 




(re)order society, preserve power relations, and oppress or exclude oppositions 
(Burke, 2002:1-27; Bigo, 2002:63-92). For Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998:23), 
“security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and 
frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.” Walter 
Lippman sees national security as the nation’s ability to secure her core values and if 
threatened, to defend these values by any possible means (cited in Wolfer, 
1962:150). Trager and Simonia (1973:36) define national security as that part of 
governmental policy having as its objective the creation of national and international 
political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital national values 
against existing and potential adversaries. Micheal Louw in his introductory note to 
the Institute of Security Studies symposium (1978) defines national security as 
combination of traditional defence policy and the non-military actions of a state to 
ensure its total capacity to survive as a political entity in order to exert influence and 
to carry out its internal and international objectives. Damus (1977:13) views security 
from the socio-economic perspective and defines security as “the prevention of 
property damage, injury and loss of lives caused by military means as well as 
limitation of such damage, casualty and death in the event of war”. Mroz (1980:105) 
sees security as the relative freedom from harmful threats. Bellany (1981:102) 
defines security as relative freedom from war, coupled with relative high expectation 
that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur.  For Martins 
(1983:12), security is the assurance of future wellbeing. Giacomo Luciani (1989:151) 
posits that national security is the ability of a nation to withstand aggression from 
abroad. Canadian National Defence College defines national security as the 
preservation of a way of life acceptable to the people and compatible with the needs 
and legitimate aspirations of others. It includes freedom from military attack or 
coercion, freedom from internal subversion and freedom from the erosion of the 
political, economic and social values which are essential to the quality of life (Course 
documents, National Defence College.1989). 
With few exceptions, the above definitions have some fundamental peculiarities. 
They are too narrow and statist in nature. They rely heavily on the use of the military 
both as a source and means of tackling threats. They are restricted to external threats 
without considering intra-state threats which are no less devastating than military 




threats.  Most of these definitions are Eurocentric and western oriented and therefore, 
do not consider the complex security problematic of nations beyond the western and 
northern hemispheres. The state is preferred as the primary referent object while 
negating other important actors that are worthy of consideration. 
Maxi Schoeman (1998:722-3) criticized Walt in particular for ‘de-historicizing’ the 
international state system and assuming its inevitability, rather than admitting that it 
is a human construct and a product of specific era and context. On the other hand, 
Richard Ullman (1983) has argued that although it may be easier and politically 
expedient to focus on the salient, external, military issues, this may actually be 
counter-productive to overall security, as it ignores legitimate non-military threats 
and threats emerging from within the state. Ullman defined a threat to national 
security as, an action or sequence of events that threatens drastically over a relatively 
brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state or 
threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the 
government of a state or to private, non-government entities within the state (Ullman, 
1983:133). Hedley Bull (1961:28) condemns excessive self-interest in approaches to 
national security, and argues for a broader view that encompasses common interests 
and national securities. Leonard Beaton raises the need to expand the conception of 
security beyond the limits of parochial national security to include a range of 
systemic considerations (Beaton, 1972). Mutimer (2006:49) contends that “the war-
like notion of security excludes other important actors and level of analyses, 
including individuals and groups as well as other institutions”. He observes that the 
modern move away from inter-state to intra-state conflict in particular, stresses the 
importance of individuals, groups and institutional analyses.  
Al-Mashat observes that national security literature is statist and not society oriented.  
As such, it strengthens psychological dependence on the state and confronts social 
powers with a real challenge to their function and their very existence (Al Mashat, 
1985:29). Society’s sacrifices are perceived as obligatory, but the state’s privileges 
are justified as necessary for survival. Nnoli furthers this argument by insisting that 
society was not subordinated to the state, it was absent altogether as a result of the 
automatic transposing of the Westphalia system to different cultural and historical 
contexts, which consequently neglected, for example, the specificities of Third 




World states formation and the type of conflict and, therefore, security problems that 
are prevalent in the Third World inter-state or domestic conflict and insecurity 
(Nnoli, 2006:25).He argues that by emphasizing the security of the state, the 
Westphalia security doctrine does not take into account the possibilities of demand 
for security from elements within the state. By predicating security on the state it not 
only ignores these demands in favour of other elements but also legitimizes the state 
politically and morally, building an aura around it that reifies it and makes it looks 
like a system divorced from the interests of the individuals and groups that compose 
it (Nnoli, 2006:26). Ayoob (1994:6) argues that the impetus for the statist 
conceptualization of security is a reflection of Westphalia trajectory of historical 
development and post 1945 European evolution. 
Consequently, Krause and Williams, (1996:230) argue that the realist focus on 
military threats to the state emanating from outside of its borders is no longer 
sufficient as a means of determining what or who is being secured, what these threats 
look like and from where they originate. Critical school of security studies argues 
that in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe, the state’s claim that its security 
concerns were paramount relative to those of its population was plausible. The states 
in Europe then were, on the whole, capable of providing internal order and 
preserving external sovereignty at a cost by and large deemed acceptable by the 
societies they governed. However, numerous processes like globalization, drastic 
decline in interstate wars, religious extremism and state sponsored terrorism in the 
twenty and twenty-first centuries brought into question the state’s capacity to sustain 
its side of the bargain.  Ann Tickner (1995:179) argues that of approximately 127 
“significant wars” which have occurred since 1945, all but two of them werewithin  
the so called Less Developed Countries (LDCs).Therefore, she accuses the realists of 
being ethnocentric in their conceptualizations, as they narrowly define security in 
terms of conflict between the great powers. 
Ayoob (1995:6) argues that the application of the realist school’s historically 
conditioned definition of security to the analysis of the Third World situations has 
created major intellectual and conceptual problems. He notes that the characteristics 
of western based security namely, its external orientation, its strong link with 
systemic security and its focus on major power, rivalries have been so thoroughly 




diluted in the Third World that the explanatory power of the concept has been vastly 
reduced when applied to Third World contexts. Responding to the proportionately 
greater number of intrastate conflicts in the Third World as compared to the First 
World, Mohammed Ayoob stresses political-institutional underdevelopment as the 
predominant source of conflict. He, therefore, argues that national security is a 
function of state building, which requires that a state possesses more than simply 
"security hardware" (control of coercive force) but also "security software" 
(legitimacy and integration). Ayoob advances a different definition: security or 
insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities, both internal and external, that 
threatens, or has the potential to, bring down or significantly weaken state structures, 
both territorial and institutional, and regimes (1997: 130). African scholars conceive 
security in broader terms to include the whole gamut of human needs. Hence, 
security for Africans connotes freedom from, or elimination of, threats not only to 
the physical existence of the state, but also to its ability for self-protection and 
development, and the enhancement of the general well-being of all the people 
(Akinyeye, 2001:40).  Cilliers (2004:11) posits that security is time-bound and 
malleable. It implies protection against, or safety from, a future risk of severe 
deprivation, injury or death, and requires rules, order and impartial adjudication and 
application. 
Expressing a similar view, Holsti and Holsti (1996:15) notes that inter-state security 
in many areas especially in Third World countries "has become increasingly 
dependent on security within those states." In the Third World, the security threats to 
the state apparatus are far more frequently internal than external, especially given 
that many decolonized nations were formed containing substantial linguistic, 
cultural, or ethnic minorities with few ties to the state. Many of the intrastate wars we 
have witnessed therefore concern questions of national liberation, unification or 
secessionquestions "of statehood and the nature of community within states."  These 
"people's wars" often make no distinctions between soldiers and civilians, and thus 
result in extraordinarily high civilian death tolls.  Moreover, because they are not 
conducted by states which have limited goals and a strong interest in self-
perpetuation as an organized group, the "ordinary cost-benefit analyses that underlie 




wars as a 'continuation of politics by other means' no longer apply” (Holsti and 
Holsti, 1996:26-7). 
Ole Waever (1989) opines that one can view security as that which is in language 
theory called a speech act. It is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying ‘security’ 
a state representative moves the peculiar case into a specific area: claiming a special 
right to use means necessary to block this development. Baldwin (1997:15) argues 
that security is gradational rather than dichotomous: you can have neither perfect 
security, nor perfect insecurity, only security by varying degree. For Caldwell and 
Williams Jr. (2006:1-2), security and insecurity also have objective and subjective 
aspects: things can at times appear more threatening to one’s security than they are in 
reality, and at times less, leading some to label them as “socially constructed” 
concepts. Security also involves, and in fact requires, a threat; and threats, in the 
traditional-security-sense, are made up of a combination of the capability and intent 
to do harm or enact violence (Baldwin 1997, 15; Caldwell and Williams, Jr., 2006, 
9). Ken Booth (1991:22-3) argues that the best starting point for conceptualizing 
security lies in  the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and collectivities, 
while bearing in mind that some degree of insecurity, as a life determining condition, 
is universal. To the extent an individual or group is insecure, to that extent their life 
choices and chances are taken away. The corollary of the relationship between 
insecurity and a determined life is that a degree of security creates life possibilities. 
Security might therefore, be conceived as synonymous with opening up space in 
people’s lives. Booth posits that the pressures to broaden and update the concept of 
security arose from the fact that the threats to the wellbeing of individuals and the 
interests of nations across the world derive primarily not from a neighbor’s army but 
from other challenges, such as economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, 
overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease. 
In most of the cases just mentioned, people are more threatened by the policies and 
inadequacies of their own government than by the Napoleonic ambitions of their 
neighbors. 
Booth insists that if we treat security as the security of the state, then we are ignoring 
the insecurity of people who are under threat from the state. He calls for a 
reorientation from (neo-) realism to a critical approach in security studies. His reason 




for this, which is the core critique of traditional security studies made by critical 
theorists, is that he sees the traditional security approach as being characterized by 
three elements which should be changed. These three elements are that traditional 
security has “.emphasised military threats and the need for strong counters; it has 
been status quo oriented; and it has centred on states” (Booth, 1991:321) Thus, he 
emphasizes emancipation as one way to help loosen the grip of the neo-realist 
tradition. 
Security’ means the absence of threats. Emancipation is the 
freedom of people (as individuals and groups) from those 
physical human constraints which stop them carrying out 
what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of 
war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor 
education, and political oppression and so on. Security and 
emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, 
not power or order, produces true security Emancipation, 
theoretically is security (Booth 1991:319). 
.  
Two interrelated conclusions follow Ken Booth’s postulation. First, security can be 
understood as an instrumental value: it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser 
extent from life-determining constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be 
explored. Second, security is beyond mere survival. One can survive without being 
secure. Security is survival-plus, the plus being the possibility to explore human 
becoming.4  
Tarry (1999:8-9) succinctly criticizes Booth’s postulation of emancipation as freeing  
people from physical and human constraints which stop them from carrying out what 
they would freely choose to do on the ground that it is methodologically unsound. 
According to her, Booth’s definition lacks two fundamental criteria. (1) it does not 
provide a clear delineation of those cases which are included and those which are 
excluded from being a security concern, and (2) the categorization of a definition is 
                                         
4Based on the foregoing, Booth (1991) argues that those entities called ‘states’ are obviously 
important features of world politics, but they are unreliable, illogical and too diverse in their character 
to use as the primary referent objects for comprehensive theory of security. He, therefore, proposes 
that individual humans are the ultimate referent. He further adds that “implicit in the preceding 
argument is the Kantian notion that we should treat people as ends and not means. States, however, 
should be treated as means and not ends”States can be utilized in enhancing security. Also the security 
of the state can contribute to the security of the individual. But the security of the state is only a means 
for the security of the individual. Thus state security per se is not valuable, but state security as a 
means for individual security is. 




not mutually exclusive (there are some ambiguous cases that could fit in more than 
one category). Firstly, by locating security and insecurity at the individual level, 
Booth makes his definition so inclusive that its conceptualization prevents it from 
being analytically meaningful, as it seems to approach any individual problem as a 
threat and preferences of all people could not possibly be taken into account. 
Secondly, there are lots of inevitable situations when one person’s freedom 
contradicting another’s cannot be resolved without further increasing the insecurity 
of both parties. Sarah gives a powerful example of this situation within the context of 
Canada. Booth’s definition would identify the federal government as the primary 
security threat for Québec sovereignists who would freely choose to separate from 
the federation. Since Booth characterizes states as being “means and not ends,” he 
would consider the Canadian state to be a threat to the distinct Québécois identity. 
This emancipation of the sovereignists would, however, be in fierce opposition to 
Québec nationalists who would freely choose to have Québec remain within the 
federation. As both choices are equally legitimate among equal individuals, it is 
difficult to imagine how this contradiction could be resolved in such a manner as to 
not make all Canadians more insecure.  
Buzan (1991:62) concurs that the threats emanating from state, whether direct or 
indirect, intended or unanticipated, are serious enough to dominate the relatively 
small and fragile universe of individual security. He acknowledges that it is 
paradoxical to see the state, which was created to secure individuals from each other, 
itself becoming a threat to individuals. However, he admits that the resultant image 
of day-day life leaves no doubt that the security of individual in any comprehensive 
sense is beyond reasonable possibility of attainment (1991:36). He insists that 
“whatever threats come from a state will be of a lower order of magnitude than those 
which would arise in its absence” (Buzan, 1991:37), because individuals are by their 
very nature creators of threats irrespective of their types and magnitude. He argues 
that the security of individuals, then, is inseparably entangled with that of the state, 
and there is no real option of going back. Moreover, it is easily forgotten that 
individuals often choose to place their lives at risk in pursuit of other values. 
Therefore, to find individuals dependent on the state for maintenance of their general 
security environment, while at the same time seeing the state as a significant source 




of threats to their personal security should not be seen as unusual. After all, Hobbes 
enunciated that the great dilemma which lies at the root of much political philosophy 
is how to balance freedom of action for the individual against the potential and actual 
threats which such freedom poses for others. The state has no fear of certain death, 
can defend itself much more efficiently than individual, and can command enormous 
range of resources to its support irrespective of its lumbering, incoherent and 
generally brontosaurus-like behavior (Buzan,1991:20).  
Heinrich Von Treitschke in effect supports  Buzan’s view when he forcefully argues 
that the state is ”primordial and necessary”, that it exists as ”an independent force” 
and that ”it does not ask primarily for opinion, but demands obedience”(Von 
Treitschke,1992:289-96).  Von Treitschke’s view is predicated on maximalist state 
extrapolation that the state requires independent standing above its citizens because 
of the essential role it plays in realization of individual interests. The minimalists 
have countered this view by positing that the state is the sum total of its parts and 
therefore, should be instrumental to their ends, supporting John Locke’s (1690 cited 
in Buzan, 1991:23) argument that the great and chief end of men putting themselves 
under government is the preservation of their property which in the state of nature is 
very unsafe and very insecure due to the chaotic conditions that pervade existence 
and prevented individuals from the effective pursuit of their values. 
Emma Rothschild (1995: 61) insightfully notes that security is thus “a condition both 
of individuals and of states” and “a condition or an objective that constituted a 
relationship between individuals and states”. Aiyede (2010) posits that without 
secure and stable countries and a body of law whereby countries can regulate their 
interaction, individual, community, regional and international security remains 
elusive. Reynolds (1980:47) explicitly challenges this maximalist view by insisting 
that individual values are and should be the prime referent by which the state’s 
behavior is judged.This view  supports the notion of a social contract  as elucidated 
by Thomas Hobbes (Hobbes quoted in Buzan,1991:38) that “‘people founded the 
state in order to defend themselves from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of 
one another, and  thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry, 
and by the fruit of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly.” 




Buzan (1991:3) states that the concept of security is, in itself, more versatile and 
penetrating. He argues that the understanding of power as the route to security was 
inherently self-defeating. He posits that security is an “essentially contested concept” 
which necessarily generates unsolvable debates about its meaning and application 
because it contains an ideological element that renders empirical evidence irrelevant 
as a means of resolving the dispute (Buzan, 1991:2-7). Buzan proposes the 
integration of his five sectors or dimensions of security and the interdependent levels 
of analysis as a better way of understanding the concept. He views a sector as a 
means of identifying specific types of interaction (Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 
1998:7). Buzan’s five sectors comprise military security, political security, economic 
security, societal security and environmental security (1991:19-20). His levels of 
analysis include the individual, national and international (both regional and system-
wide) security. Thus, Buzan sees security principally as survival and the state’s 
ability to maintain functional integrity and sovereignty against perceived hostile 
force. In his seminal book, “People, States and Fear” Buzan argues that the security 
of human collectivities is affected by factors in five major sectors: Military, political, 
economic, societal and environmental securities. 
Generally speaking, military security concerns the two-level 
interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities 
of states, and states’ perceptions of each other’s intentions. 
Political security concerns the organizational stability of 
states, systems of government and the ideologies that give 
them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the 
resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain 
acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal 
security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable 
conditions of evolution, traditional patterns of language, 
culture and religious and national identity and custom. 
Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the 
local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support 
system on which all other human enterprises depend. These 
five sectors do not operate in isolation from each other. 
Each defines a focal point within the security problematic, 
and a way of ordering priorities, but all are woven together 
in a strong web of linkages (Buzan, 1991: 19 – 20).  
 




 The above analysis were modified in Buzan’s subsequent work (see Waever et 
al.1993:24-27) to move away from its implicit and sometimes explicit placement of 
the state as the sole referent of security in the five sector. If a multi-sectorial 
approach to security is desirable, types of threats and what is at risk should invariably 
determine the referent object of security. Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998:5) argue 
that analysis means objects that are defined by a range of spatial scales, from small to 
large while levels are locations where both outcomes and sources of explanation can 
be located.  
2.3 Individual security 
The security of individuals and sub-state communities such as tribal, ethnic and 
religious groups is coterminous with the idea of human security. Individuals and sub-
state groups are component parts of the state and therefore, their security is directly 
proportional to the quality of their relationships with the state. These intricate webs 
of relationships could be positive, neutral or negative. However, the state can 
enhance the security of individuals and group collectivities through the instrument of 
institutional mechanism (rule-making, adjudication and implementation). Here, it 
should be noted that there exists a conflict between individual and the state as earlier 
elucidated by Buzan. The greater the extent to which freedoms must be foregone, the 
more powerful the state grows internally and the more likely it is that, paradoxically, 
the state will become a source of threat to individuals and other groups within the 
state. Consequently, Buzan adopted national and international security as the main 
focus of analysis because of state sovereignty and systemic level of analysis. 
2.4 National security 
The state, which may be defined as a territorial unit with definite population that is 
politically sovereign, is the second level of analysis. Different governments have 
used the label “national security”, and the concomitant term “national interest”, to 
justify their actions and to promote the desirability of their preferred policies. 
National security was traditionally equated with external defence of a nation’s 
territory although not exclusively. In realist-state centric thinking, national security 
and national interest are so imperative for state survival that individual rights and 
privileges can be violated with impunity in pursuance of them. At this juncture, it is 




worth noting that in the face of contemporary challenges and post 9/11 environment, 
a great many threats have been nationalized. 
Arnold Wolfers, in his seminal article first published in 1952, describes “national 
security” as an “ambiguous symbol” which can be meaningless and deceptive 
especially if applied as a policy label. He defines national security as the “absence of 
threats to acquired values”, Wolfers notes that there is inherent danger of 
misconception when the term is used without specifications (Wolfers, 1962:147-50). 
Baldwin (1997:12-18) made a remarkable contribution to the concept by 
reformulating Wolfer’s definition to “a low probability of damage to acquired 
values”. In adherence to Wolfer’s recommendation, he sets out two major 
specifications and five minor ones. They are as follows: “Security for whom? 
Security for which values? How much security? From what threats? By what means?  
At what cost? And in what time period”? Baldwin acknowledges that all these 
specifications need not necessarily apply in every analysis nonetheless; the means, 
costs, and time period must be clearly specified so that policy alternatives can be 
comparatively analyzed in a systemic way. The sum of Baldwin’s argument is that 
the provision of the values of national security involves some opportunity costs as 
well as problems of diminishing returns. 
2.5 International security 
 This concept underpins the primary responsibilities of states as containers and 
providers of security to their respective populations. These roles privilege states as 
the major actors in the international system. International system consists of 
relationships among state actors. These complex webs of relationships influence the 
behavior of states in diverse ways. International organizations also play various roles 
which differ according to time, circumstances and given mandates. The efficacy of 
international organizations is dependent on cooperation between its component parts 
(state actors). The defining characteristic of international system is anarchy (the 
absence of any central governing body as opposed to total chaos). These 
organizations moderate relationships among and between states through charters, 
treaties, multilateral and bilateral agreements; deviants are threatened with the use of 
force (military), sanction or boycott. The state is the leading object of analysis in this 
system because it is central to systemically generated threats to acquired values. 




Nwolise (1985) introduces ten additional approaches to security, complementing 
Buzan’s five sectorial approaches. These approaches include physical, psychological, 
spiritual, technological, national image, territorial, legal, treasury, people’s power 
and global security. 
Booth in his later work opines that new thinking about security is not simply a matter 
of “broadening” the subject matter (widening the agenda of issues beyond the merely 
military). It is possible to expand international security studies' both vertically and 
horizontally, and still remain within an asserted neo-realist framework and approach. 
Although it also broadens the agenda vertically and horizontally, critical security 
studies are fundamentally different because the agenda derives from a radically 
different political philosophy, theory, and methodology. He canvasses for critical 
security studies that develop from what he calls “global moral science” rather than 
traditional security theory that derives from the “dismal science” of international 
relations. He argues that social and political science cannot be separated from life but 
are inseparable from social and political criticism/replication and social and political 
practice; he believes that theory is constitutive rather than explanatory; and as such, 
there should be a linkage between theory and historical/social/political context. 
Security studies should be more concerned with the search for meaning than the 
endless accumulation of knowledge (Booth, 1994:13). Gaan (2010:1) argues that the 
peremptory nature of traditional security which has made policy makers impervious 
of global patterns of insecurity needs to be broadened. Hence, he advocates for the 
incorporation of insights from the Copenhagen and Welsh schools that will provide 
grist to rethinking state responses to the threats emanating from diverse sources. 
Steven Smith (2005:57) argues that the broadening and deepening of the concept of 
security is very imperative, considering the fact that humanity has been plagued by 
deepening crises which were not defined in the Westphalia thematic some centuries 
ago. Craig Snyder (2008:38) contends that while  states are the principal actors in the 
international system, due primarily to their command over the overwhelming bulk of 
military power, non-state actors such as terrorists, separatists or national liberation 
movements are also included.  




The increasing pressure to broaden the concept and the inability of the dominant 
state-centric paradigm to adequately address contemporary security problematic has 
resulted in the evolution of alternative postulations. This rethinking and re-
conceptualization of security  was shaped by four major contributors, namely, the 
commission on Global Governance and its conception of “common security”, 
Academic Peace Research and their proposal regarding “stable peace”, Third World 
Security Approaches and Post-Cold War Revival in Security Thinking. The idea of 
common security was initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, the last president of the 
defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), towards the end of the Cold 
War. Common security is premised on the notion that security must be sought and 
maintained not against one’s enemies but with them. This approach posits that states, 
in searching for security, end up making themselves more insecure by enhancing 
their military power, which in turn causes others to feel insecure and increase their 
military power in response (Herz, 1950; Wheeler and Booth, 1992 cited in Bilgin, 
2003:204). Common security seeks to mitigate the security dilemma by organizing 
policies concerning security in coordination with others to maximize mutual as 
opposed to unilateral security (Bilgin, 2003:204). The concept of common security 
was later popularized by the Palme Commission in 1982. The Commission’s 
emphasis was on global security that is nonmilitary, nonzero sum and nonviolent in 
approach. Olaf Palme, in his introduction to the report of the Independent 
Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues titled “Common Security: A 
Programme for Disarmament”, wrote: 
Our alternative is common security. There can be no hope 
of victory in a nuclear war; the two sides would be united 
in suffering and destruction. They can survive only 
together. They must achieve security not against the 
adversary but with him. International security must rest on 
a commitment to joint survival rather than on a threat of 
mutual destruction (1982:ix). 
 By putting common security into practice, Gorbachev changed the Soviet approach 
to arms control, accepting sufficiency rather than seeking parity with the United 
States (Allison 1991 cited in Bilgin, 2003:204). Accordingly, the Soviet Union was 
able to make unilateral concessions to reduce their arms, which in turn took away the 
West’s threat and paved the way for the end of the Cold War. The notion of a 




nonmilitary approach to security was further expanded by the students of Peace 
Research and their proposal regarding “Stable Peace”. They laid the intellectual 
foundation for an alterative paradigm, through massive production of studies that 
focused on individuals and groups as referents of security. Notable among these, are 
Garrison and Phipps (1989), Dunn (1991), and Rabinowitch (1997). However, Johan 
Galtung and Kenneth Boulding criticize the notions of individuals and groups as the 
referent objects of security. 
Galtung (1969) argues that peace does not just mean the absence of war; it is also 
related to the establishment of conditions for social justice. In making this point, 
Galtung distinguishes between personal and structural violence. The latter is defined 
as those socio-economic institutions and relations that oppress human beings by 
preventing them from realizing their potential. Violence, for Galtung (quoted in 
Bilgin, 2003:205), is all those ‘‘avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more 
generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is 
potentially possible.’’ Moreover, he defines cultural violence as those mechanisms 
that render acceptable both direct violence (as in killing, repression, and 
delocalization) and structural violence (as in exploitation, penetration, and 
marginalization). Thus, Galtung turns both the use of violence and the ways in which 
violence is legitimized by the society into a subject of study. By adopting a broader 
definition of violence and an approach that focuses on human needs, he and other 
students of peace research shift the focus away from the state and the military 
dimension of security to individuals and social groups and their needs (Bilgin, 
2003:205). Galtung posits that security can only be achievable when the structural 
causes of insecurity of individuals and social groups as well as states are tackled .He 
categorizes peace into two types, namely, positive peace and negative peace. He 
defines positive peace as the absence of both direct (physical) violence and indirect 
(structural and cultural) violence, while negative peace means the mere absence of 
armed conflict (Galtung, 1996:32).  
Other notable contributors to Academic Peace Research are Kenneth Boulding with 
his conceptualization of stable peace (1978), and Kaldor (1997) who emphasizes the 
increasing inappropriateness of traditional security, given the security concerns of 
individuals and social groups. These concerns are equally expressed by the Third 




World Security School. Scholars like Caroline Thomas (1987), Thomas and 
Saravanamutu (1989), Sayigh (1990), Ayoob (1995, 1997) and Nnoli (2006) share 
the view that dominant state-centric security paradigm is both western and status quo 
oriented. The Third World Approach argues that security conceptualization should be 
holistic, comprising economic, political and environmental issues. Third World 
security approach criticizes the realist approach on the grounds that it is biased, 
lopsided and skewed. It does not take into consideration the specificities of Third 
World Countries (Bilgin, 2003:206). Wilkin (1999:28) argues that the appropriation 
of the traditional security paradigm by Africans has produced negative consequences. 
Thus, rather than providing security for their citizens, states are frequently the 
instruments that destroy the security of their populations. Alberth and Carlsson 
(2009:2) argue that the essence of security is the furtherance of peace which upholds 
human well-being. 
Subsequently, the post-Cold War era has seen the emergence of revivalist scholars 
that are critical of established ways of thinking about security. These scholars are 
encapsulated under various schools of thought, notably, the Copenhagen, Welsch and 
Frankfurt schools of thought.  These academics argue that an interstate framework is 
no longer the locus of the security problems faced by many actors around the world. 
Baldwin(1995),Tickner(1995),Buzan(1991),Sorensen(1996),Bilgin,Booth,and,Jone(1
998),Buzan,Waever, and Wilde (1998),Krause and Williams (1998) were notable 
among them. The post-Cold War security revivalists argue that the growing 
disparities in economic opportunities both within and between states, the disastrous 
effects of globalization on Third World countries, diminishing non-renewable 
resources that have endangered families and communities, the proliferation of 
intrastate conflicts and the increasing waves of trans-border crime, illicit drugs and 
terrorism have provided the impetus for an alternative approach.  
 Colliers (2004:38) observes that “without the provision of national security, neither 
citizens nor communities can be personally secure in the broader sense of the term.”  
According to Richard Falk, while the new threats to security which defy boundaries 
cannot be solved by one state alone, the uneven development fostered by a 
hierarchical international system of states and a global capitalist economy has 
contributed to an intolerable situation. The security of the rich seems to be 




increasingly diminishing the insecurity of the poor (cited in Wolf, 1997:18). 
However, Hoogensen (2005:125) argues that national security does not necessarily 
mean security of people in their everyday lives. “Secure state does not always mean 
secure people”. The Commission on Human Security concur with this view when 
they argue that: 
The state remains the fundamental purveyor of security. Yet 
it often fails to fulfil its security obligations. . . . That is why 
attention must now shift from the security of the state to the 
security of the people—to human security” (C.H.S, 2003:1).  
2.6 A paradigm shift: the emergence of Human Security discourse 
Re-conceptualization of security has become necessary because of gradual but 
fundamental and long-term changes in the international system. Some of the 
prime factors which have necessitated new thinking on the concept and scope 
of security studies are the demise of the Cold War which has led to a globally 
interdependent world; change in nature of warfare as now there is struggle for 
techno –economic, political and cultural space rather than pure conventional 
military means; states are more than ever dependent on International society 
and institutions. Against the backdrop of all these factors, the late 20th century 
has seen a rise to prominence of non-traditional security (NTS) concerns, in 
particular, human security. The genealogy of the idea can be related to if not 
traced back to the growing dissatisfaction with prevailing notions of 
development and security in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Economics 
undoubtedly led the way with its critiques of the dominant models of 
economic development beginning in the 1960s. Kanti Bajpai (2000:16) argues 
that the most important forerunners of the idea of NTS/ human security were 
the reports of a series of multinational independent commissions composed of 
prominent leaders, intellectuals and academicians.  
Beginning in the 1970s the Club of Rome group produced a series of volumes on the 
“world problematique” which were premised on the idea that there are complexities 
of problems troubling people of all nations: poverty, degradation of the environment, 
alienation of youth, rejection of traditional values, and inflation and other monetary 




and economic disruptions. These challenges give credence to the concept of human 
security. The term ‘Human Security’ was originally accepted and officially used by 
UNDP in its 1994 report, in which global human security problems were categorized 
into seven, namely: economic security, environmental security, personal security, 
community security, food security, health security and political security (Suhrke, 
1999, Fourie and Schonteich, 2001, Thomas and Tow, 2002, UNDP, 1994 cited in 
Gilbert, Uzodike and Isike, 2009:267). Human security represents a shift away from 
the kind of thinking that sees ‘security’ purely in terms of territorial security or the 
protection of national interest from internal and external aggression. It concerns itself 
with the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who seek security in their everyday 
lives. In essence, the concept of human security is woven around issues of human 
emancipation (Booth 1991: 539), social justice (Peterson 1992) and human dignity 
and the environment, if they have political outcomes (Ayoob 1995). Human security 
identifies the security of human lives as the central objective of national and 
international security policy. It contrasts with, and grew out of increasing 
dissatisfaction with the state-centred concept of security as an adequate conceptual 
framework for understanding human vulnerabilities in the contemporary world, and 
military interventions as adequate responses to them (Fukuda-Parr and Messineo, 
2012:21). 
The concept of human security emphasizes the 
protection of individuals. It takes as its objectives 
peace, international stability and protection for 
individuals and communities. It comprises everything 
that is ‘empowering’ for individuals: human rights, 
including economic social and cultural rights, access to 
education and health care, equal opportunities and good 
governance (UNESCO, 2008:3).  
 
The UNDP Human Development Report considers that the emerging concerns of 
human security are job security, income security, health security, environmental 
security, and security from crime. The Report adds that people’s feelings of 
insecurity arise more from worries about daily life than from the dread of some 
cataclysmic world event. Thus, UNDP defines human security as safety from the 
constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and repression. It also means protection 
from sudden and hurtful disruption in the pattern of our daily lives—whether in our 




homes, in our jobs, in our communities or in our environment (UNDP, 1994:39). 
Hence, UNDP equates human security with the holistic security policies that ensure 
the integration of pragmatic strategies for the promotion of human rights, human 
dignity, and women empowerment, enhancement of the well- being of children, 
democratic governance and development (UNDP, 1994 cited in Gilbert, Uzodike and 
Isike 2009:267). 
Kaldor (2007:10) sees the vulnerability of human beings as pervasive, and threatened 
by new wars that are intertwined with other global threats like disease, natural 
disasters, poverty and homelessness. He argues that the dominant state-centric 
approach does not reduce that insecurity; rather the approach makes it worse. 
Similarly, Mack (2004:47-53) rails against realism’s failure to recognize the state as 
a possible internal aggressor, as well as its inherent analytic inability to explain the 
95% of all warfare that is now within, rather than between, states. Mahbub ul-Haq 
(1995:115) proposes human security as a new paradigm of security: the world is 
entering a new era in which the very concept of security will change- and change 
dramatically. Security will be interpreted as security of people, not just territory, 
security of individuals, not just nations, security through development, not through 
arms, security of all the people everywhere- in their homes, in their jobs, in their 
streets, in their communities, and in their environment (UNDP,1994 cited in Gilbert, 
Uzodike and Isike, 2009:267). 
In essence, human security means safety for people from 
both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state 
of being characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to 
people’s rights, their safety, or even their lives. From a 
foreign policy perspective, human security is perhaps best 
understood as a shift in perspective or orientation. It is an 
alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as its 
point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the 
security of territory or governments (C.H.S, 2003:40). 
For Anara Tabyshalieva (2006:13) the very utility of the idea of human security lies 
in the fact that, in contrast to earlier state-centred concepts of security that mainly 
connote military power, human security opts for “a more inclusive and multifaceted 
notion of security based on the individual”. According to Kaldor (2007:185-190) the 
concept of human security is anchored on five pillars: primacy of human rights, 




legitimate political authority, multilateralism, a bottom up approach with a regional 
focus. 
Kaul (1995:313 - 319), in equating human security with the security of individuals 
rather than just the security of nations or territory, underscores the primacy of human 
security in contemporary times thus: “What is needed today is not so much territorial 
security – the security of the state – but human security, the security of the people in 
their everyday lives, one that is reflected in the lives of our people, not in the 
weapons of our country.” Vulnerabilities springing from non – traditional sources are 
a greater threat to human existence and global peace and security than inter – state 
war and aggression. For example, poverty, disease, famine and state oppression of 
citizens have combined to produce 17 million refugees, 20 million internally 
displaced persons, and massive migrations of people within and beyond national 
borders (Boutros – Ghali 1992). It is this consideration that led Campbell (2002:8) to 
argue that human security is a theory that:  
retreats from the concept of might, one that validate all 
citizens, men and women, Africans, Asians, Indians, and all 
peoples. This new theory informs a foreign policy that is 
based on demilitarization of the planet, reversing 
environmental degradation and ending crimes against 
humanity. 
Rothschild (1995:55) posits that the human security concept expands the scope of 
analysis and policy in multiple directions. He argues that the concept extends 
downwards “to the security of groups and individuals”; horizontally, from military 
security to political, economic, social, environmental, or “human security”, and in all 
directions “upwards to international institutions, downwards to regional or local 
government, sideways to nongovernmental organizations, to public opinion and the 
press and to the abstract forces of nature or of the market”. In similar vein, Kofi 
Annan, the former secretary general of the United Nations posits that human security 
in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It 
encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care 
and ensuring that each individual has opportunity and choices to fulfill his or her 
potential (Annan, 2005a). Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing 
poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, 




freedom from fear, and freedom of future generation to inherit a healthy natural 
environment – these are the inter-related building blocks for human and therefore 
national security.  According to Frederick Mutesa and Wilma Nchito, “the many 
faces of human security”, equate security with people rather than territories, with 
development rather than arms; it is bound up with social stability and economic 
opportunity. As well as involving safety from such threats as hunger, disease and 
oppression, it means absence of sudden, unpredictable disruptions in day to day life 
(OSAA, 2005: np). 
Hence, Robert McNamara not only appreciates the strategic imperativeness of a 
nation’s military capabilities but also insists that development is necessary for 
effective security. He emphasizes that ignorance on the part of leaders makes this 
fact problematic.  
The fact is that we do not always grasp the meaning of 
security in this context. In a modernizing society, security 
means development. Security is not military hardware, 
though it may include it, security is not military force, 
though it may involve it, security is not traditional military 
activities, though it may encompass it, security is 
development, and without development there can be no 
security. A developing nation that does not in fact develop 
simply cannot remain secure for the intractable reason that 
its own citizenry cannot shed its human nature ... that is 
what we do not understand, and what governments of 
modernizing nations do not always understand (McNamara, 
1968:9). 
He  goes further to warn that any society that seeks to achieve adequate military 
security against the background of acute food shortage, population explosion, low 
level of productivity, and per capita income, low technological development, 
inadequate and inefficient public utilities, and chronic problem of unemployment, 
has false sense of security. McNamara (1968:10). With the rise of political protest 
against the uneven distribution of the benefits of globalization, James Wolfensohn, 
then President of the World Bank noted in 2000 that: “when we think about security, 
we need to think beyond battalions and borders. We need to think about human 
security, about winning a different war, the fight against poverty” (cited in Thomas 
2000:5). Similarly, Michel Camdessus, then President of IMF, remarked in 2000 that 
“Poverty is the ultimate threat facing humanity. The gap between rich and poor 




nations is potentially socially explosive….if the poor are left hopeless, poverty will 
undermine societies through confrontation, violence and civil disorder” (quoted in 
Thomas, 2000:3). Scholars such as Bajpai (2000), Thakur (2000), Leaning (2000), 
Axworthy (2001), Hampson (2002), and Alkire (2003) all suggest that the 
conceptualization of human security should be broadened to accommodate a wider 
range of issues (such as poverty, disease, and environmental disasters). They each 
counter the narrow perspective of state-centric security not only by citing the 
substantive importance of human vulnerabilities, but also by arguing that in shifting 
the referent of security, these issues necessarily fall under the human security 
umbrella. To them, the subsequent analytic and normative difficulties are unfortunate 
but unavoidable consequences of broadening the security paradigm beyond threats to 
the state. For example, Leaning and Alkire widen the definition to include the social, 
psychological, political, economic aspects of vulnerability, and all critical and 
pervasive threats to the vital core “consistent with long term flourishing” (quoted in 
Owen, 2004:378).  
By contrast, Krause (2000) and Mark (2004) argue for a narrower focus. Krause cites 
pragmatism, conceptual clarity, and analytic rigor as reasons to focus human security 
on violent threats. Krause (2000) labels the broad conception a potential laundry list 
of “bad things that can happen” and points to the perils of including the lowest 
common denominator of individual vulnerability and well-being under the rubric of 
security. For example, he points out that securitizing education can have few 
benefits. Mark (2004:27) stresses that “any definition that conflates dependent and 
independent variables renders causal analysis virtually impossible”. MacFarlane 
believes that the merit of any definition should be judged on its “value added” 
conceptual and policy consequences, and that because of this, analytic clarity and 
significant normative results are on the side of the narrow focus (cited in Owen, 
2004:379-80). Hubert points out that although the debate may at first appear 
polarized (narrow vs. broad), there is in fact significant convergence among 
proponents. Proponents are not debating the merits of various threats, but of 
attributing the appropriate policy responses.  
Against the backdrop of this debate, this study adopts a hybrid definition of human 
security as derived from the Commission on Human Security (2002) and expanded 




by Owen (2004:383-4). “Human security is the protection of the vital core of all 
human lives from critical and pervasive environmental, economic, food, and health, 
personal and political threats.”  
Wanzala (1996:85) emphasizes the developmental component of security cum 
human security by arguing that “if the conventional notion of security focuses mainly 
on military might to ward off aggression or contain adversarial states, human security 
relies on enhancing peoples’ capability to adequately improve their lives. Duffield 
(2001:16) supports this view when he posits that: “development is ultimately 
impossible without stability and, at the same time, security is not sustainable without 
development”. He argues that there is a mutually binding and reinforcing relationship 
between security and development. Abutudu (2003:107) affirms the security-
development nexus by stating that the human security recognition of the qualitative 
improvement to lives is a strong developmental component.  
The conceptual consequence described above means that it is difficult to separate 
new security regimes from development and humanitarian activities and vice versa. 
This study therefore, will conceptualize human security as freedom from want and 
freedom from fear. Human security as freedom from want describes a condition of 
existence in which basic material needs are met, and in which there is a reasonable 
expectation that protection will be afforded during any crisis or downturn, natural or 
man-made, so that survival is not threatened. Human security as freedom from fear 
describes a condition of existence in which human dignity is realized, embracing not 
only physical safety but going beyond that to include meaningful participation in the 
life of the community, control over one’s life and so forth (Thomas, 2007:108-109). 
The very purpose of human security is to reevaluate current security theory and 
policy – to rally the world’s thinkers, leaders, and resources to the issues actually 
affecting people, rather than to those the military establishment deems important. 
Proponents are mistaken if they believe this will be accomplished with a vaguely 
defined, amorphous concept. Advocates of the narrow conceptualization are aware of 
this reality and think we should cut our losses and focus on one’s harm, violence. 
This will, however, do little to protect the millions who will die this year alone from 
nonviolent preventable human security threats.   




Finally, and perhaps most importantly, several authors address human security as a 
framework in which to re-evaluate our understanding and norms of sovereignty. 
Newman points out that human security reverses our common understanding of how 
to link the citizen to the state. Traditional security sees state legitimacy looking 
outward to the international system for power, recognition, and independence. 
Human security forces the state to look inward to the “people from where it draws its 
legitimacy”. Evans cites the prominence of human security in Asian regional 
institutions not only as a sign of its vitality, but also as a litmus test for the 
international climate in which sovereignty might be readdressed. 
There are four important distinctions between a deep conceptualization of security 
and the traditional view; (1) the referent object shifts from the state to individual (2) 
there is recognition that the state can be the source of threats to individuals (3) there 
is an ontological shift that frames security as a human condition and (4) there is a 
linkage between security and development. These four factors all have unique 
consequences for individual human beings 
2.7 The complexity of Africa’s security 
Nnoli (2006:227) enunciates that the application of the new security 
conceptualization to Africa reveals the extent and intensity of the deterioration of 
individual security. The growing misery on the continent has endangered 
overwhelming numbers of Africans and many African states are under high pressure 
to satisfy the conflicting demands from both external and internal environments.  
State security in Africa has been narrowly translated as regime security or the 
personal security of the ruler who often identified himself as personifying the state. 
Critics and oppositions to domestic and public policies are threats to national 
security. The result, more often than not, was institutionalized repression of whole 
regions, groups and peoples (Salih, 1999:127; Abutudu, 2001). According to Ukeje 
(2005:10), the security problems facing contemporary Africa deserve more rigorous 
and comprehensive attention. First, Africa has become a major flashpoint of bloody 
civil wars and several other low-intensity conflicts, particularly since the end of the 
Cold War when the safety valves that the superpowers made available to prevent 
conflicts were promptly removed. Although many of these conflicts and civil wars 
were occurring within states, their “primary locale…is to be found where there is a 




combination of entrenched poverty, an excessive dependence on natural resource 
exports, and poor economic governance and state weakness” (Clover, 2004: 8-9). It 
is very difficult to distinguish between different types of conflicts as they are usually 
matched by criminal impunity and large-scale violation of human rights, as well as 
by complex humanitarian emergencies: massive internal displacements and refugee 
flows, collapse of sources of livelihood and municipal facilities, the spread of 
communicable and life-threatening diseases, the proliferation and widespread use of 
small arms and light weapons, and so on.  
These new conflicts are driven by a variety of factors, not least a militaristic ideology 
that incubates a frightful regime of terror and insecurity (Boyd and Choo, 2005: 117; 
Abdullah, 2004). Second, the collateral in terms of human, social and infrastructural 
capital losses are enormous. One study indicates that “armed conflict is surely one 
reason why at least 250 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa- nearly half of the 
population- are living below the poverty lines since the mid-1990s” (Colletta, 
Kostner and Wiederhofer , 1996: ix). A third point has to do with the legitimate fear 
that identity and resource-induced conflicts could undermine and consume whatever 
modest progresses may have been achieved on the continent. Again, these complex 
security concerns are happening at a most inauspicious moment when national 
security infrastructures have themselves been weakened, when more renegade groups 
are springing up, gaining access to dangerous weapons and challenging state 
authority, when new African wars are assuming a vicious pattern of impunity, 
plunder and profiteering, and finally, against the backdrop of what Herbst and Mills 
called the growing “diseconomies of scale” feeding directly into security problems 
for larger countries which have greater trouble policing their territories (Herbst and 
Mills, 2003: 24-25).  
Many African governments lack the capacity to equitably distribute the limited 
resources within their disposal for the wellbeing of their citizens and hence their 
security. This lack of political will on the part of most African governments to 
provide effective political leadership, manage social conflict and allocate resources 
equitably for the common good of their people has engendered multifaceted 
challenges of inter-ethnic conflicts, regional instability, and violent extremism which 
have greatly undermined many African states. The challenges of  porous borders, 




weak judicial and law enforcement institutions and poorly managed economies also 
contribute to the vulnerability of Africans to threats from both traditional and non-
traditional  realms of security (Isike, Uzodike and Gilbert:2009). These are 
compounded by natural disasters like drought, poor planning and prioritization of 
programs, corruption and mismanagement (Goucha and Cilliers: 2001).  
2.8 The evolution of U.S policy toward Africa 
The changed global environment since the end of the cold war coupled with the 
aftermath of  9/11 terrorist attacks on U.S. homeland security, have witnessed the 
emergence of new forms of securitization characterized by the proliferation of 
private military forces and private security companies offering military and police 
services that were previously under the jurisdiction of the state. Various factors 
account for these perennial outbreaks of disorder, and these factors have exacerbated 
insecurity within African continent. The remote causes include the colonial heritage 
of authoritarian governance and artificial boundaries, cold-war rivalries by super- 
power actors and competition among elites for scarce state resources. Other factors 
are support for internal conflicts by outside actors, corruption, and government 
policy and resource misallocations (OSAA: 2005). 
Africa as a whole has been identified by the U.S. government in particular and the 
Western world in general, as a breeding ground and incubation site for international 
terrorism. This Eurocentric reflexive belief is rooted in the assumption that 
international terrorism thrives amidst poverty and underdevelopment, which are 
prevalent in Africa (Keller, 2013:1). Gordon Brown, former British Prime Minister 
sums up this worldview as follows. “We understand that it is not just morally and 
ethically right that developing countries move from poverty to prosperity, but that it 
is a political imperative-central to our long-term national security and peace-to tackle 
the poverty that leads to civil wars, failed states and safe havens for terrorists” 
(Quoted in Christian Aid, 2004:2). Hence, Africa has been recognized as a region of 
both strategic and humanitarian interest. The continent of Africa has never featured 
prominently in the US foreign policy radar. During the Cold War era, US national 
interest was predicated on fighting and containing communism wherever it might 
appear. In aggressive pursuit of this objective, a consistent axiom of US foreign 
policy has been “no permanents friends or enemies, only permanent interests”.  US 




policy toward Africa is driven by US interests irrespective of the consequences for 
Africans. Iyoob and Keller (2006) note that Ethiopia was the only African country 
where the US was significantly present at the onset of the Cold War. However, the 
US presence became more visible in Africa at the height of super- power rivalries in 
US efforts to counter Soviet influence.  
This policy of ‘selective engagement’ with African governments where US national 
interests were the primary imperative was followed until the demise of the Cold War. 
The end of (US versus Soviet) ideological animosity has seen the US resorting to a 
policy of ‘disengagement’ in the interim and continued ‘selective engagement’ as 
typified by the doctrine of global war on terror (GWOT). However, it would be 
misleading to assert that the shift in US policy towards Africa was due to the end of 
Cold War and response to the events of 9/11.The National Security Strategy of the 
United States for fiscal year 1992 represented a watershed in US policy on African 
security issues. The preamble stressed US anxiety about: 
the turmoil and dangers in the developing world…[which] 
remains a dangerous place-a place of ethnic antagonisms, 
national rivalries, religious tensions, spreading weaponry, 
personal ambitions and lingering authoritarianism (US 
Government,1991:v). 
Consequently, President Bush Snr issued a presidential policy directive for the 
comprehensive review of US policy toward Africa in more than a decade. It created a 
roadmap for renewed US interest in Africa, taking cognizance of the post-Cold War 
security architecture and the attendant changes. This de-classified document became 
known as the “National Security Review 30: American Policy toward Africa in the 
1990s” (NSR 30). Among other items, this document articulated that the post-Cold 
War developments in Africa had simultaneously provided significant opportunities 
for, and obstacles to, US interests (Aning, 2001:45).  
The document acknowledges the fundamental roles of both regional and sub-regional 
organizations in Africa and therefore, seeks for its optimal utilization in the 
achievement of US foreign policy objectives. Five major areas of interests are 
highlighted. These include (a) the need to access selected African air and naval 
facilities, air space and sea lanes (b) the effort to downsize African militaries (c) the 
need to retain significant US military presence in Africa (d) the need to subordinate 




African military to civilian control through democratic norms and finally (e) to 
enhance the capacity of African military in peace keeping operations and conflict 
resolution. Despite this rhetoric, President Bush Snr administration maintained a 
policy of constructive ‘disengagement’ with Africa on the assumption that African 
crises were costly in both political and financial terms. This minimalist strategy 
manifested in the lack of US response to the Liberian crisis, a close African ally with 
strong historical links (see Ellis, 1999; Reno, 1998:79-113 cited in Aning, 2001:45).   
However, an increase in US engagement with Africa started under President Bill 
Clinton. President Clinton during his 1991 campaign suggested that his 
administration would end the paralysis that had characterized US-Africa relations. In 
December 1991, he presented his conception of international events as a presidential 
aspirant. He perceived a world where: 
[a] new set of threats in an even less stable world will force 
us …to keep our guard up …to protect our interests and 
values. To do that, [w]e …must maintain military forces 
strong enough to deter, and when necessary to defeat any 
threat to our essential interests (Clinton, 1992:26-27). 
Clinton stressed four major foreign policy issues that presumably mark a departure 
from the policy of his predecessor. These include the adoption of the principle of 
multilateralism as against unilateralism, insistence on global democracy, tackling the 
challenges of separatism and ethnic rivalries which are widespread in Africa, and the 
creation of a small lightly armed, and highly efficient, mobile rapid response force 
that could intervene at short notice in Africa (Volman, 1993:24). He made enormous 
efforts to integrate Africa more fully into the global economy through trade and 
investment (Keller, 2006). Clinton’s government devoted considerable amounts of 
time and energy to forming strategic partnerships with African countries which of 
course, relates to human security concerns. Clinton’s effort subsequently formed the 
basis for African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI).  President Clinton’s avowed 
commitment to play a commanding role in Africa and beyond is illustrated by his 
inauguration speech: 
As an old order passes, the world is freer but less 
stable…America must continue to lead the world we did so 
much to make….we will not shrink from challenges, nor fail 
to seize the opportunities of this New World. Together with 




our friends and allies, we will work to shape change, lest it 
engulf us (New York Times, 21 January 1993). 
 
Despite Clinton’s rhetoric, the reality was that intrastate conflicts escalated in Africa 
and the US’s roles in mitigating these conflicts were minimal. The sudden 
withdrawal of US troops from the Somali crisis was a clear example. Clarke and 
Herbst (1997:80) argue that the Somali debacle fundamentally altered US 
engagement with, and interventions in Africa. In 1994, Clinton signed Presidential 
Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) that forbade US intervention in future crises unless 
national interests were in jeopardy and the assignment had distinct and limited 
objectives as well as a well- defined exit strategy (Malan, 1997: quoted in Aning, 
2001:48). This policy reflected the Clinton administration’s inert response to the 
Rwandan genocide of 1994 that claimed the lives of 800,000 Africans. However, 
Dueck (2006:137-8) notes that domestic political pressure was undoubtedly a 
significant dampener, but the approach also reflected the administration’s priority to 
avoid the costs and risks of serious military action. The net result was a series of 
half-hearted interventions which served only to reaffirm the perception that the US 
was unwilling to sustain any significant costs.  
These manifestations of apathy by international communities, especially the US, over 
the security predicaments of African countries created a sense of ‘collective guilt’ 
after the Rwandan massacres. The conflicts in DRC and Burundi also helped to 
compel the US to review their policy concerning Africa. Mahbubabi points out that 
the US actively and successfully worked behind the scenes of the UNSC to ensure 
the word ‘genocide’ was not used in any Security Council Resolution as this would 
have meant that the US, as signatory to the Genocide Convention would have had a 
legal obligation to act. In eliminating the word genocide, the US not only avoided the 
necessity for involvement in what was an extreme case of human rights violation, but 
also prevented the wider international community from taking action (Mahbubabi, 
2005:50). In October 1996, the then US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher 
announced to African leaders while addressing the O. A. U, the US readiness to 
create a new political and military partnership with African states. This readiness 
eventually translated into the creation of African Crisis Response Force (ACRF).This 
idea was not well received by African states and was quickly rebranded and retuned 




to become the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). According to Ploch 
(2011:24), ACRI was a bilateral training programme designed to improve the 
capabilities of individual African state’s militaries to prepare them for multinational 
peacekeeping operations in situations where a cease-fire or peace accord already 
existed.  
In 1998 Clinton made a highly publicised six-nation tour of the continent during 
which he expressed regret for “the sin of neglect and ignorance” that the United 
States had committed in its treatment of Africa, particularly during the Cold War 
(Bullock, 2011:9). Clinton announced that it was “time for Americans to put a new 
Africa on our map” and for the United States to forge a new beginning in its relations 
with Africans. Minter (2000:270) argues that the “apology” was understated given 
the decades-long US support for Zaire’s dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko, US 
collaboration with the South African Apartheid regime and many other questionable 
engagements. Cameron (2002:270) asserts that Clinton’s increased engagement was 
partly due to lobbying efforts of the Congressional Black Caucus and other African-
American groups. Nevertheless, it did serve to indicate that Washington’s stated 
goals had shifted somewhat from its Cold War stance. This renewed engagement 
took a twist in August 1998, when the US Government launched a cruise missile 
attack against a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant suspected of producing chemical 
weapon compounds for al-Qaeda in response to terrorists bombing attacks against the 
US Diplomatic missions in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam. When he announced the 
attack Clinton told the US population that “our target was terror” (Ploch, 2011:14). 
The embassy bombings and the retaliatory strike against Sudan are considered by 
many analysts to be a turning point in US Strategic policy towards Africa (Bacevich 
cited in Bullock, 2011:8). In February 2000, during his campaign for Presidency, 
George W Bush was asked: 
Does Africa fit in to your definition of strategic interests? 
Bush responded : at some point in time the President has got 
to clearly define what the national strategic interests are, and 
while Africa may be important, it doesn't fit into the national 
strategic interests, as far as I can see them ( Lehrer, 2000). 
 
The Bush administration’s security policy in Africa was defined by two important 
factors. Firstly, the conviction that the US had become too dependent on energy 




supplies from the Middle East and Venezuela and these two regions were becoming 
increasingly hostile to the US government and her citizens. New discoveries of 
significant oil reserves in many African countries in recent years offered the US an 
opportunity for alternative source of energy in a less volatile region. Secondly, the 
fear that the growing rate of Islamic fundamentalism in many African countries 
could be exploited by terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda  to establish bases given the 
ungoverned space created by weak, failing or failed states in Africa (Vines and 
Cargill, 2010:53). President Bush appointed two African-Americans to the main 
foreign policy positions, Colin Powell as Secretary of State and Condoleezza Rice 
as National Security Advisor, which “sent a strong signal that Africa would not be 
neglected.” (Cameron, 2002:170). 
2.9 U.S Post 9/11 security architecture in Africa 
From 2000 to 2006, President Bush doubled development assistance to Africa to 
US$21.5 billion and quadrupled the funding to Sub-Saharan countries to US$5.6 
billion (Kim and Schaefer, 2008). President Bush also enhanced several key 
programs to boost trade between the United States and Africa. African Growth 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) which was created in 2000 under the Clinton 
Administration was highly emphasized during the Bush Administration and as a 
result, US imports from Africa totalled over US$44 billion in 2006, representing over 
five times the level of imports from Africa in 2001 (Liser, 2007). The African 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) were signed into law on May 18, 2000 as Title 
1 of The Trade and Development Act of 2000. The Act offers tangible incentives for 
African countries to continue their efforts to open their economies and build free 
markets (AGOA, 2008). However, this increase was largely due to oil imports from 
Africa. Other value-added products like processed agricultural products, footwear, 
clothing, and automobile parts increased from US$1.4 billion in 2001 to US$3.2 
billion in 2006. Moreover, many African economies were not structured to benefit 
from AGOA initiative, considering the fact that stringent conditions were created 
which disqualified many African countries. This view was succinctly elucidated by 
the Assistant US Trade Representative for Africa, Liser Florizelle:  
Central African Republic lost its eligibility in 2004 following 
a coup d’etat; Eritrea lost its eligibility in 2004 for its 
shortcomings on economic reform and human rights; and 




Cote d’Ivoire was terminated in 2005 for lack of progress on 
political and economic reforms. Our hope and expectation is 
that these and other countries currently not found eligible will 
strive to create conditions so that they may be positively 
reconsidered. A number of formerly ineligible countries did 
exactly that: Liberia and Mauritania addressed the problems 
we raised during the eligibility review process, made 
significant economic and political reforms in response to our 
concerns, and are now AGOA beneficiary countries (Liser, 
2007:3). 
 
The events of 9/11 eventually resulted in the formation of Combined Joint Task 
Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in 2002 as a subordinate command to US Central 
Command (CENTCOM) with its headquarters in Djibouti. The stated mission of this 
command was a kinetic anti-terrorism operation given the fact that states like, for 
instance, Somalia were seen as failed states. This was particularly evident in Somalia 
given her prior connections to regional terrorism which made her an apparent safe-
haven for al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Subsequently, the US Congress sponsored an 
African policy review in 2004. The review identified five factors which will shape 
the increased US interests in Africa over the succeeding decades. These factors 
include the following: oil and global trade, maritime security, armed conflicts, violent 
extremism and HIV/AIDS pandemics (Kansteiner and Morrison, 2004:123). In the 
health sphere, President Bush’s Administration created the President’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003. In his state of the Union Address the same 
year, President Bush mentioned Africa as a continent that is ravaged with the scourge 
of HIV/AIDS. However, he expressed hope and promise for the future. He stated 
that:  
AIDS can be prevented. Anti-retroviral drugs can 
extend life for many years. And the cost of those drugs 
has dropped from $12,000 a year to under $300 a year, 
which places a tremendous possibility within our grasp. 
Ladies and gentlemen, seldom has history offered a 
greater opportunity to do so much for so many. We 
have confronted, and will continue to confront, 
HIV/AIDS in our own country. And to meet a severe 
and urgent crisis abroad, tonight I propose the 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, a work of mercy 
beyond all current international efforts to help the 
people of Africa… I ask the Congress to commit $15 
billion over the next five years, including nearly $10 




billion in new money, to turn the tide against AIDS in 
the most afflicted nations of Africa and the Caribbean 
(Bush, 2003) 
 
The US government through the State Department established the Pan-Sahel 
Initiative (PSI) with the stated goal of preventing countries like Chad, Mali, 
Mauritania and Niger from becoming safe-havens for terrorist and criminal 
organizations. According to Fah (2010:84) the US provided basic training and 
equipment to protect the region’s porous borders, track the movement of people, 
combat terrorism and enhance regional stability in the vast, largely uninhabited 
region. The PSI was subsequently expanded in 2005 to become the Trans-Sahara 
Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) which included Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Senegal and Tunisia. TSCTI was endowed with  the wider mandate of strengthening 
regional counter-terrorism capabilities, enhancing and institutionalising cooperation 
amongst the region’s security forces, promoting democratic governance and fostering 
bilateral relations between the US and individual African states (Isike, Okeke-
Uzodike and Gilbert, 2008:33). This Counter-Terrorism Initiative was also extended 
to countries like Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in 2003 
under the umbrella of East African Counter-Terrorism Initiative (Fah, 2010:84). In 
2004, the US created the Africa Partnership Station (APS).The stated objective of 
APS is to build the Maritime capacities of the US-African partners so as to maintain 
the rule of law within their Territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, combat 
illegal activity including trafficking of drugs, people and arms, and to militate against 
piracy, oil theft and environmental crime (Pham cited in Bullock, 2011:15). 
 
The attempt by the US Government to create a UCC that is exclusively responsible 
for Africa has been aired both in the White House and Pentagon circles for a 
number of years. US policymakers view the current state of affairs in sub-Saharan 
Africa as a serious threat to American national interests (Kfir, 2008:113). The 2002 
US NSS states  
In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with 
disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a 
core value of the United States— preserving human 
dignity—and our strategic priority—combating global 




terror. American interests and American principles, 
therefore, lead in the same direction: we will work with 
others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, 
and growing prosperity. Together with our European allies, 
we must help strengthen Africa’s fragile states; help build 
indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help 
build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure 
to deny havens for terrorists (The 2002 US NSS).  
 
The document further states that an ever more lethal environment exists in Africa as 
local civil wars spread beyond borders to create regional war zones. Among its 
recommendations were: forming coalitions of the willing and cooperative security 
arrangements to confront the emerging transnational threats and the requirement for a 
security strategy that focuses on bilateral engagement due to the large size of the 
continent. 
Consequently, the Bush administration focused on three interlocking strategies for 
Africa. (1) The engagement of countries such as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and 
Ethiopia that have major influence within their respective regions. (2) The 
coordination of European allies and international institutions for constructive conflict 
mediation and peace operations in some parts of African conflict zones although with 
minimal result, and (3) the attempt to reform states and to strengthen sub-regional 
organizations (The 2002 US NSS). Prior to his visit to Africa late in his 
Administration, President Bush announced a US$15bn package to fight the scourge 
of HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and in 2004, President Bush inaugurated the 
US$1bn millennium challenge account (MCA). The MCA was created to increase 
US foreign aid to Africa by 50 per cent over the next three years and there were 
conditionalities attached which would-be beneficiaries must meet (Keller, 2013:7). 
2.10 The creation of USAFRICOM 
Hence, in October 2007, the Bush Administration announced the creation of United 
States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) with its own headquarters and staff. 
According to Kraxberger (2005:47) AFRICOM emphasizes Africa’s growing 
importance in US geo-strategic thinking. Washington has realized the considerable 
significance of Africa’s vast natural resources, rising population, unexplored 
markets, internal instability, rampant diseases and terrorism (Kraxberger cited in 




Kfir, 2008:114). Until that time, Africa had never been a priority for U.S defense 
planners. It had been a peripheral area of importance until 1952 when EUCOM was 
given the responsibility for the Algerian Departments of French Morocco, Tunisia, 
and Libya (Catoire, 2000).  
In the 1960s, growing fears of communism in sub-Saharan Africa led to the strategic 
decision to give the Atlantic Command (now U.S. Joint Forces Command) planning 
and operational responsibility for sub-Saharan Africa, with EUCOM retaining 
responsibility for North Africa. The Unified Command Plan was revised in 1962 
when the newly established U.S. Strike Command (USSTRICOM) was given 
responsibility for sub-Saharan Africa. After USSTRICOM was dissolved in 1971, 
military responsibility for sub-Saharan Africa would remain unassigned for the next 
eleven years until the 1982 biennial review of the Unified Command Plan, when US 
strategic planners assigned sub-Saharan Africa to EUCOM (Catoire cited in 
Kempsky, 2009:42). In 1983, Africa was re-divided between PACOM, CENTCOM, 
and EUCOM. This structure would remain essentially unchanged for the next 
twenty-five years until 2007. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Theresa 
Whelan remarked: 
after a period of involuntary neglect due to pressing 
business elsewhere, the United States appears to appreciate 
Africa’s elevated strategic importance in terms of counter- 
terrorism and energy security, among other things, and to 
regard regional stability, democratic development, economic 
reform, good governance, humanitarian assistance, and the 
fight against HIV/AIDs as subsidiary objectives that are 
conducive to serving those two interests (Stevenson, 
2011:48). 
This view was also expressed by NATO Supreme Allied Commander, General 
Craddock, who stated, “While Africa is rich in both human potential and mineral 
resources, it has historically struggled with relatively unstable governments, internal 
political strife, and economic problems. Many states remain fragile due to a variety 
of factors, including corruption, endemic and pandemic health problems, historical 
ethnic animosities, and endemic poverty” (Craddock, 2007).  In effect, Craddock 
endorsed the view previously expressed by   Susan Rice, former assistant secretary of 
state on African affairs during the Clinton administration: 




Much of Africa has become a veritable incubator for the 
foot soldiers of terrorism. Its poor, young, disaffected, 
unhealthy, undereducated populations often have no stake in 
government, no faith in the future, and harbour an easily 
exploitable discontent with the status quo. . . . These are the 
swamps we must drain. And we must do so for the cold, 
hard reason that to do otherwise we are going to place our 
national security at further and more permanent risk. 
(Lyman and Morrison cited in kempsky, 2009:43). 
 
However, Lusane, Jordan and Minter (2009:7) argue that the present US foreign 
policy assumption that the critical threats in the international system and against the 
United States come from rogue states, resurgent Cold War enemies and from 
international terrorists is a narrow framework which will always produce unilateral 
and counterproductive responses. They posit that the obvious security threats are 
engendered by social, political, and economic instabilities and stimulated by unequal 
power relations and lack of accountability on the part of large states. 
Many governments, scholars and civil society organizations have questioned the 
rationale behind the creation of AFRICOM. Most African governments and sub-
regional organizations have adverse opinions of and stances towards AFRICOM. 
Nigeria, South Africa, Libya and Algeria have led the opposition to AFRICOM. 
Nigeria, for instance, has insisted that the imposing presence of the US Military 
cannot be tolerated around the Gulf of Guinea region (Moore, 2007).  
Nigerian Foreign Affairs Minister, Ojo Mmaduekwe, is quoted as follows in 
“Leadership Nigeria”:  “If the command is about stationing US troops on African 
soil, we feel there is no need for that” (Leadership Nigeria, October 3, 2007). In 
South Africa, the South African Defense Minister, Mosiuoa Lekota, has warned that 
any SADC country offering to host AFRICOM would “suffer negative consequences 
from SADC fellows” (Daily News October 23, 2007). Al Jazeera quotes Algerian 
Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci stressing his country’s rejection of any military 
deployment on its soil within the context of the “Global War on Terror”. Also the 
Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), which comprises membership from Morocco, Libya, 
Tunisia, Mauritania and Algeria, has declared its opposition to foreign military forces 
operating in Africa (Reed, 2007:7). Volman (2004) makes a forceful argument that 




AFRICOM is a geopolitical bulwark against China as well as a platform for kinetic 
counter terrorism operations which will be antithetical to Africa’s stability and 
development. 
In similar vein, Schaefer (2007) offers a ‘big picture’ essay containing several sharp, 
if down beat, insights: in particular, he questions the optimistic western “assumption 
that African is capable of ameliorating the security crises in Africa”. In his view, 
Africa needs to develop a security model that “does not take western ideas and 
experiences as a starting point”. Okumu (2007) contends that an AFRICOM that is 
answerable to the Department of Defense, given wide discretion and granted 
operational autonomy, as well as possessing a relatively better understanding of 
Africa’s strategic realities, may ultimately become the major, or dominant, influence 
on the substance of US foreign policy towards Africa. It may, by default, come to 
participate in many crucial aspects of policy implementation and even dictate 
principles and policies to African governments. It could inevitably overshadow the 
civilian led policy research and policy making leadership as well as the interagency 
process, ultimately shifting the initiative away from the Department of state. 
Berschinski (2007:51) argues that the current U.S. foreign policy toward Africa 
reflects this “post-9/11 response to perceived security threats emanating from the 
continent.” This belief reflects a new type of threat in Africa that is qualitatively 
different from threats during the Cold War. Africa is viewed as particularly 
worrisome due to its weak and failing states, high poverty rates, ethnic conflicts, 
poor governance, and large uncontrolled areas. These characteristics have been 
emphasized post-9/11 because poverty, weak institutions, and corruption make states 
vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders (U.S. White 
House 2002). Responding to these critical views, Whelan cautions that “what you 
should note about the ‘African media’ is it tends to be incestuous. They pick up the 
same story and repeat it over and over –it’s not necessarily a very sophisticated 
media out there and it also tends to be dominated by – in West Africa area, the 
Nigeria media, Southern Africa, the South Africa media, and in the East, the Kenyan 
media. And they tend to deal in rumour oftentimes more than fact” (Whelan quoted 
in Burgess, 2008). 




Resistance culminated in a January 2008 African Union (AU) summit in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, when AFRICOM was a topic of discussion. However, member 
states refrained from passing a resolution condemning the new command, which 
meant that the process of creating AFRICOM could realistically continue without 
African censure (U.S. Embassy Official, March 3, 2008). In the wake of the AU 
summit, US officials pressed on towards AFRICOM‘s full operational capability on 
October 1, 2008. Nevertheless, the directive to place an AFRICOM headquarters in 
Africa was temporarily jettisoned in response to strong African resistance to the 
prospect of an enhanced US military presence on the continent (Washington Post, 
February 21, 2008). Even more modest proposals for AFRICOM ―regional 
integration teams or regional offices, which would work with sub- regional 
organizations, were dropped (Burgess, 2008:2). With the end of plans to 
expeditiously place AFRICOM headquarters on the continent, resistance diminished 
in some African countries, and with offers of training and other forms of assistance, 
states began to engage AFRICOM (Stars and Stripes June 29, 2008:1). 
AFRICOM is purported to militate against these new threats. To the public, 
AFRICOM is presented as a benign presence that will bring stability, peace, and 
prosperity to the African continent. Looking deeper, it is a military command that has 
been structured to bring security only to the US and to bolster the interests of the 
American elite few, not the interests of Africans. Furthermore, AFRICOM gives the 
Department of Defense (DoD) a dangerous level of jurisdiction over the State 
Department, USAID and other non-military agencies. Ambassadors, who have 
traditionally been the point-persons for US foreign operations, may now be 
overshadowed by Commander of AFRICOM. 
Some security analysts  who focus on Africa argue that the creation of AFRICOM 
may lead to  blind endorsement by the United States Government (as occurred during 
the cold war), of institutionally ineffective, economically corrupt and politically 
repressive regimes  led by astute and ruthless leaders. These regimes would 
enthusiastically cooperate with AFRICOM, which would give them a deceitful alibi 
to commit various human rights abuses using cold war tactics with some 
modifications. Schraeder (2006) argues that overt US presence or connection in 
Africa could thus transform the stakes of African conflicts and make them more 




impervious to diplomatic solution. A similar view was expressed by former South 
African Defense minister, Lekota that the presence of AFRICOM could exacerbate 
regional tensions, as rival states compete to host AFRICOM facilities, rather than 
contribute to compromise solutions resulting in regional security complexes as 
enunciated in Buzan (1997:12).  
Tuckey (2008:32) notes that: “What the people of Africa need is not increased 
military presence but debt relief, fair trade policies, jobs, expansion of education, and 
improvements upon existing US policies such as the President’s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Millennium Challenge Account. If the US were 
willing to boost the budgets of the State Department and USAID toward those ends, 
we may find precisely the results the Bush Administration is seeking in terms of 
stability. Long-term security is not generated through armed soldiers’ but rather 
through teachers, women, youth, micro-finance, fair and equitable policy.” 
Mark Malam, while testifying before the Senate, The Sub-Committee on African 
Affairs of the US, pointed out that ultimately, peace and democracy in Africa are 
elements that can be attained if America is willing to work in concert with Africans 
to determine their needs and desires. Pushing a military strategy that serves merely to 
benefit special interest groups like private military sub-contractors and the oil 
industry will only provoke opposition, as it has already done in many countries 
around the world. Advancing a diplomatic strategy that relies on true partnership 
with African governments, the African Union, and African civil society is the only 
approach that is in the mutual, long-term interests of the American people and the 
citizens of Africa’s many nations. Malam’s concern is that in Africa, mass 
displacement, hunger and disease is often the humanitarian fall-out of political 
failures. In order to address such challenges effectively, there may be military 
strength, political direction and humanitarian action, but this could not be done by 
integrating those elements under AFRICOM. There could be coordination between 
humanitarian, development and military actors but not integration5. 
                                         
5Testimony by Mark Malan, “AFRICOM: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?” before the 
SubcommitteeonAfricanAffairs,CommitteeonForeignRelations,USSenate,atthehearingentitled 
Exploring the U.S. Africa Command and the New Strategic Relationship with Africa, 110th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1 August 2007, http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2007/MalanTestimony070801.pdf. 




Volman and Klare (2004) state that considering the prevailing image of the U.S 
military in the Iraqi war, Africans are particularly concerned that AFRICOM will 
somehow become the lead U.S. government interlocutor with Africa representing the 
definite militarization of U.S. foreign policy towards the continent, despite the brave 
attempt to put a civilian mask on the face of the combatant command. They further 
argue that “the U.S. increased involvement and militarization of the continent would 
only fuel terrorism which it was meant to stop and increase anti – American 
sentiment in Africa” (Volman and Klare, 2004:28). Many Africans think that military 
power is absolutely no panacea for terrorist threats, and that, in most cases, it will 
backfire after building animosity and allowing conditions to deteriorate, as in 
Somalia where events speaks for themselves. Mesfin (2009) argues that contrary to 
promotion of human security, AFRICOM will produce many unintentional and 
adverse costs, which will linger for decades, including the risk of triggering a 
reciprocal militarization of China’s Africa policy. In the coming decades, China 
could conceivably , - and regardless of the associated hassle - vigorously expand its 
military co-operation with African states through pacts, joint exercises, intelligence 
exchange and training; pay its oil bills with increased sales of weapons, deploy its 
military forces, establish military facilities in Africa, or even set up its own Africa 
command. 
According to Frazer (2007), deeper analysis suggests, however, that the conception 
of AFRICOM was partially owing to the thinness of American understanding of 
diverse and complex African societies. The conception was very poorly thought 
through and badly implemented: for instance, leaving out Egypt, which is a major 
player in the international relations of Africa and key to its stability. Abel 
Esterhuyse, a South African academic and military strategist, likewise confirms that 
Africans are skeptical about AFRICOM. According to Esterhuyse, Americans should 
be open and transparent on their interests in Africa. Africans, he stresses,  are 
suspicious of America’s real strategic interests in Africa, and this is aggravated by  
America’s aggressive and militarized way of addressing problems in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  
According to Esterhuyse, the problem is that the image of U.S. foreign policy in 
many parts of Africa is informed by U.S. military actions in other parts of the world, 




especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. This image is strongly associated with the U.S. 
military profile in general and that of aggressive use of military force in particular. It 
also stands in stark contrast to efforts by DoD functionaries to attach a ‘soft power’ 
approach to AFRICOM and efforts to downplay a hard-core military role for the U.S. 
in Africa. A pertinent question is: how long will such ‘soft-power’ approach last 
before AFRICOM shows its true character and Africa or certain countries in Africa 
will be “Iraqed?” (Esterhuyse, 2008:123-6). Esterhuyse shares Malan’s view that 
Africans are afraid of the possibility that Americans would militarize their 
humanitarian action in Africa, and that American defense personnel may well play a 
significant role in such action. Esterhuyse highlights African concerns that 
AFRICOM is wearing a humanitarian mask in order to ensure a soft landing for the 
Command on the Africa continent. According to Esterhuyse, America’s humanitarian 
commitment could indeed be questioned in view of the U.S.’s inaction in past or 
recent humanitarian crises, such as those in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Darfur 
(Sudan).  
However, Carmel (2009) argues that AFRICOM was formed to implement the U.S. 
national security strategy that seeks to strengthen states and eliminate ungoverned 
space, as well as establish relationships with African states that offer a means to 
greater state stability and foster economic development (as noted earlier). According 
to the current AFRICOM Commander, Gen. Rodriguez, AFRICOM is an innovation 
designed with the conviction that American security is as threatened by weak and 
failing states as by strong ones. The command aims to address the roots of instability 
by promoting civil and defence sector reforms, military professionalism, and 
capacity-building programs which allow Africans to help themselves (Rodriguez, 
2013). As one high-level official put it, “Military security (alone) doesn’t give 
stability; it only allows a pause from the cycle of instability. You also need the pillars 
of a good economy, effective governance, and the rule of law”(Keenan, 2010:614). 
AFRICOM is showing signs of serving to protect unpopular, repressive regimes 
supportive of US interests. In the case of North Africa and the Sahel regions, the 
‘security-development’ discourse explicitly links Africa’s poor, her ‘dangerous 
classes’ as Abrahamsen calls them, the marginalised and excluded to international 
security ‘problems’ and ‘terrorism’ (Abrahamsen cited in Keenan, 2010:638). 




Regarding terrorism, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (2004) 
acknowledged that the “chaos can no longer be contained by frontiers”. Threats are 
no longer insulated, due to globalisation and interdependence through travel and 
trade. Global insecurity can be addressed by “securing the development” in areas of 
underdevelopment, which not only improves the safety of people in the developing 
world, but in the developed world (Dr Annan quoted in Denney, 2011:278). This has 
profound political and structural implications on the formation of AFRICOM and its 
role in providing security and development. Keenan (2008:18) considers the 
development aspect of the security-development nexus as a guise for what is 
essentially a narrow militaristic agenda. The ‘development’ aspect then, conceals 
U.S. domestic strategic concerns that go beyond just focussing on servicing the 
GWOT. He thereby scrutinises the concept that AFRICOM will deliver security to 
African countries it engages with and thereby be able to deliver it. Drawing on the 
U.S. involvement pre-2008, Keenan assesses that this organisation has a tripartite 
agenda: to exploit Africa’s resources; to limit Chinese engagement in Africa and to 
secure African countries as a counter balance in the GWOT (Keenan, 2008:16). 
Keenan’s ideas are based on his research in the Sahel and the Maghreb regions of 
Africa, where after the GWOT was announced, an intelligence deception was created 
that spread the idea of terrorism. This was designed to create, he claims, the 
ideological conditions for U.S. ‘invasion’ of Africa to secure U.S. strategic, natural 
resources (ibid). 
This particular project came under the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), which has been 
taken over by the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which now 
comes under the umbrella of AFRICOM. Keenan agrees with Abrahamson that the 
USA, like the UK in Blair’s ‘Commission for Africa’ (2005), are aiming at 
‘securitizing’ Africa. This change the security-development nexus, with the discourse 
shifting from one of ‘development/humanitarian’ to that of ‘risk/fear/security’ with 
Africa increasingly being mentioned in relation to the GWOT and the potential 
danger that it poses internationally (Keenan, 2008:18). By interpreting 
underdeveloped areas as dangerous, the role of aid and development has changed to 
containing the ‘threat’ thereby merging the security and development agendas so that 
they become indistinguishable. Keenan goes so far as to claim that the ‘overly 




militaristic’ role of EUCOM, from which AFRICOM took over,  has just been 
framed in a more seductive rhetoric of ‘development-humanitarian’ aims, especially 
since Obama’s inauguration. 
2.11.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
Many theories in political science and social sciences in general, can be used to 
explain the implications of AFRICOM for Africans. Theories such as imperialism, 
neo-colonialism, political realism or realpolitik, power and securitization are 
germane to the topic under discussion because of their interrelatedness and analytical 
extrapolation of AFRICOM’s imposition on Africans.  
The theory of imperialism is anchored on economic domination, subordination and 
exploitation of weak economies by the developed economies (Lenin cited in Aja, 
1998:46). One of its major proponents was V.I. Lenin who gave the theory its most 
outstanding technical meaning as the highest stage in the development of capitalism 
when, among other items, the export of capital by monopoly capitalists in 19th 
century Europe to pre-capitalist economies in overseas territories became more 
pronounced than ordinary export of manufacturers goods and services 
(Ake,1985:20). Closely related to imperialism is the theory of neo-colonialism. The 
substance of neo-colonialism is the continual economic and technological 
domination of the dependent economies by foreign economies and other interests 
without direct political control and subordination (Yansane, 1980: 24). Implicit in 
neo-colonial dominance is the continual export of capital and technology from the 
developed countries to expand and deepen the sphere of capitalist accumulation 
(Onwuka, 1987: 52). The mechanisms for neo-colonialism include the following: 
multinational corporations (MNCs), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World 
Bank and even the weak and subservient neo-colonial states in the periphery (Aja, 
1998:51). In material sense, neo-colonial strategy is facilitated by tactics such as 
foreign grants, loans, aid, economic assistance, military-defence pacts and 
agreements. In this way, dependent countries get more chained into the world market 
dominated by developed capitalist states. For example, France has been able to 
maintain a largely integrated banking network and principles to appropriate neo-
colonial monetary and financial standards in many francophone African states. In 




Nigeria, foreign oil companies have exercised monopolies in exploration and 
exploitation of resources. Western multinational corporations (such as Texaco, 
Chevron, Total, Elf, Mobil and Shell) have monopolized Nigeria’s rich oil reserves. 
According to Ake (1985:126), in virtually all the underdeveloped countries in which 
neo-colonialism has managed to bolster its position, there are growing crises of 
external debt burden, food crisis, high unemployment rate, technological 
backwardness and diversion of scarce resources to arms. 
While not underrating the relevance of theories outlined above, the study will be 
framed by theories of power within the ambit of realpolitik or political realism, 
securitization and human security paradigm. Additionally, the endemic human 
insecurity in Africa can be explored through the application of relative deprivation 
theory and neo-colonialism. This study argues that the lopsided power relationship 
between the US and Africa engendered the imposition of AFRICOM on Africans 
without due consultation with the AU, while the multi-faceted challenges of poverty, 
inter-ethnic conflicts, religious intolerance, trans-border crimes, ungoverned space 
and violent extremism in Africa induced the US government to categorize the 
continent as a zone of conflict from which emanate threats to its stability. The 
creation of a unified combatant command (UCC) in the mode of AFRICOM is an 
attempt to adequately securitize and militate against these threats. 
2.11.2 Theory of Political Realism or Realpolitik 
 
Political realists agree that state behavior is rational. This agreement is premised on 
the logic that states are guided by "national interest," usually defined in terms of 
survival, security, power, and relative capabilities (Holsti, 1996:37). National interest 
may vary according to specific circumstances. The similarity of motives among 
nations permits state managers to reconstruct the logic of policymaking in their 
pursuit of national interests--what Morgenthau called the "rational hypothesis"--and 
to avoid the fallacies of “concern with motives and concern with ideological 
preferences"(Morgenthau, 1962:18). The state can also be conceptualized as a 
unitary actor.  Because the central problems for states are starkly defined by the 
nature of the international system, their actions are primarily a response to external 
rather than domestic political forces. According to Stephen Krasner, the state can be 




treated as an autonomous actor pursuing goals associated with power and the general 
interest of the society (Krasner, 1975:33).  
Political realism identifies power, national interests and state survival as crucial in 
the analysis of interstate relations (Clapman, 1996:230; Zartman, 1967: 25-54). 
Political scientists who specialise in International Relations principally define 
“power” in terms of actor’s ability to exercise influence over other actors within the 
international system. This influence can be coercive, attractive, cooperative, or 
competitive (Useem, 2003). Mechanisms can include the threat or use of force, 
economic interaction or pressure, diplomacy and cultural exchange. Power can be 
viewed from different perspectives such as: power as the goal of a state or leaders, 
power as reflecting victory in conflict and the attainment of security, power as 
control over resources and capability, and power as a measure of influence or control 
over outcomes, events, actors and issues (Frisch, 2006:49). Moreover, the distinction 
between power as capabilities and usable options is especially important in this 
nuclear age , as the United States discovered in Vietnam and the Soviets learned in 
Afghanistan. The terrorist attack on New York and Washington of September 11, 
2001, even more dramatically illustrated the disjuncture between material 
capabilities and political impact.  
The elements of power include military, economic and technological capabilities of 
states. The theory of realism also asserts that a nation-state’s military capability is 
vital or key to the achievement of its national interests. This is so considering that in 
global politics, states may be able to achieve their objectives through the use of 
threats and military force (Brown and Sean, 1995:9). The threat or use of military 
power by the US and members of NATO has been the trend particularly in Iraq, 
Afghanistan , Libya and the imposition of AFRICOM on Africans. The operations 
are meant to safeguard and bolster the interests of the US and members of the NATO 
coalition. Territorially, related elements of national power such as defensive 
mountain ranges, water bodies, and natural resources such as oil, among others, are 
of significant value in terms of increasing a nation state’s power.  (Thompson, 
2009:16). Realist theorists observe that although nation states can pursue other 
objectives that are indirectly linked to power and security, these two elements remain 
vital or key elements to the leader of any nation in as far as the pursuance and 




attainment of national objectives is concerned. In other words, in the view of the 
realists, national security remains the top priority in the hierarchy of state objectives 
(Maeresera, 2010:75).  
The realist view of human nature and international politics is a pessimistic and tragic 
one. Man is capable of great love, kindness, and sacrifice, of course, but realists 
recognize that all humans are also motivated in no small part by greed and a lust for 
power. All social relations are therefore marked to some degree by a clash of these 
selfish desires, regardless of our good intentions and aspirations. In this analysis, 
what defines the essence of politics as a social institution is the struggle for power. 
This intrinsic contest for influence and power is present within states and other 
domestic political communities, but it is often subdued by effective laws, 
government, or shared norms. The competition for power among groups of 
individuals (i.e., states) on the international scene, however, is particularly intense 
because those controlling factors are largely ineffective in the absence of a common 
authority. Thus, the unremitting struggle for power in international system, which 
sadly but frequently manifests itself in violence and war, is an inevitable result of 
human nature. Some scholars emphasize the religious sources of man’s flawed 
nature, while others maintain a secular view. Whether because of original sin, nature 
and biology, or some other cause, the arena of politics is fundamentally tragic 
(Milbank, 2008, Berger, 2011).  
Different philosophical bases exist for the tragic stance found in inter-state relations, 
but the idea of a fundamental conflict between ethics and politics pervades all of 
them. For Morgenthau, the fundamental problem is that man is corrupted by his 
insatiable drive to dominate others. Like all animals, we have natural appetites and 
desires and are driven by the basic impulse of self-preservation (Morganthau, 
1978:4). Beyond safeguarding the conditions necessary for existence, however, we 
also possess an innate drive for self-assertion, a desire to assert ourselves as 
individuals against the world, thereby discovering our own power. This drive can 
manifest itself in many ways for example, by overcoming physical barriers in the 
natural world, competing in sports, or writing books and articles. Whenever man, 
acting alone or in concert with others, seeks to control others he has entered the 
political sphere (Ibid). Unfortunately, because man’s natural urge to dominate others 




would be satisfied only if every other human became the object of his domination; 
the lust for power is effectively unquenchable. Thus, all politics is defined by the 
permanence and ubiquity of the struggle for power. The “animus dominandi” or the 
desire to dominate lies at the heart of the human predicament (Morganthau, 
1978:29). Morgenthau’s citation of Nietzschean philosophy evokes one of the most 
famous passages of Beyond Good and Evil: “Life itself is essentially appropriation, 
injury, overpowering of the strange and weaker, suppression, severity, imposition of 
one’s own forms, incorporation and, at the least and mildest, exploitation” (quoted in 
Petersen, 1999:83).  
For E.H. Carr in “The Twenty Years’ Crisis”, the ubiquitous thirst for power is 
similarly driven by a deep facet of human nature. Despite his focus on human nature, 
Carr relies heavily on Darwin alone, commenting that “when the harmony of 
interests was already threatened by conflicts of increasing gravity, the rationality of 
the world was saved by a good stiff dose of Darwinism. The reality of conflict was 
admitted.” Carr explains: “The exercise of power always appears to beget the 
appetite for more power” (Carr, 2001:208). There is, as Dr. Niebuhr says, “no 
possibility of drawing a sharp line between the will to power and the will to live” 
(Niebuhr, 1960:3). Arguing that states are power-hungry entities and cannot be seen 
as morally responsible to each other, Carr draws on Hobbes’ conception of the 
Leviathan of the state as an Artificial Man, and also on thinkers like Machiavelli and 
Hegel (Carr,2001:104-5). The Hobbesian social contract, the argument goes, 
redirects and translates the anarchy of pre-Leviathan society from the individual level 
to the international level, so that people forming political communities accept global 
chaos in exchange for domestic peace (Carr, 2001:136-40). Classical realism thus 
sees states operating in an anarchic realm that reflects Hobbes’ state of nature, which 
is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes, 2002:xiii). 
For both Carr and Niebuhr, the nature of states reflects the inherent nature of human 
social groups. In Moral Man and Immoral Society, Niebuhr suggests that inter-group 
dynamics naturally result in winners and losers, and so “conflict between the national 
unit remains as a permanent rather than a passing characteristic of their relation to 
each other.” Niebuhr’s Christian Realism undoubtedly reinforced this conception of 
permanent conflict, firmly linking it to the doctrine of original sin. According to 




Annette Freyberg-Inan, another side of Niebuhr’s argument is that “man’s 
quintessential experience as a mortal being is a pervasive sense of insecurity, the 
insecurity results in over-defensiveness” (Freyberg-Inan, 2004:68).  The drive for 
power is magnified at the group and state level because, for many reasons, groups do 
not have the moral capability of individuals. Niebuhr argues that the will to conquer 
death by amassing power informs an egoistic and individualistic human nature. 
Niebuhr mirrors Nietzsche in this claim, although he argues from a theological 
perspective that is quite separate from the will to power. However, other realist 
scholars like Herbert Butterfield (1950) and Robert Jervis (1979) emphasize how 
even the well-intentioned search for mere physical security (that is, the impulse of 
self-preservation) paradoxically generates anxiety, mutual fear, and conflict.  
Whether man seeks power over his fellow man because of a natural urge for self-
assertion or simply in the cause of self-preservation, there is no escaping the evil 
inherent in politics. In Reflections on the State of Political Science, Morgenthau asks, 
“Why is it that the political act, in its concern with man’s power over man and the 
concomitant denial of the other man’s freedom, carries within itself an element of 
immorality and puts upon the actor the stigma of guilt?” (Morgenthau, 1955:442). 
Kenneth Thompson, in his book The Study of International Politics, notes the 
indisputable fact that ethics and politics are in conflict wherever man acts politically. 
That is the case because it is the essence of politics that man chooses goals and 
objectives which are limited and therefore equitable and just only for particular 
groups and nations. Only in the human imagination can policies and political acts be 
purely uncorrupted and undefiled by injustice “as soon as we leave the realm of our 
thoughts and aspirations,” (Thompson, 1952:451). Morgenthau in his later work, In 
Defense of the National Interest: a Critical Examination of American Foreign 
Policy, writes,  
We are inevitably involved in sin and guilt. While our hand 
carries the good intent to what seems to be its consummation, 
the fruit of evil grows from the seed of noble thought. We 
want peace among nations and harmony among individuals, 
yet our actions end in conflict and war. We want to see all 
men free, but our actions put others in chains as others do to 
us. We believe in the equality of all men, and our very 
demands on society make others unequal (Morgenthau, 
1982:17-19).  





In short, politics inevitably generates “dirty hands,” it necessarily entails some dose 
of evil. The very act of acting destroys our moral integrity for two reasons. First, 
there is the problem of our natural limitations: we are unable to control all of the 
consequences of our actions (some of which will inevitably impinge on others) and 
we are unable to completely satisfy all competing moral ends through our actions (in 
order to satisfy one legitimate moral end we inevitably must neglect others). But the 
paramount reason politics entails doing evil is that its essence and aim is the struggle 
for power over men, “for it is to this degree that it degrades man to a means for other 
men” (Morgenthau, 1982:38). Evil corrupts all politics, but especially international 
politics. Thompson argues that “This universal aspect of the corruption of absolute 
justice in the realm of politics finds its outstanding expression in international 
morality. There my nation’s justice means oftentimes your nation’s injustice; my 
nation’s security and the requirements assigned thereto may appear as the cause of 
your nation’s insecurity” (Thompson, 1952:461). 
Once one comprehends the tragedy of human nature, the problems and challenges of 
contemporary world politics can be seen in their true light. From Morgenthau’s 
perspective in the year after World War II ended, the drop of evil which inevitably 
spoils the best of intentions had transformed “churches into political organizations, 
revolutions into dictatorships and love of country into imperialism” (Morgenthau, 
1960). The fact of the matter is that there is a little bit of totalitarian buried 
somewhere, way down deep, in each and every one of us as elucidated by 
Morgenthau and Thompson who warn of a dangerous crusading nationalism, where 
nations see themselves as the repositories of values and ideas that are good for all 
mankind and hear a calling to extend the benefits of their system to peoples 
everywhere. The human desire for self-determination is thus transformed into a 
national mission aimed at, as Arendt describes it, “bringing its light to other, less 
fortunate peoples that, for whatever reasons, have miraculously been left by history 
without a national mission” (Arendt, 2013:52). 
There are two types of power, namely hard power and soft power. Hard power refers 
to coercive tactics such as the threat or the use of armed forces, assassination, while 
soft power involves economic pressure and sanctions, subterfuge and intimidation. 




Power can also be categorized into super power, great power, regional power and 
middle power. However, despite the wide applicability of political realism in the 
analysis of international relations, the theory has faced widespread criticism for its 
unsatisfactory explanationof the full range of international relations. If human nature 
explains war and conflict, what accounts for peace and cooperation? In addition, 
critics have noted a lack of precision and even contradictions in the way realists use 
such core concepts as ‘power,’ ‘national interest’, and ‘balance of power.’  They also 
see possible contradictions between the central descriptive and prescriptive elements 
of realism.  On the one hand, nations and their leaders "think and act in terms of 
interests defined as power," but, on the other, statesmen are urged to exercise 
prudence and self-restraint, as well as to recognize the legitimate interests of other 
nations (Oren, 2009:283-301). Power plays a central role in political realism, but the 
correlation between relative power balances and political outcomes is often less than 
compelling, suggesting the need to enrich analyses with other variables 
2.11.3 Securitization Theory 
 
Securitization theory was propounded and developed by the Copenhagen School 
(CS) under the leadership of Ole Waever and Barry Buzan as a tool for practical 
security analysis. The CS describes securitization as the inter-subjective and socially 
constructed process by which a threat to a particular referent object is acknowledged 
and deemed worth protecting. In Securitization and Desecuritization, Wæver 
presents the logic that informs the theoretical development of ‘securitization. Based 
on a particular understanding of security, that which is national security, Wæver 
formulates a threat-defense modality extracted from observations of certain 
operations in the field of security. Wæver argues that the same logic which 
conceptualizes the construction of the threat-defense sequence in the military sector 
can be used to understand ‘securitization’ processes in other sectors (Wæver 1995: 
51). Securitization is the inter-subjective establishment of an existential threat, which 
demands urgent and immediate attention, as well as the use of extraordinary 
measures to counter this threat (Buzan et al 1998: 24-25; Wæver 1995: 51).  
The CS defines this social interaction as a rhetorical one: a discursive exchange 
between a securitizing actor and an audience in relation to an object, the referent, and 




that which threatens it. Using an Austinian understanding of speech acts, the CS 
explains that a successful securitization process is facilitated by internal or linguistic 
factors and by external or contextual factors, the social capital of the speaker and the 
nature of the threat (Buzan et al 1998: 32-33). The goal of the Copenhagen School is 
defined as the following: “Based on a clear idea of the nature of security, 
securitization studies aims to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who 
securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what 
results and, not least, under what conditions (what explains when securitization is 
successful)” (Buzan et al 1998: 32).  
The securitizing actor is that who puts forward a claim to securitize an issue. The CS 
explains that the successful securitization of a referent object will depend on the 
inter-subjective agreement among the subjects as to whether the claim made by the 
actor is legitimate or not. They argue that “no one is excluded from attempts to 
articulate alternative interpretations of security,” but as a result of the power 
structures within the field of security, certain actors, typically state elites, hold an 
advantaged position over defining security threats (Buzan et al 1998: 31-32). Wæver 
states that “by definition something is a security problem when the elites declare it 
so” (Wæver 1995: 54). Although, the CS has attempted to move away from this 
explicitly state elite orientation, their focus remains on successful instances of 
securitization, which due to the biased nature of security are generally dominated by 
statist elites (Buzan et al 1998: 37-39). 
Critical analysts of security argue that the statist field of security has led to 
securitization processes that exclude certain groups and ideas resulting in negative 
consequences for the individuals or the global community (Wyn Jones, 1999: 99; 
Bellamy, Bleiker and Devetak (eds.) 2008; Hansen, 1999; Hoogensen and Rottem, 
2005; Krause and Williams, 1997). A commonly cited example of this potentially 
harmful approach to security is the arms race of the Cold War, whereby the 
procurement of weapons and their dispersion to client states in the name of ‘national 
security’ contributed to political repression, armed rebellions and civil war, and a 
shift of resources away from other security issues, such as food or environmental 
(Cheesman, 2005: 63; Wyn Jones 1999: 99). A more contemporary case in point is 
the ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWoT), which Bellamy et al (eds.) critically explored in 




their 2008 book, Security and the War on Terror. Williams, one of the contributors, 
argues that the US government dominated approach to terrorism resulted in a 
revitalization of political realism and a militaristic security policy. He argues that the 
securitization of international terrorism, led by the elite directed security policies of 
the US, pushed the promotion of human security and environmental sustainability to 
the side-lines of the international security agenda ((Williams, 2008: 10). 
Security politics remains a largely closed domain governed largely by state elites. 
This institutional dominance translates into securitization processes which are the 
product of politics of exclusion and control that often generate adverse impacts on 
individual and global security. In short, by labelling something as ‘security’, an issue 
is dramatized as an issue of supreme priority. One can therefore think of 
securitization as the process through which non-politicized (issues not talked about) 
or politicized (issues publicly debated) issues are elevated to security issues that need 
to be dealt with urgency, bypassing legitimate public debate and democratic 
procedures. Securitization provided a fresh take on the increasingly tiresome debate 
between those who claimed that threats are objective (i.e., what really constitutes a 
threat to international security) on the one hand, and those that maintained that 
security is subjective (what is perceived to be a threat) on the other. In an attempt to 
sidestep or bypass this debate, the Copenhagen school suggests that security should 
instead be seen as a speech act, where the central issue is not if threats are real or not, 
but the ways in which a certain issue (troop movements, migration, or environmental 
degradation) can be socially constructed as a threat. The idea of speech acts has a 
long tradition in philosophy and refers to the idea that by saying something, 
something is done. So, just as the naming of a ship is a speech act that brings 
something into effect, the uttering of ‘security’ can be viewed as an act by which all 
kind of issues (military, political, economic, and environmental) can become staged 
as a threat.  
However, not all talk about security qualifies as securitization in the sense 
understood by Ole Wæver and his Copenhagen colleagues. A securitizing speech act 
needs to follow a specific rhetorical structure, derived from war and its historical 
connotations of survival, urgency, threat, and defense. The constitution of 
securitization within the national security discourse implies an emphasis on 




authority, the confronting and construction of threats and enemies, an ability to make 
decisions and the adoption of emergency measures (Buzan and Hansen, 2009:213-
214). According to Buzan et al (1998:25), the way to study securitization is to study 
discourse and political constellations. When does an argument with this particular 
rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience 
tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? If by means of 
an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing 
actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be 
bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization. Moreover, ordinary issues can 
be reframed to become political issues or above politics using security platform. 
Thus, an event or action which is a public issue which is non-political is defined 
ranging from non-politicized issue through politicized to securitization (Buzan et al, 
1998:23).  
However important and innovative contribution to our understanding of security may 
it be, the securitization framework is problematically narrow. First, the form of act 
constructing security is defined narrowly, with the main focus on the speech of 
dominant actors, usually political leaders, which encourages an interpretation that 
securitization is only happening when there are discursive interventions of those who 
are institutionally legitimate to speak on behalf of a particular political community 
(usually a state). This also excludes a focus on other forms of representations, such 
as images or material practices. (McDonald, 2008: 564). At the same time, the 
conceptual framework of securitization puts a special emphasis on the acceptance of 
the audience which is claimed to be essential in the successful securitization process. 
Contextual factors, which the Copenhagen school terms facilitating conditions, help 
explain why some securitizing moves are more likely to be accepted by the audience 
than the other. These facilitating conditions are taken as givens that either help or 
hinder securitization but are not conceptualized as constitutive of the speech acts, 
which is at odds with the claim that security is a social construction. There is tension 
between understanding securitization as a productive process by focusing on the per-
formative power of the speech act, and as a constructed process by claiming that 
security is inter-subjectively constituted (Sulovic, 2010:5). 




2.11.4 Human Security Paradigm  
 
Various attempts have been made to provide an adequate conceptualization of human 
security. There are two main contemporary theories of international relations. At one 
end of the continuum is an approach based on a neo-realist theoretical framework, 
which maintains a continued emphasis on the primacy of the state within a broadened 
conceptualization of human security. Some call this approach the ‘new security 
thinking’. A postmodernist or ‘critical human security’ approach that is rooted within 
the pluralist theory of international politics represents the other end in this security 
discourse.  
Human security paradigm emerged in the 1990s to challenge and ameliorate the 
inadequacies of the realist state-centric world view which crystallized during the cold 
war. It is rooted within the pluralistic tradition in international politics. Human 
security focuses on people’s own perceptions of their in/security and their 
articulations of opportunities and threats in their everyday lives. Human security is 
strongly linked to notions of values and interests. And since they may be different in 
different places, the concept of human security is regionally bound (Burgess, 
2007:97). Thus, people may have different views on what security means for them. 
According to the United Nations Development Programme (Human Development 
Report, 1994), human security is defined as: “Safety for people from both violent and 
non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being characterized by freedom from 
pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety, or even their lives.” 
 Human security paradigm serves as a counter to the selfish pursuit of state or elite 
security. People become the primary referent of security. The main point is to 
understand security comprehensively and holistically in terms of the real-life, 
everyday experiences of human beings and their complex social and economic 
relations as these are embedded within global structures. It therefore becomes 
imperative to view security in terms of patterns of systemic inclusion and exclusion 
of people (Thomas, 2002). The twin goals of protection and empowerment: “freedom 
from fear” and “freedom from want” (United Nations Commission on Human 
Security, 2003) thus represent the core principles of ensuring survival, meeting basic 
needs (protecting livelihood) and safeguarding the human dignity of the most 




vulnerable groups in society. In this way, emphasis shifts from a security dilemma of 
states to a survival dilemma of people (Hudson, 2005:163). 
The notion of human security is based on the premise that the individual human 
being is the only irreducible focus for discourse on security. Mac Farlane and Khong 
(2006:2) posit that the claims of all other referents (the group, the community, the 
state, the region and the globe) derived from the sovereignty of the human individual 
and the individual’s rights to dignity in her or his life. They argue that in ethical 
terms, the security claims of other referents, including the state, draw whatever value 
they have from the claim that they address the needs and aspirations of the 
individuals who make them up. Campbell (2002:8) argues that human security is a 
theory that: retreats from the concept of might, and emphasizes the right and 
wellbeing of individuals and social groups. According to the Commission on Human 
Security, the objective of human security thus is to protect the vital core of all human 
lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillments (CHS, 2003:4). 
The Human Security Commission argues that protecting the vital core of human lives 
necessitates taking action on countering deprivation from extreme poverty, ill health 
and other maladies, and the effects of environmental degradations (CHS, 2003:6). 
Barry Buzan in his seminal work, People, State and Fear, broadened the 
conceptualization of security into five sectoral areas namely, political, economic, 
social and environmental security, in addition to the militaristic security (Buzan, 
1991). 
Subsequently, the UNDP has stratified various threats to human security under seven 
broad categories. These are economic, food, health, environment, personal, 
community and political threats. The essence of this categorization is to adequately 
mitigate against human vulnerabilities which are beyond the state-centric purview. 
However, given the human centrality of the paradigm, scholars such as Krause, 
Buzan, Macfarlane, and Mark point out that “security” is the label given to the 
highest priority issues; and that making everything a security threat in effect 
prioritizes nothing. Moreover, shifting the referent to the individual proliferates the 
concept without adding analytic value – the more harms that are labeled ‘security 
threats’, the harder it is to study the relations between them (Owen, 2004:379). As 
Mack puts it, “bad things must be studied separately” (Mack, 2002:14). Paris adds 




that researchers should stick to “clearly defined topics and empirical questions” 
(Paris, 2001:87-102). The second line of critique addresses the potentially 
unmanageable policy consequences of human security. Here, the first charge is that 
labeling all potential harms to the individual security threats makes prioritizing 
political action impossible. 
These three theories constitute the frameworks for the analysis of AFRICOM in the 
continent. 
2.11.5 Relative Deprivation Theory (RD) 
 
The paradigmatic study of the protracted human security pathology in the continent 
is viewed through the analytical lens of relative deprivation theory. Relative 
deprivation theory was developed by Ted Robert Gurr. The theory links economic 
disparity with the propensity of individuals to resort to violent political action. Gurr 
uses relative deprivation to ‘‘denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy 
between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective value satisfaction, that disposes men to 
violence’’ (Gurr, 1970:3-4). The theory furnishes a more useful analysis of internal 
conflict (especially collective violence). The concept of RD finds its clearest 
expression in the works of James Davies (1962: 5-19), Oberschall (1969: 5-23), and 
Birrel (1972: 317- 343). This theory places the relative sense of deprivation as the 
main source of grievance and conflict behaviours among people.  As Runciman 
(1966: 9) pointedly notes, if people have no reason to expect or hope for more than 
they can achieve, they will be less discontented with what they have, or even grateful 
simply to be able to hold on to it. According to Gurr (1970:9-11), "all collective 
attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors or its 
policies" emanate from feelings of deprivation. He further elaborates on the forms of 
political violence with which he is concerned:  
Turmoil: Relatively spontaneous, unorganized political 
violence with substantial popular participation, including 
violent political strikes, riots, political clashes, and localized 
rebellions. Conspiracy: Highly organized political violence 
with limited participation, including organized political 
assassinations, Small scale terrorism, small-scale guerrilla 
wars, coups d'e'tat and mutinies. Internal war: Highly 
organized political violence with widespread popular 
participation, designed to overthrow the regime or dissolve 




the state and accompanied by extensive violence, including 
large-scale terrorism and guerrilla wars, civil wars, and 
revolutions (Gurr, 1970:11).   
 
In his masterpiece Why Men Rebel, Gurr (1970: 24) argues that the greater the 
deprivation an individual perceives relative to his expectation, the greater his 
discontent; the more widespread and intense discontent is among the members of a 
society, the more likely and severe is civil strife. In essence, what Gurr is saying is 
that collective disadvantage and relative deprivation underlie violent political 
mobilization. When individuals’ expectations of economic or political goods exceed 
the actual distribution of those goods, political violence is more likely.  Fearon and 
Laitin (2003:75-90) demonstrate that poverty is a positive predictor of violent 
domestic conflict, along with general political instability, rough terrain, and large 
population levels, because it is related to ‘‘financially and bureaucratically weak 
states’’ and aids insurgents in recruitment.  
2.12 Conclusion 
 
This chapter contributes to the human security debate through a review and analysis 
of the evolutionary trend and sequence of events that engendered the global call for 
reconceptualization of security. The chapter examined the uniqueness of African 
security which deserves peculiar and urgent attention. It also canvassed, inter alia, 
the inadequacies of Western oriented security paradigm in addressing the human 
security needs of the continent. Hence, the theories of power within the purview of 
political realism, securitization and human security paradigm are adopted as 
frameworks for the study’s theoretical analyses, while relative deprivation theory is 
used to explain the negative response of African people to Western imperialist 
incursion into the continent. In the next chapter, the study will critically examine the 
fundamental causes and consequences of human insecurity in Africa. The 
endogenous and exogenous factors that coalesced to produce humanitarian 









AN OVERVIEW OF THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
HUMAN INSECURITY IN AFRICA  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The human security situation in Africa is of utmost concern not only to Africans but 
to the other regions of the world. However, the human security situation in Africa 
historically has been characterized by pathology of conflict that has disruptive 
consequences for the wellbeing of her people. There were histories of conflicts in 
pre-colonial Africa. However, histories also show that conflicts and wars were not 
unique to Africa as evidence abounds of its existence in other regions of the world.  
Futhermore, pre-colonial African conflicts were not recorded to have occurred on the 
large scale of some conflicts in today’s Africa (Taiwo, 2009:59). The characteristics 
of pre-colonial conflicts varied between internal rebellions, wars of conquests 
between kingdoms, tribal wars over farmlands and reciprocal killings over murdered 
kin (Bujra, 2002:29). However, there were long peaceful periods of economic boom 
and inter-state relations which enhanced the wellbeing of the people.  
Insecurity and instability in much of Africa has become a single, complex and 
interrelated problem that is an intrinsic part of the debate about the nature and 
capability of the African state (Aning, 2003:4). While there are only a few collapsed 
or failed states in Africa, most African states are weak, as governance has contracted 
rather than expanded in recent decades parallel with the acute economic crises 
experienced by the continent (Cilliers, 2004:21, Messner, 2014:23-26). Africa has 
been judged to be “the most warring region on the planet” (Van Tongeren, 1999:11; 
Jackson, 2000a:210).  
The rate of conflict in Africa increased drastically in the late 1980s when half of its 
region were plunged into violent crises, affecting the security conditions of about 30 
per cent of the continent`s population (Jackson, 2000:208). By mid-2001, violent 
conflicts of diverse magnitude have impinged on the human security conditions of 
many African countries. Countries like Rwanda, Liberia,  Algeria, Sierra Leone, 




Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, Uganda, Senegal, Guinea, Angola, Western Sahara, 
Chad and  the Comoros were engrossed in violent conflicts while many other states 
like Lesotho, South Africa, Namibia, Kenya, Central African Republic, Djibouti, 
Ghana, Cote d`Ivoire, and Nigeria faced instability, high levels of domestic political 
violence, or burgeoning secessionist and rebel movements (Jackson, 2000). 
Countries like Somalia, Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo have continued to 
engage in unending internal conflicts which have spilled over into neighbouring 
states and upset regional security. The rapid growth of regional and intra-state 
conflict in viciousness, intensity, magnitude and complexity has compounded the 
security challenges in Africa. These threats have been much more pronounced and 
indeed have taken on a scale, intensity and frequency that have defied even the 
imaginations of scholars, policy-makers and practitioners. 
The fact is that whenever and wherever conflict occurs, the security of individuals 
and communities are seriously undermined. As Wanyande (1997: 1-2) discloses, the 
costs of conflicts in Africa in terms of loss of human life and property, and the 
destruction of social infrastructure are enormous.  Hundreds of thousands of people 
have been killed in many of the countries in which the conflicts occur. Many others 
have also suffered and continue to suffer untold psychological trauma associated 
with conflicts. Moreover, once conflicts occur, scarce resources are inevitably 
diverted to the purchase of military equipment at the expense of socio-economic 
development (Report of the Commission for Africa (RCA), 2005: 107). The 
Rwandan genocide of 1994 stands as vivid testimony of conflict-engendered 
suffering that is prevalent in Africa. The insecurity situation in the continent is 
graphically illustrated by Annan when he points out that:  
Since 1970, more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa; 
the vast majority of them are intra-state in origin. In 1996 
alone, 14 of the 52 countries of Africa were afflicted by 
armed conflict, accounting for more than half of all war 
related deaths worldwide and resulting in more than 8 million 
refugees, returnees and displaced persons. The consequences 
of those conflicts have seriously undermined Africa’s efforts 
to ensure long-term stability, prosperity and peace for its 
people (UNSCOR, 1998:4).  




Jackson (2000:22) posits that about eight million Africans were estimated to have 
lost their lives as a direct result of war from 1960 to 2000 and about five and a half 
million of these figures were civilians. Statistics of refugees show that within the 
period, there were eleven million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Africa and 
another three million cross-border refugees (DFID 2000:para.21).   
This challenge of insecurity has engendered poverty and endangered the human 
security of many Africans. Akokpari (2007), posits that Africa has an alarming 
amount of conflicts and instability. Over 40 per cent of its 800 million people live 
below the poverty line and this percentage is predicted to rise. Currently, there are 
conflicts of diverse magnitude in many African countries which are detrimental to 
human wellbeing and engender gross violation of individual rights. Libya, Egypt, 
Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Central African Republic are hot spots where low premiums are placed on human 
lives and wellbeing. This worsening security situation is more pronounced in Sub-
Saharan Africa with far-reaching consequences. According to McKinley (2005:10), 
about five hundred million Africans face the daily struggle of survival on less than 
$2 income. In 18 out of 40 Sub-Saharan countries, the proportion of under-nourished 
people has increased steadily over the past decades to reach 400 million people at 
present (World Bank Report 2010). The maternal mortality ratio for the world is 
estimated at 400 per 100,000 live births but, at 1,000 maternal deaths per 100,000 
live births in Africa. The countries with the highest maternal mortality ratio are all in 
Africa and out of twelve countries with the highest number of maternal deaths; the 
continent is home to seven, thus accounting for one-third of global maternal deaths. 
Adding to the challenges of insecurity is the excruciating burden of HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. While HIV/AIDS is a global crisis, the continent has the highest incidence 
of the disease. 
According to WHO and UNAIDS, (2010:20), over three-quarters of all AIDS deaths 
occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa. Worldwide, some 40 million people are currently 
infected with the HIV virus; over 25 million of them are in Africa. More than 10 
million children in Africa have been orphaned by AIDS. While the global HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rate is estimated at 1 per cent, the average for Sub-Saharan Africa is over 
9 per cent (UNICEF, 2012). This pandemic disease is deepening and spreading 




poverty, worsening gender inequalities and eroding governments’ capabilities to 
adequately cater for citizens. Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest proportion of 
people living in abject poverty, with nearly half of its population below the 
international poverty line of $1 a day. 
 Compounding the security challenges in Africa is the complex series of 
interconnected and ever-evolving crises faced by countries of the Sahel region.  The 
crises in Mali and Nigeria were not least a result of the security vacuum following 
the Libyan revolution. The ousting of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 and the subsequent 
fragility of the Libyan state exacerbated the Sahel’s longstanding political, economic 
and humanitarian vulnerabilities.  Instability in Mali and increased arms flows from 
Libya into the region collided with a humanitarian crisis brought on by drought and 
poor harvests in a region already burdened by chronic poverty and food insecurity. 
These volatile mixes of insecurity and conflict aggravated the continent’s 
developmental process and caused   Africa’s human security condition to deteriorate.  
This view is corroborated by Solomon and Wart (2005:4) who argue that territorial 
disputes, armed conflict, civil wars, violence and the collapse of governments and 
ultimately the state have come to represent the greatest challenges to peace, security 
and stability in Africa. In this chapter, the study explores some of the endogenous 
and exogenous causes of human insecurity in Africa and their consequences for the 
continent’s security problematiques. 
3.2 Historical Background  
Various factors are responsible for the deplorable human security situation in Africa. 
The immediate causes of human insecurity in Africa include dictatorial regimes, 
poverty, state weakness or fragility, injustice, exclusion and discrimination. Others 
include political instability, ethno-religious rivalries and electoral violence. Beyond 
the immediate pathologies mentioned above, there are various historical factors that 
account for these perennial disorders. The great cataclysms of Western colonialism, 
imperialism and neo-colonial interventions and the subsequent misrule by post-
colonial political leaders are fundamental factors that have excarbated and are 
excarbating the condition of human security in Africa.  Tejan-Cole (1998:481), for 




instance, argues that we cannot comprehend the contemporary security situation in 
Africa without making reference to the turmoil and tragedy of the past. 
Rodney (1984) argues that the precondition for understanding the root of political 
instability and insecurity in Africa is an examination of the historical development 
and the dynamics of the peripheral capitalist state in Africa. Mazrui (2008:37) 
concurs with this view when he posits that the seeds of post-colonial wars lie in the 
sociological and political mess which ‘white’ colonialism created in Africa. He 
further argues that colonial powers destroyed old methods of conflict resolution and 
traditional African political institution, without creating an effective substitute. 
Nwolise (2001:26) avers that Africa’s security problematic can be dated as far back 
as the trans-atlantic, East African, and North African slave systems and dynamics, 
specifically between the 1450s and the 1850s when about 400,000,000 African sons 
and daughters were violently seized and taken to Europe as sellable commodities. 
The method of their acquisition introduced violence, rape, murder and torture, all of 
which cheapened and degraded human life to scales never previously known in 
Africa (Taiwo, 2009:62).   
3.3 The colonial legacy 
The contemporary security situation in Africa is rooted in the “Berlinist state” that 
parceled out African territories to various imperialist powers (Kieh, 2007:3). The 
balkanization of Africa into spheres of influence by the European powers dated back 
to the 15th century with the colonization of Angola in 1442, and Mozambique in 
1505 by Portugal. The colonial conquest was furthered by French occupation of 
Senegal, Reunion and Mauritius in 1637, 1663 and 1715 respectively.  In 1652, the 
Dutch settled at the Cape while the British occupied Sierra-Leone, Cape Colony, 
Natal, Gold Coast and Nigeria in 1808, 1814, 1843, 1842 and 1851 respectively. 
Algiers, Equatorial Africa and Tunisia were invaded by France in 1830, 1841 and 
1881. The British invaded and occupied Basutoland in 1868 and subsequently 
annexed the Transvaal in 1877 (Woddis, 1961; Fordham, 1968; Oliver and Fage 
cited in Offiong, 2001:8). The British occupation of Egypt in 1882 which was 
intended to insure the British control of the Suez Canal resulted in the alienation of 
France and consequential territorial disputes that were resolved in Berlin conference 
of 1884-1885 (Offiong, 2001:9). 




In 1885, King Leopold of Belgium seized the Congo and German East Africa was 
also established.  Subsequently, others followed: Sudan 1889, Zanzibar 1890, 
Nyasaland 1891, Northern and Southern Rhodesia 1891, Bechuanaland 1891, 
Uganda 1893, Dahome 1894, Kenya 1895, Nigeria 1900, Italian Somaliland 1905, 
Libya 1911, and Spanish Morocco 1912.  Thus, African societies were attacked and 
conquered. Eventually, Ethiopia was Africa’s only autonomous state, but was 
invaded by fascist Italy in 1935 (Woddis cited in Effiong, 2001:10). However, it is 
noteworthy that these conquests were not achieved without considerable resistance 
from African societies. Western powers merged different ethnic groups into 
provinces with little regard for the people living in the newly controlled areas, or for 
existing geographic or cultural boundaries. Populations that had previously identified 
themselves as distinct, based on their cultural, ethnic, and/or religious heritage, were 
forced to unify under a single national identity. The new multi-ethnic colonial 
territories were maintained, upheld, and controlled through the use of violence, and 
through the implementation of imperialist policies. In regard to vast areas occupied 
and the diversity of African communities, the Western powers created a class of 
intermediaries to assist them. Certain populations were denied their political, 
economic, social, and human rights. The various ethnic nationalities that opposed the 
imposition of colonialism were grossly repressed and marginalized to the advantage 
of those who cooperated with colonial policies.   The colonial authorities enhanced 
the authority of African chiefs who supported and propagated colonial ideas to the 
detriment of the emerging nationalists while recalcitrant African leaders were 
deposed and exiled. This pattern of selective marginalization polarized societies and 
created conflicts. Ancient unresolved conflicts and other hostilities between African 
societies which came under colonial rule were fully exploited by the colonial 
administrations while old hostilities were deepened. 
Governments were organized according to European colonial theory and practice, 
and were staffed predominantly by European decision-makers. The colonial 
government was usually headed by a Governor-General appointed by the 
metropolitan power without consultation with the colonized. In British colonial 
territories, the system of ‘indirect rule’ was introduced as a result of shortage of 
colonial staff, meaning that they were using African authorities to keep order, collect 




taxes and supply labour.  In communities where centralised systems of government 
were not entrenched (for example, the Igbo-speaking people of South-Eastern 
Nigeria), paramount rulers were appointed and imposed on the people. In French 
colonial territories, policies of assimilation and association were introduced which 
used a system of direct rule where African chiefs were no more than colonial 
puppets.  As agents of colonial rule, they lost their previous traditional positions of 
authority. Democracy, good governance and fundamental human rights were not 
included in the vocabulary of colonial overrule.  
The colonial administrations deliberately refused to provide enabling environments 
for Africans. Africans were forced to provide sundry services to the state while they 
were denied the basic necessities of life like shelters, jobs, health care, and education 
and in extreme cases food (Kieh, 2009:8). Thus apart from the recruited and often 
forced labour needed to build infrastructural systems that would facilitate 
transporting agricultural and mineral resources to the coast, there was also need for 
assistant workers for the colonial bureaucracy. First, the locals had to undergo some 
training, hence the introduction of the mission and colonial schools. The result of this 
was the creation of a new class of individuals exposed to aspects of European culture 
that were super-imposed on the local ethnic cultures (Diop, 2012:224). 
European powers controlled every aspect of the colonial economy in order to 
maintain power and domination and to realize the economic objectives of 
colonization. Africans were forced to produce cash crops by the use of physical and 
economic coercion, and by the expropriation of land for large scale plantations for 
growing crops for European market (Lappe and Collins, 1994:37).  Colonial 
administrations redistributed land and determined who should produce what and 
how. Laws and policies reflected interests and values of European imperial powers 
such as as military uses, economic advantages, Christianization, European 
settlement, and so on (Ibid). These imperial policies exacerbated ethnic rivalry by 
favouring one group above the others, distributed resources in an unequal manner, 
disallowed democratic governments, and prohibited local participation in 
governmental decisions and actions.  Strike action and trade unionism were either 
banned or restricted, political parties were limited and in extreme cases disallowed. 




Local press outlets were closed down and criticism was suppressed while emergent 
nationalists were either arrested, ostracized, jailed or banished (Woddis, 1967:15). 
Colonial rule in most African counties lasted less than a century but its negative 
impact on the human security of Africans was enormous and far-reaching Between 
the 1880s and the beginning of the World War I., during the New Imperial period, 
Africa experienced transition from the ‘informal’ imperialism of military control and 
economic dominance to the direct rule of European powers. By the end of World 
War I. Western powers such as Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, 
Portugal and Spain, had divided Africa into spheres of their influence in order to 
acquire new lands and resources. However, their knowledge about Africa was 
inadequate. Africa was known more as a coast- line than as a continent and the maps 
utilized to carve up Africa were mostly inaccurate. When European powers were 
marking out the boundaries of their new territories, they simply drew straight lines 
on the map without taking into consideration the numerous traditional monarchies, 
chiefdoms, and other forms of African polities (Meredith, 2005:8). “Whenever and 
wherever colonial rule was established, it was essentially a paternalistic, bureaucratic 
dictatorship” (O’ Tole, 2001:48). Land and people became no more than ‘pieces on 
the chess board’ as Britain’s Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury verified: “We have been 
giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small 
impediment that we never knew exactly where they were” (quoted in Meredith, 
2005:2).  
Zeleza (2012:2) notes that the wars of conquest exacted a heavy demographic price, 
which, when combined with the predations of primitive colonial accumulation, most 
graphically and grimly illustrated in King Leopold’s genocidal ‘red rubber’ tyranny 
in the Congo that slaughtered 10 million people (Hochschild 1998), led to the deaths 
of many millions of people and spawned such vast dislocations that some medical 
historians have called the years between 1890 and 1930 ‘the unhealthiest period in all 
African history’ (Patterson and Hartwig 1978: 4). The character of the colonial state 
was multidimensional. As earlier stated, some of the dimensions of colonial Africa 
were repression, violence, negligence, exploitation and exclusion. Edie (2003:48) 
posits that: 




All colonial states in Africa had certain characteristics; they 
were conceived in violence and issued from conquest; they 
established imperial sovereignty on the conquered territories; 
they were all centralized and coercive; they all created 
bureaucratic elite; they dominated economic activities; they 
employed racists ideologies; they all sought to integrate the 
economy of the colony into the imperial economy. 
 
The oppressive policies of the colonial state reflected its total disregard for the 
cultural, economic, political and social rights of Africans. As a violent construct, the 
colonial state relied primarily on the use of brute force as the dominant mode of 
state-society relations.  The colonial state constituted the greatest threat to individual 
and community wellbeing. Crowder (1987:11) notes that the colonial state engaged 
in burning of villages, destruction of crops, killing of women and children, and 
execution of leaders. By these means the colonial power conquered and subjugated 
Africans through their state control of state power and resources. The typical colonial 
regime was autocratic, authoritarian, undemocratic and despotic. Despite its 
authoritarian nature, the colonial state was weak, and its involvement with African 
society was very limited, since it had little concern for the improvement of the 
masses’ conditions of life. During the era of colonialism, the rural masses were 
alienated from the state. Thus, the colonial period saw the development of a state 
based on domination rather than legitimacy and an authoritarian political culture that 
considered violence, patronage and corruption as normal tools of maintaining control 
over a population (Chazan et al, 1999). 
The constitutional powers of the territories were tenaciously held by the colonial 
officials without recourse to the natives. Decrees were issued without debates, 
consultation or participation. Laws were enacted with impunity to enhance the 
maximum exploitation of the colonized people and their natural resources. African 
people were rigidly tied by these draconian decrees and legal enactments so as not to 
disrupt their exploitation. Decrees were promulgated to set the lowest minimum 
wage, to impose a poll tax, to introduce system of forced labour, to refuse people the 
right to grow the crops of their choice  With the stratification of African society into 
classes, ethnicities and races for the colonial braggadocio, coupled with the transfer 
of Africa’s resources to the metropolis through plunder and pillage, the colonial state 




created a volatile human security situation which bedevilled the post-colonial 
security architecture of the continent.  In most parts of Africa, the state was so 
intertwined with concessionary companies that the distinction between the public 
administration and business came to be blurred (Bayard, 1993). The state nearly 
exclusively focused on its extractive duties. An impressive industrial infrastructure 
and an extended network of roads were built, but sectors, such as healthcare and 
education, were completely ignored and left to the church, which had been operating 
99.6% of schools (Young 1994). No good quality education was provided until the 
1950s. Additionally, the colonial governments cemented North-South dichotomies in 
Africa. There were separate administrations in many parts of Africa. For example: 
northern and southern Sudan, British Somalia and Italian Somaliland, northern and 
southern protectorates in Nigeria, Eritrea (Italian) and Ethiopia (not colonized), as 
well as regional or ethnic favoritism in Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi 
escalating political disputes directly after the departure of the colonial 
administrations. 
Some analysts argue that the current security challenges in Africa resulted from 
colonialism and "incomplete nation-building." During colonization, heterogeneous 
populations were united into single parties and movements against the common 
enemy. Some states still experience conflict between those who won and those who 
lost out at independence. 
Colonial borders are a further source of human insecurity. During the Cold War 
many conflicts in the continent were not easily distinguishable as internal or inter-
state wars. The end of the Cold War has weakened ideological models and internal 
security mechanisms, resulting in new demands for self-determination. In a balanced 
system of reciprocity, traditional warfare had a political function: to establish 
ascendancy to ensure control of resources and a symbolic means of delineating the 
political and cultural boundaries of ethnic identity. The collapse of that system began 
with colonial penetration and is linked to the introduction of new forms of exchange 
relations, a shrinking resource base, decay of governance, and the spread of 
automatic weapons. Localized battles for resource control have in effect been 
replaced by state-sponsored asset transfer that benefits narrow elite bands whose 
interests do not fit with historical notions of balance and reciprocity. 




These conditions were particularly evident in Belgian Congo and British colonial 
territories like Sudan where the British favoured the Arab speaking north and its 
trading elites, while they ignored, completely, a South Sudan that had been deemed 
to be just a reservoir of resources (Woodward, 2003). The British administration 
limited itself to taxing the production of resources, such as cotton, and exploiting the 
thriving trade conducted by an emerging class of North Sudanese traders. Except for 
the maintenance and the expansion of communications, the colonial administration 
had not taken any significant measure to modify the living conditions of the 
Sudanese (ibid). 
Both colonial possessions were ruled with authoritarian methods, both retained their 
coercive institutions intact after the independence and in both, the limits between 
private business and public administration were blurred because of the exclusively 
extractive nature of the state. In this respect, for example, the Belgian colonial state 
was very similar to the Congo of Mobutu, under which the central government 
relinquished any function aside from the extraction of revenue for a restricted group 
of privileged individuals. Another important aspect is that both used divide and rule 
tactics, purposely neglecting the improvement of the local workforce through 
education. Instead, they privileged an ethnic or social group over the others, 
increasing inequality and the creation of small, westernized local elite (Gordon, 
2007). 
Kieh (2009:7) stratifies the colonial mission into two broad categories. First, 
colonialism created conditions that were favourable to the accumulation of capital by 
the members of the imperial capitalist classes  either resident in the metropolis or the 
colonies. This factor clearly demonstrated the centrality of economics as the 
motivating force that gave impetus to colonialism and imperialism. Through this 
framework, wealth is transferred from Africa to countries overseas (Davidson, 
1994:19). Second and related, in order to create conditions that were propitious for 
the profit-making agenda of the dominant classes, the colonial state developed a full 
battery of repressive tools that sought to cow colonized Africans into submission. 
Amin (2006:93) hinges the motive of western colonization of Africa on economic 
imperatives of the colonizers as they systematically created conditions that bred 
violence and insecurity. Africans for centuries were culturally adulterated through 




religious and mental indoctrination against their heritage. In short, colonization has 
left Africans weakened culturally, economically and politically and in a crisis of 
leadership. 
These negative cultural effects cannot be overemphasized. Adigun Agbaje contends 
that colonialism’s attempt to replace indigenous values with Western ones produced 
a cultural dualism, leading to a "moral disorientation among the African people 
between the old and the new, a dualism neither well-aligned nor properly digested." 
Communalism and traditional religious leadership were discouraged, and replaced 
with "the gospel of individualism and a monastic and abstract view of a universal, 
remote God, not directly concerned with issues of governance, who could be 
approached only through practices and observances infused with Western cultural 
precepts" (Agbaje, 2003:41).  
At the end of the 1960s, six African colonies remained. Of the six, five were settler 
colonies, that is, colonies in which the European settler community’s monopoly of 
power kept the majority African populations from gaining their political freedom. Of 
these six countries, five were in Southern Africa: Angola (Portugal/settler) 
Mozambique (Portugal/settler), Namibia (South Africa/settler), South Africa 
(British/Dutch settler) and Zimbabwe (British/settler). The small Portuguese colony 
of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde in West Africa was the sixth colony. Just as in 
other African colonies, African nationalist movements had formed in each of these 
countries in the 1940s and 1950s. These political parties sought peaceful, 
constitutional change. That is, the primary aim of the nationalist parties was to 
change the constitutions of the settler colonies to recognize the rights of the majority 
African population. One of the popular slogans of these parties was the demand 
for One Man, One Vote.  
For many years, the white settlers in settler colonies had the right to vote. They used 
this vote to elect representatives who passed laws that protected the power of the 
European settlers and discriminated against Africans. African nationalist leaders 
believed that if franchise was the right of all citizens, the majority population would 
use their vote to bring in majority, independent African rule. The settler colonial 
governments responded to the non-violent constitutional demands of African 




nationalist parties with laws that banned all political protests and with violence. 
Repressive legislation allowed the settler governments to arrest and imprisoned the 
leaders of the banned African political parties. The most famous of the imprisoned 
political leaders is Nelson Mandela, the leader of the African National Congress of 
South Africa, who spent twenty-seven years in jail before being released in 1989. In 
1994, he became the first president of an independent South Africa. However, 
Mandela was just one of many African leaders who spent years in jail as a result of 
their demands for freedom, majority rule, and independence for their countries 
One of the most important legacies of the colonial era was the formalization of 
expansionism. The British pushed their boundaries in southern Sudan and Kenya 
until they met with resistance from Ethiopia, France and Italy, all of whom were 
widening their rule concurrently. The trend continued after independence with 
Somali irredentism, Ethiopia’s annexation of Eritrea, claims on French-protected 
Djibouti, and various border skirmishes. Internal expansion of state power within 
state boundaries often met with violence, such as in the Ogaden, Bale, and Sidamo 
provinces of Ethiopia during Emperor Selassie’s reign.  
3.4 Neo-colonialism in Africa  
The anti-colonial wars were protracted and brutal;6 in some cases hardly a generation 
passed before wars against colonization turned into wars against colonialism. These 
were defensive, unavoidable wars7, waged at enormous cost to African lives and 
livelihoods, driven by the desire to maintain or regain political autonomy, the 
precondition for establishing the social contract of democracy, the political culture of 
human rights, and the economic possibilities of development (Zeleza, 2007:5).  
Nkrumah (1965:ix) defines neo-colonialism as the process whereby the state has all 
the outward trappings of international sovereignty but in reality, its economic system 
and political policy are directed from outside. The term neo-colonialism was 
                                         
6
 Algerian war of independence against France (1954-62), Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and 
Cape Verde wars against Portugal (1975), Mau Mau revolt in British-ruled Kenya (1951-4), second 
Chimurenga (Rhodesian Bush war) in Zimbabwe against Britain (1964-79), Western Sahara liberation 
war against Spain and France (1956-75),  Namibia liberation war against apartheid South Africa 
(1966-90 ) and South Africa war against apartheid regime (1960-94). 
7 Asiwaju (1985) identifies 177 partitioned ethnic groups that span all African borders. Moreover, 
Englebert et al (2002) estimates that the population of partitioned ethnic groups is on average more 
than 40% of the total population. Likewise, Alesina et al (2011) argue that many post-colonial wars 
are attributable to these arbitrary partitions. 




popularised in the wake of decolonisation, largely through the activities of scholars 
and leaders from the newly independent states of Africa and the Pan-Africanist 
movement. Many of these leaders came together with those of other postcolonial 
states at the Bandung Conference of 1955, leading to the formation of the Non-
Aligned Movement. The All-African Peoples' Conference (AAPC) meetings of the 
late 1950s and early 1960s spread this critique of neo-colonialism. Their Tunis 
conference of 1960 and Cairo conference of 1961 specified their opposition to what 
they labelled neo-colonialism, singling out the French Community of independent 
states organised by the former colonial power.  “Resolution on Neo-colonialism” is 
cited as a landmark for having presented a collectively arrived- at definition of neo-
colonialism and a description of its main features. Throughout the Cold War, the 
Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of Solidarity with the People of Asia, 
Africa and Latin America defined neo-colonialism as a primary collective enemy of 
these independent states.  
Denunciations of neo-colonialism also became popular with some national 
independence movements while they were still waging anti-colonial armed struggle. 
During the 1970s, in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola for 
example, the rhetoric espoused by the Marxist movements FRELIMO and MPLA, 
which were to eventually assume power upon those nations' independence, rejected 
both traditional colonialism and neo-colonialism. Neo-colonialism is divided into 
two categories namely paternalistic and modern neo-colonialism. The term 
paternalistic neo-colonialism involves the belief held by a neo-colonial power that 
their colonial subjects benefit from their occupation8. Critics of neo-colonialism, 
arguing that this is both exploitive and racist, contend this is merely a justification for 
continued political hegemony and economic exploitation of past colonies, and that 
such justifications are the modern reformulation of the civilizing mission concepts of 
the 19th century (Chikendu, 2004:71). 
Foreign mercenaries, like the United States and British veterans training anti-
insurgency troops in Sierra Leone, are often accused of being instruments of neo-
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colonial powers.  French government minister, Jacques Foccart, was alleged to have 
used mercenaries like Bob Denard to maintain friendly governments or overthrow 
unfriendly governments in France's former colonies.9  
Modern neo-colonialism also known as Françafrique refers to the continuing close 
relationship between France and some leaders of its former African colonies. It was 
first used by president of the Côte d'Ivoire, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who appears to 
have used it in a positive sense, to refer to good relations between France and Africa, 
but it was subsequently borrowed by critics of this close and unbalanced relationship. 
Jacques Foccart, who from 1960 was chief of staff for African matters for President 
Charles de Gaulle (1958–69) and then Georges Pompidou (1969-1974), is claimed to 
be the leading exponent of Françafrique. In 1972, Mongo Beti, a writer in exile from 
Cameroon, published Main basse sur le Cameroun, autopsie d'une décolonisation 
('Cruel hand on Cameroon, autopsy of a decolonization'), a critical history of recent 
Cameroon, which asserted that Cameroon and other colonies remained under French 
control in all but name, and that the post-independence political elites had actively 
fostered this continued dependence.  
Verschave, Beti and others point to a forty year post independence relationship with 
nations of the former African colonies, whereby French troops maintain forces on the 
ground (often used by friendly African leaders to quell revolts) and French 
corporations maintain monopolies on foreign investment (usually in the form of 
extraction of natural resources). French troops in Africa were (and it is argued, still 
are) often involved in coups d'état resulting in a regime acting in the interests of 
France but against its country's own interests.  
Those leaders closest to France (particularly during the Cold War), are presented in 
this critique as agents of continued French control in Africa. Those most often 
mentioned are Omar Bongo, ,President of Gabon, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, former 
President of Côte d'Ivoire , Gnassingbé Eyadéma, former President of Togo, Denis 
Sassou-Nguesso  of the Republic of the Congo, Idriss Déby, President of Chad, and 
Hamani Diori, former President of Niger.The French Community and the later 
Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie are defined by critics as agents of 
                                         
9 The Guardian October 16, 2007. Also see The Independent, October 16, 2007. 




French neo-colonial influence, especially in Africa. While the main thrust of this 
claim is that the Francophonie organisation is a front for French dominance of post-
colonial nations, the relation with the French language is often more complex. 
Algerian intellectual Kateb Yacine wrote in 1966 that "Francophony is a neo-
colonial political machine, which only perpetuates our alienation, but the usage of 
French language does not mean that one is an agent of a foreign power, and I write in 
French to tell the French that I am not French."  
After a hastened decolonization process of the Belgian Congo, Belgium continued to 
control, through “The Société Générale de Belgique”, roughly 70% of the Congolese 
economy following the decolonization process. The most contested part was in the 
province of Katanga where the Union Minière du Haut Katanga, part of the Société, 
had control over the mineral and resource rich province. After a failed attempt to 
nationalize the mining industry in the 1960s, it was reopened to foreign investment.  
Critics of British relations with its former African colonies point out that the United 
Kingdom viewed itself as a ‘civilizing force’ bringing ‘progress’ and modernization 
to its colonies. This mindset, they argue, has enabled continued military and 
economic dominance in some of its former colonies, and has been seen again 
following British intervention in Sierra Leone.   
3.4.1 Neo-colonialism as economic dominance    
In broader usage, the charge of neo-colonialism has been leveled at powerful 
countries and transnational economic institutions who involve themselves the affairs 
of less powerful countries. In this sense, ‘Neo-colonialism’ implies a form of 
contemporary, economic imperialism that powerful nations behave like colonial 
powers, and that this behaviour is likened to colonialism in a post-colonial world. In 
lieu of direct military -political control, neo-colonialist powers are said to employ 
economic, financial, and trade policies to dominate less powerful countries. Those 
who subscribe to the concept maintain these amounts to de facto control over less 
powerful nations (see Immanuel Wallerstein's World Systems Theory cited in 
Sorinel, 2010:220-224).   
Both previous metropolitan powers and other economically powerful states maintain 
a continuing presence in the economies of former colonies, especially where it 




concerns raw materials. Stronger nations are thus charged with interfering in the 
governance and economics of weaker nations to maintain the flow of raw materials 
overseas, at prices and under conditions which unduly benefit developed nations and 
trans- national corporations. Those who argue that neo-colonialism historically 
supplemented (and later supplanted) colonialism, point to the fact that Africa today 
pays more money every year in debt service payments to the IMF and World Bank 
than it receives in loans from them, thereby often depriving the inhabitants of these 
countries  of  actual necessities. This dependence, they maintain, allows the IMF and 
World Bank to impose Structural Adjustment Plans upon these nations. Adjustments 
largely consisting of privatization programs which they say result in deteriorating 
health, education, an inability to develop infrastructure, and in general, lower living 
standards.  
They also point to recent statements made by United Nations Secretary-General's 
Special Economic Adviser, Dr. Jeffrey Sachs, who heatedly demanded that the entire 
African debt (approximately $200 billion) be forgiven outright and recommended 
that African nations simply stop paying if the World Bank and IMF do not 
reciprocate:  
The time has come to end this charade. The debts are 
unaffordable. If they won't cancel the debts I would suggest 
obstruction; you do it yourselves. Africa should say: 'thank 
you very much but we need this money to meet the needs of 
children who are dying right now so we will put the debt 
servicing payments into urgent social investment in health, 
education, drinking water, control of AIDS and other needs.' 
(Professor Jeffrey Sachs, Director of The Earth Institute at 
Columbia University and Special Economic Advisor to UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan).  
 
Critics of the IMF have conducted studies of the effects of its policy which demands 
currency devaluation. They pose the argument that the IMF requires these 
devaluations as a condition for refinancing loans, while simultaneously insisting that 
the loan be repaid in dollars or other First World currencies against which the 
underdeveloped country's currency had been devalued. This, they say, increases the 
respective debt by the same percentage of the currency being devalued, therefore 




amounting to a scheme for keeping Third World nations in perpetual indebtedness, 
impoverishment and neo-colonial dependence (Ake,1981:33).   
One variant of neo-colonialism theory suggests the existence of cultural colonialism: 
the alleged desire of wealthy nations to control other nations' values and perceptions 
through cultural means, such as media, language, education and religion, purportedly 
ultimately for economic reasons (Watson cited in Chikendu, 2004:40). One element 
of this is a critique of ‘Colonial Mentality’ which writers have traced well beyond the 
legacy of 19th century colonial empires.  Critics argue that people, once subject to 
colonial or imperial rule, latch onto physical and cultural differences between the 
foreigners and themselves, leading some to associate power and success with the 
foreigners' ways. This eventually leads to the foreigners' ways being regarded as the 
better way and being held in a higher esteem than previous indigenous ways 
(Nwankwo, 1995:28). In much the same fashion, and with the same reasoning of 
better-ness, the colonized may over time equate the colonizers’ race or ethnicity itself 
as being responsible for their superiority. Cultural rejections of colonialism, such as 
the Negritude movement, or simply the embracing of seemingly authentic local 
culture are then seen in a post-colonial world as a necessary part of the struggle 
against domination. By the same reasoning, importation or continuation of cultural 
mores or elements from former colonial powers may be regarded as a form of neo-
colonialism. 
Through the process of neo-colonialism, Africa’s post-independence leaders were 
provided with means to perpetuate their regimes as long as they aligned their policies 
with their various Cold-War partners, thereby relieving leaders from any semblance 
of accountability to local populations. The USSR was seeking to ally itself with 
African liberation movements, especially the more radical ones. The Western powers 
responded by supporting, almost unconditionally, the most corrupt regimes 
imaginable as long as they adhered to their ideological proclivity. While the 
independent struggles liberated Africans societies from formal colonialism, in many 
cases they left a lasting legacy of conflict which, coupled with Cold War intrusion, 
sooner or later erupted into vicious post- colonial conflicts, as happened in Algeria in 
the 1990s (Martinez 2000; Volpi 2003) and in postcolonial Angola and Mozambique 
where UNITA and RENAMO served as ‘apartheid’s contras’, as William Minter 




(1994) calls them (also see Ciment 1997, Dinerman 2006). The Cold War served to 
exacerbate the fragile human security situation in Africa. Cilliers (2004:23) noted 
that France in particular carried out an average of one military intervention in Africa 
per year from 1960-1994. The post-colonial order was founded on the same lop-sided 
socio-economic and political structures which were already in existence. Zeleza 
(2008:1-2) posits that many postcolonial conflicts are rooted in colonial conflicts. 
Similarly, Kastfelt (2005:2) opines that there is hardly any zone of conflict in 
contemporary Africa that cannot trace its sordid violence to colonial history.  
Indeed, the unfinished business of liberation is at the heart of the current crisis and 
conflict in Zimbabwe (Hammar et al. 2003; Carmody 2001; Campbell 2003), not to 
mention other countries in the region, including post-apartheid South Africa where 
high levels of violence persist (Melber 2003; Gumede 2005; Gordon 2006). It is also 
important to remember that Africa’s anti-colonial wars, which helped to bring to an 
end the ‘age of empire’, transformed European and world history. For example, the 
crisis engendered by the Algerian war ushered in the Fifth Republic in France and 
decolonization in Mozambique and Angola liberated Portugal itself from four 
decades of fascism (Zelezi, 2007:4). Thus, by dismantling the colonial empires and 
undermining the architecture of imperial racism, Africa’s liberation wars encouraged 
Europe to “re-humanize itself”, in Ali Mazrui’s (2003: 21) memorable phrase.  
Unfortunately, independence brought little respite from the ravages of war for people 
in many countries. The instabilities and insecurities of postcolonial Africa are rooted 
in the political and cultural economies of both colonialism and the post-independence 
order itself. These are latched on to the shifting configurations and conjunctures of 
the international division of labour, especially the legacies and challenges of state-
making and nation-building, on the one hand, and the struggles over 
underdevelopment, dependency, and sustainable development, on the other; how to 
establish modern societies that are politically, economically and technologically 
viable in a highly competitive, unequal and exploitative world.   
 
 




3.5 The role of African elites in the contemporary human security situation in 
Africa 
The movement for independence was spearheaded by a small group of educated 
Africans. These groups of individuals were united in their struggle against 
colonialism. However, later developments suggest that they united merely because 
they had common enemies. As soon as the European left, this unity collapsed. Each 
leading nationalist wanted to achieve power using the people of his tribe as the base. 
This shows that what was taken as unity of purpose by African nationalist’s elites 
was only an illusion. Fundamentally, all government has elites at the head. 
Everywhere elites are viewed as essential elements of the political and social life of 
the country and in every country, the stability of the nation and its regime seem to 
depend in a large measure on the way in which the elite is organized and fits with the 
other sectors. There are qualities which constitute the hallmark of competent groups, 
and which are necessary for national development. Essentially, the formation of 
elites is legitimated by their identification with the most pervasive goals in society. 
That is, elites are an embodiment of national consensus. Elite therefore is a nexus of 
need fulfillment that binds situational demands and group membership. Thus, the 
failure and success of national development depends on any given elite’s 
effectiveness in knitting together political influence so that it responds to functional 
demand on the system.  
By personalizing national values and giving a relentless drive to development, the 
elites energize the productive capacity of the society. Indeed, the quality of a nation’s 
elites and the image which they project upon the world constitutes an important 
source of power. In the former colonies, indigenous elites were nurtured by the 
political culture of the colonial state and were accustomed to identifying the state as 
the only purveyor of financial resources and favours.10Instead of changing colonial 
institutions, laws and values for the better, African ruling elites entrenched these 
deeply compromised governance systems. The newly independent governments were 
often highly centralized and strongly dominated by one political leader and his 
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political, ethnic or regional faction11. These post-independence governments reposed 
enormous powers in the hands of their ‘founding fathers.The dominant structural 
make-up of these governments has meant that they can seamlessly fit into a similar 
centralized political culture very much like the colonial administration. These new 
African leaders saw state power as an instrument of domination that did not require 
the consent of those subject to it (Bandoura, 1995). Upon independence, these elite 
groups adopted the maximalist state structure where the state is expected to play a 
fundamental role in the political and economic life of their countries. Hence, many 
post-colonial states in Africa assumed leading and wide ranging interventionist roles 
with large public sectors. Pitcher (2002:17) notes that “States were expected to be the 
mechanism that would hasten economic and social development; they would be 
responsible for making their countries modern. They would bankroll large, 
technologically sophisticated industrial projects and mechanize agriculture.” 
As the political center was broadened, it generated increased agitation and demands 
by various ethnic nationalities for self-rule12. Ethnic elites rejected indirect rule as an 
insufficient form of political representation and demanded privileged access to the 
highest echelons of the central government to credibly guarantee their security and a 
fair share of state spoils (Roessler, 2011:304). These ruling classes found themselves 
in a sociological and economic situation not of their own historical making. They had  
been placed in the positions they  held as a result of the departure of the metropolitan 
servants of colonial empire who were merely Europeans working within the matrix 
of colonial empire, all sharing the same culture and traditions with their homologues 
in the European headquarters . The bureaucratic class that was nurtured during the 
colonial era was naturally promoted as the new instrument of exploitation as the era 
of neo-colonialism took hold. This was the genesis of Africa’s comprador 
bourgeoisie. The unskilled indigenous communities that were impoverished by 
colonial policies had no significant holdings in the private sector. Very few 
grassroots cadres which formed part of the liberation movements had professional 
careers outside the struggle. At independence, many were simply appointed to posts 
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for which they had little aptitude, experience or skills,  Such a situation fuelled 
corruption as newly acquired state bureaucracy, military, judiciary, nationalized 
private industries were often seen as the ‘spoils’ of victory and the reward for the 
struggle of independence. The whole process became opaque and unaccountable with 
‘struggle aristocracies’ dishing out patronage – jobs, government tenders, and newly 
nationalized private companies - to their political allies, ethnic group(s) or regional 
interests.    
 Giving jobs to members of the same faction, ethnic group or region meant the idea 
of merit-based appointments was all too often thrown out of the window. This also 
meant that even if the newly empowered independence movement launched 
economic development programs to transform the colonial economy, such reforms 
were hardly ever going to have any impact, given the fact that unqualified cronies 
were managing key public institutions, and that scarce resources were being diverted 
to allies, family and friends. Appointments to the key institutions that scrutinize as 
well as hold rulers to account - the judiciary, the police, and the media - became 
increasingly occupied by liberation aristocracy loyalists. These institutions already 
corrupt under colonialism, continued to be perverted by a new set of management 
cadres who were unlikely to hold the rulers, through whose patronage they served, to 
account. In many countries, this continues to be the case today. Those who held 
junior ranks in the colonial hierarchy but had little skills and education found it 
difficult to make a decent living in the post-colonial society. They too were forced to 
seek out, by corrupt means, the patronage of leaders that had control over the 
distribution of the ‘spoils’. Almost the only jobs available in the newly independent 
country were in government or, the newly nationalized media, banks, schools, 
universities etc. Remunerated employment depended on ‘clearance’ from the 
liberation movement leaders or the ruling group. In most cases, those critical of the 
incumbent regimes or their policies were likely to be excluded from work in the 
public and private sectors.  
African post-colonial governing elites were confronted with the challenge of how, 
under conditions of low economic development, to establish and maintain control of 
diverse and geographically dispersed societies, in the absence of strong political 
institutions or a unifying national ideology. In order to mitigate this colonial legacy, 




governing elites initially built ethnically inclusive governments in which appointees 
from rival ethnic groups played a role similar to that played by tribal chiefs during 
colonialism, acting as intermediaries between regime and society, to facilitate the 
transfer of local information and mobilize support for the regime (Rothchild and 
Foley cited in Roessler, 2011:303).  
The ethnic power-sharing formula and the elite accommodation boosted the 
legitimacy of leaders of independent countries as national figures and strengthened 
their societal control through the institution of ethnic brokerage. The ethnic power 
holders were compensated with influence at the highest levels of government and 
access to state resources, which they amassed with impunity and subsequently, 
employed and financed their own patronage networks and mobilized societal support 
for the regime (Van de Walle, 2009:6).  Thus, many post-colonial African states 
relied on the promise of development and their ability to work towards meeting the 
important needs of all citizens. The legitimacy of their governments was incumbent 
on ameliorating these needs. Unable to fulfil their pre-independence promises,  post-
independence regimes became increasingly authoritarian to sustain their positions 
and legitimacy. 
However, as development initiatives failed, it quickened recourse to repression as 
regime maintenance became the overriding preoccupation of African post-colonial 
governments.  13They put increasing pressure on post-independence elites to live up 
to their promises of improved conditions of life and equitable of resources and power 
(Chazan et al, 1999). Given the inability of many African governments to meet the 
social and economic needs of their people, the citizens became disillusioned with 
governments that could not provide basic social and economic services, such as jobs, 
education, and adequate health-care. These rulers created “atmosphere[s] of 
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perpetual musical chairs” by their frequent reshuffling of ministers in and out of the 
government. Though costly in terms of government efficiency and productivity, 
“revolving door” appointments can be an effective political tool, as it prevents clients 
from amassing too much power within their respective ministries. Moreover, it 
expands the size of the ruling coalition while minimizing disaffection if the ruler can 
credibly convince clients that the revolving door to power always remains open, 
providing those who have been replaced with an incentive to stay in the ruler’s 
favour in hopes of a possible future appointment, rather than defecting and joining 
the opposition (Ibid). 
 Roessler (2012:309) notes that this is one of the most prevalent tactics rulers employ 
“to prevent threatening centres of power from coalescing” within their regimes, 
especially in the army, the security services, and the police, by the frequent 
replacement of cabinet ministers, commanders of armed forces, party leaders, and 
top bureaucrats as exemplified by the two of Africa’s longest-serving leaders, 
Mobutu Sese Seko, the President of Zaire between 1965 and 1997, and Hastings 
Banda, the President of Malawi from 1964 to 1994. Subsequently, the strains 
eventually lead to political violence which more often than not provides an 
environment for military take-over of governments by unconstitutional means. These 
situations occurred as professed allies, especially those with footholds in the army, 
police, or security services, exploited their regimes access and coercive capacities to 
seize power on their own.14Thus, in time, political leaders appeared to be more 
concerned with staying in power, and building an economic base for themselves, 
than in the economic and social development of the citizens. In the process, leaders 
were virtually deified for their commitment to the struggle for independence, and 
spent their later years embroiled in an undignified fight for political power at the 
expense of their countries. This trend is epitomized by President Robert Mugabe of 
Zimbabwe, whose policies have caused his country’s GDP to shrink by roughly 40 
per cent during 1999 to 2003. Inflation rose by 526 per cent by October 2003, and 
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left two-thirds of the population in need of food aid in 2002/3. Often, African leaders 
appeared distracted by the benefits of office since “power also brought with it many 
opportunities for attaining wealth in an African context of extreme scarcity and 
poverty as well as limited private accumulation.” Since most other avenues to wealth 
were restricted, with the larger private enterprises being in non-African hands, 
political power and the benefits associated with state control became the focus of 
intense struggle. Thus, “Patronage politics has been integral to post-colonial efforts 
to maintain political control in poor, ethnically diverse peasant societies. Yet, 
although valuable in helping to consolidate ruling coalitions, the dynamics of 
patronage relations have in many proved economically highly damaging” (Beeker 
and Gool, 2012:11).  In many post-colonial states, the result of patronage politics is a 
minority of economically well-off individuals, but an overwhelming majority  of the 
people are increasingly impoverished in a continent rich in natural resources and 
development potential. The inability of post-colonial governments to meet the 
legitimate needs of their citizens degenerates into violence and exacerbate deep-
seated ethnic animosities. The governing elites respond to this threat by adopting the 
strategy of ethnic exclusion so as to safeguard their grips on power, even at the cost 
of forfeiting societal control and risking civil war (Horowitz, 1985:471). This 
condition creates room for military intervention in African politics (although 
nowadays there are far fewer military coups in postcolonial Africa than was the case 
in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.) 
3.6 The impact of the military on Africa’s human security situation   
Almost all African countries that gained their independence in the 1960s started out 
with multi-party systems. However by the end of the 1980s, only few African 
countries maintained multiparty systems15. Indeed by 1970, half of the independent 
countries in Africa had military governments. That is, the military took over control 
of the government by unconstitutional means, usually through coups d’etat, and 
forcefully overthrew the elected civilian governments. Some coups d’etat were quite 
violent. In the process of taking control, the military ousted members of the civilian 
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government, including, at times, the president. However, surprisingly, sometimes 
coups d’etat were non-violent. In these cases, the military simply surrounded the 
presidential palace and the civilian government surrendered peacefully.  
Military intervention in African politics dates back to 1952 when Colonel Gamel 
Abdel Nasser overthrew King Farouk on July 23, 1952. In 1958 the second military 
coup took place in Africa. This time it was in Sudan when General Ibrahim Abboud 
overthrew the civilian government. The wave of military intervention washed over 
the West African coast when in 1963, a military coup was staged against the 
government of Silvanus Olympio of Togo and he lost his life in the process. Togo 
which attained independence on 27th April, 1960, became the first country in West 
Africa to experience a military coup. That same year, Colonel Christopher Soglo 
overthrew the government of Herbert Maga the Premier of Dahomey (now the 
Republic of Benin) on October 28, 1963 for endless political bickering. And in 
Nigeria, the first military intervention took place on January 15, 1966. Today, only a 
few African states have not experienced military intervention in their politics16. The 
frequency of coups d’état in this region reached the point where in Benin, for 
instance, in just one decade (1963 – 73), there were six successful coups.  
This averages to about one coup in every twenty months. Nigeria, Ghana and 
Burkina Faso are not very far behind on this table. Of the 16 countries in West 
Africa, only the Archipelagos of Cape Verde and Senegal have been spared the 
whips of men on horseback. There was an attempted coup in Senegal in 1962, 
however. This was engineered by Mamadou Dia, the then Prime Minister, under 
President Léopold Sédar Senghor (Wiking, 1983:53). The 'positive image' of military 
hierarchies and military governments was the first to be espoused, anchored solidly 
in formal organization theory. Briefly stated, the military was seen by many Africans 
as the most national, unified, disciplined, modern, and efficient structure in society, 
and the repository of western and managerial skills. Army officers were viewed as 
puritanical, nationalist, dedicated to rapid socio-economic change, a-political and 
impatient with, the sterile infighting, corruption, and mismanagement of resources by 
political elites (Decalo, 1973:111). As a result of these alleged attributes, the army 
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was viewed as “the most efficient type of organization for combining maximum rates 
of modernization with maximum levels of stability and control”, (Levy, 1966:603). 
However, many scholars have pointed out that these very same professional 
attributes limit its effectiveness in office. Specifically, the army's lack of ideology 
and developmental strategies, its hierarchical conception of authority and civic rule, 
were viewed as obstacles in the way of stable and constructive military 
administration (Mazrui, 1969:24). 
The initial declarations and actions of the military juntas were illustrative of systemic 
disequilibrium. They all claimed that the old regime was despotic, authoritarian and 
corrupt. They all promised to honour the country’s international obligations and 
respect human rights. Irrespective of these claims, various factors precipitated 
military take-overs in African states. These factors include the incipient 
developmental tensions consequent to mobilization policies, corruption, 
governmental inefficiency, and intensive inter-elite strife or to a general swing of the 
legitimacy pendulum from incompetent civilian regimes to allegedly efficient, 
honest, national, and apolitical military forces (Decalo,1973:113). Other claims 
responsible for military incursion in the continent’s politics were political tampering 
with military professional integrity, its hierarchy of command, budget, personal 
amenities, fringe benefits and pay scales.17  
However, Austin (1969) succinctly notes that the explanation of military 
interventions in Africa by pinpointing areas of systemic stress is not placing 
sufficient weight on the personal and idiosyncratic element in the military 
hierarchies, which have much greater freedom and scope of action within the context 
of fragmented and unstructured political systems. These praetorian assaults from 
various segments of the military regimes, engenders acute ethnic, inter-elite, and 
social-economic cleavages that further insecurity challenges in Africa. 
                                         
17 Throughout the continent, there have been striking similarities between military coups. Most of the 
coups that are described as bloodless have taken place while the head of state is away (e.g. Ghana’s 
Kwame Nkrumah in February 1966; Nigeria’s Yakubu Gowon in July 1975; Seychelles' James 
Mancham in June 1977; and Central Africa Republic’s Jean-Bedel Bokassa in September 1979; etc.), 
and are usually the handiwork of people either currently or formerly close to the deposed regime 
(Roessler, 2011:6). 




Once in power, most African militaries embarked on an internal settling of accounts 
within the army, military budgets increased while the coup plotters received 
accelerated promotions. Army salaries were increased. Contrary to the academic 
literature about austerity and Spartan tastes, the officer corps does not differ in its 
bourgeois tastes from the other elites, traditional cultural values not usually placing a 
high value on asceticism. Thus, for example, the austerity budgets of the N.L.C. in 
Ghana included a 5 per cent raise in military salaries, and 41 per cent increase in 
military expenditure between I966-7 and 1968-9, while allocations for agriculture, 
industries, communications, and trade were cut between 28.3 and 78.2 per cent 
(Price, 1971:425). And the blurring of civil-military boundaries brought about 
increased corruption and the politicization of army personnel, as well as the 
possibility of military fragmentation and counter-coups.     
Since the early 1980s the pendulum has slowly shifted away from a focus on the 
achievements of African armies, though some contemporary works still implicitly 
start with these assumptions. The body of evidence weighs heavily in the direction of 
African armies which are neither 'complex structures', nor national, westernized, or 
modern. In most instances, hierarchical structural charts camouflage deep malaise 
and cleavages reflecting the wider societal chasms superimposed upon lines of 
division based on age, class, education, and rank (Howe, 2001:46). And whatever 
organizational unity African armies may possess has frequently been dramatically 
eroded through the politicization of their cleavages and personal ambitions once in 
power. 
The African military juntas safeguarded their regimes by concentrating power in the 
hands of a small ruling clique who were in most cases, family members or co-
ethnics. These individuals were seen as more loyal due to trust developed over years 
of repeated interactions. They were embedded within the same social networks that 
facilitate information exchange and makes plotting more difficult; and stronger in-
group norms of reciprocity (Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Habyarimana et al.2007). 
Most of the military regimes reneged on redressing the enormous human security 
pathologies created by long years of misrule; rather, they cynically exploited their 
country’s ethnic and religious fault lines for personal advantage. These military 




regimes exerted dictatorial control over their societies and spread dissatisfaction 
among their citizens which has manifested overtime in popular rebellions and 
generated crises of human security.18  
While such counter-maneuvering is designed to strengthen one’s position, the 
downside of such tactics is that they reinforce the incumbent’s fears of a possible 
coup d’état. Overall, then, elite accommodation in the shadow of the coup d’état can 
give rise to an internal security dilemma, as power holders, fearful that the other side 
is going to violate its commitment to sharing power, maneuver to defend their 
privileged positions. But such action merely increases uncertainty; intrigue and 
suspicion that factions in the regime are plotting to seize or consolidate power at the 
expense of other stakeholders. Rising mutual fears lead allies-turned-rivals to adopt 
more extreme measures to defend themselves until eventually a point of no return is 
reached and both sides become convinced that they will be eliminated in the future. 
At this stage, eliminating one’s rival from power is the only viable strategy to 
guarantee political and personal survival as articulated by Zimbabwe’s president, 
Robert Mugabe, in 1982. Referring to his coalition partner in the midst of an 
escalating power struggle, Mugabe claimed that “ZAPU and its leader, Dr. Joshua 
Nkomo, are like a cobra in a house. The only way to deal effectively with a snake is 
to strike and destroy its head” (quoted in Cilliers, 2004:59). 
The sit-tight mentality of military dictatorships in Africa and their inability to open 
up democratic space created a pathology of counter coups which has had far-
reaching effects on political rule in postcolonial Africa. What makes the coup so 
dangerous compared with other anti-regime techniques, such as mass demonstrations 
                                         
18 As the juntas applied the strategies of ethnic stacking and discretionary appointments to monopolize 
wealth and power at the expenses of the masses, it increased anxiety and engendered tension as fellow 
military officers began to question the “conspiratorial and undemocratic character” of this clique and 
its control of states resources. In the absence of any credible guarantees that the regime and the 
shadow clique will not turn on them, “power holders” maneuver to protect their privileged positions 
and strengthen alliances in anticipation of the eventuality that the ruler will strike. Thus elites seek to 
build up their own secret networks and parallel security forces. This is exemplified in the late 1960s 
when Uganda’s chief of staff of the army, Idi Amin, fearing that President Milton Obote was going to 
replace him, began to recruit individuals from his home area in the West Nile District, especially from 
the Lugbara, Madi, Kakwa, and Nubian tribes who were mainly Sudanic speakers, to outnumber the 
predominance of soldiers ethnically closer to Obote, namely, those from the Acholi and Langi tribes. 
By one estimate, between 1968 and 1969 there was about 74 per cent increase in Sudanic speakers in 
the Ugandan army (Chabal and Daloz cited in Cilliers, 2004:58). Moreover, in late January 1970 
Amin’s deputy and potential successor, Brigadier Pierino Okoya, was found murdered 




or insurgencies, is connoted by its French meaning, “stroke of state.” In contrast to a 
rebellion, which requires a sustained military operation before it presents a credible 
challenge to the ruler’s grip on power, the counter coup, as a swift, surprise strike, 
poses a much more immediate and unpredictable threat, coming not from those based 
in society but from those inside the government who have the capability to use the 
state apparatus, especially the military or the police, to depose the incumbent.  
The imminence, proximity, and secrecy of the threat, coupled with its incredibly high 
costs, have forced rulers to be on the defensive at all times and adopt a set of “coup 
proofing” techniques, contributing to what Migdal describes as the “politics of 
survival.” (Migdal quoted in Roessler, 2011:7; see also Goldsmith, 2001; Horowitz, 
1985)  Decalo (1973:121) argues that with few exceptions it is difficult to find 
evidence, in the army interventions in tropical Africa, of any wish to bring about 
fundamental social changes in the structure of power within the state. “The coup as a 
method of change that changes little has become endemic to Africa's politics”. A 
change in political style, a redistribution of political and economic power among the 
elites, and the expansion of military interests is more often than not the most 
significant outcome of army rule. The change in political style includes a return to a-
political rule most characteristic of the colonial administration, linkages with the 
civil service, and the promotion of technocrats to the cabinet. Mobilization policies 
are de-emphasised, eroded traditional authority is retrenched, and a loose monolithic 
consensus is pursued with greater or lesser zeal. If corruption was rife during the 
civilian era, the army may set up commissions of inquiry, but will avoid criminally 
implicating the bulk of the civil service or, for that matter, itself or its allies in the 
coup. 
As the African military class becomes enmeshed in politics, their organizational 
unities are dramatically eroded through the politicization of their cleavages and 
personal ambitions. In a societal context of acute scarcity where other elites are 
competing for the same rewards and benefits, civilian and military grievances 
coincide, coupled with the existence of the corporate 19and personal ambitions of 
                                         
19 NRA was formed in 1981 when Yoweri Museveni's Popular Resistance Army (PRA) merged with 
ex-president Yusuf Lule's group, the Uganda Freedom Fighters (UFF). Museveni, then leader of the 
Uganda Patriotic Movement party, alleged electoral fraud and declared an armed rebellion, following 




officers, creating contradictions which escalated into violent conflicts in many 
African states. These wars of regime change are often engineered by self-described 
revolutionary movements that seek to overthrow the existing government and 
establish a new socio-economic dispensation, including conditions and content of 
citizenship. An important example is the National Resistance Movement-Army 
(NRM-A) of Yoweri Museveni, which captured power in Uganda in 1986, the 
second guerrilla organization in an African country after Chad to succeed in doing so 
(Amaza 1998; Kasozi 1994; Mamdani 1995; Kabwegyere 2000). Since then, wars of 
regime change have been waged in various countries from Liberia to Sierra Leone to 
Ivory Coast (Adebajo 2002; Moran, 2006; Marshall-Fratani, 2006), and from 
Somalia to Ethiopia to the two Congos, often with disastrous results that have led, 
not to state reconstruction as in Uganda and Ethiopia20, but rather to state 
retrenchment or even collapse, as in Somalia (Kusow 2004; Lyons and Samatar 
1995). Some of the movements waging these wars are best considered, like 
RENAMO, as ‘terrorist’ in their unwillingness to distinguish between military and 
civilian targets; indeed, they thrive on perpetrating systematic violence against 
civilians to demonstrate the incapacity of the state to protect them21. 
Many post-colonial rulers, whether civilian or military, succumbed to the temptations 
and blandishments of neo-liberal capitalism irrespective of the communitarian 
                                                                                                                   
the victory of Uganda Peoples Congress in the bitterly disputed 1980 general elections.Museveni, who 
had guerrilla war experience with the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO) in Mozambique, and 
his own Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) formed in Tanzania to fight Idi Amin, led the NRA 
to victory against Ugandan government troops (UNLA) in 1986. By the time that the victorious NRA 
entered Kampala in 1986, about a quarter of its 16,000 combatants were Banyarwanda. 
20 See Collette, N. and I. Wiederhofer. 1996. “Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The 
Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda”, World Bank 
Discussion Paper no 331. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
21 Postcolonial African history is replete with examples of the breakdown and violent rupture of elite 
accommodation, often involving very personal fallouts between friends and comrades-in-arms, such 
as between Jean-Bédel Bokassa and Alexander Banza in Central African Republic in the late 1960s; 
Mathieu Kérékou and michel Aikpe and Javier Assogba in Benin in of the early 1970s; lansana Conté 
and Diarra Traoré in Guinea in the mid-1980s; Samuel Doe and Thomas Quiwonkpa in liberia in the 
early 1980s; Hissène Habré and hassan Djamous and idriss Déby in Chad in the late 1980s; João 
Bernardo Vieira and his chief of staff of the army, Ansumane Mané, in Guinea-Bissau in 1998; and 
Robert Guéï and Ibrahim Coulibaly in Côte d’ivoire in 2000. In each of these examples the elites 
cooperated to seize the state, only to experience a violent divorce over their inability to commit to 
sharing power. Viewed thus, all the inadequacies of civilian rule usually cited as reasons for military 
take-overs become the ‘backdrop’ against which inter-elite conflicts (intra-civil, intra-military, and 
civil-military) arise, and the arena within which personal ambitions manifest themselves 




principles of Africa’s cultures22. These elite’s indulgences created cultural antinomy 
as such privileges were not extended beyond their neo-class boundaries.  Excessively 
lavish and wasteful ‘bling’ lifestyles enjoyed by a small elite provided fertile ground 
for corruption, particularly with a background of high levels of poverty, inequality 
and unemployment. This scenario is  depicted by Diop (2012:223-224): “the socialist 
communitarian-minded intellectuals or academics who on being appointed to offices 
of important ministerial positions in governments are transformed from living lives 
of mind to living the superficial lives of exaggerated material wealth, openly on 
display with its expected posturing and pomposity”. 
For their part, the superpowers and former colonial masters remained undaunted in 
their support for whoever came to power irrespective of the means as long as their 
interests were adequately projected and rigorously pursued. However, the end of the 
Cold War engendered increasing demands for African rulers to implement economic 
and political reforms.  The sudden withdrawal of superpower support not only laid 
bare the ephemeral nature of the state but also precipitated a process of failure and 
collapse in most African states. By the 1980s, pressure from the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund and Western powers impelled African governments to 
adopt neo-liberal structural adjustment programmes. Most public enterprises and 
state-owned companies were privatized as governments were asked to shrink, 
downsize and to limit their activities towards ensuring the provision of business-
friendly environments. Weak-state politics and internal conflicts are linked in two 
primary aspects. In the first and most extreme case, rulers (and their rivals) see great 
benefits in the creation and maintenance of ‘war economies’ or ‘complex 
emergencies’ (see Bardal and Keen 1997; Reno 1995, 1998a, 1998b; Duffield 1998; 
Kaldor 1999; Keen 1998; Jung and Schlichte 1999). Far from being a breakdown in 
normally peaceful politics, or an irrational outburst of ethnic hatred, many of 
Africa’s current internal conflicts are the direct result of deliberate, rationally 
calculated strategies aimed at accumulation by state (and non-state) elites. In the 
environment created by intrusive globalization, with increased external demands and 
decreasing internal resources, conflict and instability may be associated with 
                                         
22 See Beckman, B. 1993. The Liberation of Civil Society: neo-liberal Ideology and Political Theory. 
Review of African Political Economy. Volume 20, issue 58. Pp 22-33 




innovative and expanding forms of political economy (Duffield 1998). Some internal 
conflicts are, in fact, a new form of politics, what many are calling “warlord politics” 
(Reno 1998a).   
Globalization processes are the key external variable in the so-called ‘explosion’ of 
internal conflict in Africa since the fall of the Berlin wall. A large number of Africa’s 
states were sustained by the patronage they attracted from Cold War protagonists 
who allowed them to buy off political rivals, suppress local strongmen through 
superior arms, or quell internal opposition in the name of anticommunism or anti- 
imperialism23. Mobutu’s regime in Uganda, Mengistu’s regime in Ethiopia and Siad 
Barre’s regime in Somalia were classic examples of this process. The loss of this 
support following the decline of superpower rivalry, and subsequent international 
pressure towards economic and political liberalism undercut the ability of African 
leaders to maintain their regimes without resorting to war or reinventing 
patrimonialism in new and innovative forms. In a related process, the political space 
for African elites has been narrowed by the imposition of the political and economic 
conditionalities of the Washington consensus. That is, “by emptying the political 
arena of ideas, competition for power was reduced to its bare essentials, personality 
and local/ethnic considerations became paramount, and the remnants of the state 
were likely to fall prey to the untrammelled competition for power” (Cornwell, 
1999:71).   
Globalization processes have also widened the gap between the developed and 
developing regions of the world and exacerbated the economic crisis that lies at the 
heart of many weak states. Declining revenues for both patronage and coercion have 
forced weak-state leaders to adapt, often towards the direct military control of 
resources and populations. More traditional internal conflicts, or civil wars, which 
                                         
23 Data from U.S. Agency for International Development (2009) shows a decrease in total U.S. 
military assistance to third countries since the early 1980s. The Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute estimates that world military expenditures dropped from $1.1 trillion in the late 
1980s to $740 billion in 1997. There was also a drastic reduction in international arms sales: from 
1986 to 1995, they plummeted 55% (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2008). The 
Soviet Union became actively involved in sub-Saharan Africa, which came second after the Middle 
East in the volume of Soviet assistance received; during the 1956–88 period, it received $23 billion 
(Mott 2001, 52). In 1974, there were approximately 3,600 Soviet advisers in Somalia alone (Andrew 
and Mitrokhin 2005, 449). Such aid may have been militarily effective in the short term but did not 
strengthen weak states in the long term. In fact, Clapham (1996) argues the opposite in the case of 
African states. 




have been on-going since the Cold War period in Sudan, Somalia, Angola, are now 
showing similar adaptions, particularly the formation of entrenched war economies 
(Ibrahim, 2013:87-88).   
At the less extreme end of the scale, internal conflict is the inadvertent result of 
nonetheless risky strategies by African elites to hold onto power (particularly in 
times of crisis), establish hegemony, or manage political demands. Pursuing 
exclusionary politics, the indiscriminate use of state coercion on civilian populations, 
unleashing ethnic chauvinism, or manipulating multiparty elections are all high-risk 
strategies that can lead directly to war. Similarly, the failure to deal appropriately 
with spill-over or contagion effects, internal or external shocks, or eroding state 
autonomy (state collapse), can also result in internal conflict.  It is the structural 
features of weak states which are the context or underlying causes of internal 
conflicts, and the strategies of elites which are the proximate cause or trigger. The 
key variables in explaining internal conflict, therefore, are weak-state structures and 
weak-state processes (Arriola, 2009:1342-7).    
3.7 Neo-liberal policies as the source of Africa’s human security 
challenges  
David Harvey, in his book A Brief History of Neoliberalism, defines neoliberalism as 
a theory of political and economic practices which proposes that human well-being 
can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills 
within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free 
markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional 
framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the 
quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defence, police and 
legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to 
guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if 
markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social 
security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if 
necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State interventions in 
markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the 
theory, the “state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess 
market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort 




and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit” 
(Harvey, 2005:2).  
 Economic reform programs such as austerity measures, structural adjustment 
programs which are introduced in the context of economic stabilization often 
intensify poverty and income inequality, at least in the short run, and therefore can 
exacerbate human insecurity24. The introduction of user fees for previously free 
services in many African countries has heightened social tensions, as has the removal 
of certain producer and consumer subsidies. Austerity measures have caused food 
riots and other forms of instability in some countries. This in turn has led to the 
expansion of security systems designed to repress public expressions of discontent, 
undermining what are often parallel processes of democratization. The Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and Austerity Measures were sets of neo-liberal 
policies introduced by the Bretton Woods institutions, notably the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank, in the early 1980s. SAPs were born as a result of a 
debt crisis that hit most African countries after the demise of the Cold-War. This debt 
crisis has its origin in the early 1970s when the newly independent African countries 
were encouraged by the West to borrow money from the International Financial 
Institutions to finance their developmental projects. Even the World Bank “preached 
the doctrine of debt as the path towards accelerated development”.  As a result, huge 
amounts were borrowed by the political elites, often wasted on luxuries, ‘white 
elephant’ projects or stolen by corrupt officials (Usually stooges, selected by the 
exiting colonial powers to lead these failed African states). Very little was invested 
productively with a view to achieving sustainable economic growth (George, 1995: 
21).  
The IMF and World Bank which in principle were supposed to facilitate trade and 
make short-term loans available to countries with temporary balance of payment 
problems (George 1995: 19), in practice exercise strong influence over the economic 
policies of most African countries. Far from being democratic, these Bretton Woods 
institutions entrenched the policies of the rich industrialized countries of the West 
                                         
24  Ross P. Buckley, “The Rich Borrow and the Poor Repay: The Fatal Flaw in International Finance”, 
World Policy Journal, Volume XIX, No 4, Winter 2002/03 (Emphasis Added). Also see: Carol Welch, 
“Structural Adjustment Programs & Poverty Reduction Strategy, Foreign Policy in Focus”, name of 
journal? Vol 5, Number 14, April 2000. 




who virtually control its apparatus irrespective of its over 170 member countries.25 
The inability of many African countries to repay their debt has made them dependent 
on new loans. The IMF has the power to declare countries credit worthy or not. To 
get the seal of approval countries have to accept the conditions of structural 
adjustment programs advocated by the Bretton Woods institutions. They have to 
restructure their economies according to IMF/World Bank guidelines – otherwise 
they will have virtually no chance to get loans from private or public creditors 
anywhere ( George,1995:19-21). 
These measures forced countries on a path of deregulated free market economies 
through liberalization, opening national markets to international competition, 
privatization of public services and companies, deregulation of labour relations and 
cutting social safety nets and reduction of government deficit through cuts in public 
spending. The IMF and World Bank basically determine countries’ macro-economic 
policies; they take control over central bank policies and over public expenditure 
through the so-called ‘Public Expenditure Review’ (Toissant and Comanne 1995:14). 
Structural Adjustment Programmes engendered the gradual withdrawal of the state 
from basic health and educational services. Under its ‘Public Investment Programme’ 
the IMF even decides what type of infrastructure should be built, while an imposed 
system of international tender ensures that public-works projects are carried out by 
international construction and engineering firms ( Chossudovsky, 1995: 59).  
SAPs were built on the fundamental condition that debtor countries have to repay 
their debt in hard currency thereby converting the productive patterns of African 
states from what local people eat, wear or use towards goods that can be sold in the 
industrialized countries so as to obtain such currencies for loan repayment. The 
                                         
25The United States and Western European countries suddenly increased these interest rates 
outrageously, making it virtually impossible for African countries to service their debts.  Indebted 
African countries were forced to take up new loans to pay the interest so as to avoid bankruptcy. For 
instance, in 1980 the total debt of developing countries stood at US$ 567 billion. Between 1980 and 
1992 these countries paid back US$ 1662 billion. However, because of the high interest rates, the debt 
increased to US$ 1419 billion in 1992 – despite the repayments. Debt repayments drain about US$ 
160 billion each year from ‘developing’ countries. This is about 2.5 times the total development aid 
that these countries receive. Since the 1980s, debt repayments are a major mechanism of transferring 
wealth from the South to the North (Quoted in Touissaint and Comanne, 1995:9). The former French 
President Francois Mitterand admitted this when he said in 1994: ‘Despite the considerable sums 
spent on bilateral and multilateral aid, the flow of capital from Africa toward the industrial countries is 
greater than the flow of capital from the industrial countries to the developing countries’ (Touissaint 
and Comanne 1995: 10-12). 




truncation of African productive patterns led to escalation of violent conflicts in 
many parts of the continent. Between 1980 and 1992, African countries lost 52% of 
their export income due to deteriorating prices (Touissant and Comanne, 1995: 12; 
George, 1995:22; Bournay, 1995: 51). The structural adjustment programmes 
became an integral part of the dynamic of crisis in Africa and increasingly 
complicated the economic problems of the continent (Laasko and Olukoshi, 1996: 
19; Ake, 1996), sharp drops in living standards and mass hunger followed. The 
unbridled reliance on market forces orchestrated by privatization and removal of 
safety nets invariably compounded the concentration of wealth in a few hands, 
expanding at a heightened pace the number of the marginalized and excluded. As 
Ojo (1999: 6) perceptively observes, “nothing can be a greater threat to security than 
being excluded from life supporting economic activities”. The Commission on 
Human Security (CHS) supports this view by noting that “the exclusion and 
deprivation of whole communities of people from the benefits of development 
naturally contribute to the tensions, violence and conflict within countries” 
(Commission on Human Security, 2003: 5). 
The neo-liberal agenda has placed much stress on the necessity to shrink the state 
while enlarging the purview of the market. Indeed, the market is to be allowed to do 
its work unhindered. This has in practice meant the systematic effort to reverse those 
elements of the welfare state that in post-colonial Africa marked fundamental aspects 
of the nation-building project. Across Africa, policies such as the removal of state 
subsidies from various social and productive sectors (education, health and 
agriculture), privatization, denationalization, public sector down-sizing, etc., all of 
which the standard structural adjustment programme insists upon, have combined to 
unleash human security threats that may not be war-related, but undermine every 
conceivable idea of a meaningful life (Abutudu,2005:34). 
Chossudovsky (1997:57) argues that the environment of scarcity created in the wake 
of adjustment programmes in Africa precipitates the exacerbation of people’s 
insecurity by massively visiting state repression on those who protest their increasing 
misery. Yet, this environment of deprivation has the potential to directly heighten 
competition among dominant elites for dwindling state resources, a situation that has 
often sparked violence among groups, whether communal, ethnic or religious, who 




are easily mobilized behind their ‘leaders’. Situations like this suggest a link between 
the ‘economic genocide’ unleashed by structural adjustment programmes and 
globalization accentuating communal and ethnic violence in Africa26. In focusing on 
the issue of security, it is necessary to pay attention to certain elements in the 
conceptual makeup of human security as possible sources of ambiguity in its 
operationalization. For example, terms such as ‘freedom’ or ‘enabling environment’ 
may be suggestive of efforts to sustain and provide a rationale for neo-liberal 
economism. It is clear, for example, that as put forward by the Human Security 
Commission, this framework is taken as given. It does not critique policies which 
generate ‘deprivations and oppression’, since such policies only become threats or 
‘menaces’ when they generate long term deprivation and oppression.  
Chossudovsky (1997, 1999), notes the linkage between IMF and World Bank 
sponsored reforms, the economic crisis, and the varying degrees of political violence 
that has bedeviled Africa. He argues that the Rwandan (ethnic) genocide of 1994 was 
fuelled by the imposition of the IMF/World bank reforms which consequently 
inflamed ethnic tensions and accelerated the process of economic collapse after the 
economic deterioration that followed in the wake of the collapse of the international 
coffee market in 198727 (Chossudovsky quoted in Prunier,1995:160). 
In Somalia, an economic system based on exchanges between pastoralists and small 
agriculturalists, and virtually self-sufficient in food production up to the late 1970s, 
was disrupted when the Bretton Woods reform programme was introduced in the 
early 1980s. The periodic devaluation of the Somali shilling which came as part of 
this package in 1981 led to price hikes in the cost of farm inputs, even as the 
purchasing power of urban dwellers plunged. The livestock economy itself became a 
                                         
26The result has been worsening economic conditions in most countries, particularly in Africa. This 
provoked what has been dubbed ‘IMF-Riots’ – the gut protests that occurred frequently in most 
African capitals once  
IMF/World Bank conditionalities were implemented by national governments. Such riots have been 
responsible for fall of more than a dozen African governments in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
including Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia in 1991 (Bond and Dor, 2003).  
27Wood (2001, p.64) argues that especially in poorer states ethnicity plays a significant role in 
economic and social differentiation. Poverty, overpopulation, land scarcity, possible famine and 
competition for power offer fertile ground for the ideology of Lebensraum. This ideology is advanced 
by extremist forces in order to accumulate resources which are currently not available to their 
people.  This ideology was implemented in Rwanda to describe Tutsis as invaders who are responsible 
for the socio-economic imbalance.  
  




victim of the privatization of animal health, the commercialization of water and the 
neglect of water and rangeland conservation. Cattle exports, and therefore foreign 
exchange earnings, fell drastically. The basis of exchange between pastoral and 
smallholder agriculture was undermined, and the foreign exchange earning capability 
was negatively affected. Simultaneously, the efforts to roll back the state were to 
unfold through the retrenchment of 40% of the public-sector work force 
(Chossudovsky, 2011:np).  
The IMF and World Bank advocate for political liberalization as one of  their 
fundamental conditions and as an integral aspect of structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs).28 This  condition has witnessed a multiplication of political 
parties throughout the sub-continent. Moreover, the combination of liberal 
democracy and SAPs has undermined democratic dividends. The absence of 
substantive democracy has become a major source of mass disillusionment in many 
African countries. It is a collective discontent that threatens to undermine the idea of 
democracy itself. As earlier noted, the democracy as crafted in many African 
countries had the strong input of the IMF/World Bank group and other donors 
through the conditionality attached to structural adjustment programmes. Thus, in 
spite of the consensus that emerged,   democratic regimes were constrained from the 
outset in economic and social policy. Any give democratic regime’s mandate in these 
respects generally discounted the needs of the voters in favour of implementing harsh 
adjustment policies, or at best, economic growth. Secondly, democracy has come to 
typify, in Africa, a ritual of plural political parties and periodic elections. But the 
liberal democracy that supposedly arose from this has reduced democracy to multi-
party elections, which are no longer threatening to African despots. It provides them 
with international respectability without constraining their absolutism, 
authoritarianism, corruption and ineffectiveness29. It does not prioritize   the 
                                         
28The debt crisis in Africa is a case in point. Nigeria borrowed US$ 3 billion between 1978 and 1983. 
That debt had become a US$ 32 billion albatross by 2000, even after about US$ 10 billion has been 
used in servicing it in the intervening period. Servicing this debt annually in current terms required 
about the principal sum originally borrowed. Replicated among most African countries in varying 
degrees, this situation is an obvious ‘menace’ to the ability of African states to deploy resources to 
tackle ravaging diseases such as malaria and HIV/AIDS on the continent or make meaningful progress 
in eradicating illiteracy (Chossudovsky cited in Abutudu, 2005:43).   
29See: Yusuf Kianda and Mathias Kamp (eds).The State of Multiparty Democracy in Uganda. 2010.  




problems of the poor such as poverty, ignorance and disease, which keep them from 
effective participation in multiparty elections (Nnoli, 2003: 17-18). 
As the state’s ability to address issues of poverty, illiteracy and disease declines, the 
resulting mass disillusionment creates problems of legitimacy for regimes, which try 
to maintain themselves in power through repression and election rigging30. Over the 
past four decades, various forms of communal and religious violence have been the 
hallmark of many African countries. Civil wars, ethno-religious violence, ethnic 
cleansing, insurgency, terrorism, etc., have been the more extreme expression of a 
process that has seen economic crisis and IMF/World Bank reforms pitching the state 
against its citizens, and community against community, in shooting wars. In response 
to the crises raging in Africa, the World Bank and the IMF subsequently launched 
the HIPC Initiative, with the aim of ensuring that no poor country faces a debt 
burden it cannot manage. Since then, the international financial community, 
including multilateral organizations and governments have worked together to reduce 
to sustainable levels the external debt burdens of the most heavily indebted poor 
countries. In 1999, a comprehensive review of the Initiative allowed the Fund to 
provide faster, deeper, and broader debt relief and strengthened the links between 
debt relief, poverty reduction, and social policies. In 2005, to help accelerate 
progress toward the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the 
HIPC Initiative was supplemented by the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). 
The MDRI allows for 100 percent relief on eligible debts by three multilateral 
institutions—the IMF, the World Bank, and the African Development Fund (AfDB) 
for countries completing the HIPC Initiative process. In 2007, the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IaDB) also decided to provide additional “beyond HIPC” debt 
relief to the five HIPCs in the Western Hemisphere31. 
3.8 Poverty as a source of human insecurity in Africa   
One of the major causes of insecurity and instability in Africa is poverty. In 2010, the 
UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated that 239 million people in 
                                         
30 For instance, Gnassingbe Eyedema of Togo: 1967-2005, Omar Bongo of Gabon: 1967-2009, 
Francois Bozize of CAR: 2003-2013, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe: 1980-present, Yahya Jammeh of 
Gambia: 1994-present etc. 
31 See: International Monetary Fund Fact Sheet: Debt Relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) Initiative. 




sub-Saharan Africa constituting about 30 percent of the overall population were 
hungry and undernourished. In its most recent estimates, Africa was reputed to be the 
continent with the second largest number of hungry people, as Asia and the Pacific 
had 578 million, principally due to the much larger population of Asia when 
compared to sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa actually had the largest 
proportion of its population undernourished (FAO 2010).  Thus, almost one in three 
people who live in sub-Saharan Africa  are hungry, far  more than any other region of 
the world, with the exception of South Asia. 
Poverty can be defined as a static or dynamic concept. The definition of poverty as a 
cycle projects its dynamic nature and its linkage to marginalization and social 
exclusion. Marxist theory projects a perspective of poverty that relates to images of 
social processes and social structures within a society. This view reveals a linkage of 
poverty to conflict. For example, the peasantry in Marxist ideology provides a fertile 
ground for social revolution (Castells 1996). Webster English dictionary defines 
poverty as “The state or condition of having little or no money, goods, or means of 
support”. This is an extremely vague definition and covers poverty as a whole. The 
World Bank definition (2006:4) summarizes the various conceptions of poverty 
described above. Using a basic needs approach the World Bank provides a simple 
definition of poverty which views the phenomenon as multidimensional and a 
situation in which people are unable to fulfil their basic human needs as well as lack 
of control over resources, lack education and skills, poor health, malnutrition, lack of 
shelter, poor access to water and sanitation, vulnerability to shocks, violence and 
crime and the lack of political freedom and voice. For ease of comparison, the Bank 
uses “reference lines set at $1 and $2 per day in 1993 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
terms where PPPs measure the relative purchasing power of currencies across 
countries”. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(2001,para:13) defines poverty as a ‘sustained or chronic deprivation of the 
resources, capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for the enjoyment of an 
adequate standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic, political and social 
rights’. This definition crystallises more than a century of research on poverty and 
shows how far our understanding of poverty has come. From the early FGT 
generation measures when poverty was mostly about money measures, this UN 




definition showcases the multi-dimensional understanding that has emerged in this 
paradigm shift.  Stigliz, Sen and Fitoussi (2009:7) give a concise assessment of this 
on-going shift which identifies some of the missing dimensions of poverty. In the 
early 1990s the UNDP, inspired by some of the earlier works of Amartya Sen, 
introduced human development index (HDI), thus, demonstrating that wellbeing is 
more than just about money. There is now general consensus that we can only 
understand and deal with poverty if we understand all its dimensions. A new 
generation of multi-dimensional poverty indexes has also begun to emerge.   
Poverty is a multi-faceted problem that goes beyond economics to include, for 
instance, social, political, and cultural issues. Some notable scholars have argued that 
poverty engenders deprivation, insecurity, and aggression which invariably lead to 
violent conflicts and instability (Gurr, 1970; Sandbrook, 1982; Nathan, 2003). 
Burton (1997:43) argues that the escalation of conflict and instability in developing 
countries is precipitated by gross denial and marginalization of people’s biological 
and psychological needs that relate to growth and development. The overriding 
importance of this argument is that people’s basic needs (such as food, water, shelter 
and health) cannot be traded, suppressed, or bargained for. Thus any attempt to do 
this leads to conflict. According to Aristotle, social strife and revolutions are not 
brought out by the conspiratorial or malignant natures of man; rather revolutions are 
derived from poverty and distributive injustice. Therefore, when the poor are in the 
majority and have no prospect of ameliorating their condition, they are bound to be 
restless and seek restitution through violence. No government can build stability and 
peace when it is awash on a sea of poverty (cited in Okanya, 1996:3).  
Hettne (2002:2) developed five categorizations of poverty. These are absolute 
poverty, relative poverty, administrative poverty, consensual poverty and contextual 
poverty. First, absolute poverty occurs when human beings live in a state of 
deprivation due to meager income or lack of access to basic human needs which 
include food, pottable water, sanitation, health, shelter, education, and information. 
Second, relative poverty defines poverty from a comparative point of view. Here, 
poverty is not absolute but relative. Imagine a hypothetical world with three 
countries, A, B, and C with an estimated wealth of 70 per cent, 25 per cent, and 5 per 
cent respectively. Assume further that poverty is pegged at 30 per cent and below. 




Under these assumptions, both B and C are poverty-stricken but C is poorer relative 
to B. Third, administrative poverty includes all those who are eligible for state 
welfare because they are either temporarily unemployed and/or unable to earn an 
income. Fourth, consensual poverty depends on the perceptions of what the public 
deems to be below basic sustenance. Finally, contextual poverty is based on a 
comparison of poverty with the socio-cultural and economic levels of a particular 
society.  
The categories are helpful in contrasting the poor and non-poor in a particular 
society. A common thread runs through all these distinctions between types of 
poverty. They highlight the fact that poverty is a general condition of deprivation and 
want that consigns its victims to the periphery of their societies. In short, poverty is 
linked to economics. But this approach is not very helpful to policy planners. There 
is therefore the need for a more comprehensive and holistic approach to move 
definitions of poverty beyond economics (Lipton et al, 1992). According to the 
Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC) Report (2005), there are two dimensions 
of poverty. These dimensions can be differentiated by those living in long term 
(durable) or chronic poverty, and those who occasionally or are sometimes poor 
(transitory poor) (CPRC 2005:19-20). The length of time that qualifies an individual 
as living in chronic poverty is variable. The emerging consensus is that it is data 
availability that ultimately can tell us which households have remained in poverty 
between the measurements periods, and therefore fit the dimension of chronic 
poverty. After more than a decade of work on chronic poverty, we now know that the 
upper limit for chronic poverty is often a lifetime. In general chronic poverty will 
include those that have always been poor (have never been above the poverty 
threshold) and those that are usually poor (may occasionally be above the line but on 
balance are below the poverty threshold most of the time). The reason for this 
distinction is largely to do with the nature of policy responses to the different levels 
of poverty..  The term ‘extreme poverty’ is often used as a proxy for chronic poverty 
since it is often easier to calculate the extremely poor based on single data bases 
(CPRC, 2005:21). Those living in transitory poverty include those whose fortunes 
fluctuate around a given poverty threshold. In most African agrarian societies, this 
might include households that emerge out of poverty during a good agricultural 




season but fall below the line with any adverse event to their livelihoods. Also 
included in the category of the transitorily poor are households that have experienced 
poverty before but on balance have living standards above the poverty threshold. For 
example, a household whose breadwinner loses a job due to the financial crisis may 
decline into poverty till the means of livelihood are restored at which point the 
household may move again above the poverty threshold (CPRC, 2005:22-26). 
 In Africa, absolute poverty is most prevalent while other categorizations are  overtly 
present. Most people do not have sufficient income to purchase the basic necessities 
of life. According to United Nations Report (2008: np), about 75 per cent of the 
world’s poorest countries are located in Africa. This statistic includes historically 
poor regions like Zimbabwe, Liberia, and Ethiopia. For the past two years, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Africa’s second largest country, has also been 
ranked the poorest in the world. In 2010, 414 million people were living in extreme 
poverty in sub-Saharan Africa accounting for 48.5 percent of the population in that 
region. Approximately 1 in 3 people living in sub-Saharan Africa are 
undernourished. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United 
Nations (UN) estimated that 239 million people (around 30 percent of the 
population) in sub-Saharan Africa were hungry in 2010. This is the highest 
percentage of any region in the world. In addition, the UN Millennium Project 
reported that over 40 percent of all Africans are unable to regularly obtain sufficient 
food and about 547 million people live without electricity in sub-Saharan Africa. As 
a result, a staggering 80 percent of the population relies on biomass products, such as 
wood, charcoal, and dung, in order to cook. Over 500 million Africans suffer from 
waterborne diseases. According to the UN Millennium Project (2010:47-59) more 
than 50 percent of Africans have a water-related illness like cholera. Every year, sub-
Saharan Africa loses $28.4 billion to water and sanitation problems. This amount 
accounts for approximately 5 percent of the region’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
exceeding the total amount of foreign aid sent to sub-Saharan Africa in 2003.  
About 38 percent of the world’s refugees are located in Africa. Many of these 13.5 
million refugees and displaced persons have lost their homes due to widespread 
violence and conflict. Fewer than 20 percent of African women have access to 
education. Uneducated African women are twice as likely to contract AIDS and 50 




percent less likely to immunize their children. Meanwhile, the children of African 
women with at least five years of schooling have a 40 percent higher chance of 
survival. Women in sub-Saharan Africa are over 230 times more likely to die during 
childbirth or pregnancy than women in North America. Approximately 1 in 16 
women living in sub-Saharan African will die during childbirth or pregnancy 
compared with 1 in 3,700 women in North America. More than 1 million African 
children die every year from malaria. Malarial deaths in Africa alone account for 90 
percent of all malaria deaths worldwide. 80 percent of these victims are African 
children. The UN Millennium Project (2010:47-49) has calculated that a child in 
Africa dies from malaria every 30 seconds. 
These vulnerabilities create dissatisfaction and disillusionment among the masses, 
particularly when the government is corrupt. Conflicts are therefore often caused by 
an attempt to acquire these basic needs by violent means. As deprivation increases, it 
engenders frustration which escalates and erupts into violence. Poverty in Africa is 
caused by a number of factors. The principal causes of poverty are harmful economic 
systems, corruption, environmental factors such as drought and climate change, 
population growth, poor governance, inadequate employment opportunities, poor 
infrastructural development, resource underutilization, unending conflicts, wars, poor 
IMF/World bank policies, among others (WHES 2012). Irrespective of the 
continent’s human and material resources, 47 per cent of African population lives on 
$1.25 a day or less, a principal factor in causing widespread hunger (United Nation, 
2012:207). The World Bank (2005: np) notes “Sub-Saharan Africa is the world’s 
poorest continent, with nearly half of its 719 million people subsisting on less than a 
dollar (US$1) per day”. The statistics from the MDGs Assessment (2007:4) record 
that poverty has declined in a number of African countries. Notwithstanding, Africa 
remains the world’s most poverty stricken continent (UN, 2007). 
 According to “The Economist” (cited inWrong, 2004:52), about 40 per cent of the 
region’s wealth is privately held and stashed in foreign bank accounts outside the 
region. Green and Seidman (1968) argue that there have been structural imbalances 
in African economies, compared to other regions. It may be contended that this view 
has been overtaken by time. However, It is  Africa’s predicament that caused Ali 
Mazrui (in Fapohunda, 2002), one of the most celebrated African writers, to assert 




that Africa is the first home of mankind, yet the last to be made truly inhabitable in 
contemporary world as a result of poverty and underdevelopment. In fact the 
common problem of poverty in Africa is a clear case of ‘resiptsa loquito’ (meaning 
‘the matter speaks for itself’), particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, a body 
of empirical work has emerged which identifies poverty as one of the causal factors 
behind violent conflict, although again, this does not differentiate between chronic 
and transient poverty. Broadly, it is argued that uneven development processes lead 
to inequality, exclusion and poverty.  This contributes to growing grievances 
particularly when poverty coincides with ethnic, religious, language or regional 
boundaries.   
These underlying grievances may explode into open conflict when triggered by 
external shocks (such as a sudden change in terms of trade) or mobilized by conflict 
entrepreneurs. Although few argue that poverty per se causes conflict, research 
points to the importance of extreme horizontal inequalities as a source of grievance 
which is used by leaders to mobilize followers and to legitimize violent actions 
(Stewart and FitzGerald, 2000). On the other hand, according to Hunger Notes 
(2013:3), the operation of the global economic and political system are chiefly 
responsible for the excruciating poverty and hunger in Africa and elsewhere. 
Essentially, control over resources and income is based on military, political and 
economic power that typically ends up in the hands of a minority, who live well, 
while those at the bottom barely survive. The implication is that gross inequality 
exists as the budgetary axe tends to descend on programmes for the poor. For 
example, the trade deregulation introduced by SAPs had a crippling effect on certain 
groups, thus accentuating inter-group tension.  Historically, marginalized sections of 
the population often turn to organized crime and banditry. Similar processes can be 
identified in many of today’s conflicts. As Keen notes: “in Sierra Leone, a chronic 
shortage of employment opportunities has been matched by a contraction in 
educational opportunities and in these circumstances many youths have turned to 
rebellion as a kind of ‘short cut’ to wealth as well as status” (Keen, 1998:7).  Another 
example can be found in Nigeria where a major contributory factor to the Boko 
Haram insurgency in the Northern part of the country was the sense of 
marginalization of the rural youth popularly known as ‘Almajeris’.  Although 




liberalization has brought benefits to Nigeria (it recently became the fastest growing 
economy in Africa), it has also produced a fragile and brittle rural economy and 
growing economic disparities (Esidene and Yatu, 2012:11).  
Though poverty may not be the underlying cause of violent conflict, it is an 
important factor in its sustainance. In situations where there are few sources of 
livelihood, joining militant or terrorist groups may represent an essential survival 
strategy, as evidenced in Nigeria’s Niger-Delta region where gross marginalization 
of the oil-producing communities from resource extraction and distribution created 
negative local environmental impacts leading to growing tensions. Extractive 
development policies lead to resource scarcity and environmental stress. This may 
manifest itself in tensions between pastoralists and farmers, or between the landless 
and landowners, as for example, the crisis in Western Darfur clearly demonstrated. It 
may also lead to stress-induced migration. Thus, environmental degradation and 
resource scarcity may become a significant aggravator or trigger of violence. 
Therefore, poverty and insecurity are commonly understood to be closely related. 
Both evoke images of destitution, destruction and human suffering. To sum up: 
human insecurity in Africa has led to high numbers of deaths and displaced people, 
material destruction and even state collapse. In this way, years of development 
efforts and investments are destroyed. Arguably, under certain circumstance poverty 
is a cause of conflict. When poverty-induced grievances are not met, poor people will 
riot, question government altogether and join rebel groups. Economic decline and 
extreme poverty may then reinforce tendencies to resort to violent means.    
3.9 Ethnicity as a source of human insecurity in Africa 
Ethnic conflict is a major political problem that continues to undermine the human 
security of many African countries. Ethnic rivalry over scarce resources and political 
power to control resources has led to violent conflicts and occasionally to full scale 
wars. Kelman (2007:64-65) defines an ethnic group as a group of people whose 
members identify with each other through a common heritage, often consisting of a 
common language, culture, religion, ideology or geographical area. Ethnicity is an 
identity. As a result, it inevitably occupies sizeable space within the political arena 
and also it is the easiest and most natural way for people to mobilize around basic 
human needs such as security, food, shelter, economic well-being, inequality, land 




distribution, autonomy, and recognition. This is why ethnicity can be a powerful 
catalyst for violence. Ethnicity and ethnic rivalry are not new developments in 
Africa.  Ethnic politics in Africa have their roots in the contradictions inherent in the 
exercise of state power by colonial authorities seeking to establish hegemony (Boon, 
1994:111). Ethnic identity formation facilitated indirect rule, which in turn retarded 
emergent class consciousness.  
According to Shillington (1989: 356), the colonial masters emphasized the 
distinctions between the different ethnic groups, thereby strengthening tribal 
differences and rivalries between these groups and preventing them from forming a 
united opposition against the colonizers. Shillington further argues that these groups 
had always lived in the past as a people despite some customary differences that 
might have existed between them like their dressing, housing and religious practices. 
Furthermore, even when these groups experienced competition and conflicts, it was 
for political power or economic advantage and not “because they were of different 
‘tribes’”. Hence, Shillington (1989: 356) contends that the “colonial authorities 
invented ‘tribalism’”. As if the “creation of and insistence on the differences between 
the African peoples (separatist feelings) by the colonizers was not enough, 
successive colonial constitutions in Africa entrenched political power along regional 
lines (Ogunbadejo, 1979: 86).  
One of the worst examples of colonialism- founded ethnic rivalry and resultant 
conflicts is the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda which was characterized by the attempted 
extermination of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu in the country (Scherrer, 2001). The 
death toll of this genocide is estimated at 937,000 people (Asiimwe, 2004: np)32. 
However, Nnoli (cited in Fonchingon, 2010:14) argues that colonialism cannot be 
completely blamed for “creating” multi-ethnic states in Africa, but instead, for 
encouraging hatred based upon ethnic differences and for forging differences 
amongst African peoples and nations in order to facilitate its rule, thereby destroying 
the foundation for potential state building in Africa. Following independence, post-
                                         
32 According to a BBC report of April 2004 titled “Rwanda: How the Genocide happened”, the 
Belgians created differences between Tutsis and Hutus which did not exist before their arrival. These 
differences went as far as creating identity cards for Tutsi minorities illustrating their superiority over 
Hutus and giving them the leadership positions in the country. The result was hatred and the nurturing 
of feelings of revenge by the Hutu, which culminated in the 1994 genocide which saw the 
slaughtering of over 800,000 Rwandans within a period of four months (BBC News, 18/12/2008) 




colonial governments continued with the manipulation and disintegration of ethnic 
identities and groups. Weakstate elites also used the appeal to ethnicity in their own 
attempt to establish hegemony, “institutionalizing the divisions which exist by 
making ethnic identity the basis for political and (to a lesser extent) economic 
participation, and by striving to improve the competitive strength of the ethnic 
groups of the top leaders of the ruling faction” (Ake, 1976:9). For example, after 
coming to power in a coup in 1981, General Andre Kolingba established what has 
been termed an ‘’ethnocracy’’ in the Central African Republic (CAR) (Havermans, 
1999a:222-3). Every important political, military, and judicial position was filled by 
his or affiliated ethnic groups. Later, when Ange- Felix Patasse came to power in 
1993, he took revenge by excluding Kolingba‟s group (the Yakoma) in favour of his 
own group, the Sara-Kaba. These practices helped to consolidate ethnic rivalries that 
have become a common part of politics in post-colonial Africa (Amoo, 1997; 
Rodney, 1972; Dumont, 1966; Nugent, 2004; Meredith, 2005). Ethnic divisions thus 
contributed to the formation of parties along ethnic lines, which later contributed to 
the marginalization of parties which refused to be co-opted into the ruling party. 
Consequently, ethnic division and rivalry can be seen as a major trigger and cause of 
human insecurity on the continent.  
Ake (cited in Diop, 2012:228) argues that politicization changed to political ethnicity 
when the nationalist movement, which was united mainly by common grievances, 
started to disintegrate on the verge of independence as its leaders maneuvered to 
inherit power. In a situation in which class consciousness was rudimentary, those 
leaders who came from numerically large ethnic groups could not resist the 
temptation of using an ethnic ideology to consolidate a substantial political base33. 
                                         
33 In some colonial territories, for instance Nigeria, the strategy of decolonization gave impetus to 
political ethnicity. In the spirit of indirect rule, the major administrative and political units of Nigeria 
were made to coincide with the spatial locations of the three major ethnic groups. Then, under 
pressure from nationalist forces, the British devolved power to these regions. The Constitution of 
1954, sometimes described as the 'regionalist constitution', gave residual powers to the regional 
governments and also granted them self-government under regional premiers who would be the 
leaders of majority parties in the regional legislature. The three leading nationalist leaders, Alhaji 
Ahmadu Bello in the north, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe in the east, and Chief Obafemi Awolowo in the west 
opted for power in the region instead of remaining in the central government which was still 
controlled by the British. As they all won their regional premiership and consolidated their power base 
in the regions, Nigeria came to be dominated by three regional, ethnic parties. 




Thus, no account of political ethnicity can be complete without consideration of the 
character of the state in Africa. 
During the post-colonial period, the Sub Saharan region witnessed a substantial 
number of violent conflicts, mostly within states between contending ethno-political 
entities manipulated by rival elite groups. Regardless of the ideological facade of a 
given regime, the principles of co-optation and exclusion formed the basis of the 
prevailing political system. Political leaders in Sub Saharan Africa have held on to 
power, time and again, by mobilizing client groups through the distribution of goods 
and services in order defend their interests in the face of resistance from contending 
elite groups or against incursions of outsiders. 
Ethnic groups who feel marginalized often develop feelings of revenge and hatred 
against those who enjoy socio-economic well-being from the resources of their states 
because of their affiliation to the ruler (the ‘owner’ or ‘controller’ of the national 
cake) based on clientele politicking. Since there are rarely any state guided structure 
and political arrangements or functional governance procedures for rational and 
appropriate distribution of state resources and power, there is usually a resort to 
conflict (Harris and Reilly 1998: 9). The environment of sustained marginalization or 
fears of assimilation can accentuate ethnic cleavages, and appeals to ethnic 
sentiments can prove to be a potent tool in conflict. Lake and Rothchild (1998:43) 
note that as critical as ethnicity is to conflict, empirical evidence shows that ethnicity, 
itself, is not a source of violent conflict but can used as an instrument of conflict. 
This is not to suggest that there are no purely ethnic-based conflicts. African 
societies are replete with ethnic conflicts between ethnic and cultural groups, 
pastoralists and agricultural groups, but these are hardly the arenas of the systemic 
breakdowns and cataclysmic violence that engulf entire countries and regions; and 
even these are exacerbated by failure of governance mechanisms of conflict 
resolution. Studies have shown that a mix of political and military factors having to 
do with overly-centralized governance structures, the use of military resources in 
support of arbitrary and autocratic governance and the implementation of policies 
and practices that sustain rent-seeking and predation, are fundamental elements in 
most situations of institutional failure and violent conflicts (Gurr, 2000; Nwokedi, 
1998). 




 More specifically, the struggle for hegemony or the application of severe repression 
can spiral into armed conflict when excluded or targeted groups attempt to protect 
themselves or take control of the state. In Liberia, the brutal and erratic regime of 
Samuel Doe eventually led to his downfall. When Charles Taylor invaded from 
neighboring Cote d’Ivoire in December 1990 with a group of only 150 fighters, Doe 
responded by slaughtering hundreds of people in Nimba County for supposedly 
collaborating with the rebels. In response, thousands rallied to join Taylor’s National 
Patriotic Forces of Liberia (NPLF) and within a few months Taylor was threatening 
the capital Monrovia. Siad Barre’s brutal repression of the Isaq clan in Somalia in 
1988 can be seen in the same light and, interestingly, had the same effect. Ethnic 
loyalties can claim primacy over other forms of group loyalty and protagonists in 
conflict can more easily take recourse in ethnic solidarity (Englebert, 2009:32).  
3.10 Conclusion 
This chapter captured how the colonial legacy, neo-colonialism, elitism, military 
interregnum, neo-liberal policies, and ethnicity have coalesced to impoverish 
Africans, creating a protracted culture of human security pathology that periodically 
erupts into open conflict and warfare. At the heart of all these conflicts and wars are 
struggles over power and resources: power cohered around the state and its 
governance structures, developmental capacities, delegated practices and 
distributional propensities, and resources in terms of their availability, control and 
access. The era of colonial intervention in Africa integrated the traditional social 
hierarchies and relations of production and social, political and cultural traditions 
into western modernity in an uneasy symbiosis under the powerful influence of neo-
liberal political economy, leaving behind ingrained legacies, changing the structure 
of economy, the nature of state institutions, system of class stratification, and 
patterns of state and society. As a result, most African governments were bequeathed 
with various contradictions which pervaded the colonial state. Hence, post-colonial 
Africa inherited weak states and dysfunctional economies that were aggravated by 
poor leadership, corruption and bad governance in many countries.  
In the next chapter, the study will narrow its focus to selected countries in the 
continent where human insecurities are more prevalent. The chapter will discuss the 




human security challenges in the Sahel countries and Horn of Africa and how these 





















HUMAN SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL REGION, 
THE HORN OF AFRICA AND CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the study will examine the human security challenges in selected 
countries within the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa and Central African Republic. 
These countries were selected based on the contemporary human insecurity 
challenges that they are currently facing. In order to comprehend the human security 
situation in the countries of the Sahel, it is pertinent to reflect briefly on her 
geography and historical evolution of development. The Sahel region covers the 
expanse stretching from the Atlantic to the Red Sea and encompasses parts of 
Senegal, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, and 
Somalia. Its land mass comprises more than 80 per cent desert lands (Batterbury, 
1998:4). To speak of desert means to speak of areas without fixed community life 
and thus areas not, in fact, subject to jurisdiction of states, which prefer to expend 
their often limited means of control in inhabited regions. Today, the population 
density of the Sahel remains in the vicinity of one inhabitant per square kilometer 
(Salah, 2012:1). There is a strong correlation between the economies of the countries 
in this region as a result of their geographical peculiarities and the variations in 
rainfall. These countries also experienced acute problems food security as a 
consequence of years of drought. Estimates from the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO, 2013) record that more than 16 million 
people in the Sahel are directly threatened by malnutrition in the wake of the 2011 
drought. In this context, no country in the region can do without international 
emergency aid; but delivery of aid to the people presupposes that the states are able 
to guarantee the security of its passage.   
The colonial histories of the countries within the Sahel region, as elsewhere on the 
African continent, are the histories of territorial boundaries that were drawn with the 




interests of the colonizing countries in mind, not according to the national cohesion 
of the peoples concerned (Ikome, 2012:1)34. Since the early 1960s, these boundaries 
have been the basis for international recognition of sovereign states in the region. To 
avoid undermining the young state formations, which could lead to a cascade effect, 
the African Union, like the Organization of African Unity (OAU) before it, 
established the inviolability of the borders inherited from colonization as a founding 
doctrine. Reinforced by the validation of respect for the territorial integrity of states 
in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the new doctrine has partially fulfilled the task it 
was assigned, namely, avoiding or at least slowing thoughts of secession that might 
have resulted from an unpredictable recasting of the map of the continent. It was not, 
however, able to settle the question of the cohesion of diverse communities in a 
manner that would, in each state, make these communities into a nation (Salah, 
2012:2). 
The post-colonial states in the Sahel region were perceived by certain parts of the 
national communities as the states of the dominant ethnic groups. This perception has 
been nourished by political practices, such as patronage and nepotism, which have 
succeeded in reinforcing the feeling of exclusion among certain parties. The 
perception has led to various demands that range from the simple sharing of political 
power to the recognition of self-rule, and even to secession and the creation of an 
independent state (Salah, 2012:3). The absence of true national integration among 
various ethnic nationalities within the Sahelian countries constitutes favourable 
grounds for identity-based demands that, depending on the circumstances and the 
evolution of the balance of power between the state and the groups contesting the 
state, can be minimal or extreme. The countries in the Sahel region are mostly 
populated by Muslim and are fundamentally faced with two types of threats namely, 
rebellions of identity and rebellions of autonomy or secession. These identity-
oriented demands were further exacerbated by reaction against the processes of 
economic and cultural standardization that accompany globalization (Olivier, 
2004:34). Among the Sahel countries that are faced with human insecurity 
pathologies, Libya, Mali and Nigeria  have emerged as the three most affected 
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countries where the insecurity of individuals are at crisis stage, as they tend to 
become the points of interactions, even convergences, of all the destabilizing 
dynamics in the sub-Saharan region (Ould Bah, 2013). However, it is in Mali that 
one finds in full effect the instability factor consequent on  the absence of cohesion in 
the population of  the state. 
4.2 Human security challenges in Mali  
The Malian population is characterized by a largely black majority, of which the 
rather urbanized Bambaras are the dominant group, and a Tuareg component, a 
nomadic people of Berber origins, that is present in most of the neighboring 
countries such as Niger, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Mauritania, and Libya. The Tuareg 
people are marked, despite their dispersion and the stratification of their social 
organization (structured around tribes and castes) by a strong sentiment of identity 
that is symbolized, beyond a shared way of life, by the usage of a common language 
known as Tamasheq (Salah, 2012:4). In Mali, although they are not the only 
inhabitants in the north, the Tuaregs are localized there, particularly in the cities of 
Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu, situated on the Niger River. During colonization, this 
region was judged to be of little utility and did not truly interest France, which left 
there neither schools nor infrastructure of note. A consequence was that the Tuaregs, 
already little inclined toward urban life given their nomadic ancestry, remained, on 
the margins of the modernization processes that had started to emerge with 
colonization. They were marginalized from the benefits of the western education that 
the school of the Republic brought, even if it was colonial (Francis, 2013:38).  
During the wave of emancipatory ideas that started in Mali in the 1950s, the Tuaregs 
were forced to the margins as a result of lack of active and educated elite. 
Furthermore, when Mali achieved sovereignty in 1960, the Tuaregs were virtually 
absent from the political and administrative structures and organs of the new state35. 
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Although this was a direct consequence of their situation during colonization, the 
Tuaregs could only experience it as a frustration (Krings, 1995:59). To this were 
added the resentments that fed the Modibo Keita government’s excessive reaction to 
the first rebellion (known as Afellaga rebellion) at the start of the 1960s, despite the 
rebellion’s limited number of participants and the situation of quasi-abandonment by 
the Malian state of its already especially deprived north (Devon, 2013:2).  
The National Pact was not, however, truly implemented. Rebellion began to be 
spoken of again in the 2000s. On July 4, 2006, an accord for the restoration of peace 
and security and for the development of the northern Kidal region was signed in 
Algiers. It recalled the achievements of the National Pact of 1992 that had 
recognized the specific characteristics of northern Mali and at the same time 
reaffirmed the commitment of the parties to the territorial integrity and national unity 
of the Republic of Mali36. Measures were planned to secure better participation of the 
local peoples in the decision-making processes and a regional provisional 
coordination and monitoring council was also created37. In order to stimulate and 
accelerate the economic, social, and cultural development of Kidal, the accord 
envisaged a special investment fund intended for financing development activities 
such as livestock breeding, hydraulic energy, transportation, communication, health, 
education, and culture. Other initiatives were also anticipated: a program targeted at 
ending the isolation of the region via the paving of principal roads, the construction 
of an airfield in Kidal, the electrification of the primary towns of districts and 
communes, telephone coverage, and the establishment of regional radio and a 
national television relay network. A reading of the main clauses of the Algerian 
accord confirms the extreme impoverishment of this broader northern area known as 
                                                                                                                   
status of “autonomous region” for the north, the rebels did receive promises for its development and 
obtained its decentralization. 
36 It must be noted that since the accord was signed the factors hostile to a durable peace have 
multiplied. First, there was the arrival of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its branches 
who found sanctuary in this virtual no-man’s-land deserted by the regular army. At the same time 
came the return of illicit trafficking, particularly the trafficking of drugs, which provides income to 
both the rebellion and AQIM simultaneously and has found its place in the strategic realignment of 
the region. The brazenness of the trafficking is best illustrated by the Boeing aircraft loaded with 
cocaine that landed in the Malian desert in 2009 at an airfield specially prepared for this purpose and 
which, after having been unloaded, was burned to the ground. The major event, though, was the 
Libyan crisis 
37 See Benjaminsen (2008:819-831). 




Azawad38. However, the Algerian accord of 2006 was not implemented any more 
than its 1992 predecessor had been (Freedom House, 2009).  
Many Tuaregs, having fled Mali in the 1990s, were conscripted into the Libyan army 
and fought on the side of the militias of the former Libyan leader. After the fall of 
Gaddafi, they returned with arms of another kind; these were no longer the 
Kalashnikovs used in the guerrilla tactics of the rebellion in the 1990s but were 
heavy weapons that could be used to invade the cities with the goal of expelling the 
regular army (BBC News 17th October, 2011). The Tuaregs were not the only ones to 
benefit from the proliferation of heavy weapons resulting from the Libyan crisis. 
AQIM and its branches clearly did not miss this opportunity (Lee and Momtaz, 
2011). Incontestably, this new situation explains the change in the nature of the 
armed rebellion, which since April 2012 has succeeded in pushing the regular Malian 
army out of the entire the region of the north, sealing the division of the country into 
two zones. Indeed, the rebellions of the 1990s and 2000s were not demanding the 
independence of Azawad, only the greater administrative and cultural autonomy of 
the region and a program of investment to accelerate economic and social 
development. Today, the principal player in this change from rebellion to secession 
is the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Morgan, 2012). Created on 
October 16, 2011, this movement is a product of the fusion of the Tuareg Movement 
of Northern Mali (MTNM), which directed the rebellions of 2006–2009, and the 
National Movement of Azawad (MNA), a purely political organization which began 
in November 2010 with the purpose of peacefully recovering the specific rights 
confiscated from the people of Azawad. The MNLA has subscribed, since its 
creation, to a politics of liberation and independence that is reinforced by its recent 
military successes. On the side of this important actor, but far from representing the 
entirety of the Tuareg peoples today, are those who align themselves with jihadist 
Salafism. Truly amorphous and loosely bound, this entity clearly has its roots in the 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) that has officially taken the name 
al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).  
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While this movement is directed by former combatants of the Armed Islamic Group 
of Algeria, it recruits to a large extent among the Mauritanians and the Malians. Its 
establishment in the Malian north and within the confines of Algeria, Mauritania, and 
Niger has strengthened since 2003 and constitutes a threat to all of these countries. 
Indeed, AQIM does not limit itself to a simple military presence.39 More and more, 
the movement transforms itself via relationships with the people, to whom it renders 
services, using revenue derived from different types of trafficking activities. Some 
members have also intermarried with tribes in the region. However, as detailed 
above, the jihadist movement does not indicate a single group but several movements 
that are not all aligned, to the same degree, with the Azawad cause. Among these 
forces, there is first of all Ansar Dine, which is led by Iyad Ag Ghali, a former 
Tuareg militant who converted to Salafism in the mosques of Mauritania in the 
2000s. Founder of the Azawad People’s Movement (MPA), he played a decisive part 
in the conquest of the northern cities. While the Ansar Dine movement formed an 
affiliation with the MNLA during the subjugation of Kidal, it is with other Salafist 
groups that it captured Timbuktu. Relations between the MNLA and Ansar Dine 
remain unsettled.  
The MNLA identifies itself as a secular movement defending the cause of the 
Azawad peoples, which knows that it can have the recognition of the international 
community only if it is not classified as “Salafist.” On the ground, however, the 
balance of military force is largely in favor of the Salafist groups that must, 
consequently, be handled carefully; the contradictory positions expressed by the 
MNLA towards those groups originate in this context. Indeed, two days after having 
concluded an accord with Ansar Dine in which the two movements agreed to join 
together to form the Transitional Council of the Islamic State of Azawad, the MNLA 
announced that the final communiqué diverged from the agreement that had been 
reached and that they had serious differences with the Salafist organization on the 
topic of the application of Sharia40. In addition to Ansar Dine, it is necessary to take 
into account another Salafist organization, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in 
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West Africa (MUJAO). A breakaway from AQIM, this group is led by Sultan Ould 
Badi, an Arab from Mali’s Gao region, assisted by the Mauritanian Mohamed Khya, 
alias Qoulqoum. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that all of the Salafist 
movements meet together for consultation, which reinforces their influence as 
compared to the secular movements. To add to the confusion, the announcement on 
May 28, 2012, of the creation of a new armed group, the Northern Mali Liberation 
Front (FLNM), must be highlighted. The FLNM seeks to combat the efforts of 
Islamist movements to implement Islamic law.  
It is difficult to say, at this time, what or whom is really concealed behind this group 
and what the importance of its creation is. One thing is clear: at this point in the 
evaluation of the balance of power on the ground, the tilt is in favour of the loosely 
affiliated jihadist grouping that has used the space left vacant by the central Malian 
government as the point from which it spreads out toward the other countries in the 
region. In this context, these movements’ exploitation of activities characteristic of 
transnational criminality (trafficking of drugs and arms, abduction and holding of 
Western hostages not only in Mali but also in Niger and Mauritania) appear only as a 
consequence of this anomaly: these non-state groups’ control of certain important 
portions of the territory of a state. The contagious effect of these groups, which today 
operate from northern Mali, varies according to their nature and objectives. While 
the MNLA claims to serve as a sort of secular voice for the demands of the Azawad 
peoples who have always felt marginalized if not completely excluded from the 
development process in Mali41, the shock wave created by its recent radicalization 
symbolized by the proclamation of Azawad independence appears manageable 
(Rogers, 2012). 
Indeed, the mixed, even hostile, reactions that it provoked among the Tuaregs in 
Niger, who, as a result of their historically turbulent relationship with the central 
government, were supposed to be the most favourably inclined towards this 
declaration, show that the Tuareg question can still be addressed by means of 
negotiation and within the framework of the existing state. Niger, it is true, has made 
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efforts to integrate a part of the Tuareg political elite into its political and 
administrative structures. The sitting prime minister of Niger, Brigi Rafini, is a 
Tuareg. Similarly, one of the advisors to the president is none other than Rhissa Ag 
Boula, an emblematic figure in the two Tuareg rebellions that shook Niger from 
1991 to 1995 and again from 2007 to 2009. Ag Boula has clearly counselled the 
Tuaregs in Niger against any attempts to imitate the MNLA.42 Does this mean that 
the demand for independence, for the moment confined to Mali, is doomed to fade? 
It would be imprudent to respond categorically to this question. In reality, everything 
depends on the evolution of all the other destabilizing dynamics. They have only to 
lead to a weakening of the Nigerian state in order for demands for independence to 
be foreseeable there as well. At the vanguard of these dynamics is the veritable 
industry of abducting and holding hostages emerging in Mali, which is connected to 
the growing influence of AQIM. Indeed, the presence of the Salafist groups is by far 
more destabilizing than the identity-related demands of the Tuaregs. To those 
demands, placed in their true context, political solutions can still be found. The 
jihadist groupings establish themselves by developing a discourse and a practice of 
non- coexistence with “impious” governments.43 
4.3 Human security challenges in Nigeria 
Likewise, the Nigerian state which to some extent is integrated in the Sahel region 
has been characterized by some inherent contradictions which have drastically 
impinged on the security of its teeming population. Nigeria became an independent 
nation on the 1st. October, 1960 (Shillington, 2004:29), followed by the civil war 
which erupted in 1967 and ended in 1970 (Madiebo, 1980, Achuzie, 1986). Given 
the heterogeneous nature of Nigerian society44, the religious sensitivity of Nigerians, 
and the prolonged military rule that ended with the advent of civil rule in 1999, 
critical national issues more often than not are given ethno-religious colouration. The 
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various attempts by Islamic fundamentalists to forcefully establish Sharia law on a 
constitutionally recognized secular society are obviously the manifestation of 
ingrained animosities that have characterized Nigerian society (Adesoji, 2010:16). 
The on-going Boko Haram insurgency in the north-eastern part of Nigeria is not the 
first of its kind; nevertheless, it is the first terrorist group that has challenged the 
legitimacy of the Nigerian state, whose seeming ineptitude is becoming apparent 
with regular outbreaks of violence of many kinds despite the state’s continuous 
promises to mitigate them (Falayi, 2014). The Maitatsine  uprising of 1980 in Kano, 
1982 in Kaduna and Bulumkutu, 1984 in Yola and 1985 in Bauchi, obviously the 
first attempts at imposing a religious ideology on a secular, independent Nigeria, 
marked the beginning of ferocious conflict and crises in Nigeria (Isichei, 1987: 194-
208; Ibrahim, 1997: 511-512). Following the Maitatsine crises, or interspersing them, 
were several other crises (Adesoji, 2010:17). These include the Kano metropolitan 
riot of October 1982, the Ilorin riot of March 1986, the University of Ibadan crisis of 
May 1986, the nationwide crisis over Nigeria’s membership in the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference in January/February 1986, the Kafanchan/Kaduna/Zaria/ 
Funtua religious riots of March 1987, the Kaduna Polytechnic riot of March 1988, 
the acrimonious nationwide debate on Sharia (Islamic law) at the Constituent 
Assembly in October/November 1988, the Bayero University crisis of 1989, the 
Bauchi/Katsina riots of March/April 1991, the Kano riot of October 1991, the 
Zangon-Kataf riot of May 1992, the Kano civil disturbance of December 1991 and 
the Jos crisis of April 199445 (Imo 1995: 21-23; Ibrahim 1997: 512-516; Enwerem 
1999 cited in Adesoji, 2010:23).  
                                         
45  Between 1999 and 2008, 28 conflicts were reported, the most prominent being the Shagamu 
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Although almost all the crises have been subsumed under religion and explained by 
even some authors as religious factors, it is apparent that other extraneous and 
underlying factors like economic disequilibrium/inequality, envy, corruption among 
leaders and poverty among the youth (who easily became willing tools in the hand of 
patrons), and the unhealthy contest for political office have all played parts (Ibrahim, 
1997: 521-524; Human Rights Watch 2005: 48; Sulaiman, 2008: 20-26). The 
assertion of Ibrahim, corroborated by Ladan, that all ethno-religious crises have 
behind them a perceived domination by supposedly external or illegitimate groups, is 
quite accurate in this case (Ibrahim, 1998: 51; Ladan, 1999: 105). According to 
Mamodu (2011), the public outrage at the monumental corruption within the 
government circle and the negative Western influence, especially in government, 
triggered the emergence of the Boko Haram sect. Boko Haram was created in 2002 
by Mohammad Yusuf (1970-2009), a radical Islamist cleric, in Maiduguri, Borno 
state, in North eastern Nigeria. The group's official name, according to its manifesto, 
is Jamaiatu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awata Wal-Jihad which translates as "Association of 
Sunnis for the Propagation of Islam and Jihad.” The name “Boko Haram” is derived 
from a combination of the Hausa word boko meaning “book” and the Arabic word 
haram which is something forbidden, ungodly or sinful. Literally, it means “book is 
sinful”, but its deeper meaning is that Western education is sinful, sacrilegious or 
ungodly and should therefore be forbidden. Characteristically, the sect opposes and 
outrightly rejects western education, western culture and modern science. 
Alternatively, it embraces and advocates the propagation of and strict adherence to 
Islam by all and sundry regardless of anyone’s personal wishes. In line with this 
objective, the sect sought to impose Sharia across all Nigerian states (Bumah and 
Adelakun, 2009: 40; National Life 2009). Yusuf set up a religious complex, called 
Markaz, following his expulsion from two mosques in Maiduguri by Muslim clerics 
for propagating his radical views. The complex included a mosque and an Islamic 
school. Many poor Muslim families in Nigeria, and neighbouring countries, sent 
their children to the school to get a proper education which the government of 
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Nigeria has failed to provide46. The center had ulterior political goals to create an 
Islamic state and impose Sharia laws, and it soon became a recruiting ground for 
future jihadists to fight the state.  
For the first seven years of its existence, Boko Haram's operations were relatively 
peaceful, and they typically only criticized northern Muslims for participating in 
what the group considered to be an illegitimate, non-Islamic state, but in 2009 the 
government began investigating reports that Boko Haram members were arming 
themselves, and when Boko Haram members defied a ban on riding motorcycles 
without helmets, this led to deadly clashes with Nigeria security forces. The incident 
was suppressed by the army and about 700 people are estimated to have been killed. 
The group's founder, Mohammad Yusuf, was also arrested and was later killed while 
still in police custody. His father in-law and other sect members were also killed in 
circumstances which human rights groups have called extra-judicial killings. 
Mohammad Yusuf's lifeless body was shown on television and the security forces 
declared that Boko Haram had been eradicated47.  
However, after Mohammad Yusuf's death, Boko Haram carried out its first terrorist 
attack in Borno state in January 2010 and four people were killed. Since then, Boko 
Haram has increased the frequency and intensity of its attacks with increased suicide 
bombings and assassinations spreading from Maiduguri to Abuja. Some experts say 
the group is leading an armed protest against corruption, abusive security forces, and 
economic disparity in northern Nigeria and that it is feeding off tensions that long 
have existed between the Muslim north and Christian south (Crisis Group Africa 
Report, 2013). The sect’s membership cuts across the broad spectrum of society, but 
a preponderant number of members comes  from its poorest groups. Thus, beyond 
former university lecturers, students, bankers, a former commissioner and other 
officers of Borno State, membership extends  to drug addicts, vagabonds, and 
generally lawless people although the common denominator among all members  is 
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their desire to overthrow the secular government and to propagate Islamic law 
(Chiedozie, 2009:2).  
The wide gap in time notwithstanding, the socio-economic conditions that are 
prevalent in the Nigerian society sustains the existence of Boko Haram. In some 
cases, the situation has got worse: There is mass poverty; inequality in educational, 
political and employment opportunities; ignorance due to limited educational 
opportunities; growing unemployment; and governmental corruption, including the 
misuse of resources, by which the people are repulsed (Usman, 1987: 21; Enwerem, 
1999: 125; Ale, 2009: 8). These problems swell the army of vulnerable people whose 
disillusionment and impoverishment made them easy prey. In particular, with the 
notorious corruption among the political elite, the country’s vast wealth has failed to 
improve the lives of citizens. This, coupled with stolen election mandates, has led to 
a growing disenchantment with the Western system of governance, particularly 
among jobless young men (McConnell, 2009). A contributor to the London Times 
saw the uprising as a symptom of the social breakdown that has made Nigeria so 
prone to violence (Anonymous 2009).  
In understanding the Boko Haram phenomenon, it should be clarified that extremists 
Islamists have at various times in Nigeria’s post-civil war past, unleashed bouts of 
sporadic violence against non-Muslims over specific issues. A few examples are the 
occasions when  extremists were opposed to the hosting of the “Miss World Beauty 
Pageant” in Abuja and when  extremists went on a rampage over what they perceived 
to be the desecration of the Islamic holy book by non-believers. The present 
sustained attacks aimed at the exorcising an Islamist enclave from the Nigeria 
federation where the Shari’a legal system would be the order of the state, 
championed by Boko Haram, primarily originated in response to the perceived loss 
of political power by some elements in northern Nigeria who were opposed to the 
emergence of a non-northern Muslim as President of Nigeria following the demise of 
a former President48.  
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After the election of Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian Southerner, as the President of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria in 2010, there was an increase in violent activities by 
the Boko Haram sect, which began to wage war on the new government led by 
President Jonathan. Violence linked to Boko Haram's activities is reported to have 
resulted in an estimated 10,000 deaths between 2001 and 201249 (Ekanem, Dada and 
Ejue, 2012). The tenure of President Goodluck Jonathan has also been dogged by 
threats from elements who felt that President Jonathan's emergence ‘scuttled’ a 
fragile power balance in Nigeria. Some leading politicians had pointblank threatened 
to render Nigeria ungovernable for President Jonathan, a threat that coincided with a 
dramatic rise in Boko Haram terror activities (Aribisala, 2014).  
By virtue of Boko Haram’s increasing links with international extremist Islamic 
terror groups such as Al Shabab and AQIM, the group has exacerbated the fragile 
human  security situation in Nigeria. The large expanse of ungoverned space has 
given them unhindered access to carry out their nefarious activities. Recently, the 
group attacked the border town of Chibok in the northeastern Nigeria, killing 
innocent civilians and abducting about 270 female students from their school hostels. 
Indeed, the leader of the group acknowledged responsibility for the abductions and 
threatened to sell the girls into slavery (BBC News 5th May, 2014).  As news of the 
abduction of the students from the Government Girls secondary School, Chibok 
filtered through, there was palpable shock and angst, initially across the Nigerian 
federation, and as the information became widespread, across the globe. The initial 
sense of disbelief of the news was doused and replaced with the reality that indeed a 
horrendous act had occurred when pictures of the burnt out school premises were 
made available and the School’s Principal and the Bornu State Government 
confirmed the incident50. 
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4.4 Human security challenges in Libya 
The United Kingdom of Libya which gained independence on 24 December 1951 as 
a constitutional and hereditary monarchy under King Idris is made up of Tripolitania, 
Fezzan, and Cyrenaica. The Libyan population is split up between an estimated 140 
different tribes or clans, of which there are 30 powerful tribes (Fearon, 2003:213).  
The Libyan Constitution which contained many of the entrenched rights common to 
European and North American nation states was enacted in 1951.  Article 5 of the 
constitution proclaimed Islam as the official religion of the State, while Article 11 of 
the constitution formally set out rights such as equality before the law as well as 
equal civil and political rights, equal opportunities, and an equal responsibility for 
public duties and obligations, without distinction of religion, belief, race, language, 
wealth, kinship or political or social opinions. The discovery of oil reserves in 1959 
and the subsequent income from crude exports transformed Libya from one of the 
world's poorest nations to an extremely wealthy state. However, the oil wealth 
created resentment and dissatisfaction among different ethnic groups and factions 
over the concentration of the nation's wealth in the hands of King Idris. This 
discontent coupled with the rise and consolidation of Arab nationalism and 
Nasserism throughout North Africa and the Middle East subsequently led to the 
over-throw of King Idris on September 1969, by a small group of military officers 
led by 27-year-old army officer Maummar Gaddafi (U.S.Dept. of State, 2005). 
                                                                                                                   
Goodluck Jonathan claimed in May that Boko Haram was "an al-Qaeda operation". The extent to 
which this is technically true depends on how broadly we define the al-Qaeda network - and it should 
be noted that Ayman al-Zawahiri has never even publicly referred to Boko Haram - but their ties to al-
Qaeda and its affiliates are now so numerous that they are impossible to ignore. 
For example in 2002, Osama bin Laden dispatched one of his aides to Nigeria to distribute $3m to 
Salafi groups. Boko Haram's founder, Mohammed Yusuf, is thought to be a recipient of this money. 
Bin Laden's interest in Nigeria seemingly did not end with Yusuf's 2009 death at the hands of 
Nigerian security forces. Documents discovered in bin Laden's Abbottabad compound in Pakistan are 
thought to show an ongoing dialogue between Boko Haram and the top levels of al-Qaeda, potentially 
even with bin Laden himself. By 2006, Boko Haram members were training in the Sahel alongside al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), whose emir Abdulmalek Droukdel admits assisting Boko 
Haram in a variety of other ways. Co-operation continued until at least 2013, when a large 
contingent of Boko Haram fighters attended an AQIM training centre in Timbuktu, Mali.  
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/06/boko-haram-al-qaeda-
201463115816142554.html 




In 1973, Gaddafi announced the suspension of all existing laws and the 
implementation of Sharia law.  He said that the country would be purged of the 
"politically sick". A "people's militia" would "protect the revolution". There would 
be an administrative revolution, and a cultural revolution. The country’s human 
security records deteriorated as Gaddafi executed dissidents publicly and the 
executions were often rebroadcast on state television channels (Eljahmi, 2006:3). 
According to Amnesty International, Gaddafi employed his network of diplomats 
and recruits to assassinate dozens of people inside Libya as well as  political refugees 
around the world who were openly critical of his regime. Between 1980 and 1987, 
Amnesty International recorded at least 25 assassinations in Libya (The Los Angelis 
Times 26th February 2011). However, in other respects, Gaddafi’s government made 
tremendous progress in enhancing his citizens’ well-being. Human development 
reports reveal that Libya  was one of the Arab countries that  made progress 
according to the human development index (HDI), which measures health, education, 
income, etc. For example, from the rank of 64 in 2000, and 61 in 2001, Libya jumped 
to the rank of 13 in the world, and first in Africa in 2010. Compared to its neighbors, 
Libya enjoyed a low level of both absolute and relative poverty. Meanwhile, its 
abundant oil revenues and small population (5.5 million people) resulted in one of 
the highest GDPs per capita in Africa (Yoichi, 2011). Life expectancy at birth for 
males increased from 46 years in 1970 to 77 years in 2010 and from 48 years to 80 
years for females for the same period. Equal opportunities in education were offered 
by the state, while basic education was free to all and compulsory up to secondary 
level51.  
However, frequent criticisms were raised by the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights (UNCHR) and several human rights defence organizations against the 
                                         
51 The literacy rate was the highest in North Africa in 2010, as nearly 88 per cent of the population can 
read. Since the 1970s, the number of university students has increased gradually to more than 200 
000, in addition to 70 000 students enrolled in the higher technical and vocational sector in 2010. The 
rapid increase in the number of students in the higher education sector has been mirrored by an 
increase in the number of institutions of higher education . By the end of 2010, there were 15 
universities across the country (Ashour, 2011:12). While criminal activities have been increasing in 
the last two decades, some have attributed this to the inflow of ‘African’ migrants. In a report 
published in 2007, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) praised Libya for its achievements in the 
field of economic diversification, pointing to the rapid growth in non-oil activities (7.5 per cent) as 
well as in oil production (4.7 per cent) in 2006 (BTI, 2009). 




repressive practices of the Gaddafi regime. For example, Amnesty International 
expressed concerns about the large number of alleged cases of enforced 
disappearances and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary killings (Amnesty 
International Report, 2010). Moreover, the Internal Security Agency that was 
involved in such violations continued to be immune from accountability and 
punishment. This situation was compounded by the absence of genuine civil society 
institutions independent of the system. Freedom of expression and freedom of 
assembly and association were subject to severe restriction; the authorities did not 
show any tolerance towards opposition. Critics of the government’s record on human 
rights were punished; former detainees at Guantánamo Bay whom the US authorities 
have returned to Libya re-detained, so arrested and jailed some members of the 
victims’ families, who were seeking to know the truth of their relatives. It was 
unclear the fate of hundreds of forced disappearances and other gross violations of 
human rights committed in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (Human Rights Watch 
January, 2009). 
Moreover, since 1999, Gaddafi regime embarked on neo-liberal reforms as part of a 
broader campaign to reintegrate the country into the global capitalist economy after 
the lifting of U.N. embargo (Hochman, 2009:14). Many Libyans were suspicious of 
this project in light of the corruption and tyranny they had endured since 1969 and 
the era of the international embargo. These suspicions increased as the basic anti-
corruption policy set up by Gaddafi failed to achieve its purpose and was selective in 
performing its functions in a manner that made it another tool for imposing 
trusteeship and control over economic and financial entities that dealt with foreign 
companies, through subjecting them to the supervision of the regime’s loyalists 
(Fuhr, 2013:38). Thus, despite the economic reform programmes, tensions escalated 
and an opposition to the regime grew stronger. But the opposition was not able to get 
rid of the regime by itself. Meanwhile, foreign powers were not confident that the 
opposition inside and outside Libya could undertake this role due to its fragmentation 
and the ambiguity of its goals and objectives (Etzioni, 2012:49).   
However,   the examples of popular protest movements which overturned the rulers 
of Tunisia and Egypt, its immediate neighbors to the west and east, in late 2010 led 




to a popular protest in Libya’s eastern province of Benghazi. This marked the first 
serious effort to organize a broad-based opposition against Gaddafi regime. After 
violent attempts by the Libyan government to quell the protests, armed opposition 
fighters took the stage, battling government forces and wrestling for control of the 
capital, Tripoli (Beaumont, 2011). The opposition quickly transformed to rebellion 
and subsequently formed the National Transitional Council under the leadership of 
Mustafa Abdul Jalil, Gaddafi’s former justice minister (Ross, 2011). Despite 
international diplomatic initiatives, the crisis escalated leading to the passage a UN 
Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) in March 2011, sanctioning the 
establishment of a no-fly zone and authorizing NATO to use “all means necessary” 
to protect civilians with Libya52. This represents the invocation of (R2P) doctrine, 
which is a fundamental aspect of human security (UN SCOR, Doc S/RES/1973 
(‘Resolution 1973’) 17 March 2011). 
While the Arab Spring reverberated across northern Africa, the Libyan crisis forced 
neighboring countries such as Mauritania, Mali, Chad, and Niger to weather most of 
its fallouts. The crisis in Libya unleashed unforeseen consequences on the West 
African Sahel states of Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Mauritania. Following an inflow of 
weapons, ammunition, and armed fighters from Libya’s ‘Islamic Legion into 
northern Mali, a dormant Tuareg rebellion was revived, leading Malian government 
forces to launch an offensive. The succeeding months witnessed a military coup and 
the takeover of northern Mali by armed and Islamist groups in a battle for autonomy 
(Fessy, 2012). Nigeria faced increasing violence by the armed group Boko Haram. 
Although Niger and Mauritania have not witnessed internal rebellion, they have been 
forced to open their borders for refugees fleeing the crises in Mali and Cote d’Ivoire 
and exacerbating the longstanding political, economic and humanitarian 
vulnerabilities (George, 2012:1).  
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 The Allied Forces launched attacks on over 20 “integrated air defense systems” using more than 
110 Tomahawk cruise missiles during operation Odyssey Dawn. The International Criminal Court 
subsequently issued an arrest warrant for Gaddafi, alleging that Gaddafi had been personally involved 
in planning and implementing "a policy of widespread and systematic attacks against civilians and 
demonstrators and dissidents” (Black and Smith, 2011). On 16 September 2011, the U.N. General 
Assembly approved a request from the National Transitional Council to accredit envoys of the 
country’s interim controlling body as Tripoli’s sole representatives at the UN, effectively recognizing 
the National Transitional Council as the legitimate holder of that country’s UN seat. The 42-year reign 
of Gaddafi’s government met a violent end with his death in October 2011. 




The collapse of Libyan security institutions created human security challenges in the 
Sahel region, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis brought on by drought and poor 
harvests in a region already burdened by chronic poverty and food insecurity. 
Terrorist and extremist groups, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 
exploited the resulting political vacuum and seized control of the northern two-thirds 
of Mali. Exercising greater freedom of movement, terrorists had access to a larger 
pool of potential recruits and the ungoverned space provided training opportunities.  
At the same time, transnational criminal networks used well-established smuggling 
routes to increase their trafficking in weapons, drugs and people.  Chad has been a 
steady route for illicit weapons trafficking out of Libya (Yamamoto, 2013). 
The UN-NATO intervention in Libya created regional security complexes. While the 
French and West African-led intervention has successfully wrestled control of the 
majority of Malian territory from terrorists and weaken AQIM, continued 
asymmetric attacks against international and Malian forces in and around northern 
population centers illustrate that Mali, Nigeria and the entire Sahel region remain 
vulnerable to violent extremism.  
4.4.1 The impacts of the Libyan crisis on the Sahel states 
The influx of refugees from Libya to the neighboring counties created humanitarian 
challenges to the Sahel states. The Libyan economy under Gaddafi’s regime was 
very strong and therefore, supported some the Sahel states such as Chad, Mali and 
Niger that were threatened by drought, poor harvest and state fragility. In addition to 
Libya’s considerable investments in these counties which provided gainful 
employment for their citizens and ameliorated human security challenges, (George, 
2012:5), the strong Libyan economy had also attracted workers from these countries. 
Following the demise of the Gaddafi government and the escalation of instability, the 
number of returnees from Libya crossed 209,030, with 95,760 in Niger, 82,433 in 
Chad, 11,230 in Mali and 780 in Mauritania (UNDP, 2011). The labour migration to 
Libya acted as a key source of income for the development of neighboring 
communities. The loss of remittances has had an especially adverse effect on these 
countries, particularly in light of looming food crises. The influx of traumatized and 
impoverished returnees has not only disturbed social structures in receiving 




countries, but has also impacted the humanitarian situation in countries that already 
face food and nutrition crises, poverty, unemployment, limited access to social 
services, weak state institutions, diseases and effects of natural disasters such as 
drought (George, 2012:4). 
In addition to returnees, large quantities of weapons and ammunition smuggled out 
of Libya are being used to create instabilities and insecurities in neighboring counties 
as expressed in the preceding paragraphs. Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger are 
the frontline countries affected by this outflow. Unsecured weapons storage facilities 
that were previously guarded by the Libyan government are the main source of the 
outflow. The unhindered movement of these weapons across state borders by former 
fighters who were either members of the Libyan army or mercenaries participating in 
the Libyan conflict, has led to the proliferation of arms, to the benefit of arms 
traffickers and terrorist and other armed groups operating in the region (Stohl, 
2012:4). 
The deplorable economic and socio-political environment coupled with monumental 
corruption, gross inequality and deprivation in the Sahel make it a fertile breeding 
ground for the penetration and development of terrorist groups and other armed or 
criminal groups that seek to profit from the increasingly chaotic conditions in the 
region. Since its formation in 2007, the Algerian-run Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) has been a key factor in the Sahel-Saharan region. Following 
Algeria’s fight to contain it, AQIM developed networks in the Sahara, cooperating 
with smuggling rings in the region (Filiu, 2010:4). The AQIM has so far been 
weakened by deep internal rivalries, and has in the past largely partnered with 
criminal groups in the Sahel rather than with ideologically ambitious local Salafi 
movements53 (ibid). With increasing instability in the Sahel, particularly in Mali and 
Niger and Nigeria, the threat of expansion and increased consolidation of the group 
in the Sahel-Sahara is an issue of concern.  
                                         
53 Emerging reports suggest that the AQIM which has consolidated its hold in northern Mali through 
control of existing drug trafficking networks, kidnapping ransoms, inflow of arms from Libya along 
with armed fighters, and armed and extremist groups seeking to expand their activities in the region 
have affiliated with other terrorists groups in the region. For instance, there is evidence of ties 
between AQIM and newly formed armed groups such as the Ansar Dine in northern Mali, as well as 
with the Nigeria-based radical Islamist group, Boko Haram (UNSC, 2012). 




The role that other groups are playing in this complex network of actors seems to be 
galvanized by this affiliation, making AQIM a sort of franchise. The presence of 
AQIM also seems to have led to an intensification of extremist activities in the name 
of Islam (as most recently seen in northern Mali). Al-Qaeda’s history indicates that it 
is strongest when it has attached itself to deep-rooted local conflicts (such as in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Somalia) and “rides” with them (Jenkins, 2010:1). 
The situation in Mali and Nigeria and potentially in Niger could provide the right 
ingredients for AQIM and its allies to take root and create humanitarian catastrophes.  
4.5 Human security challenges in the Horn of Africa 
The Horn of Africa region includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, 
Sudan and South Sudan, while the greater Horn incorporates Tanzania and Uganda. 
These countries share similar geographic endowments, and besides that, the countries 
of this region are, for the most part, linguistically and ethnically linked together 
(Joireman, 1997:1), evincing a complex pattern of interrelationships among the 
various populations (Fukui and Markakis, 1994:4). The political climate in the Horn 
of Africa today is influenced by local political and social conflicts not only in terms 
of specific histories and effects, but also their interaction with forces operating at a 
global level. The history of the countries of the Horn since the end of colonialism in 
the region has largely been one of violent repression and insurgency (Wasara, 
2002:1). The Horn of Africa has been known for decades as one of the hottest 
geographical spaces of internal dissidence and interstate conflicts. Africa's longest 
civil wars occur in this region (Assefa, 1999). This was the case of the Eritrean war 
of liberation against Ethiopian regimes. The civil war in Sudan is another civil war 
that is associated in one way or the other with the region. No matter how 
governments in the region came to power, in practically every case, force has been 
the means of dislodging them. Succession by peaceful election has been the 
exception (Maxted and Zegeye, 2001:3). The situation is critical with more than 13.3 
million people affected, 4 million in acute need of humanitarian assistance, and 
250,000 who are thought to be in dire need of food and at risk of starvation (CRS 




report, 2012). Conditions in this region have created an escalating refugee crisis, 
primarily in Kenya and Ethiopia (Astatke Bayou, 2002)54. 
There are three major reasons why the Horn of Africa has attracted international 
attention for many centuries (Schulz, 2011:41). First, its strategic location: four 
countries in the Horn of Africa, namely Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan, border 
two crucial sea routes, the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. These waterways are 
currently regaining importance in international naval trade now that a number of 
Middle Eastern countries, Asian countries and Russia are trying to open new markets 
in Africa in the wake of the end of the Cold War. With the discovery of large 
quantities of oil in Africa especially in the gulf of Guinea, Africa is emerging as a 
lucrative market for Asian technology. Second, the region has the most diverse 
religious and ethnic groupings. In view of a tendency for ethnic and tribal wars to 
erupt throughout the region, this situation requires careful management. Most of the 
residents of the Horn of Africa espouse Sunni Islam as their religion and most of 
them can trace their historic origins to the Middle East. With its radical religious 
politics, it is likely that the Horn of Africa will witness, as has already been the case 
in Sudan and some parts of Somalia, the rise of Islamic radicals trying to impose 
their version of Islam on others and thereby fuelling global insecurity.   
Finally, the Horn of Africa has significant agricultural potential. The source of over 
80% of the waters of the Nile River and its tributaries is in the area. With such 
agricultural potential, the Horn of Africa could achieve economic prosperity should 
its leaders assign top priority to peace in the region. The Horn of Africa has the 
capacity to identify trade interests in East Africa and neighboring Middle Eastern and 
Asian countries.  
However, the states of the Horn of Africa are weakened by acute environmental 
degradation. A fragile ecological inheritance of cyclical drought has been aggravated 
by armed conflicts. Pastoralists and other hinterland populations have been among 
the primary victims. Desertification, droughts, and a scarcity of resources have 
displaced large numbers of people, driving them across national borders as migrants 
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or as environmental refugees55. Aside from putting pressure on state boundaries, their 
arrival sometimes results in feelings of insecurity and intolerance among the local 
population, who have to compete with refugees for the same limited resources 
(Maxted and Zegeye, 2001:5).  
People who live in this region of Africa have faced pervasive crises for a very long 
time. The dynamics of the crisis originate at the local and at the global level. The 
people suffer from the impact of colonialism and authoritarianism, and the rule of 
those who try to manipulate and control the role of the state for their own narrow 
interests. The crisis is manifested in many different forms: civil wars, violation of 
human rights, the suppression of civil liberties, abject poverty, famine, epidemics, 
debt problems, population displacement, ecological disasters and 
disenfranchisement. The crisis in the Horn appears to be without end creating one of 
the worst humanitarian catastrophes in modern era (Refugees International, 
2011).The inequitable distribution of resources generates intense armed conflicts 
among different social groups. These conflicts result in further depletion of 
resources, violence, disruption of economic production and increased demographic 
displacement. Eventually, the crisis destroys the social fabric by promoting 
militarization, tyranny and mutual animosity and together these over time produce a 
“culture of warfare” (Wasara, 2002:57-62).  
The region’s asymmetric integration into the global capital markets escalated the 
security crisis leading to the disruption of regional economies by unequal exchange 
and exploitative relations with the West and the formation of an alliance between 
global capital and the region’s economically privileged and ruling political elites 
(Weintstein, 2008). The myriad of human security pathologies in this region are 
engendered by the violent struggles for state power among the various ethnic groups 
that have cross-cutting cleavages. The overlapping ethnic identities between the 
states in this region create regional security complexes as instability and insecurity in 
one country gravitates to insecurity in neighboring countries. States have been the 
central conduit to power and resources and the ruling groups are clientelists and 
sectarians, leaving no political space for disenfranchised and marginalized social 
                                         
55 See und Frieden, S., and London Institute for African Alternatives. (1999). Ecology, politics and 
violent conflict. M. Suliman (Ed.). London and New York: Zed Books. 




groups who often have no choice but to resort to resistance to obtain freedom and 
emancipation through the application of ethnic and religious solidarity (Attilio, 
2006:1). 
Consequently, Horn of Africa states themselves have become central elements of the 
crisis, largely through their incessant quest to centralize and concentrate power. 
These states then produce and reproduce hegemonic facades, seemingly so 
inextricably caught up in their own political practices that they cannot extricate 
themselves from it. Centralizing power in this region was often a response to or 
excuse for ethnic strife and political competition, and served to exacerbate 
underlying problems even while temporarily overwhelming symptoms. The main 
investment in governance in the Horn was the multi-faceted instrument of internal 
security, subverting broader development of governance and civil society (ibid). 
Besides colonial legacy (with the exclusion of Ethiopia) which has been explained in 
chapter three, Cold War rivalries contributed significantly to the deplorable human 
security condition in the Horn of Africa. The strategic proximity of this region to the 
Persian Gulf and the Red Sea with its oil traffic made it a strategic hub which excited 
the interests of the superpowers. The Cold War imperatives influenced the policies of 
external actors toward the region. Although states and their associated social welfare 
systems received enormous resources, aid was accompanied by hundreds of millions 
of dollars in military assistance which reinforced repressive security apparatus and 
legitimized divide-and-rule governing policies (Agyeman-Duah, 1996). The 
northeast corner of the Greater Horn was particularly targeted because it is close to 
the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union poured hundreds of millions of dollars into 
Somalia before and billions into Ethiopia after 1977. The United States did the 
reverse, although on a lesser scale. The US also supported governments beyond 
Ethiopia and Somalia, including Kenya and Sudan under Numeiry (Ball, 1991:199). 
As Cold War priorities subsided and military aid dwindled, authoritarian states met 
violent ends or mutated to attempt to address donor states’ post-colonial interests, 
particularly democratization. Nevertheless, the legacy of overdeveloped internal 
security systems and bloated military budgets remain fixtures in most Horn states, 




even in countries where governments are attempting to make clean breaks with the 
past (Patman, 2009:38). 
4.6 Human security challenges in Somalia  
Having lacked a functioning state for over 20 years, Somalia has faced protracted 
insecurity and human suffering. Various manifestations of armed conflict are 
occurring in Somalia: civil war, foreign interventions, regional proxy wars, and 
communal clashes, clashes between paramilitaries, piracy, Islamist movements and 
armed criminality (APFO, 2012:4). The colonial contradiction of arbitrary state 
boundaries accompanied Somalia’s independence in 1969. Hence, the attempt to 
reunite with three large Somali groups trapped in other states, such as French 
Somaliland in Djibouti, the annexed Ogaden and Haud regions in Ethiopia and 
northern Kenya, was resisted by the Western support for Ethiopia and Kenya, which 
causes Somalia to look to the Soviet Union for military aid. Nevertheless the Somali 
government managed to maintain a fairly neutral stance in international affairs 
during the 1960s, a position which changes dramatically after 1969 (Hassan, 2010:3).  
The 1969 elections which ushered in President Muhammad Egal under the Somali 
Youth League were truncated by his assassination in the same year. The ensuing 
political upheaval provided an opportunity for the commander of the army, 
Mohamed Siad Barre to seize power. Barre introduced a brutal Marxist dictatorship, 
insisting upon the supremacy of party and nation as opposed to the local clan 
loyalties which are a strong feature of Somali culture56. In 1977, with Ethiopia in 
chaos after the fall of Haile Selassie, Somalia attacked Ethiopian garrisons in the 
Ogaden. Soon a Somali army was besieging the city of Harar. But President Siad  
was betrayed by his chosen superpower. The Soviet Union saw a more important 
potential client in the new Ethiopia. Early in 1978 the Ethiopian army, using Soviet 
equipment and reinforced by troops from Cuba, recaptured the Ogaden. The result 
was the mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees over the borders 
into Somalia (Lockyer, 2006:13-15). 
                                         
56 See Ssereo, F. 2003. Clanpolitics, clan‐democracy and conflict regulation in Africa: The experience 
of Somalia. The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 2(3-4), 25-40. 




In the aftermath of this disaster guerrilla groups, clan-based and regional, were 
formed in and around Somalia with the intention of toppling Barre's repressive and 
centralizing regime. By 1988 the result was full-scale civil war, resulting in the 
overthrow of Barre in 1991. He withdrew to the safety of his own clan, becoming 
one warlord among many in this increasingly chaotic nation57. In 1991 the faction 
controlling the former British Somaliland confused matters by declaring its 
independence as the republic of Somaliland58. The conflict destroyed Somalia's crops 
during 1992 and brought widespread famine. Food flown in by international agencies 
was looted by the warring militias. By December 1992 the situation was such that the 
UN actively intervened, sending a force of 35,000 troops in Operation Restore Hope. 
The UN briefly calmed the situation, persuading fifteen warring groups to convene in 
Addis Ababa in January 1993 for peace and disarmament talks59. These seemed at 
first to make progress, but the situation on the ground continued to deteriorate. In 
March 1994 American and European units in the UN force withdrew, finding the 
level of casualties unacceptable. Troops from African countries and the Indian 
subcontinent remained in Situ.  
During the rest of the decade the situation got worse rather than better. From late 
1994 the capital, Mogadishu, was divided between the two most powerful of the 
warring factions. In each a leader declared himself the president of the nation and 
organized a supposedly national government. In March 1995 the remaining UN 
forces were evacuated from the coast under the protection of an international flotilla. 
At the end of the decade the only remotely stable region was the breakaway republic 
of Somaliland, in the northwest. An interim constitution was introduced here in 1997 
and a president was elected. But the would-be republic failed to win any international 
recognition (Le Sage, 2005:3). In 2000, Abdiqasim Salad Hassan was selected as the 
President of the nation's new Transitional National Government (TNG), an interim 
administration formed to guide Somalia to its third permanent republican 
government. Subsequently, former Puntland President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was 
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elected as President of the succeeding Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 
October 10, 2004 (Rulers, 2004).  
In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an Islamist organization, assumed control 
of much of the southern part of the country and promptly imposed Sharia law. The 
Ethiopian intervention into the crisis in 2006 toppled the ICU and accentuated the 
disintegration of the Somali state as competing clan groups and warlords struggled 
for control of local productive resources. In addition to facilitating an administrative 
and security vacuum, the intervention proved transformative. The authority of the 
TFG was reestablished with assistance of Ethiopian troops and the African Union 
peacekeepers (O’Kasick, 2007).  
Following this defeat, the Islamic Courts Union splintered into several different 
factions. Some of the more radical elements, including Al-Shabaab, regrouped to 
continue their insurgency against the TFG and oppose the Ethiopian military's 
presence in Somalia. Throughout 2007 and 2008, Al-Shabaab scored military 
victories, seizing control of key towns and ports in both central and southern 
Somalia. At the end of 2008, the group had captured Baidoa but not Mogadishu. By 
January 2009, Al-Shabaab and other militias had managed to force the Ethiopian 
troops to retreat, leaving behind an under-equipped African Union peacekeeping 
force to assist the Transitional Federal Government's troops (USCIRF, 2009). On 29 
December 2008, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed announced before a united parliament in 
Baidoa his resignation as President of Somalia. In his speech, which was broadcast 
on national radio, Yusuf expressed regret at failing to end the country's seventeen-
year conflict as his government had mandated to do (BBC News, 29 December, 
2008). 
 He also blamed the international community for its failure to support the 
government60, and said that the speaker of parliament would succeed him in office as 
the Chairman of the Transitional Federal Government. Taking advantage of the 
advanced collapse of the state in Somalia and the inability of the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) to make headway against it or any of the other challenges 
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confronting its rule, Al Shabaab took control of large areas of central Somalia, giving 
it control over the entire south and central Somalia. In 2007, it claimed an affiliation 
with al-Qaeda, and took responsibility for its first major attack outside of Somalia in 
July 2010, when twin bombings in Kampala killed more than 70 people watching TV 
coverage of the World Cup soccer final (Uganda Media Centre, 2010). In February 
2010, it issued a declaratory statement of practical support for AQAP that prompted 
Western policy makers to worry about the prospect of enhanced cooperation among 
al-Qaeda affiliates in the region, although to date this remains more rhetorical than 
actual (Joscelyn and Roggio, 2012:1). The increasing level of threat from Al-
Shabaab was merely one of multiple insecurities afflicting Somalia and the wider 
Horn of Africa.  
Meanwhile, economic motivations constituted potent drivers of conflict elsewhere, 
crossing national boundaries and contributing to the appearance of generalized zones 
of instability and border conflicts. These included damage to pastoralist livelihoods 
arising from infrastructural neglect and disruption to trade routes, uneven access to 
seaports, energy-related issues, the impact of drought and the pernicious effects of 
localized conflicts on the intraregional economy (OCHA, 2012). Thriving shadow 
networks constituted a parallel economic structure that facilitated regional trade in 
arms and the smuggling of people and fuel. This created an enabling environment for 
individuals and groups that sought to utilize these illicit networks for more sinister 
exchanges. Finally, the regionalization of localized conflicts enabled the ICU to 
receive transfers of arms and advisers. 
Factional fighting between Al Shabaab and TFG-allied forces continued to 
undermine human security situation in the country and has in fact, spiral into 
neighboring countries. Piracy, terrorism, human trafficking and famine are symptoms 
of the wider instability that has plagued Somalia. According to US Embassy in 
Nairobi, in 2011/2012, Al Shabaab carried out at least 17 attacks involving grenades 
or explosive devices in Kenya61. At least 48 people died in these attacks, and around 
200 people were injured. Nine of these attacks occurred in North Eastern Province, 
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including locations in Dadaab, Wajir, and Garissa. Four attacks occurred in Nairobi, 
and four in Mombasa. Targets included police stations and police vehicles, 
nightclubs and bars, churches, a religious gathering, a downtown building of small 
shops, and a bus station. Other attacks include two simultaneous assaults on churches 
in Garissa on 1 July 2012. In this attack, 17 people were killed and about 50 people 
were injured (US Embassy, 2012). The terrorist group claimed responsibility for the 
21 September 2013 attack, when unidentified gunmen attacked the upmarket 
Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The attack, which lasted until 24 
September, resulted in at least 67 deaths, including four attackers. Over 175 people 
were reportedly wounded in the mass shooting, with all of the gunmen reported 
killed62. The Islamist group al-Shabaab characterized the attack as retribution for the 
Kenyan military's deployment in Somalia.  
4.7 Human security challenges in Sudan and South Sudan  
Sudan which gained her independence in 1956 from Egyptian-British colonial rule 
has faced succession of human security crises which eventually led to the secession 
of Southern Sudan as a sovereign state in 2011.  It was clear from the beginning that 
peace could not last as incipient animosities between North and South were not 
resolved before and immediately after independence. Sudan has been characterized 
by internal conflict and tensions. Ethnic, cultural and religious divisions have 
coincided with unequal political and economic relations between North and South. 
The divisions and imbalances led to the first North-South Sudan civil war (1955-
1972), followed by the second civil war (1983-2005) and the Darfur conflict which 
began in 2003, continuing to this day. The human cost of the latter two wars was 
particularly heavy with around 2.5 million people, mostly civilians, left dead from 
the fighting (US Committee for Refugees, Sudan: 2001). The Second Sudanese Civil 
War, fought between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) of the South 
and the Northern government based in the capital Khartoum, was brought to a 
conclusion by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) see http://www.aec-
sudan.org/docs/cpa/cpa-en.pdf. The CPA addressed many issues, but an important 
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stipulation of the treaty was the referendum which decided South Sudan attainment 
of self-determination from the North in 2011 (McKay, 2012:4). 
 In spite of such proclamations, however, the inception of the Republic of South 
Sudan has been   marred by violent clashes which have been spreading like wildfire 
in areas around the North-South border and elsewhere. Abyei, an oil-rich region 
along the North-South border, has seen violent conflict devastate its landscape and 
inhabitants since January 2011, and this has become worse as time has progressed. 
Abyei was due to hold a separate referendum at the same time as the South’s, when 
its inhabitants would also decide whether to become part of the North or South. 
Unfortunately, progress on that vote still remains deadlocked. The settled population 
of the area, the southern-oriented Ngok Dinka, asserts that they alone should have 
that right to vote. But the nomadic Misseriya people, who migrate to Abyei from the 
North, are equally adamant that they should also have the right to vote. In the past, 
there have been major tensions between the two groups and thousands have died on 
account of feuds over water and land (McKay, 2012:7). 
The Abyei dispute assumed broader political dimensions due to the oil reserves and 
its geostrategic importance and had been used as a bargaining chip between North 
and South. In May 2011, Sudan Armed Forces from the North and their allied civil 
militias stormed Abyei, set homes on fire, looted stores and forced anybody healthy 
enough to flee for their lives. More than 100,000 people have been displaced (UN 
News Centre, Sudan: 2012). The dispute over Abyei has become one of the most 
intractable in Sudan. Elsewhere along the border, hostilities have surfaced in South 
Kordofan and Blue Nile. Instead of having their own referendum, both areas were 
granted more vague ‘popular consultations’ to decide whether or not the CPA had 
met the aspirations of the people, but the findings placed little or no obligation on the 
central government in Khartoum to fulfill those expectations. The two regions were 
heavily contested during the Second Sudanese Civil War, and these regions have 
become areas of continued instability and insecurity. 
Human security challenges in South Kordofan escalated ahead of the gubernatorial 
and state assembly elections, held on May 2, 2011 when the National Congress Party 
candidate Abdul Aziz al-Hilu narrowly beat the SPLM candidate, but the SPLM 




alleged the voting was rigged. The tensions exacerbated, and fighting commenced in 
early June 2011 when SAF moved into South Kordofan’s capital Kadugli and 
initiated aerial attacks, triggering clashes with SPLA units in the region and causing 
mass displacement. Some 50,000 people fled from South Kordofan and Blue Nile 
state to Ethiopia (UNOHA, 2011). Violence reached a particularly intense pitch in 
Jonglei, the largest state in the South which is bordered by Ethiopia. The incidence of 
fighting between the Luo-Nuer and Murle tribes rapidly increased since December 
2011 when 8,000 armed men from the Luo-Nuer attacked the Murle’s home of Pibor 
County. Over 1,000 people were killed in fighting between the Luo- Nuer and Murle 
tribes between June and December 2011(IRIN, AllAfrica, 18 March, 2012). 
The ethno-religious cleavages between the North and South Sudan are the major 
sources of conflict in what was formerly the largest and perhaps most diverse country 
in Africa. The northern Sudan, which is presently known as Sudan, is a model vision 
of a unified Arab/Muslim culture and constitutes about 70% of the previous 
Sudanese population. Meanwhile, South Sudan is populated mostly by non-Muslim 
Nilotes, speaking languages of one section of the Nilotic sub-branch of the Eastern 
Sudanic branch of Nilo-Saharan63. They are characterised by physical similarity and 
many common cultural features, constituting about 30% of the former Sudanese 
population (UNWPP, 2010).   
The condominium government instituted “closed door” ordinances which restricted 
movements between the two regions and prohibited the Muslim North from 
proselytizing in the south. There was also separate curriculum in southern schools. 
The amalgamation of the two regions without due consultation with southerners 
created tension in the south, who feared being subsumed by the political power of the 
larger north. The relations between the two regions heightened after the February 
1953 agreement by Britain and Egypt to grant independence to Sudan without 
commitments to create a federal system that would give the south regional autonomy 
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coupled with imposition of Arabic as the official language of administration, which 
deprived most of the few educated English-speaking southerners of the opportunity 
to enter public service (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006:14). The south also felt threatened 
by their gross marginalization and the replacement of trusted British district 
commissioners with unsympathetic northerners. Out of 800 civil service jobs vacated 
by the British official, only 6 positions of junior officers were given to the south 
(Jok, 2007:41). Before independence in 1956, the first civil war had erupted and 
extended from 1955 to 1972 when the British-administered southern army units 
(Equatorial Corps) mutinied in Totit, in August 1955, in protest  against their transfer 
to garrisons under northern officers. The rebellious troops killed several hundred 
northerners. The government ruthlessly suppressed the revolt by executing seventy 
southerners for sedition (Hizkias, 1987:34). However, the reaction failed to pacify 
the south as some of the mutineers escaped to remote areas and organized resistance 
to the Arab-dominated government of Sudan which gradually crystalized into the 
Anyanya guerrilla army. The immediate causes of the mutiny were a trial of a 
southern member of the national assembly and an allegedly telegram urging northern 
administrators in the south to oppress Southerners (O’balance, 1977:62).  
However, there are ingrained animosities that have exacerbated this division. For 
instance, the south resented Prime Minister Abbud's southern policy after the military 
take- over of 1958.  Abbud’s government openly tried to “Arabize” the South, and to 
suppress cultural freedom. In February 1964, Abbud expelled foreign missionaries 
from the south. He then shut down parliament to cut off a last outlet for southern 
complaints. These policies impelled southern leaders to support the incipient rebel 
group Anya Nya that had begun sporadic attacks on the Sudanese forces since 1955 
(Metz, 1991). The human security consequence of the first Sudanese war was 
estimated to about half a million deaths while many hundreds of thousands were 
internally displaced or forced to live as refugees (Wells and Dilla, 1993:5). The 
Addis Ababa Agreement ended this war in March 1972 by granting the Southerners a 
single administrative region with various defined powers, but it turned out to be only 
a temporary pause in the unrest because, within a decade, another tragic war started. 
The second Sudanese civil war was a continuation of the first war. It originated in 
southern Sudan in 1983 and ended with the signing of the Comparative Peace 




Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement (SPLM/A) in Nairobi in 2005 (Taha, 2011:20).  
The war resulted in the death of about two million people and the displacements of 
about four million, causing widespread poverty and disease. The civilian death toll is 
one of the highest of any war since World War two and was marked by a large 
number of human rights violations particularly the atrocities perpetuated by the GoS 
against the people of south Sudan (Seymour, 2003:7). Besides the ethno-religious 
contrast between Islam and emerging Christianity in north and south Sudan, there is 
a related linguistic element to the North/South cleavage. Choice of language also 
played a political role in the ethnic and religious cleavage between the northern and 
southern Sudanese. English has been associated with being non-Muslim, as Arabic 
was associated with Islam. Thus language was a political instrument and a symbol of 
identity. In early 1991, with about 90 percent of the southern third of the country 
controlled by the SPLA, the use of Arabic as a medium of instruction in southern 
schools remained a political issue, with many southerners regarding Arabic as an 
element in northern cultural domination. Juba (or pidgin) Arabic, developed and 
learned informally, had been used in southern towns, particularly in Al Istiwai, for 
some time and had spread slowly but steadily throughout the south, but not always at 
the expense of English. “The Juba Arabic used in the marketplace and even by 
political figures addressing ethnically mixed urban audiences could not be 
understood by northern Sudanese” (Metz, 1991). Historical patterns of interaction 
and rule, religion, race (Arab vs. African), and language have worked to deepen the 
North/South cleavage in Sudan.   
In the South, the Nilotic peoples are themselves divided. The Dinka, Nuer, and 
Shilluk are the three largest Nilotic groups. They entered southern Sudan before the 
tenth century, and constituted about sixty percent of the South’s population in 1990 
(about ten percent of Sudan's population overall). The Dinka live in a wide swathe 
over the northern portion of the southern region. The Nuer, the next largest group, 
was only about one-fourth to one-third the size of the Dinka. The Shilluk, the third 
largest group, had only about one-fourth as many people as the Nuer. Tribal 
migrations going back to the fifteenth century led to distinct cultural settlements with 




a wide range of political institutions, going from acephalous anarchy among the Nuer 
to centralized monarchy among the Shilluk (Gwen, 2009).   
 Any suggestion of a culturally united Nilotic south needs to take into account the 
separate institutions and histories of the Nilotic groups. It also needs to contend with 
the reality of an ugly Dinka/Nuer war in 1991. With the collapse of the Mengistu 
regime in Ethiopia in May 1991, the SPLA lost a key supply line and military bases 
in Southwest Ethiopia and this brought 350,000 southern Sudanese refugees back to 
Sudan, exacerbating the security situation. In response to this new difficulty, John 
Garang, the leader of the SPLA and a Dinka, summoned a meeting of the SPLA high 
command, in which those summoned feared that they would be arrested.  But Riek 
Machar, a Nuer, took this moment to break away from the SPLA to form the SPLA-
Nasir faction, in part due to an agreement with Khartoum. Head-on intra-Nilote 
warfare followed in which many civilians were killed. The Nasir faction controlled 
much of the Upper Nile while Garang’s Torit faction controlled most of Equatoria 
and Bahr-el-Ghazal. Indeed, the South-on-South death toll, in Jok and Hutchinson’s 
(1999, 126-27) reckoning “exceeds those lost to atrocities committed by the 
Sudanese army.”   
 It was northern oppression rather than cultural unity that brought the Dinka and the 
Nuer to cultivate a common identity as “southerners” (Reed 1972, 20). This is a quite 
different claim than one that portrays a culturally unified South as a coherent side in 
a social cleavage. Intra-Nilotic conflict is not the only complexity in the South. The 
South also has several groups of non-Nilotes. The Azande people, who entered 
southern Sudan in the sixteenth century, established the region's largest state. In the 
1950s, the Zande were seeking independence for their own state, which they called 
the Sué River Republic (Reed 1972, 20). The Avungara are another non-Nilotic 
population in the South. In the eighteenth century, the Avungara conquered the 
Azande, who were de facto vassals to Avungara power until the British recognized 
their autonomy (Metz, 1991).   
 Further confusing the territorial divide between “North” and “South” are the Ngok 
Dinka, living on the borderlands in Kordofan between North and South. Many                                                  
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too is culturally divided. “The two largest of the supratribal categories are the 
Juhayna and the Jaali (or Jaalayin). The Juhayna category consisted of tribes 
considered nomadic, although many had become fully settled. The Jaali 
encompassed the riverine, sedentary peoples from Dunqulah to just north of 
Khartoum and members of this group who had moved elsewhere. Some of its groups 
had become sedentary only in the twentieth century. Sudanese saw the Jaali as 
primarily indigenous peoples who were gradually arabized. “Sudanese thought the 
Juhayna were less mixed, although some Juhayna groups had become more diverse 
by absorbing indigenous peoples” (Metz, 1991:31).   
 There are further complexities among northerners. The Baqqara tribe, for example, 
moved south and west in earlier centuries, and mixed with the indigenous 
populations there. Today, they are scarcely to be distinguished from them, and are 
popularly thought to be the descendants of southern slaves. Yet they are considered 
in ethnic reckonings to be unquestionable northerners. And so, in 1951, proposals to 
give special status and protection to the south were defeated, and received the 
greatest calumny from these Baqqara. Deng (1995, 130-131) quotes Mansour Khalid:  
“Abd al- Tam…can be deemed, like so many other Sudanese of markedly Negroid 
origin, to have been compelled to take positions like that in order to out-Herod 
Herod.” This is true, Deng asserts, for the Baqqara, who have no traditional links to 
Arabs -- these are the greatest Arab chauvinists, and most strongly anti-Dinka64.   
 In Darfur, still in the North, the Fur (who were ruled until 1916 by an independent 
sultanate and oriented politically and culturally to peoples in Chad) is a sedentary, 
cultivating group long settled on the western frontier. They are non-Arabized 
Muslims, and referred to invidiously by other northerners as “Zurga” or blacks. 
Living on a plateau north of the Fur (and many in Chad) are the seminomadic people 
calling themselves Beri whom the Arabs call Zaghawa. They are Muslims who have 
retained many pre-Islamic rites. Herders, the Zaghawa also gained a substantial part 
of their livelihood by gathering wild grains. The Masalit, a Nilo-Saharan-speaking 
agriculturalist tribe, also Muslim, over the past century encroached through small 
scale war on traditional Fur land (HRW April 2004, 6). HRW (May 2004, 5) refers to 
                                         
64 See Deng, F. M. 2011. War of visions: Conflict of identities in the Sudan. Brookings Institution 
Press. 




the Zaghawa, Fur and Masalit as “Africans”, and these became the principal victims 
of the military campaign against a rebel insurgency beginning in 2003. “Arabs” are 
the principal recruits into the Janjaweed militia65.    
 The Nubians, living in the Nile River valley in far northern Sudan and southern 
Egypt, are the second largest Muslim group in Sudan. Nile Nubians speak Arabic 
(usually as a second language), but don’t consider themselves Arab. In the early 
1970s, an organization uniting the Fur and the Nuba, amongst others, into a United 
Sudan was formed. African Liberation Front spoke for the interests of “Africans” (as 
opposed to Arabs) who were residents of the North (Reed 1972, 9). The organized 
presence of non-Arabs in the North further undermines the notion that there is a 
sharp difference between the Arab/Muslim North and the African/Christian South. 
All of this ethnographic description is complicated still by migration. One estimate 
has it that in 1973 alone more than ten percent of the Sudanese population moved 
away from their ethnic homelands for economic reasons. Most of the migrants were 
of employment age and moved to cities, particularly in the Khartoum metropolitan 
area, which attracted a third of all internal migrants. Migrant flows escalated in the 
latter 1980s because of drought and famine, civil war in the South, and bandits’ 
crossing over from Chad (Metz, 1991).     
The Darfur debacle constitutes an addition to the catalogues of human security 
pathology in Sudan. Darfur is the Fur homeland, and has been Muslim since its first 
sultan, Sulayman Solong, decreed in the 16th century that Islam was to be the 
sultanate's official religion (Metz, 1991). However, large-scale religious conversions 
did not occur until the reign of Ahmad Bakr (1682-1722), who imported teachers, 
built mosques, and compelled his subjects to become Muslims. In the eighteenth 
century, several sultans consolidated the dynasty's hold on Darfur. The sultans 
operated the slave trade as a monopoly. They levied taxes on traders and export 
duties on slaves sent to Egypt, and took a share of the slaves brought into Darfur. 
Some household slaves advanced to prominent positions in the courts of sultans, and 
the power exercised by these slaves provoked a violent reaction among the 
traditional class of Fur officeholders in the late eighteenth century. The rivalry 
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between the slave and traditional elites caused recurrent unrest throughout the next 
century” (Muhammad al-Idrisi, 2000:114-115).   
 The British annexation of Darfur to Sudan terminated the Fur sultanate. Many Furs 
educated themselves in Arabic in the expectation of getting advancement in the 
Sudanese political environment. They were seen as outsiders by the Arabs and their 
advancement was slow. Moreover, Arabs and Fur competed for scarce land. When in 
the late 1970s oil was discovered, the Fur had greater incentives to demand 
autonomy, which was de facto achieved in the 1980s.  The civil strife in Chad during 
the 1980s spilled over into western Darfur and exacerbated the historical tensions 
between the non-Arab Fur and Zaghawa ethnic groups. As Metz (1991:59) reports, 
“At the time of the Bashir coup in June 1989, western Darfur was being used as a 
battleground by troops loyal to the Chadian government of Hissein Habré and rebels 
organized by Idris Deby and supported by Libya”. Deby was from the Zaghawa 
ethnic group that lived on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border, and the Zaghawa of 
Darfur provided him with support and sanctuary. Hundreds of Zaghawa from Chad 
had also fled into Sudan to seek refuge from the fighting. In May 1990, Chadian 
soldiers invaded Sudan’s provincial capital of Al Fashir, where they rescued 
wounded comrades being held at a local hospital (Prunier, 2005: 16-24). During the 
summer, Chadian forces burned eighteen Sudanese villages and abducted 100 
civilians. Deby's Patriotic Movement for Salvation (Mouvement Patriotique du Salut) 
provided arms to Sudanese Zaghawa and Arab militias, ostensibly so that they could 
protect themselves from Chadian forces. The militias, however, used the weapons 
against their own rivals, principally the ethnic Fur, and several hundred civilians 
were killed in civil strife during 199066. Sudan’s government was relieved when 
Deby finally defeated Habré in December 1990. The new government in N'Djamena 
signaled its willingness for good relations with Sudan by closing down the SPLM 
office. Early in 1991, Bashir visited Chad for official talks with Deby on bilateral 
ties. But there is every reason to see the Chad civil war, and the use of Darfur as a 
sanctuary for rebels, played a key role in arming African Muslims in Darfur in 
fighting against Arab herders and challenging the state.   
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Another major contributor to the insecurity in the region was the 1984-85 drought 
which heightened relations between Fur and Arab, and between Fur and Zaghawa 
pastoralists. The proliferation of automatic weapons made recurrent clashes over 
pasture lands and theft of livestock bloodier. In 1988-1989, the intermittent clashes 
in Darfur evolved into war between the Fur and the Arabs. It became a civil war and 
not just a communal conflict when the government in Khartoum began to arm the 
Arabs (HRW, April 2004, 7-9). By 1990-91 much of Darfur was in a state of war, 
with many villages being attacked (Metz, 1991).  The conflict in Darfur pitted the 
government of Sudan and allied militias, called the janjaweed, against an insurgency 
composed of two groups. The Darfur Liberation Front metamorphosed to the Sudan 
Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM). Initially, rebels were made up of the Zaghawa, the Fur and the Masaalit. But 
later, the Jebel and Dorok peoples joined the rebellion (HRW 2003, 36).   
In April 2003, the SLA launched a surprise attack on El Fashir, the capital of North 
Darfur, and damaged several government owned military aircraft and helicopters and 
looted fuel and arms depots. The Sudanese government responded with a heavy 
bombing campaign and the introduction of heavy equipment, including tanks to stave 
off rebel attacks (HRW April 2004, 7-9). The Darfur region of western Sudan has 
been the site of terrible violence, death, and displacement; what the United States has 
labeled 'genocide.' Despite what is currently the world's largest relief operation, 
efforts to calm the conflict and assist the approximately five million Darfurians 
suffering ongoing deprivation have produced precious few results. With no end in 
sight for the turmoil, Ahmad Sikainga, a native of Sudan and Professor of History at 
the Ohio State University, explores the origins and current status of the Darfur 
conflict 67(Sikainga, 2010). 
4.8 Human security challenges in Central African Republic 
Central African Republic, a landlocked country that is sparsely inhabited gained 
independence from France in 1960. The country is extremely underdeveloped and 
perhaps one of the poorest countries in the world (Berg, 2008:8). Besides poverty, 
CAR has struggled with recurrent insurgencies and army mutinies since the late 
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1990s. The pathologies of insecurity and instability that have bedeviled the nation 
could be traceable to the colonial legacy of French brutality and series of successive 
post-colonial kleptomaniac regimes that have availed themselves of the resources of 
the country to enrich themselves while embroiling peacefully coexisting ethnic 
groups in competition with one another (Saulnier, 1998:14). The French exploitation 
of the country during the colonial era and its continuation in the contemporary era 
has resulted in deficiency of physical infrastructure, the absence of government 
administration and institutional breakdown. This influence is illustrated by the fact 
that there has not been any change in the country’s government to date without at 
least the consent, if not the active intervention of France (Berg, 2008:3).   
Central African Republic has a population of about 5.5 million people with 
conglomeration of more than 80 ethnic groups, each with its own language. About 
75% are Baya-Mandjia and Banda (40% largely located in the northern and central 
parts of the country), and 4% are M'Baka (southwestern corner of the C.A.R.). 
Sangho, the language of a small group along the Oubangui River, is the national 
language spoken by the majority of Central Africans. The population of the country  
mainly comprises Christians and followers of indigenous beliefs who constitute 
about 85% of the population, while Muslims constitute about 15% of the populations 
(U.S. Dept. Country Notes, 2014). Religious identity is often closely associated with 
ethnic identity. Only a small part of the population has more than an elementary 
knowledge of French, the official language. More than 55% of the population lives in 
rural areas. The chief agricultural areas are around the Bossangoa and Bambari. 
Bangui, Berberati, Bangassou, and Bossangoa are the most densely populated urban 
centers. Central African Republic is bordered by Chad, Sudan and Democratic 
Republic of Congo. Regional insecurity and instability within these areas have 
resulted in porous borders and have increased trans-border crimes, illicit trades and 
proliferation of weapons (CIA World Factbook, April11, 2014). CAR has undergone 
several armed conflicts since the mid-1990s that badly affected the population. 
The 1996-7 mutinies, the May 2001 coup attempt by former leader Andre Kolingba, 
which affected a section of Bangui residents and the six months rebellion by Francois 
Bozize against the regime of Ange-Felix Patasse from October 2002 to March 2003 
created humanitarian crisis in the provinces of Ouham, Ouham Pende, Nana Grebizi, 




Kemo and parts of Ombella Mpoko. Thousands of people abandoned their homes for 
the bush while an estimated 41,000 refugees crossed over and remain in southern 
Chad, afraid to return home because of the destruction of their villages, continued 
insecurity and the collapse of infrastructure (IRINAfrica, 3 March, 2004). The 2002-
2003 rebellion engendered food insecurity as most farms were burnt; health and 
educational facilities looted, and many people were exposed to diseases and 
epidemics (OCHA, 2004). 
The latest chapter in CAR's history of violence began in December 2012, when a 
coalition of predominantly Muslim rebel forces from the northern part of the country 
known as Seleka bolstered by mercenaries from neighboring Chad and Sudan 
advanced southwards, and eventually toppled President Francois Bozizé in March 
2013(OCHA, 2014). Since the Bozizé government was ousted, the writ of the state 
has apparently been affected with a prevalence of insecurity as a result of the 
proliferation of armed groups. The rebels have been engaged in battles with 
government troops and said they overthrew Bozizé because he failed to follow 
through on earlier peace deals. Bozizé's regime was marred by allegations of 
corruption and cronyism (see http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/car-
3.htm). Seleka is a heterogeneous coalition of Central African rebel groups that 
emerged in northeastern CAR in 2006 and foreign combatants who have nothing in 
common except being Muslims (Lombard, 2014:1). The rebels took up arms not so 
much to replace the government as to force it to allocate resources to their 
marginalized region. The violence in CAR spiraled into chaos as Seleka rebels 
terrorized civilians, looted properties and burn villages and killed Christians and 
destroyed non-Muslim communities (FIDH Report, 2014:7). The level of violence, 
lawless and impunity has created a "human catastrophe of epic proportions ". 
According to Amnesty International, about 1 million people, in a country of 5.5 
million, fled their homes. Many of those fleeing were farmers and herders, and 
officials feared that their absence would lead to famine (IRC, 2014:1).  
The coup leader, Michel Djotodia who assumed power in April 2013 under a new 
transitional national council, suspended the constitution, and dissolved parliament. 
He was sworn in as head of state in August and promised to hold free and fair 
elections within 18 months. The weak and fragile state institutions have disintegrated 




following looting and the destruction of most of the country's administrative and 
judicial infrastructure. Séléka's leadership failed to have effective control over the 
various armed groups within its coalition, thus, despite being officially dissolved on 
13 September, its former constituents are still able to carry on indiscriminate attacks 
and looting. Furthermore, fighting between various armed groups has affected many 
parts of the country, resulting in large-scale atrocities and escalation of humanitarian 
crisis (Dersso, 2013:1). There has been significant participation of numbers of 
foreign fighters from Chad and Sudan which has heightened the risk of cross-border 
movement of armed groups, as well as small arms (Geel, 2014:9). Roland Marchal 
points  out that Seleka fighters had ‘notional inclinations for political Islam’ but also 
shared ‘strong sense of communal identity and a will to avenge previous CAR 
regimes and their beneficiaries identified as Christians’ (Global Observatory, 
September 2013). For the first time in the country’s history, large-scale atrocities are 
being committed along Muslim-Christian lines. In response to the rebellion and the 
increasing wave of indiscriminate attacks against Christians, the largely Christian 
populations in Bangui and villages across the north have formed self-defence units 
called anti-balaka ("anti-machete" in the Sango language). The retaliating Christian 
militias were equally  brutal to Muslims.  Reprisals by the disbanded Seleka led to at 
least 750 deaths in Bangui in early December 2013, and casualties have continued to 
increase at a rate of 20 deaths per day on average (Médecins Sans Frontières reported 
last week). In the worst case scenario, killings, rapes and other abuses have been 
committed by Muslims against Christians and vice versa. A high proportion of CAR 
Muslims have become targets of communal violence as the withdrawal of the 
disbanded Seleka fighters to Chad, Sudan and Cameroon has made the Muslim 
population increasingly vulnerable to mob violence. The African Union refused to 
recognize Djotodia as president and subsequently suspended its AU membership 
while imposing sanctions, travelling bans and asset freeze on the Seleka leadership68. 
In October 2013, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said the country had 
experienced "total breakdown of law and order," and he authorized the deployment 
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of a peacekeeping force69(Cordier et al, 2013). In December, the African Union 
increased the size of its force there from 3,500 troops to 6,000. France deployed 
1,600 soldiers to CAR. Many feared that CAR was on the brink of experiencing 
genocide. At the urging of regional leaders, Djotodia resigned in January 2014 for his 
failure to stem the escalating violence between Christians and Muslims that left the 
country in tatters. In January, the 135-member national transitional council elected 
Catherine Samba-Panza, an insurance broker and the mayor of the capital, Bangui, as 
interim president. 
The country’s leading clerics, Bishop Nestor Aziagba, and Imam Layama, both 
spoke of their fears of a genocide, a prospect also  evoked by French Foreign 
Minister Laurent Fabius, senior UN officials as well as human rights activists 
(Guardian 6th December, 2013). Bishop Aziagba described the situation as primarily 
a political crisis. One person was helped by mercenaries from Chad and Sudan to get 
into power. Unfortunately, most of the mercenaries who helped him to get into power 
are Muslim mercenaries from abroad. They don't have any feeling for the local 
population, so they started committing abuses, looting their properties, cows, 
ransacking their crops, burning down everything they had, he added 70(IRIN Africa 
Nov 27, 2013).  
However, Louisa Lombard of the University of California at Berkeley noted in April 
2013 that many Muslims in CAR had long put up with discrimination: 
People from southern CAR frequently refer to all north-
easterners as 'foreigners' (Chadian or Sudanese), meaning that 
regardless of their actual citizenship status; they do not belong 
in the country. When they travel, people from the Northeast 
are targeted for special surveillance because of their alleged 
'foreignness'. For instance, on the many roadblocks operated 
by branches of the state security forces, rebels and/or others, 
people with Muslim-sounding names or dress are frequently 
subject to harassment and extra extortion (African Argument 
January 24, 2014).  
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Imam Layama, one of the leading Islamic clerics in CAR corroborated the views 
expressed by the Archbishop. He emphasized that at the root of the conflict was 
greed for CAR’s natural resources. “Our riches have attracted greed”. Politicians use 
this wealth to get into power, so there are lots of mercenaries in the country, 
occupying the mining areas. And because there is no state, smuggling is going on 
with complete impunity. If security is not restored, the country will be stripped bare. 
Politics, he added, was also part of the toxic mix71 (IRINAfrica 27 November, 2013). 
The country is improbable on a variety of levels and had never had a tightly-woven 
social fabric. It has always been more of loose netting that has become dangerously 
frayed over the last few years. The crisis in CAR could be traced back to the early 
20th century, when French colonial authorities concentrated their administrative 
energies on Bangui and relegated the northeast to concessionary companies as 
‘autonomous district’. As a result, everything that is ‘state’ and ‘nation’ in the CAR 
grows out of the French-Christian enterprise centered on the capital. According to 
Lombard, most of the northeastern towns such as Ndele, Vakaga and Sikkikede were 
considered to be inhabited by foreigners. However, these ‘foreigners’ may have lived 
in the country for generations. In making these claims, the government officials echo 
their colonial predecessors, who justified killing the raiding sultans because they 
were ‘foreign’ invaders with no right to rule over people here. Since this territory is 
occupied almost exclusively by ‘foreigners’, the central government does very little 
there. People in northeastern CAR feel neglected and grossly marginalized. People 
with Islamic-sounding names are made to pay more at the roadblocks that proliferate 
especially in the southern and western parts of the country than people with Christian 
names, and it is harder for people from the Northeast to obtain national identity 
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documents. Many Muslims, like former president Michel Djotodia, take a Christian 
name in order to minimize the discrimination they face (African Argument January 
24, 2014). 
Another source of tension stems from the high levels of migration after upheaval in 
Chad and economic crisis in other neighboring countries, such as Cameroon. Many 
of these migrants are Muslim, and many profit from commerce, whether running 
shops in markets or trading diamonds. Legally, immigrants’ children who are born 
on Central African soil are CAR citizens72. In popular opinion, though, they remain 
foreigners. The migration has bolstered Central Africans’ widespread fear that the 
country is being invaded by foreigners, as it was once by trans-Saharan raiders and 
French concessionaires. The outsized roles of the Chadian president and men-in-arms 
in the CAR’s politics, especially over the past decade, also added to people’s 
frustrations73. Also immediately valuable is the expectation of the population that 
democratization would lead to a rapid, perceptible improvement in their living 
conditions, which was, however, scarcely possible given the lack of infrastructure, 
insufficient indigenous skilled workforce and steady state revenue decline. 
Overwhelmed by the challenges posed by the task of developing the country, 
President Bozize concentrated on buttressing his own power by expanding his 
support base and personal enrichment from resources of the state. As a result of his 
obvious inability to at least slow down the economic malaise. His administration’s 
inability to pay the salaries of civil servants created human security challenges. The 
piling-up of civil servants salaries arrears, especially over the second half of 2013 
created disenchantment and frustration among the populace. Market purchases and 
bar sociality cultivates a day-to-day ‘getting along’ no less real for being bred of 
practical necessity and the drying up of money removed any such possibilities for 
social lubrication. An injection of cash, such as by paying those salaries, would do 
much more for people’s well-being and the establishment of security than a strictly 
‘humanitarian’ distribution. Given all of these dynamics and histories of mistrust, the 
Seleka rebellion has provided avenue for the masses to vent their anger and 
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frustration which subsequently, crystallized into inter- and intra-community score-
settling and cruelty (Brown et al, 2013:212). 
4.9 African Union response to human security challenges in Africa 
The African struggles for de-colonization, emancipation, human rights, dignity and 
identity crystallized into the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
in May 1963. The Charter establishing OAU was based on the principles of state 
sovereignty and non-interference, and stipulated the struggle for the decolonization 
of Africa among its fundamental objectives, as it was believed that Africa could not 
be considered free unless the last colony had gained its independence, achieved the 
right to self-determination, and won the fight against apartheid (Gawanas, 2009:137).  
Linked to this was an obligation on OAU member states to provide support to people 
involved in liberation struggles, as set out in Article 20(3) of the African Charter. 
Furthermore, the justification of human rights as the basis of OAU struggle was 
enshrined in the United Nations universal declaration of rights which in its preamble 
recognizes the inherent dignity, equality and inalienable rights of all members of 
human family as the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. It gave 
credence to the aspiration of African people74. Hence, OAU was built on the 
theoretical foundation of Ubuntu as encapsulated on the concept of Pan-Africanism. 
However, the OAU perception of human rights as evidenced by the decolonization 
struggle and the right to self-determination precludes the salient rights of African 
people as it relates to their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights 
(Heyns, 2006:15).  
The preponderance of human security pathologies and gross violation of individual 
rights within the continent as exemplified by the escalation of conflicts, increasing 
cases of genocides, killings, torture and other civil and political rights violations that 
beset the continent show that OAU failed to adequately addressed the aspirations of 
African people (Human Security Report, 2005:22). For instance in 2007, Freedom 
House found that, of the 20 countries in world with the worst protection of civil and 
political rights, eight are in Africa (Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya, 
Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland and Zimbabwe). It also determined that, of the 45 
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countries classified as “not free” in the world, 18 are in Africa (Freedomhouse, 
2007). Thus, 18 out of the 53 or so countries in Africa are seen to be not free. In the 
1990s, 160 million Africans lived in countries ravaged by civil war; three million of 
them were killed in the course of such conflicts (Sarkin, 2009:13). Intra-state conflict 
comprised 79 of the 82 conflicts on the continent during that period (Kibble, 2003). 
Of the 32 intra- and inter-state armed conflicts that have occurred worldwide since 
2004, nearly half took place in Africa (Project Ploughshares, 2005:2). Children are 
often used as soldiers in these conflicts and it is estimated that 300,000 child soldiers 
are involved in 21 ongoing or recent armed conflicts around the world (Sheppard, 
2000:12). It has also been estimated that 2 million children died and 6 million 
children were wounded as a result of conflict in the years between 1994 and 2004 
(Davison, 2004).  
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) states that there are about 37 
million displaced people around the world as a result of conflict. Many of these 
people are in Africa, the largest numbers coming from the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Sudan and Somalia. 25 million people out of the 37 million people 
that are internally displaced are Africans (UNHCR, 2006). From 1956 to 2001, 80 
successful and 108 unsuccessful coups took place in Africa, nearly half of them in 
West Africa (McGowan, 2003:42). The fact that 50 of these coups, 13 of which were 
successful, took place in the final decade of the 20th century indicates that forced 
regime change is on the rise. Even in relatively peaceful states, many Africans 
endure abject poverty and lack access to food and basic necessities such as potable 
water (McGowan, 2003:43). 
In the face of these egregious human rights abuses and the incessant unconstitutional 
changes of government, the historical response both at continental and international 
levels, had been hand-wringing when hostilities break out, but little if anything in the 
way of serious preventive action.  Yet there are often obvious signs that war may be 
coming in particular official policies that violate human rights through systematic 
discrimination and disregard for the rule of law, stolen elections (if any are held at 
all), and impunity for gross abuses (Nowrojee, 2004:38). The major world powers 
have not given the United Nations (U.N.) the capacity to respond effectively to 




Africa’s wars. Although some of the Africa’s former colonizers have sent troops in 
recent years to areas ravaged by conflict including the 2000 British intervention in 
Sierra Leone75 and the French engagement in Côte d’Ivoire in 200276. However, the 
major powers have repeatedly made it clear that they will not make the necessary 
commitment to prevent the massive human rights violations in Africa that result from 
conflict as evidenced by the neglect in such areas like Rwanda, the DRC, Burundi, 
and the Central African Republic (Nowrojee, 2004:40). OAU was handicapped as the 
principles of sovereignty and non-interference were repeatedly used to fend off 
criticism of state sponsored violence against its citizens (Kioko, 2003:809).  
With the end of the Cold War in 1990s and the emergence of a new world order in 
which values like democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights  gained 
wider acceptability, the imperative need to find collective ways and means of 
effectively addressing the many grave problems of the continent such as endemic 
poverty, HIV/AIDS and armed conflicts, as well as responding to the challenges 
posed by a globalizing and integrating world necessitated the transformation of OAU 
to African Union (AU) in July 9, 200277. African leaders were generally in 
agreement on the need to promote and consolidate African unity, to strengthen and 
revitalize the continental organization to enable it to play a more active role and keep 
pace with the political, economic and social developments taking place within and 
outside the continent. These leaders felt that the many problems the continent was 
confronted with required a new way of doing things; such a new approach should 
include building partnerships between governments and all segments of civil 
society78, in particular women, youth and the private sector, as well as strengthening 
the common institutions and providing them with the necessary powers and resources 
to enable them to discharge their respective mandates effectively (AU Constitutive 
Act, 2000).  
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 The Constitutive Act of the AU envisages a more integrated level of continental 
governance. Under the Act, there is a commitment to “promote and protect human 
and peoples’ rights,” and it specifies that “governments which shall come to power 
through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of 
the Union.” It also provides for a fifteen-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) 
to replace the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and 
Resolution. The council will facilitate the A.U.’s response to crises and will 
“promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, 
protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human 
life and international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts” 
(AU, 2002).  Article 4 (h) of the A.U. Protocol explicitly authorizes the organization 
to “intervene in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (AU Constitutive Act, 2000).   
At the same time as the process establishing the A.U. was ongoing, African 
governments led by South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria created another new 
mechanism to promote good governance and economic development known as the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). NEPAD rests on the 
determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise 
of underdevelopment and exclusion in a global war. It sees peace, security and 
democracy as prerequisite for attracting investments, garnering growth and 
development, and reducing poverty. It places demands on African governments to 
commit to a set of targeted initiatives, intended to strengthen their political and 
administrative frameworks in line with the principles of transparency, accountability, 
integrity, respect for human rights and the promotion of the rule of law (NEPAD 
2001:para. 1). NEPAD is built on five core principles of good governance; 
entrenchment of democracy, peace, stability and security; sound economic policy-
making and execution; productive partnerships; and domestic ownership and 
leadership79.    
One of the NEPAD systems for monitoring adherence to the rule of law is the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) created in 2003. Under the APRM, a 
                                         
79 See Secretariat, N. E. P. A. D. 2001. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development. Abuja, 
Nigeria, October. 




group of African “eminent persons” is to conduct periodic reviews of members’ 
“policies and practices” “to ascertain progress being made towards achieving 
mutually agreed goals.” Membership in the APRM is not mandatory80. Rather, states 
choose peer review by signing an additional memorandum of understanding (Cilliers, 
2004:5).    
In 2002, the AU adopted a Memorandum of Understanding on Conference on 
Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). This 
includes a set of undertakings on a wide range of issues related to human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law.  The CSSDCA, loosely modeled on the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), has a peer review implementation 
mechanism that resembles but in some respects is stronger than NEPAD’s.  There are 
obvious areas of overlap between the CSSDCA and NEPAD, and there is now an 
attempt to coordinate the two processes, with ongoing discussions about harmonizing 
the standards used and division of responsibilities under the different review systems. 
The AU places much emphasis the nexus between peace, democracy, and 
development. The organization’s institutional architectures are based on the principle 
that democracy and development can help promote peace. Each of the three areas has 
its own protocol, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and 
Security Council of the African Union of 2002; the African Charter on Democracy, 
Elections, and Governance of 2007; and the NEPAD Framework Document of 2001 
(AU, 2002, 2007). Each also has a legal instrument with an implementation 
mechanism, the Peace and Security Council; the Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
Unit; and the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency respectively. The three 
sectors are intended to coordinate their efforts closely. The African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM) and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme (CAADP) were both established in 2003 in support of NEPAD’s work.  
The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme of 2003 is 
recognized as a sound approach to rejuvenating and strengthening agricultural 
production and resource management, as well as food security on the continent. It 
seeks to provide a policy framework for the agricultural sector, which generates 35-
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40 percent of Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employs about 70 percent 
of its population81. In essence, CAADP is about bringing together diverse key 
players at the continental, regional and national levels to improve co-ordination, to 
share knowledge, successes and failures, to encourage one another, and to promote 
joint and separate efforts to achieve the CAADP goals.  Overall, CAADP’s goal is to 
eliminate hunger and reduce poverty through agriculture. To do this, African 
governments have agreed to increase public investment in agriculture by a minimum 
of 10 per cent of their national budgets and to raise agricultural productivity by at 
least 6 percent.”82 Thirty African countries had joined the programme by February 
2013, but a mere eight are allocating 10 percent of their national budgets to 
agriculture as pledged in 2003, and only 26 have established appropriate plans and 
monitoring (Adebajo and Paterson, 2012:23). By January 2013, 33 countries had 
joined the APRM, which sets and investigates standards of governance, addresses 
democratic deficits and  oversees important tax and electoral reforms. By, 2013, 17 
countries had undertaken its review process (APRM January 2013). Many African 
countries have also not signed the agreements regarding women’s rights (ratified by 
36 states), and combating corruption ratified by 34 states (AU 21 February, 2013). 
Moreover, seven African states have not signed the protocol establishing the Peace 
and Security Council (AU 28 February, 2013). Compliance with these mechanisms 
has been hampered by the non- binding nature of its findings and capacity constraints 
at the national level. 
 In the face of these daunting challenges, the AU has made some landmark 
achievements since its transformation. Between 1960 and 1990, no single ruling 
party in Africa lost power. Between 1989 and 1998, the number of multi- party 
political systems in Africa increased from five to 35. After 2002, ruling parties were 
voted out of power in Benin, the Central African Republic (CAR), Ghana, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and 
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Zambia though; the quality of democracy in many countries has arguably declined 
since 2005, in particular with the curtailing of political rights during elections.  
Furthermore, the number of inter-state conflicts has decreased since the creation of 
the AU from eight in 2002 to four in 2012. The African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA) of the African Union (AU) has made a significant contribution 
to this positive development through its peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-building 
and conflict transformation efforts. The AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and 
Development (PCRD) framework which was adopted at the 9th Ordinary Session of 
the Executive Council in Banjul, Gambia, in July 2006, remains a credible conflict 
prevention tool for responding to current and future post-conflict security challenges 
or threats. It addresses the needs of countries emerging from conflict, including the 
requirements of affected populations, prevention of the escalation of disputes and 
avoidance of relapses into violence, as well as focusing on the root causes of conflict 
and consolidating sustainable peace (Addo, 2012:90). The PCRD framework has six 
key indicative elements that form the basis of efforts across different phases of 
action. These are security, humanitarian/emergency assistance, political governance 
and transition, socio-economic reconstruction and development, human rights, justice 
and reconciliation, and women and gender (Mathews, 2009:29). 
However, one of the fundamental challenges faced by the AU is the relative 
powerlessness of its institutions. African member states sometimes do not comply 
with norms to which they have agreed, both on the continent and internationally. In 
addition, unlike the UN Security Council, the AU does not have a body with the 
power to enforce its decisions83. The AU Peace and Security Council often lacks the 
power to implement its decisions with the possible exception of suspending countries 
whose soldiers have staged coups d’état . 
Since the AU’s governance framework is premised on the voluntary compliance of 
member states for its implementation, 84if this cooperation is withheld, its structural 
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mechanisms are undermined. For example, the APRM’s authority has weakened 
since Tshwane questioned its findings on xenophobia in South Africa. President 
Thabo Mbeki’s government objected to criticisms made in a 2007 report issued by 
the body, in particular dismissing its warning about a xenophobic threat in South 
Africa as “simply not true”. Less than a year later, 62 African immigrants were killed 
and 100,000 displaced in xenophobic attacks (Mwanasali, 2012:73). Furthermore, 
other key AU agreements remain un-ratified by many member states (Engel, 
2012:24). The African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance only 
reached its threshold of 15 signatories in January 2012. The many states that have not 
signed the document are not obliged to observe its principles. Indeed, about one-third 
of AU member states actively oppose its efforts to entrench human rights and 
democracy principles and protocols, while many others appear to support its goals 
merely in response to peer pressure. 
Other challenges facing the union are lack of consensus, weak early warning 
capabilities in intelligent field, lack of financial and institutional capacities for 
intervention and donor dependency (African Briefing Report 16 May, 2011). The 
dynamics of inter-governmentalism, tensions within its supranational architecture, 
weak institutional and political integration of its RECs, coupled with ambiguities in 
terms of common governance values and standards have impeded on the 
effectiveness of the Union in promoting human security in Africa (Mbeki: April 29, 
2011). The AU’s credibility, authority and reliability have suffered following the 
crises in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire. The proposed AU roadmap for resolving the 
conflict in the Libya crisis has not been given proper attention by the international 
community, and has rather been criticized within and outside the continent. 
Similarly, the AU has also been criticized for having mismanaged the quick 
resolution of the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, among others, by not being forthright in 
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supporting the ECOWAS position on intervention. The AU appears to have lost 
credibility due to the interplay of the following fundamental factors:  Perception: the 
popular protests in North Africa (including the Libyan crisis) and the Middle East 
have been perceived as an ‘Arab Spring’, rather than an African issue. This 
perception was fed by the lack of consultation between African and European leaders 
on the issue, and further aggravated by the predominance of the Arab League and the 
relatively slow reaction of the AU. Given the fact that the Libyan crisis has important 
political and financial implications for the AU, it should have been prioritized by the 
organization from the beginning (African Briefing Report 16 May, 2011).    
The internal divisions within the Union have undermined its efforts in continental 
peace-building. For example, three African states voted in favour of UNSCR 1973 
(South Africa, Gabon and Nigeria), despite the AU High Panel (Toumani Ture/Mali, 
Zuma/RSA Museveni/Uganda, Abdul Aziz/Mauritanie, Nguesso/C-Brazzaville) 
taking a different position. Subsequently, the AU five-point Roadmap, which 
included a ceasefire, the protection of civilians, humanitarian aid, dialogue, and an 
inclusive transitional period, meeting the aspirations of the Libyan people, gathered 
much criticism. The AU’s mediation proposals (11/12 April) were rejected by the 
Libyan opposition (National Transitional Council), which insisted on Gaddafi’s 
departure (Aljazeera: news 12 April, 2011:00:35). 
The conflict in Côte d’Ivoire is another classic demonstration of the AU subsidiarity. 
The situation in Côte d’Ivoire showed that the AU Panel lacked a coherent strategy. 
The AU’s choice to send Thabo Mbeki to resolve the dispute between Gbagbo and 
Ouattara in December 2010 failed on two accounts. First, Mbeki did not combine 
efforts with ECOWAS. Second, South Africa was seen as a peacemaker that often 
opted for a pro-government (in this case pro-Gbagbo) approach (Vanguard 8 
February, 2011). Similarly, Raila Odinga compromised his neutrality as a mediator 
when he supported military action prior to confirmation by ECOWAS, which had not 
reached an internal consensus on the matter at the time as a result both parties felt 
that they were dealt with unfairly (Koua: January 20, 2011). Outgoing Malawian 
President Bingu Mutharika visited Côte d’Ivoire in an effort to salvage the declining 
role of the AU, but it proved unsuccessful. Eventually, Teodora Nguema was 




considered too controversial to be involved in the resolution of the crisis because of 
his questionable human rights credentials. The level of consensus regarding the 
legitimacy of Ouattara achieved at the ECOWAS level provided a basis for AU and 
an international consensus. The AU Resolution of 9 March 2011 endorsed Ouattara’s 
legitimacy.   
The AU’s attempt at a peaceful resolution of the Côte d’Ivoire crisis was hampered 
many times by internal divisions between Member States that undermined the 
credibility of the AU as the main political mediator. These divisions were reflected 
within the AU mediation team, notably when RSA sided with Gbagbo and claims 
emerged from the Ouattara camp that RSA had stationed a naval warship off the 
coast to prevent an ECOWAS intervention. It later emerged that South African naval 
presence was part of a mutual military exercise between Côte d’Ivoire and RSA 
(see:www.africareview.com/News/-/979180/1110752/-/index.html). 
4.10 Conclusion   
 The chapter concludes that the AU needs to work in collaboration with African civil 
society organizations to ensure that the rights of individual Africans are adequately 
protected and projected through strict adherence to policies that will enhance human 
security. In light of the chapter’s content, it can be seen that the human security 
situation in the entire region of Africa is intricately webbed in an interwoven 
relationship as instability in one part invariably affects the stability of other parts. We 
can find common trends among all the countries in focus. They are all facing internal 
political instability and bad leadership, which is further complicated by a lack of 
democratic traditions, colonial history, and experiences of repressive military 
regimes. While we can certainly look on democratization of these countries from 
many different aspects, from the security point of view, political changes have 
indeed brought new aspects of threats and many new actors. While the countries 
have become more inclusive to some extent, that also presented a new opportunity 
for various ethnical groups, following their own goals and interests. However, taking 
in consideration everything stated before, the replacement of military dictators by 
elected civilians was not all that citizens wanted. They wanted, above all, a 
government that would prove to be better than military rule; one that would respect 




their rights while continue to provide security. All countries discussed in the 
chapter’s case studies are tackling the issues of border instability, and are major 
recipient countries for large amounts of refugees from neighboring war-torn 
countries. While Mali and Nigeria were deeply affected by the Libyan civil war, 
Libya on the other hand was affected by the Arab spring. Central African Republic 
experienced continuous influx of refugees from Chad and Sudanese region of Darfur. 
The incoming refugees that usually settle in the border regions of the recipient 
country present an additional stress for already fragile human security. Refugees are 
a particularly vulnerable social group since they lack almost any legal economic 
income, at the same time they present an increasing social, economic and 
humanitarian burden for the recipient state, which most African countries cannot 
handle themselves, thus refugees usually suffer from high undernourishment and are 
easy targets for extremist and terrorist groups that operate in the area.  
Countries in focus are all suffering from poor governance, lack of elite consensus, 
and acute poverty. Indicators confirmed the connection between human insecurity 
and regional instability. Countries with a lower degree of stability and higher rates of 
violence normally face a higher probability of human insecurity and vice versa, 
countries dealing with human insecurity are more likely to become victims of social 
unrests, criminal violence and terrorist activity. The situation in Nigeria shows that 
political corruption and lack of political instability can contribute to high levels of 
human insecurity. The political situation in Africa, to a big extent is still affected by 
decolonization and the postcolonial reality of unstable regimes, enormous 
inequalities and low political inclusiveness.  Regional approaches do not seem to be 
yielding the desired goal of human security promotion, nor do they provide a 
foreseeable hope for the teeming populations of Africa that are daily marginalized by 
the governments that swore to protect and promote their fundamental rights.  
In the next chapter, the study will examine the evolution of US foreign policy toward 
contemporary Africa. The chapter will briefly examine the policies of several US 
governmental administrations and the strategic interests that propel such policies. 
The study will analyze the sequence of events to engender the creation of 
AFRICOM, its programs, operations and activities in the continent of Africa. 





 UNITED STATES’ FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF AFRICOM 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the human insecurity in selected African countries 
especially the countries in the Sahel region and Horn of Africa. It was noted that 
human insecurity in the Sahel region and Horn of Africa are inextricably linked. 
Porous borders and limited government presence and capacities mean that insecurity 
in one part of the region can quickly become a security threat in another. In 2011, 
one result of the Libyan revolution, among many others, was an increase in the flow 
of dangerous weapons and well-armed, experienced fighters into the Sahel.  
The collapse of Libyan security institutions caught the Sahel at an especially 
vulnerable time. In Mali, a rebellion in the north by heavily armed, primarily Tuareg 
rebel groups, together with weak governance in Bamako, corruption, and an 
ineffectual counterterrorism response, culminated in a March 2012 coup d’état. 
Terrorist and extremist groups, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 
and Boko Haram exploited the resulting political vacuum and seized control of the 
northern two-thirds of Mali and north-eastern Nigeria. Terrorists enjoyed greater 
freedom of movement and, temporarily, access to a larger pool of potential recruits 
and training opportunities. At the same time, transnational criminal networks used 
well-established smuggling routes to increase their trafficking in weapons, drugs and 
people.  
Chad has been a steady route for illicit weapons trafficking out of Libya. These 
human security pathologies are resultant effects of exogenous influence as 
colonialism created arbitrary boundaries and entrenched perennial poverty through 
the process of imperialism and globalization. In this chapter, the study will look at 
United States (US) foreign policy toward Africa, `the US strategic interests that 
motivate these policies and how these interests eventually crystallized into the 
creation of USAFRICOM. The chapter will also examine AFRICOM’s programs, 
activities and current operations in the continent since its creation.  




To enable a systematic analysis of US foreign policy toward Africa, a concise 
conceptualization of foreign policy is needed. Much scholarly effort has been spent 
on defining foreign policy. However, few of these definitions will be reviewed.  
According to Pearson (2010:146), foreign policies are strategies governments use to 
guide their actions towards other states. The foreign policy process is the set of 
procedures and structures that states use to arrive at foreign policy decisions and to 
implement them. In the rational model of decision making, officials choose the 
action whose consequences best help meet the state’s established goals. By contrast, 
in the organizational process model, decisions result from routine administrative 
procedures; in the government bargaining (or bureaucratic politics) model, decisions 
result from negotiations among governmental agencies with different interests in the 
outcome.  
From a neo-realist perspective, foreign policy is strongly determined by the external 
environment, an international system characterized by anarchy. In this system, states 
understood as unitary, rational actors interact to assure them of the security (Jervis, 
1978:167-9). A state’s foreign policy behaviour is determined by its relative power, 
which is a function of distribution of power in the international system, and is seen to 
depend on material resources (military capacities, raw materials) (Mearsheimer, 
2007:83).  
Little attention is paid to the domestic context. In a neoliberal (institutionalist) 
perspective, the international system is also primarily an arena for state interaction, 
but non-state actors and intergovernmental institutions can also play a role. Since 
states strive to maximize their interests in this arena, “cooperation under anarchy” 
(Oye, 1986), the creation of institutions through durable inter-state cooperation 
become feasible (Keohane, 1989). This presupposes bargaining among states on the 
basis of predefined objectives (ibid), formulated in a domestic context via the 
pluralistic competition of interests.  Opening up the black box of the domestic 
context and the explanation of the link between internally defined interests and their 
defence in the external arena via foreign policy can be perceived as the major 
contributions neoliberal theorists have made to foreign policy analysis (Doyle, 
2008:49), demonstrating in quite sophisticated ways how these arenas might interact 
(Moravcsik cited in Keukeleire and Schunz, 2008:4-5). Central to the formulation 




and defence of interests is the emphasis on economics, in addition to military and 
natural resources, which makes the neoliberal concept of power slightly broader than 
the neo-realists’ 
 United States foreign policy is in tandem with the US national interests. The global 
policy perspective of the US is that of a Super-Power that is bent on preserving the 
international capitalist system. V.I. Lenin's theory of ‘Imperialism the Highest Stage 
of Capitalism’ is both self-explanatory and still relevant today.  He outlined the ethos 
of imperialism as follows: (1) the gap in economic development between 
industrialized Western (and European settled) countries and those restricted to 
primary production. This gap is widening under continued imperialist domination. 
 The export of capital from the more developed countries to the less.  
  The division, especially in the late nineteenth century, of territories 
throughout the World by the more developed nations as part of the rivalry and 
competition for strategic and economic advantages. This competition for 
colonies led to two world wars.  
 The further concentration and centralization of capital and the integration of 
the world capitalist economy into the structures of the giant Western-based 
multi-national corporations or integrated monopolistic enterprises. These 
multinational corporations not only accelerate technological change but also 
control trade, prices and profits.  
 The decline in the period since the Russian Revolution of 1917 of national 
rivalries among the leading capitalist countries as an international ruling class 
is consolidated and constituted on the basis of ownership of control of the 
multi-national corporations; and as the world capital market is 
internationalized by the World Bank and other agencies of the international 
ruling class.  
 The evolution of global imperialist foreign policy which corresponds to the 
global interests and perspectives of the multinational corporations.  
The intensification of these tendencies arises from the threat of world socialism to 
the world capitalist system. A number of US scholars have in recent studies shown 
that the US global policy has always been a grand and deliberate plan (Mandaza, 




1985:9). In the real world, US global planning has always been sophisticated and 
careful, as you'd expect from a major superpower with a highly centralized and class 
conscious dominant social group. Their power, in turn is rooted in their ownership 
and management of the economy, as is the norm in most societies. During World 
War II, American planners were well aware that the United States was going to 
emerge as a World dominant power, in a position of hegemony that had few 
historical parallels, and they organized and met in order to deal with this situation 
(Chomsky.1985:3). This developed subsequently into the conception of "Grand 
Area" planning85. 
The Grand Area was a region that was to be subordinated to the needs of the 
American economy. As one planner put it, it was to be the region that is strategically 
necessary for world control. The geopolitical analysis held that the Grand Area had 
to include at least the Western Hemisphere, the Far East, and the former British 
Empire, which we (the US) were in the process of dismantling and taking over 
ourselves. The Grand Area was also to include western and southern Europe and the 
oil producing regions of the Middle East; in fact it was to include everything, if that 
were possible. Detailed plans were laid for particular regions of the Grand Area and 
also for international institutions that were to organize and police it, essentially in the 
interests of this subordination to US domestic needs (Chomsky, 1985:3-5). 
This is a policy based on real politik analysis of US interests. I In 1948 a Top Secret 
document of The State Department made it clear that the questions of human rights, 
justice and economic and social progress for those dominated by the US was quite 
secondary in this regard (PPS:23). This document outlined as follows: 
We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the 
luxury of altruism and world benefaction. We should cease to 
talk about vague and..., unreal objectives such as human 
rights, the raising of the living standards, and 
                                         
85 On September 12 1939, a few days after World War II broke out in Europe, CFR leaders met with 
Assistant Secretary of State George Messersmith, a longtime member of the council, to offer their 
services on postwar planning. Messersmith spoke later in the day with Undersecretary of State 
Sumner Welles and Secretary of State Hull, both of whom expressed interest in the idea. Shortly 
thereafter CFR president Norman Davis talked with his friend Hull and received verbal approval of 
the plan (Shoup, 1974, p. 64). The State Department also conveyed its approval of the plan to the 
Rockefeller Foundation, which gave the council $44,500 on December 6 to begin its work. This 
foundation support continued for the life of what turned out to be a five-year project, and it amounted 
to over $10 million in 2013 dollars. 




democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to 
have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then 
hampered by idealistic slogans, the better86(The State 
Department Policy Planning Staff Papers: 1947-1949. Vol 1 
Garland, 1983). 
 
The point can hardly be overstated: imperialism is aggressive by nature; and includes 
in its armour and weaponry all those policies and actions designed to attain its global 
objectives: political blackmail, economic blockades, manipulation of "aid" and the 
control of the international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund and in addition to open aggression, intervention, etc. 
(Mandaza, 1985:42). Yet it would be to miss the point if it were forgotten that the 
major objective of US policy is not aggression for its own sake, but in pursuit of a 
"stability" within which its economic and strategic interest will as far as possible be 
maintained intact. 
U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa have long been carried out by multiple U.S. 
government agencies. The primary actors are DoS; USAID; DoD; and country 
ambassadors. Other agencies include: Departments of Health and Human Services; 
Justice; Treasury; Energy; Commerce; Agriculture; Homeland Security (DHS); 
Trade and Development Agency (TDA); National Institute for Health (NIH); Centres 
for Disease Control (CDC); and Millennium Challenge Corporation (Lawson and 
Epstein, 2009:20). The three main agencies of DoD, DoS, and USAID represent 
defense, diplomacy, and development which, according to the National Security 
Policy, comprise three key elements of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus. DoS 
oversees several programs that relate to democracy promotion, narcotics control and 
international law enforcement, terrorism, weapons proliferation, and non-UN 
peacekeeping operations, including oversight of PEPFAR through the U.S. Global 
AIDS Coordinator. USAID is responsible for most of the bilateral development 
assistance, including economic growth, global health, and democracy programs, 
[and] Title II of P.L. 480 food assistance (Lawson and Epstein, 2009:21-22). 
Department of Defence is responsible for foreign military financing and training 
                                         
86 Planning Policy Statement 23 “PPS/23: in U.S. Foreign Policy” is one of the attempts to identify 
the major global problems facing American policy makers and strategies for coordinating policy 
decisions based on cost/benefit analyses. 




programs, support for international peacekeeping operations, healthcare, and 
humanitarian assistance, among others.  
These programs are mostly bilateral in nature (country specific) rather than 
multilateral (combined with contributions from other donors). Individual agencies 
are largely responsible for bilateral programs, which often have considerable overlap. 
The multilateral programs are also intended to accomplish many of the same 
objectives as the bilateral assistance, although through different channels. All 
programs are under the policy guidance of DoS and, in some cases, under its direct 
authority, the diverse and sometimes related objectives of the many implementing 
aid agencies operating within the African environment raises questions about 
whether these agencies are working at cross-purposes or duplicating each other’s 
work (GAO-08-860:23). 
 5.2 U.S foreign policy toward Africa 
Although there are deep historic and cultural ties between the United States of 
America and Africa which dates back to inauspicious beginning of slave-trading 
network, there exists no consensus within US policy circles over Africa’s importance 
to US strategic interests. Despite this historic asymmetrical linkage of US-Africa’s 
relationships, US foreign policy toward the continent has been marked by 
indifference, at worst, and neglects, at best (Schraeder, 1994:3). Africa has very often 
been treated as a low priority foreign policy backwater compared to the time, effort 
and resources dedicated to many other regions considered by Washington to be of 
greater concern (Patman, 2008:317). The origins of the US/Africa relationship are 
steeped in the grubby business of the slave trade and the associated repatriation of 
emancipated slaves by ‘Colonization Societies’ to the African West coast 
commencing in 1815 to Sierra Leone87, ultimately leading to the establishment of 
Liberia (the free land) as a republic in 1847 (Bullock, 2011:2). By the end of the 
nineteenth century, attracted by Africa’s natural resources, virtually the entire 
                                         
87 Colonization Societies were private initiatives either set up by altruistic abolitionist white-
Americans who  
believed that the best hope for emancipated slaves to escape hardship and inequality was to leave the 
US or  
by US States wanting to get rid of their freed slave population. Library of Congress “History of 
Liberia: A  
Timeline” http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/gmdhtml/libhtml/liberia.html (accessed 22 April 2011). 




continent was under European colonial power, with Britain and France taking the 
largest share (Bagby, 1999:278). 
5.2.1 President Franklin D Roosevelt’s foreign policy doctrine in Africa 
Franklin D Roosevelt was the first American president to hint at the liberation of 
Africa, along with other regions under colonial rule during the Second World War. In 
March 1941, President Roosevelt who had become an ardent anti-colonialist laid out 
his position in unequivocal terms:  
There has never been, there isn't now, and there never 
will be, any race of people on earth fit to serve as 
masters over their fellow men. We believe that any 
nationality, no matter how small, has the inherent right 
to its own nationhood. (Foster, 1955:18). 
 Roosevelt doggedly pursued decolonization policy with British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill and leaders of other Allied colonial powers, culminating  in the 
creation in 1945 of the UN Trustee Council whose remit was to oversee the 
decolonization of those dependent territories that were placed under the international 
trusteeship system. Of the eleven territories placed under trusteeship, seven were in 
Africa ( http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/history.htm).  
5.2.2 President Harry Truman’s foreign policy toward Africa 
The Cold War which started under President Truman brought a fundamental shift in 
Roosevelt’s anti-colonial agenda as ideological war against USSR and its allies 
commenced. The United States government supported their European allies, some of 
whom still retained vestiges of colonial power. African struggles for independence 
were met with vehement resistance by the west as there were widespread fears that 
African independence might open the door to communism (Bagby, 1999:278). 
Washington adopted a policy of ‘selective engagement’ cultivating African countries 
as client states, providing support to sometimes brutal and corrupt regimes including 
the crushing of ethnic rebellions or defending against threats from neighbors while 
seeking to undermine those states whose sympathies lay with Moscow (Patman, 
2008:317). Due to the strategic importance of the countries in the horn of Africa, 
most especially Ethiopia, US foreign policy toward this region dated back to 1945 
and was guided by a series of Cold War rationales that viewed the region as a means 
for solving non-African problems.  




Specifically, US policymakers did not perceive the countries and peoples of the Horn 
of Africa as important in their own right but, rather, as a means of preventing the 
further advances of Soviet communism. As a result, US relationships with various 
regimes in the region evolved according to their perceived importance within an 
East-West framework (Schraeder, 1992:571). Emperor Haile Selassie, for example, 
was courted from the 1940s to the 1970s because of the importance of Ethiopia as 
part of a worldwide telecommunications network directed against the Soviet Union. 
After the US-Ethiopian security relationship was shattered in the aftermath of the 
1974-7788 Ethiopian revolution and the rise to power of a Soviet-backed regime 
headed by Mengistu Haile Mariam, the Somali regime of Siad Barre achieved greater 
status in Washington because of Somalia's importance as an access country from 
which the United States could counter militarily any perceived Soviet threat to 
Middle Eastern oil fields (ibid). The US partiality to certain countries in the region 
over others, especially Ethiopia and Somalia which received more than $600 million 
and $800 million respectively in economic and military aid, created regional security 
complex and increased tensions in the region when viewed in a security context. 
During Ethiopia’s annexation of Eritrea, the United States actively supported 
Ethiopia (Eberhart, 2011:3). This pattern of selective support led to distrust of US 
intention within the region. 
 In 1950 a joint US-Belgian military mission visited the Belgian Congo, which 
supplied two-thirds of the US demand for uranium. Their intention was to assess the 
security situation in a colony that was, according to George Marshall, “the primary 
source of danger” to US strategic interests in Africa. Marshall, best known as the 
author of the post-war Marshall Plan, was concerned about Soviet intentions in 
Africa. But he recognised that the most serious threat would be “a large scale 
uprising of the natives in the area or considerable disaffection of the natives 
employed in the mines” (Wright, 1997:19). This fear of a mass uprising involving the 
African working class has guided US foreign policy in Africa ever since. Even when 
                                         
88 Napper, Larry C., “The Ogaden War: Some Implications for Crisis Prevention,” in George, 
Alexander L., ed., Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention (Boulder: Westview, 
1979), p. 237. I. William Zartman comments on this mediation initiative: “The United States [was] in 
a poor position to produce resolution. Only the ally of the country making the concessions — here, 
Ethiopia — would be able to buy an agreement.” Zartman, “The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy in 
Third World Conflicts,” ibid., p. 348. 




the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union was dissolved, the CIA continued to 
finance UNITA because their real concern had always been with a popular 
movement rather than Soviet penetration (ibid).The US elite groups were engaged in 
an internecine struggle for control of the continent’s strategic resources. This 
struggle may be carried on by political or military means. Throughout the Angolan 
war major US companies such as Gulf Oil, Chase Manhattan Bank and General Tire 
retained their interests in Angola. The only time they were forced to suspend their 
operations was under pressure from the US government (Talbot, 2002). 
5.2.3 President Dwight Eisenhower’s African Policy 
Eisenhower’s Vice President, Richard M. Nixon emphasized the strategic importance 
of Africa to US national interests after a twenty-two- days tour of African continent 
in 1957. He asserted: 
 For too many years, Africa in the minds of many Americans 
has been regarded as a remote and mysterious continent 
which was the special province of the big game hunters, 
explorers and motion picture makers... There must be a 
corresponding realization throughout the executive branches 
of government, throughout the congress and throughout the 
Nation, of the growing importance of Africa to the future of 
the United States and the Free World and the necessity of 
assigning higher priority to our relations with the area (Nixon 
cited in Schlisinger, 1973:580). 
 
In 1958, President Eisenhower created the Bureau of African Affairs in response to 
the increasing number of African states gaining independence. The Bureau was 
headed by an Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs who, in turn, was 
supported by a Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary, three Deputy Assistant 
Secretaries, as well as a host of regional offices staffed by country directors and desk 
officers who monitor the day-to-day developments in sub-Saharan Africa. Events in  
North Africa were monitored by the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs. The major function of the Bureau is the maintenance of smooth 
and stable political relationships with all African governments. President Eisenhower 
and his Secretary of State firmly embraced Truman’s policy of containment.  




The growing forces of African nationalism were dismissed as of little importance and 
the African elites that espoused neutrality in the US/communist ideological war were 
treated with disdain.   In accordance with the Eisenhower administration’s policy of 
universal diplomatic presence, US embassies were opened in the newly independent 
states. As African embassies opened in Washington DC, black diplomats faced the 
brunt of the segregation laws. This damaging situation was recognized by a number 
of State Department Officials and prompted the start of an internal campaign to end 
segregation. It was this insight that drove Secretary of State Dean Rusk to urge 
congress to pass a bill that most US citizens considered at the time to be purely 
domestic legislation, which became the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Garland, 
2008:12-13). Martin Luther King Jr highlighted the global dimensions of the 
American Civil Rights Movement and actively drew on tactics, ideas and pressures 
emanating from Africa. This is illustrated in a speech he made in 1960: “…the new 
sense of dignity on the part of the Negro has been the awareness that his struggle for 
freedom is a part of a worldwide struggle. He has watched developments in…Africa 
with rapt attention…These rapid changes have naturally influenced the thinking of 
the American Negro. He knows that his struggle for human dignity is not an isolated 
event” (Jermi, 2010:106).  
5.2.4 President John F. Kennedy’s Africa doctrine 
On inauguration in 1961 President Kennedy brought with him an interest in African 
affairs having chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s subcommittee on 
Africa and spoken out against colonialism in the Senate. Although Kennedy had 
much greater empathy for pro-independence movements than his immediate 
predecessor, he faced significant problems on the African continent including 
Apartheid in South Africa, the anti-colonial revolt taking in place in Portuguese 
Angola and the chaos following Congo’s rapid decolonization all of which had to be 
dealt with against the overriding US Cold War policy of Containment of the Soviet 
Union (Frazer and Murray, 2002:105-7).  
After the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963, President Nixon’s 
administration departed from the Cold War image of the previous US governments. 
He saw the Soviet Union as a traditional great power with which the US could 
negotiate (Schraeder, 1996:33). President Nixon signed the Nixon-Brezhnev détente 




with the Soviet President in 1970 which was a bi-lateral agreement between the US 
and Soviet Union to end the proxy wars in Africa (Cohen, 2003:20). During a speech 
made during a visit to Ethiopia, Secretary of State William Rogers called for an end 
to the Cold War in Africa and shift of focus by the international community from 
East-West competition to development. The Nixon Doctrine contained the Soviet 
expansionism in Africa, retrenched the US forces and disavowed direct intervention 
in Africa. However the 1975 arrival of Cuban forces in both Ethiopia and Angola 
caused President Gerald Ford to reject the worldwide détente relationship initiated by 
Nixon (ibid). 
5.2.5 President Gerald Ford’s African policy 
A concern of the Ford administration was how to extend American political 
influence and exercise control over Africa’s strategic resources. His administration’s 
aggressive attitude toward the continent manifested over the US support for Jonas 
Savimbi’s UNITA in Africa’s longest civil war which left Angola devastated and 
killed half a million people, rendered 3.5 million people homeless and 86,000 people 
disabled as a result of landmine (Talbot, 2002: np). The US involvement in Angola 
followed previous intervention in the Congo/Zaire, where the CIA organized the 
murder of Patrice Lumumba and installed Mobutu Sese Seko as president. 
5.2.6 President Jimmy Carter’s Africa’s doctrine 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the possibility of the operation 
spreading beyond into Iran and Kuwait raised the profile of Africa in the US policy 
radar as the Carter Administration began to court some African countries for basing 
facilities and transit authorization for its forces from East African states close to the 
Arabian Gulf including Somalia, Djibouti and Kenya (Cohen, 2003:21). President 
Carter imposed sanctions on South Africa’s Apartheid government and publicly 
criticized them. 
5.2.7 President Ronald Reagan’s Africa doctrine 
In July 1981, the new US Secretary for Defence, Caspar Weinberger outlined the 
main objectives of "US Military Strategy for the 1980s". According to Weinberger, 
the US "is and always should be, a global power, with global concerns and 
responsibilities" that are essential to its global interests. The task of the US 




Government, therefore, was "to protect those interests wherever they are assailed 
and, in view of our global role, we must defend and support a stable, peaceful 
international system" (quoted in Chomsky, 1985:7).  
Accordingly, the intention is to "support regional security in Africa" and cooperate 
with our allies and friends in Africa to deter aggression and subversion by our global 
adversary. We intend to assure the US and our allies’ fair commercial access to 
essential fuel and non-fuel minerals and other raw materials produced in Africa, and 
at the same time to promote the growing engagement of the American economy and 
the American private sector in Africa's growing economy"89 (Ibid). 
Soviet military power, which includes "the training and support of terrorists" and 
"the use of military assistance and proxies" was the most immediate, significant and 
dangerous threat to the national security of the United States". In short, the national 
security objectives of the United State "included the usual aims of foreign and 
military policy: protecting US interests, supporting allies and friends, maintaining 
access to resources, etc.” (Ibid). He viewed US interests in Africa as "wholly 
consistent and compatible with the interests of the African States themselves" 
(Weinberger cited in Campbell, 1998: 357-364). Therefore, according to Crocker, the 
presence of Cuban troops in Africa is "inimical to our objectives and to African 
interests also" (ICA, June 9, 1981). Implicit in the entire policy statement is the view 
that Africa as a whole is ‘rightfully’ a US sphere of influence. What complicated US 
policy was South Africa's policy of apartheid, which had increasingly become a 
human rights issue in international politics with public opinion dead set against it. 
The Reagan doctrine contained two new dimensions: the need "to contain Soviet 
expansion" and that of "intervening in areas that the United States deemed to be part 
of 'The Soviet empire' " (Time Magazine, 4 August, 1985:9).The strategy was to be 
pursued through both conventional and unconventional means. In the period 1981 to 
                                         
89 The architect of the Reagan’s Africa policy, Chester Crocker, summarized his country's broad 
objectives in Africa. Addressing a State Department Foreign Policy Conference, in Washington, on 
2nd June, 1981, he stated: "The Reagan administration recognizes that Africa is a region of growing 
importance to US global objectives — economic, political, strategic, human and so forth. We cannot 
afford to neglect a region where our interests are so clearly growing and I would simply refer here in 
passing to the obvious facts of our long history of involvement with Africa, to the many links of 
culture and a blood that ties an important portion of our own citizenry to Africa; to our growing 
import-dependence on fuel and non-fuel minerals produce in Africa, to Africa's growing place as a 
focus of world politics and its growing role as an actor in World politics" (Mandaza, 1985:12) 




1985, covert action and special operations as well as diplomatic, political and 
economic means were used "with increasingly close cooperation between the 
Department of Defence and the Central Intelligence Agency" (Ibid). Thus by late 
1983, the US was engaged in several major covert operations around the continent, 
including those against Angola, Chad, Ethiopia and Libya, "all of which involved the 
expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars" (Jeune Afrique, 27 October, 
1982:33). 
 However for much of 1983 and 1984, this military strategy "aimed at the systematic 
destabilization or over- throw of Third World governments" was not publicly known 
until the explicit outline of the "Reagan doctrine" by President Reagan himself in 
January 1985: "we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives on 
every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua — to defy Soviet- supported 
aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth" (The Guardian, 
February 16, 1986). Hence, the President adopted the idea of constructive 
engagement in dealing with Africa. This idea means that there were moderates in the 
African governments and so you wanted to encourage them. And if you 
constructively engaged with them, they would promote gradual change, political 
reform and so on. But to just oppose the government would make it intransigent and 
that would create greater polarization, and that was a situation from which only 
extremists would benefit.  The members of the Reagan team argued that the United 
States would best achieve its purposes through an understanding of South Africa’s 
internal dynamics and encouraging evolutionary change; these policy advocates 
counseled against economic warfare and in favour of maintaining continuing 
pressures on Pretoria. Because these ’realists’ concluded that change would be 
determined primarily by the actions of internal elements rather than through external 
pressures and incentives, they regarded it as in US interests to facilitate a negotiated 
settlement among the domestic African actors90. The Reagan administration saw the 
African National Congress (ANC) as a dangerous, pro-communist movement. So the 
notion of constructive engagement was gradual reform. It was also linked to Reagan 
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supporting the Sullivan principles as a proper way to bring about change. Despite the 
abominations of apartheid in South Africa and the global outcry against the racial 
marginalization of black South Africans, the US was very slow to end its tacit 
support (Chazan et al., 1999:446).  
The links that the African National Congress had to communism were judged 
sufficient by successive administrations to justify US support for the racist 
government. Through the 1950s the US abstained on UN General Assembly 
resolutions condemning apartheid. Indeed, in the 1980s President Reagan vetoed the 
imposition of UN sanctions justified by a belief in both free trade and South Africa’s 
role as a bastion against Marxism in the region. A policy shift forced through by 
Congress finally occurred in the mid-1980s, including imposition of economic 
sanctions, which ultimately helped bring apartheid to an end in 1990 (Jentleson, 
2010:393). Prior to his assumption of office as the president of the United States, 
Ronald Reagan made a notable statement in connection with the liberation of 
Angola.  
I don't know about you, but I'm concerned — scared is 
the proper word — about what is going on in Africa, he 
said. Many Americans have interpreted our interest in 
Africa as an extension of our own desire to achieve racial 
equality and elimination of injustice based on race. I am 
afraid that is a naive oversimplification of what is really 
at issue. (African Report, 1980:3). 
These considerations have, with varying degrees of emphasis and intensity, prompted 
violent and horrific US intervention in various parts of the continent. For instance, 
the series of acts of destabilization and the accounts of CIA operations in Africa ever 
since the Congo Crisis of 1960 and the related assassination of Lumumba; the 
overthrow of Nkrumah; the well-known pattern of destabilization of frontline and 
SADCC states through the agency of the South African military machinery; and the 
support of such bandit groups as the MNR in Mozambique and UNITA in Angola. In 
1985, the administration openly declared support for UNITA rebels. During 
Savimbi’s visit to Washington, D.C. in 1986, President Reagan invited him to the 
White House. Following the meeting, Reagan spoke of UNITA winning "a victory 
that electrifies the world." Savimbi also met with Reagan's successor, George H. W. 
Bush, who promised Savimbi "all appropriate and effective assistance" (The New 




York Times January, 1989).  US Cold War machinations in  Angola have left the 
country deeply divided politically between MPLA and UNITA supporters   It was 
only after the end of the Cold War that US administrations had the freedom to shape 
policy for Africa without the baggage of non-African imperatives (Cohen, 2003:20).  
In Libya, the relations between Gaddafi’s government and the U.S. under President 
Reagan were continually contentious, beginning with the Gulf of Sidra incident in 
1981; by 1982, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was considered by the CIA to be, 
along with USSR leader Leonid Brezhnev and Cuban leader Fidel Castro, part of a 
group known as the "unholy trinity" and was also labelled as "our international 
public enemy number one" by a CIA official (Times August 23, 1982). These 
tensions were revived in early April 1986, when a bomb exploded in a Berlin 
discothèque, resulting in the injury of 63 American military personnel and death of 
one serviceman. Stating that there was "irrefutable proof" that Libya had directed the 
"terrorist bombing", Reagan authorized the use of force against the country (Global 
Security Org. April, 2005). In the late evening of April 15, 1986, the U.S. launched a 
series of air strikes on ground targets in Libya. The UK Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher allowed the US Air Force to use Britain's air bases to launch the attack, on 
the justification that the United Kingdom (UK) was supporting America's right to 
self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (BBC News April, 
1986). The attack was designed to halt Gaddafi's "ability to export terrorism", 
offering him "incentives and reasons to alter his criminal behaviour". The president 
addressed the nation from the Oval Office after the attacks had commenced, stating, 
"When our citizens are attacked or abused anywhere in the world on the direct orders 
of hostile regimes, we will respond so long as I'm in this office" (ibid). The attack 
was condemned by many countries. By a vote of 79 in favour to 28 against with 33 
abstentions, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 41/38 which 
"condemns the military attack perpetrated against the Socialist People's Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya on 15 April 1986, which constitutes a violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations and of international law" (UNSC/Res/41/38/1986:Nov.20). 
5.2.8 President George H .W Bush’s doctrine on Africa 
The Bush administration departed significantly from the ideological view of the 
Reagan administration. He embraced the principle of realpolitik and moved beyond 




the policy of containment. Among his administration’s early move was for the US to 
announce that future foreign aid would be dependent on democratization. Between 
1990 and 1992 the promise was delivered by cutting off assistance to long-time Cold 
War allies like Zaire, Liberia and Sudan and instead providing support to South 
Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique (Dueck, 2006:138). In 1990, Bush met separately 
with South Africa’s reform-minded president, F. W. de Klerk, and with the newly 
freed Black Nationalist leader Nelson Mandela. He supported sanctions against the 
South African government which helped to dismantle the apartheid system of racial 
segregation. His administration lifted the sanctions in 1991 after concluding that the 
requirements imposed by Congress had been met (Grolier Encyclopedia, 2000). On 
September 11, 1990, President Bush addressed a joint session of Congress regarding 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and he discussed "an historic period of cooperation," 
which he called the New World Order91. Bush claimed this new order would be freer 
from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the 
quest for peace. An era in which nations of the world, East and West, North and 
South, can prosper and live in harmony (Millercentre.org:, np). Again, on January 
16, 1991, in an address to the nation about the start of the Persian Gulf War, 
President Bush used the term in explaining the motivations and justifications for 
using force against Iraq92: 
We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a 
new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs 
the conduct of nations. When we are successful—and we will be—we have a real 
chance at this new world order, an order in which a credible United Nations can use 
its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the U.N.'s founders (Bush, 
George HW. "Address to the Nation on the Invasion of Iraq, January 16, 1991)."  
President Bush's New World Order involved collective security with multinational 
cooperation, and it broke down Cold War conceptions and created new allies. The 
New World Order sees international politics among sovereign states balancing each 
other’s power (Nye, 1992). In 1992, President Bush signed and issued the National 
Security Strategy of the United States for fiscal year 1992 known as the “National 
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Security Review 30”. This document represents a watershed in US policy on African 
security issues.  
The preamble stressed US anxiety about "the turmoil and 
dangers in the developing world ... [which] remains a 
dangerous place—a place of ethnic antagonisms, national 
rivalries, religious tensions, spreading weaponry, personal 
ambitions and lingering authoritarianism (US Government, 
1991: v).  
The NSR 30 was the first comprehensive review of US policy toward Africa in more 
than a decade. It offered a framework for pursuing US interests in Africa in the light 
of rapid changes engendered by the end of the cold war. A de-classified intelligence 
assessment prepared as part of NSR 30, concluded that post-cold war developments 
in Africa provided both "significant opportunities for, and obstacles to, US interests". 
Outlining strategies for realizing these security interests and objectives, NSR 30 
concluded that "Africa's regional or sub-regional organizations ... [have] potential 
utility for the achievement of US foreign policy objectives". To attain these goals, 
five major issue-areas were identified:  
 Access to selected African air and naval facilities, air space and sea lanes 
 Downsizing African militaries  
 African military support for democracy, human rights and civilian control  
 Conflict resolution and African regional peacekeeping operations 
  Retaining sufficient US military presence in Africa (Aning, 2001:45).  
Despite this analysis and its perception of threats from Africa among other places, 
the US initiated a policy of constructive "disengagement" from Africa through a 
well-crafted strategy of downsizing the human and material contribution needed to 
provide credible responses to African security issues. Simply put, in the calculations 
of the US, resolving African crises were costly in both political and financial terms. 
A classic example of how this minimalist strategy was tested was during the collapse 
and disintegration of Liberia into total chaos and the emergence of predatory 
“warlordism” from 1989 to 1997 (Ellis, 1999; Reno, 1998: 79-113).  
During the crisis, the expectation among Liberia's populace, especially the elite, was 
that the US would respond quickly and massively to the collapse of its quasi- colony 
in Africa, by providing military and political support to resolve the civil war 




(Interview in Lagos, Nigeria, 15 July 1997 cited in Aning, 2001). Instead, in the 
calculations of US security experts, the geo-strategic value of its previously close 
African ally with strong historical links and whose émigrés had dominated its politics 
had diminished, and did not justify the disbursement of human and material 
resources (Tanner, 1998; US Defence Security Assistance Agency, 1991). Under the 
new US policy, unilateral or multilateral involvement in resolving crises in "minor 
states" were at best scaled down or at worst curtailed (Aning, 1999:335). Such 
tactical withdrawal continued despite the conclusion of US strategic planners that, 
instabilities in Africa provide fertile soil for insurgency, and are the potential sources 
of regional conflict.  
When considered in the light of the proliferation of modern arms, the situation in the 
developing world poses significant threats to vital US interests’ worldwide (Gray, 
1990:18). However, as a contingency measure to prevent such crises from damaging 
US interests, James R. Locher III, former Assistant Secretary of Defence for Special 
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), designated Africa as a priority area 
(Jane's Defence Weekly, 1990). To demonstrate its new-found concern about threats 
emanating from Africa, on 1 July 1990, a month prior to the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) established the US Army 
3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) (3rd SFG) based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 
A major rationale for the establishment of the 3rd SFG was to contribute to resolving 
African crises (Volman, 1993:2). In the calculations of the Pentagon's strategists, 
Africa was one of three potential areas (apart from Latin America and the Pacific 
Rim of Asia) where low intensity conflict (LIC) could require US intervention. The 
3rd SFG attained its full strength of 1,370 officers when a third battalion was 
activated in October 1992. Its chief overseas missions since July 1990 have been 
dispensing medical assistance and undertaking joint military training exercises with 
several African countries including Zimbabwe, Namibia, Niger and C6te d'lvoire 
(Volman, 1993: 2; Aning, 2001:46). 
President Bush envisaged order arising from broad values like democracy and human 
rights, as well as from international law and institutions such as the United Nations93. 
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In the wake of dire humanitarian crises that gripped Somalia following the overthrow 
in 1991 of its long-term military dictator, Siad Barre, President Bush deployed 
perhaps what was the largest military force the US  had ever sent to Africa. Known 
as “Operation Restore Hope”, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was an 
unprecedented operation involving 25,000 troops (Sarjoh and Aning, 2008:4). 
UNITAF consisted of contingents from about 24 countries with a mandate to restore 
security, and undertake humanitarian activities to help relieve the suffering of the 
civilian population. US forces later operated as part of the Security Council-
authorized United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II), whose mandate was 
to restore peace through disarmament and reconciliation of the various parties to the 
conflict. Although the operation was initially successful in helping to feed the Somali 
people, President Bill Clinton ordered the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia 
after eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed in Mogadishu, in an operation to capture 
Mohamed Aideed, a particularly unpleasant warlord. The tragedy was further 
amplified in the US by horrific TV coverage of US soldiers’ bodies being dragged 
through the streets (Chazan et al, 1999:447). "Operation Restore Hope" left many 
people wondering whether the United States should intervene in other countries 
when U.S. interests were not clearly at stake.  
 5.2.9 President Bill Clinton’s African policy doctrine 
At the beginning of Clinton’s presidency, his world view seems unclear. His 
campaign rhetoric suggested that he held similar opinions about moving beyond 
containment in the post-cold war era and creating a new world order based on U.S. 
leadership as the sole remaining superpower (Banjo, 2010:142). Some suggested that 
his selection of officials suggested a return to the regionalist policies reminiscent of 
the Carter administration. The administration was expected to down- play the foreign 
dimensions of conflicts in Africa in favour of their internal roots, and recognize 
African nationalism as an important constraint on American intervention on the 
continent (Shraeder, 1994: 35).   
However, the emphasis on the spread of democracy as a key policy tool was still 
very prevalent in Clinton’s agenda. The new administration prioritized market reform 




and free trade as a mechanism for development and democratization94. For reasons of 
international strategy, Africa’s conflicts rank lower than those in Bosnia or the 
former Soviet Union. Thus, at the point of Clinton’s entry into the White House, 
Africa still ranked lowest on the USA’s totem pole of international concerns. 
Arguably, Clinton’s appointments soon changed the course of U.S policy thought on 
Africa. George E. Moose, who was appointed by Clinton  to replace Herman Cohen 
as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, inherited a full desk of United 
States’ concerns in Africa: from civil war in Angola to humanitarian disaster in 
Somalia and to concerns about the onward march of Islamic fundamentalism in 
Africa. After whirlwind diplomatic shuttle in Africa and Europe, George Moose, 
declared that, ‘Fostering democracy will be the central plank of the administration’s 
policy’. The second and third areas of U.S. Africa policy he listed were conflict 
resolution, followed by trade and investment (cited in Agonafer, 1996: 247). This 
policy change came on the threshold of Clinton’s appointment of other key foreign 
(Africa) policy aides. Some of these diplomatic actors included committed 
Africanists or have had extensive experience in Africa such as, Warren Christopher, 
George Moose, Dennis Jett and Jennifer Ward. Soon after their call to service, 
several imperatives became apparent in official U.S. thinking about Africa which 
became the essential character of the Clinton years. Clinton adopted “Development 
Diplomacy” in his conduct of a whole range of foreign relations with developing 
countries95.  
Banjo (2010:143) defines “Development Diplomacy” as a foreign policy process of 
conducting relations with developing countries targeting poverty mitigation and 
reduction as end product. It can also be described as the overall policy options of a 
developed state or super/hyper power towards less endowed states, weak economies 
and countries in conflict or emerging from conflict that focuses on issues that has 
direct impact on human security and survival with primary aim of enabling 
beneficiaries (citizens of recipient states) to have access to good life. Finally, it can 
be  bilateral or multilateral, but must be the official engagement with the developing 
world  by the developed  north with the sole aim of finding effective solutions to a 
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growing number of socio-economic, political, health and environmental problems in 
the global south. Development issues may include HIV/AIDS, Debt crisis and direct 
financial assistance, aid, peace- keeping and building. Others include economic 
justice and fair trade, human rights and democracy, environmental sustainability, 
disaster mitigation and conflict resolution amongst others. Bill Clinton’s foreign 
policy doctrine toward Africa rested on economic imperative and multilateralism 
(Furley and May 1998, 149). In one of his few statements on Africa during the 
election campaign, Clinton said ‘the USA should do more to support United Nations 
peace- keeping operations, and should explore new ideas for preventive 
diplomacy’(Africa Confidential, 1993: vol 34). Consequently, he created the post of 
Secretary of State for Global Affairs, to highlight many key issues that affect Africa 
more than other regions. Some of these include: environmental degradation, 
terrorism, drugs, population policy, and international health risks such as HIV/AIDS 
and trans-border and inter-continental migration (Banjo, 2010). His administration 
was particularly vocal about environmental disaster in Africa96.   
President Clinton’s administration gave new impetus to African regional and sub-
regional organizations97. Clinton took steps to expand the US/UN mission 
significantly and at the suggestion of Washington, the UN approved a resolution 
calling for the reconstruction of Somalia as a failed state; however it rapidly became 
apparent that the conditions for nation building and democracy-promotion were 
extremely poor. On May 3, 1994, President Clinton signed a Presidential Decision 
Directive establishing U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. This 
directive was the product of a year-long interagency policy review and extensive 
consultations with dozens of Members of Congress from both parties98. 
The policy represented the first, comprehensive framework for U.S. decision-making 
on issues of peacekeeping and peace enforcement suited to the realities of the post- 
Cold War period. President Clinton argued that peace operations are not and cannot 
be the centre-piece of U.S. foreign policy. However, as the policy states, properly 
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conceived and well-executed peace operations can be a useful element in serving 
America's interests. The directive prescribed a number of specific steps to improve 
U.S. and UN management of UN peace operations in order to ensure that use of such 
operations is selective and more effective (Terry, 1996:101).  
The policy directive (PDD) addresses six major issues of reform and improvement: 
These issues are (a) Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace 
operations to support -- both when we vote in the Security Council for UN peace 
operations and when we participate in such operations with U.S. troops. To achieve 
this goal, the policy directive sets forth three increasingly rigorous standards of 
review for U.S. support for or participation in peace operations, with the most 
stringent applying to U.S. participation in missions that may involve combat. The 
policy directive affirms that peacekeeping can be a useful tool for advancing U.S. 
national security interests in some circumstances, but both U.S. and UN involvement 
in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective. 
(b). Reducing U.S. costs for UN peace operations, both the percentage our nation 
pays for each operation and the cost of the operations themselves. To achieve this 
goal, the policy directive orders that we work to reduce our peacekeeping assessment 
percentage from the current 31.7% to 25% by January 1, 1996, and proposes a 
number of specific steps to reduce the cost of UN peace operations. 
(c). Defining clearly our policy regarding the command and control of American 
military forces in UN peace operations. The policy directive underscores the fact that 
the President will never relinquish command of U.S. forces. However, as 
Commander-in-Chief, the President has the authority to place U.S. forces under the 
operational control of a foreign commander when doing so serves American security 
interests, just as American leaders have done numerous times since the 
Revolutionary War, including in Operation Desert Storm. The greater the anticipated 
U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will agree to have a UN 
commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. Any large scale 
participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to 
involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational 




control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc 
coalitions. 
(d). Reforming and improving the UN's capability to manage peace operations. The 
policy recommends 11 steps to strengthen UN management of peace operations and 
directs U.S. support for strengthening the UN's planning, logistics, information and 
command and control capabilities. 
(e). Improving the way the U.S. government manages and funds peace operations. 
The policy directive creates a new "shared responsibility" approach to managing and 
funding UN peace operations within the U.S. Government. Under this approach, the 
Department of Defense will take lead management and funding responsibility for 
those UN operations that involve U.S. combat units and those that are likely to 
involve combat, whether or not U.S. troops are involved. This approach will ensure 
that military expertise is brought to bear on those operations that have a significant 
military component. The State Department will retain lead management and funding 
responsibility for traditional peacekeeping operations that do not involve U.S. 
combat units. In all cases, the State Department remains responsible for the conduct 
of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN Mission in New York. 
(f). Creating better forms of cooperation between the Executive, the Congress and 
the American public on peace operations (Davidson, 1998)  
The policy directive sets out seven proposals for increasing and regularizing the flow 
of information and consultation between the executive branch and Congress; the 
President believes U.S. support for and participation in UN peace operations can 
only succeed over the long term with the bipartisan support of Congress and the 
American people (PDD 25 The White House May 6, 1994). The Presidential 
Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) practically forbade US intervention in future crises 
unless national interests were in jeopardy and the assignment had distinct and limited 
objectives as well as a well-defined exit strategy (Malan, 1997:1). The document is 
framed as a cautious hedge of obstacles to UN action and to American participation, 
a justification for refusal, rather than a stimulus to action. It does not name 
compelling factors that, if present, would require intervention; only requisite 




conditions whose absence can justify inaction. "The PDD trapped the UN in a 
vicious circle99: the United States would refuse any new deployment of UN Blue 
Helmets unless all the necessary conditions (logistical, financial, troop deployments, 
etc.) were fulfilled yet they could never be fulfilled without the active support of the 
superpower." This "first comprehensive US policy on multilateral peace operations 
suited to the post-Cold War era", in White House words, is a clear response of 
withdrawal from interventionism (Grunfeld and Huijboom, 2007). 
After the Rwanda debacle, Clinton’ administration made a number of proposals 
regarding involvement in African peace-making efforts which ranged from financial 
assistance for various African initiatives including the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) and the Organisation of African Unity, now African 
Union (AU). The US State Department officials embraced warmly the Nigeria-led 
ECOMOG peace operations in Liberia, despite media criticism. Washington gave 
some $29 million support to the ECOMOG peace-keeping operations. Training, 
logistics and non-lethal equipment were also provided to specific ECOMOG 
contributing states like Ghana and Senegal. Senegal got US$15 million in 1991 and 
1992, while another US$15 million was provided for Tanzanian and Ugandan 
participation in ECOMOG in 1993 and 1994. Furthermore, US$50 million was 
provided in 1997 and 1998. An example of US military assistance was the provision 
of logistic services by Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), (Ellis, 1999; Kramer, 
1995; Africa Watch, June 1993: 30-33). About $200 million were channeled through 
aid agencies to Amos Sawyer’s government in Monrovia for humanitarian assistance 
(Africa Confidential, 1993: Vol. 34).  More significant than the total amounts 
provided was their reactive nature. These came several years after the Liberian 
conflict had started. Considering the fact that Liberia is a US’s quasi-colony in 
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Africa, there were high expectations that the US government will intervene and 
ameliorate the suffering of the Liberian people; the US refrained from active 
engagement on the grounds that it was an African problem and deserved an African 
solution100. Similarly, the UN argued that its agenda was full and could not be 
burdened with Liberia. Rather, Clinton’s administration encouraged the OAU to give 
a stronger lead in regional crises as it moves away from its strict doctrine of non-
intervention in domestic conflicts (Sesay, 1996:35-41). 
Subsequently, former US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, in an address to the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in October 1996, emphasized the United 
States' preparedness "to create a new political and military partnership" with African 
states. He stated inter alia that due to the Burundi crisis and its potential impact on 
other states, "we must develop the capacity for an effective response ... in any future 
crisis, and we must find new ways for Africans to work together and for the 
international community to support you." (Aning, 2001:49). After presenting the 
ACRF idea, Christopher went on a five-nation African tour that took him to Angola, 
Ethiopia, Mali, South Africa and Tanzania, where the broad outlines of the scheme 
were reiterated. He emphasized that ACRF would hopefully "become a strong link in 
the chain of successful responses to conflict that the OAU was building." ACRF 
consists of African troops reinforced by training, equipment, logistical and financial 
support from the United States and other countries. The immediate aim of the force 
was not to intervene in hostilities, but to shield designated safe havens from conflicts. 
This would enable civilians to obtain protection and humanitarian assistance. The 
intermediate and long-term aims of ACRF are to assemble a rapid reaction capability 
force from participating African contingents. ACRF will be developed in full 
consultation with the United Nations and the OAU. Critically, the original plans 
envisaged a standing force that could be quickly assembled, led by Africans and 
deployed under UN auspices. According to ACRF's mission statement, it was "to 
protect innocent civilians, ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid, and help resolve 
conflicts in Africa and beyond." ACRF, therefore, looked like a marriage of 
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convenience based on African pro-activism and the disbursement of indeterminate 
international resources (US State Department, 1997).  
This concept was greeted with avalanche of criticism by the key OAU member states 
and major political, economic and military actors within the sub-regional 
organizations, especially Nigeria and South Africa (Henk and Metz, 1997: 24). These 
criticisms resulted from widespread uncertainty about the proposal. Its outlines were 
fuzzy and it sounded more like a military standing force. There are several critical 
issues and questions which the initiative has still not satisfactorily answered, but 
which will impact on its chances of success. These concerns are (i) Training; (ii) 
Strategic Command and Control; (iii) Operational Command, Control and Logistics; 
and (v) Criteria for Selection, Participation and Deployment. In view of the 
expressed concerns of Africans, the idea was subsequently rebranded and detuned to 
become the African Crisis Response Initiative (Williams, 1997).  
5.2.9a. African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) 
According to Ploch (2011:27), ACRI was a bilateral training programme designed to 
improve the capabilities of individual African state’s militaries to prepare them for 
multinational peacekeeping operations in situations where a cease-fire or peace 
accord already exists. It was a US State Department managed and supported training 
initiative101. ACRI was purported to enhance the capacity of selected African 
militaries to respond effectively to peacekeeping or humanitarian relief operations on 
the continent. ACRI's emphasis was on training based on a common peacekeeping 
doctrine and the supply of interoperable communications equipment, which would 
enable the units to work together more effectively. ACRI had a long-term objective 
to train up to 12,000 military personnel. Headed by the US State Department Special 
Coordinator for ACRI, the initiative sought to promote common doctrine, 
interoperability, and standard communications technology among African forces. 
While ACRI encouraged joint training exercises between African forces to hone their 
capacity to respond in emergency situations, ACRI was not designed to create a 
standing force. Peacekeepers from a number of African nations would stand ready in 
their nations of origin for rapid deployment to areas of crises as needed. Deployment 
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African Crisis Response Initiative and Beyond. DIANE Publishing. 




of ACRI-trained troops was a sovereign decision of the ACRI partner in response to 
a request from international political entities such as the United Nations (UN) or the 
African Union (AU), or a sub-regional organization such as the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS)102. ACRI-trained troops could also 
deploy as part of a multinational coalition force for peacekeeping103. As Executive 
Agent for ACRI, US European Command (EUCOM) was responsible for the 
development of the military aspects involved in establishing and maintaining the 
concept. EUCOM was supported in this role by the US Central Command 
(CENTCOM), US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), US Atlantic Command 
(LANTCOM; later re-designated as Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), and US 
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). US forces conducting ACRI battalion-
level training came under the operational control of the Special Operations 
Command Europe (SOCEUR). ACRI training was largely conducted by soldiers 
deployed from the 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina. 
Since its establishment in 1997, ACRI conducted training in Senegal and Uganda in 
late July 1997 following the arrival of about 120 US soldiers of the 3rd Special 
Forces Group and XVIII Airborne Corps, both of Fort Bragg, North Carolina; US 
Army, Europe (USAREUR); and SOCOM. US Special Forces trained African 
military forces to respond within 30 days to a contingency, humanitarian or 
peacekeeping related. The American teams started 60-day training programs on 1 
August 1997 for about 750 host nation soldiers in each country. Later in 1997, US 
teams trained similar forces in Malawi, Ethiopia and Mali. The US training teams 
used peacekeeping doctrine based on international standards. The US government 
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Peacekeeping Institute, Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College. 
103During initial battalion training, US Army instructors trained African soldiers in highly professional 
interoperable program of instruction in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. The ACRI 
program, for both initial and follow-on training, exposed the host military to the full range of 
peacekeeping tasks authorized under chapter 6 of the UN Charter, from convoy escort, logistics, and 
protection of refugees, to negotiations and command and control. Conducted by US Army instructors, 
the initial training included instruction in military operational skills, command and staff operations, 
and computer-simulated exercises. Observance of human rights, issues of humanitarian law, 
negotiation and mediation, and other humanitarian concerns relevant to peacekeeping are interwoven 
into the training program. ACRI increased both the level and character of involvement of non-
governmental, private voluntary and international organizations in ACRI training in order to increase 
African peacekeepers' capacity to respond to complex humanitarian emergencies  




claimed that training each battalion costs the United States about $3 million, 
including $1 million in mainly non-lethal US equipment, primarily communications 
gear such as hand-held radios (Malan, 1997:3).  
According to the US State Department, ACRI expended $15 million in 1997 and 
$22 million in 1998. ACRI expended approximately $18 million for 1999, $20 
million for 2000 and 2001 and requested an additional $20 million for 2002. The 
Bush Administration sought $24 million in 2004 under the Peacekeeping 
Operations (PKO) for Africa programs, compared with $40 million requested in 
2003. Support for ACRI came from the PKO program (Ibid). However, ACRI 
failed to yield the intended result. Critics argued that ACRI was crafted around 
Cold War peacekeeping doctrine designed for inter-state conflicts without taking 
into consideration the peculiar nature of intra-state conflicts in Africa which is 
characterized by total disregard for international humanitarian law. Though many 
African countries embraced ACRI, including Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana, Ethiopia 
and Senegal, the two regional powers, Nigeria and South Africa remained opposed 
to what they viewed as a foreign initiative that did not necessarily address African 
concerns (Sarjoh and Aning, 2008:18).  
 Berman (2004:134) notes that ACRI had more to do with what the U.S felt it could 
provide than what African countries necessarily needed, since the countries 
themselves were not consulted about the contents of the programme. The 
programme also failed to provide logistics and military hardware, which were 
deemed to be of greater importance by African states than the training of troops. 
With an annual budget of US$15 million, it was difficult to see how ACRI could 
address the serious capacity issues facing African countries as they bore the brunt of 
peacekeeping duties on the continent. The limited nature of the programme also 
made it difficult to see a clear cause-and-effect relationship between the training 
offered and the overall performance of troops in the field (Ibid). There were  also  
International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs in Africa which 
were aimed at promoting professionalism and respect for democracy and human 
rights, while enhancing capabilities for participation in peacekeeping operations. 
These programs usually ran well under $1 million per country, although Senegal got 




$1 million in under the FY04 request and South Africa, received $1.6 million. 
Overall, IMET would rose from $11.1 million to $12.5 million under the FY04 
request (US Department of State 12 July, 2001). 
The United States contributed to United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa 
and elsewhere through a program entitled Contributions to International 
Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA). Funds for CIPA were appropriated in the 
legislation that funds the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, rather than 
in the Foreign Operations appropriation, which governed foreign assistance. CIPA 
for Africa had increased significantly in FY02 due to US support for UN 
peacekeeping in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
Stabilization in Sierra Leone brought a subsequent reduction in this program. Still, 
between 1997 and 2004, ACRI was put to good use. An ACRI-trained battalion 
from Mali deployed to Sierra Leone as part of the ECOWAS peacekeeping force. 
Soldiers from Ghana were also involved in that operation. ACRI-trained troops 
from Benin were deployed as a part of an ECOWAS-approved peacekeeping force 
in Guinea-Bissau and Senegalese soldiers were engaged under the UN mission in 
the Central African Republic (Serafino, 2010). 
In March 1998 Clinton made a highly publicized six-nation tour of the continent 
during which he expressed regret for “the sin of neglect and ignorance” that the 
United States had committed in its treatment of Africa, particularly during the Cold 
War. Clinton announced that it was “time for Americans to put a new Africa on our 
map” and for the United States to forge a new beginning in its relations with Africans 
(quoted in Bacevich, 2002:107). This increased engagement was partly due to 
lobbying efforts of the Congressional Black Caucus and other African-American 
groups, indeed President Clinton took several members of the Caucus with him on 
his 1998 visit to Africa (Cameron, 2002:170). Although some argued that the 
‘apology’ was understated given the decades-long US support for Zaire’s military 
dictatorship, collaboration with the South African Apartheid regime and many other 
questionable engagements, nevertheless it did serve to indicate that Washington’s 
stated goals had shifted somewhat from its Cold War stance (Minter, 2000:270).  




Although the August 1998 bombing attacks against the US Diplomatic missions in 
Kenya and Tanzania which resulted in twelve American and several hundred African 
deaths were attributed to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda104, the US response was to 
launch a cruise missile attack later the same month against a Sudanese 
pharmaceutical plant suspected of producing, on behalf of al-Qaeda, compounds 
necessary for the production of chemical weapons.105 The real purpose of the attack 
was less retaliatory and actually a pre-emptive first shot in a campaign to deny access 
to weapons of mass destruction reinforced by Washington’s long standing criticism 
of Sudan for being a safe haven to terrorists (although in 1996 it had expelled bin 
Laden). When announcing the attack Clinton told the US population that “our target 
was terror.” (quoted in Bacevich, 2002:110-111). The embassy bombings and the 
retaliatory strike against Sudan are considered by many analysts to be a turning point 
in US Strategic policy towards Africa (Ploch, 2011:14). 
5.2.9b African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 
Clinton’s administration also initiated the ‘trade not aid’ campaign which culminated 
into a trade bill, The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)106 Bill that was 
signed into law on May 18, 2000. The deals with extension of trade benefits 
designated 34 sub-Saharan African countries.  While on state visit to Nigeria in 
August 2000, Clinton also suggested the inclusion of some indigenous items in the 
list of items to enjoy duty-free and quota-free access into the U.S. market. The 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is a nonreciprocal trade preference 
program that provides duty-free treatment to U.S. imports of certain products from 
                                         
104 On August 7, 1998, two car bombs exploded at the American Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and 
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 people and wounding more than 5,000 others. Twelve 
Americans were killed in the Nairobi blast. 
105 The US launched missiles from American warships in the Red Sea into Sudan. Several hit the Al-
Shifa pharmaceutical factory, which the United States claimed was helping Osama bin Laden, the 
mastermind of the embassy attacks, build chemical weapons. One man was killed and ten were 
wounded in Sudan by the strike. 
Then United States National Security Council advisor Richard Clarke stated that intelligence existed 
linking Osama bin Laden to Al-Shifa's current and past operators, namely the Iraqi nerve gas experts 
and the National Islamic Front in Sudan 
106 The African Growth and Opportunity Act, or AGOA (Title I, Trade and Development Act of 2000; 
P.L. 106–200 [1]) is a legislation that has been approved by the U.S. Congress in May 2000. The 
purpose of this legislation is to assist the economies of sub-Saharan Africa and to improve economic 
relations between the United States and the region. 




eligible sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. Its current authorization expires on 
September 30, 2015 (Williams, 2014:22).   
In terms of tariff benefits and general eligibility criteria, AGOA is similar to the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a U.S. trade preference program that 
applies to more than 120 developing countries. AGOA, however, covers more 
products and includes additional eligibility criteria beyond those in GSP. 
Additionally, AGOA includes trade and development provisions beyond its duty-free 
preferences (Ibid).  
U.S. imports from AGOA beneficiary countries (AGOA countries) represent a small 
share (2%) of total U.S. imports and are largely concentrated in energy-related 
products. Oil is consistently the top duty-free U.S. import from AGOA countries, 
accounting for 77% of such imports in 2013. Despite remaining the top U.S. import 
under AGOA, U.S. oil imports from the region have fallen by more than half or 
nearly $30 billion, since 2011. Among non-energy products, apparel is the top export 
for a number of AGOA countries. U.S. apparel imports typically face relatively high 
tariffs and are excluded from duty-free treatment in GSP, but are included in the 
AGOA preferences giving AGOA countries a competitive advantage over other 
apparel producers. Still, only a handful of countries, primarily Lesotho, Kenya, and 
Mauritius, make significant use of the apparel benefits107. Apart from apparel and 
energy products, South Africa accounts for the bulk of U.S. imports under AGOA. 
As the most economically advanced country in the region, South Africa also exports 
a much more diverse range of manufactured goods than other AGOA countries; 
vehicles in particular have become a major South African export under AGOA. 
However, the AGOA has been criticizes based on its strict conditions which had 
                                         
107 The basic provisions of AGOA include the following:   
1. The lifting of all existing quota on textile and apparel products from sub-Saharan African countries 
into the U.S. market. 2. The extension of duty/quota free access into the U.S. market for sub-Saharan 
apparels made from yarns and fabrics not available in the U.S. 3. The extension of duty/quota free 
treatment for apparel made in Africa from U.S. yarn and fabric and for knit-to shape sweaters made in 
Africa from cashmere  and some merino wool’s as well as apparel produced in Africa from silk, 
velvet, linen and other fabrics not produced in commercial quantities in the U.S. 4. The Act extends 
duty-free and quota-free access to the U.S market for apparel made in Africa with Africa/regional 
fabric and yarn. Such imports, however, are subject to a cap (limit) ranging from 1.5 to 3.5 billion 
dollar U.S. apparel import over an eight-year period. African apparel imports made with African 
fabric/yarn currently totals about $250 million (www.agoa.info/terms/html). 




made most sub-Saharan African countries ineligible to benefit from the trade act 
(Stevens and Kennan, 2005). 
Eligibility for the AGOA trade preference program consists of two separate steps. 
First, the country must be included in a statutorily-created list of sub-Saharan African 
countries, described in AGOA (19 U.S.C. 3706). This list has been updated 
periodically by new legislation (e.g., the 112th Congress added South Sudan in P.L. 
112-163).  
The second step requires the President to determine annually which eligible 
countries, from those on the list of SSA countries defined by Congress, should 
become beneficiaries of the AGOA preferences. There are two different sets of 
criteria for the President’s consideration in this process: Section 104 of AGOA (19 
U.S.C. 3703) and Section 502 of the Trade Act of 1974, or GSP (19 U.S.C. 2462). 
Section 104 is specific to AGOA and requires the President to consider a number of 
factors related to the prospective AGOA country’s economy; rule of law; elimination 
of barriers to U.S. trade and investment; poverty reduction efforts; protection of 
worker rights; support of terrorist activities; and interference with U.S. national 
security and foreign policy efforts (Mattoo, Roy and Subramanian, 2002:62). These 
also include a number of economic and political factors. In two separate 
proclamations during the past year, President Obama has made changes to AGOA 
country eligibility. The President reinstated AGOA eligibility for Mali and 
Madagascar, which is now effective. He also terminated AGOA eligibility for 
Swaziland, effective January 1, 2015, due to the country’s failure to meet eligibility 
criteria related to worker rights.  
The first broadside fired against AGOA is that it was externally imposed on Africa.  
Critics argue that the bill, like past U.S. policy initiatives, utilized findings and 
analysis of the African situation based largely on misinformed analysis of the 
African situation and American perceptions and a shallow understanding of Africa 
formed from a distance. This paternalistic outlook is said to be in contradiction to the 
stated objective of changing past U.S. attitudes towards sub-Saharan Africa.  Second, 
a number of development activist contested that any discussion on development in 
Africa that does not decisively deal with the debt crisis will come to naught just like 




so many others before it as 80% of Africa’s export earning is spent on debt service. 
Though AGOA was intended as a trade bill and not a debt relief bill, but under 
current circumstances, debt relief should be a high priority than trade promotion. 
Third, criticism has been the primacy of the market and profits. This raised the 
suspicion that AGOA represents the mere use of legislation to secure for the U.S an 
African market for so long dominated by Europe. The fourth is the unbalanced 
private and public sector development. Critics pointed out that the bill asks African 
governments to play a diminishing role in the economic affairs of their countries 
while at the same time pushing for more private sector involvement. It is suggested 
that development in the public sector should accompany development in the private 
sector, so that the two sectors balance and complement one another.  The fifth 
reservation has to do with monitoring trade and aid initiatives. Critics observed that 
donor groups and African governments alike have manipulated conditionalities in the 
past to advance their own interest without regards to whether actual progress toward 
democratic and economic reform was been achieved.  The sixth criticism is that 
AGOA is antithetical to sub- regional integration (Banjo, 2010:143-146). 
Concerns expressed within this context has to do with the fear that the moves to 
establish Free Trade Area with sub-Saharan countries would be selective and 
disruptive to African regional initiatives already underway and reflected the colonial 
era of divide and rule approach. Current regional initiatives in Africa  are said to be 
barely managing to grow and develop, thus might  make more sense if the U.S. 
sought to strengthen these existing regional groupings rather  than seeking the 
establishment of new ones. The seventh negation is the possibility of AGOA 
shrinking investment in social capital. Some critics noted that AGOA prescribes cuts 
in domestic spending and corporate taxes that will significantly reduce the revenue 
base of African governments, leading to reduced investment in the development of 
social capital and poverty eradication schemes.  The eight worry about AGOA is the 
agriculture and food security concerns. The bill urges unilateral removal of subsidies 
and market safeguards aimed at protecting and stabilizing local agricultural 
production, the backbone of most sub-Saharan African economies.  This would likely 
reduce agricultural output within Africa and increase dumping of U.S. exports on the 
African market, thus undermining the efforts of local African entrepreneurs. The 




ninth problem with AGOA has been the fact that eligibility standards are too 
restrictive. These requirements such as, protection of intellectual property rights, 
improvements in labelling and certification standards, eliminating corruption and 
pursuit of WTO membership, would disqualify the majority of sub-Saharan African 
countries.  Finally, it is said to offer a false textile boom.  AGOA package has been 
described as having no gains for the textile manufacturers. The decrepit state of the 
local textile manufacturing industry which has been exacerbated by the dumping of 
cheap, used clothes from foreign countries, may have prepared enough ground for 
the sector’s lack of competitive standing in the AGOA scheme. Manufacturers have 
touted this, among other factors, as major constraint in the industry’s bid toward 
international competitiveness (Banjo, 2010). 
5.2.10 President George W. Bush’s foreign policy toward Africa 
In February 2000 while campaigning for the Presidency, then Governor George W 
Bush was asked in a TV interview, “…does Africa fit in to your definition of 
strategic interests?” He responded “…at some point in time the President has got to 
clearly define what the national strategic interests are, and while Africa may be 
important, it doesn't fit into the national strategic interests, as far as I can see them” 
(quoted in Lehrer, 2000:np). Once in office, two factors underpinned the Bush 
administration’s security policy in Africa. First the conviction that the US had 
become too dependent on oil from the Middle East and Venezuela and that Africa, 
particularly given a significant number of new oil reserve discoveries, offered an 
opportunity to diversify supplies. This view was further reinforced by the rising 
demand for oil and other natural resources by emerging economies, particularly 
China. Second was the concern that al-Qaeda-type organisations could become 
established in African states that had a significant Muslim population, or even worse, 
that al-Qaeda could establish bases in a failed African State such as Somalia (Vines 
and Cargill cited in Bullock, 2010:53). His appointment of two notable African-
Americans into the main foreign policy positions, Colin Powell as Secretary of State 
and Condoleezza Rice as National Security Advisor, sent an indication that Africa 
will be one of the major priority of his foreign policy outline (Cameron, 2002:170). 
Secretary Powell was more visibly interested in Africa than Rice, and made the 




continent one of his first priorities and stressed that he would continue to give Africa 
close attention.  
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, there was a 
renewed interest in the continent, prompting a shift in US Africa policy driven by its 
‘global war on terror’. While addressing a Joint Session of Congress on the evening 
of September 20, 2001, President Bush declares that "we will make no distinction 
between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them. He 
further asserts that:  
We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to 
terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision 
to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. 
From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbour 
or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a 
hostile regime (Bush, September 20, 2001).  
The Horn of Africa received new attention from the US military as a potential front-
line in what was to become the Global War on Terror (GWOT).108 In particular 
Somalia as a largely ungoverned space, prior connections to regional terrorism and 
an apparent safe-haven for al-Qaeda, al shabaab and its affiliates was identified as a 
focal point for counter-terrorism operations. The result was the formation of 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa  
5.2.10a The Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) 
CJTF-HOA was established at Camp Lejeune, N.C., on Oct. 19, 2002 as a 
subordinate command to US Central Command (CENTCOM). In November 2002, 
personnel embarked on 28-day training cruise aboard USS MOUNT WHITNEY, and 
arrived in the Horn of Africa on Dec. 8, 2002. CJTF-HOA operated from the 
MOUNT WHITNEY until May 13, 2003, when the mission transitioned ashore to 
Camp Lemonier utilizing a former French Foreign Legion camp in Djibouti as a 
                                         
108  Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is a term which has been applied to an international military 
campaign that started after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. This resulted 
in an international military campaign to eliminate al-Qaeda and other militant organizations. The 
United States and many other NATO and non-NATO nations such as Pakistan participated in the 
conflict. The phrase "War on Terror" was first used by U.S. President George W. Bush on 20 
September 2001. The Bush administration and the western media have since used the term to argue a 
global military, political, lawful, and conceptual struggle against both organizations designated as 
terrorist in nature and regimes accused of supporting them. It was originally used with a particular 
focus on Muslim countries associated with Islamic terrorism organizations, like al-Qaeda or like-
minded organizations. 




permanent headquarters. At any given time there are between 2,000 and 3,000 
service members “on board” the base comprising people from each military branch 
of the U.S. Armed Forces, civilian employees, and representatives of Coalition and 
Partner countries. The Combined Joint Operating Area (CJOA) consists of Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Seychelles (Pham, 2009:236).  
 The original stated mission of a kinetic antiterrorism operation evolved over time 
with the mission emphasis becoming “to build partner nation capacity in order to 
promote regional security and stability, prevent conflict, and protect US and coalition 
interests” (www.hoa.africom.mil/AboutCJTF-HOA.asp). While US Special 
Operations forces continued with their business against terrorism in the region, 
CJTF-HOA focussed on indirect activities, aimed at denying extremist groups and 
ideologies the ability to exploit the vulnerabilities of the states, societies and ethnic 
groups in its area of responsibility. To achieve this, the CJTF adopted measures to 
foster interagency integration which included establishing liaison officers at US 
Embassies in the region, appointing a Senior Military advisor to the US Mission in 
the African Union (AU) Headquarters in Addis Ababa and in particular the inclusion 
of a Senior State Department official as Commander CJTF-HOA’s foreign policy 
advisor as well as a USAID official as the development advisor (Pham, 2007:74). 
This arrangement subsequently crystallized to become the model for the future 
AFRICOM.  
 The formation of CJTF-HOA is a reflection of the shift in US foreign policy toward 
Africa as emphasized by the 2002 National Security Strategy, which states: “The 
events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states ... can pose as great danger 
to our national interests as strong states” (The White House, National Security 
Strategy of the United States September, 2002). Hence, on 18th September, 2002, 
President Bush released his first National Security Strategy since assumption of 
office in accordance to section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 
1986 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 404a), which requires the U.S. President to transmit to 
Congress each year a “comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the 
United States.” The overarching goal of the National Security Strategy (NSS) report 
is to outline the global interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are 
vital to its national security (Haine and Lindstrom, 18th September, 2002).The 




content and the tone of the 2002 US National Security Strategy were largely defined 
by the attacks of September 11th, which is the first large-scale aggression against the 
continental U.S. (CONUS) since 1812. This dramatic event was seen by the Bush 
administration as a tectonic shift in the history of international relations, comparable 
to the rise of the Soviet power after the Second World War. The menace of global 
terrorism gives this document special significance. The document states that: "The 
United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. 
We cannot let our enemies strike first." (Bush, 2002). The 2002 NSS document 
underlined three main objectives. These are as follows:  
 To defend the peace by “fighting terrorists and tyrants”. 
 To preserve the peace by “building good relations among the great 
powers”; and, 
 To extend the peace by “encouraging free and open societies on every 
continent”. 
At its core, the document calls for the United States to use its “unparalleled military 
strength and great economic and political influence” to establish “a balance of power 
that favours human freedom”. The identified threat lies in the combination of 
terrorism, tyranny and technology, i.e. weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The 
combination of these three “T’s” makes the security environment more complex and 
dangerous (White House, National Security Strategy September, 2002). Bush 
emphasizes the importance of taking pre-emptive military action against threatening 
terrorist states, even when such action is opposed by the United Nations. "As a 
matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging 
threats before they are fully formed," he writes. Advising that the U.S. can no longer 
assume the reactive defensive posture employed throughout the Cold War, President 
Bush wrote, "The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's 
threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' 
choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first." 
To better undertake pre-emptive prevention of terrorist attacks, Bush proposes that 
the United States: 




 "Build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate 
information on threats, wherever they may emerge." 
 "Coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most 
dangerous threats”. 
 "Continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid 
and precise operations to achieve decisive results." 
Along with the military response policies outlined in the new security strategy, 
President Bush proposed the U.S. must also "wage a war of ideas" against 
international terrorism, including: 
 "Supporting moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim world, to 
ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile 
ground in any nation," 
 "Diminishing the underlying conditions that spawn terrorism by enlisting the 
international community to focus its efforts and resources on areas most at risk". 
 "Using effective public diplomacy to promote the free flow of information and 
ideas to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom of those in societies ruled by 
the sponsors of global terrorism" (Bush, 2002). 
Among the reasons advanced for Africa’s rise in strategic value are the continent’s 
natural resources. In some cases, Africa will be as important a source for U.S. energy 
imports as the Middle East (Lake and Whitman, 2006:9). Equally important, as the 
human security deterioration in Darfur bear witness, certain elements within Africa 
continue to “test the resolve of the international community and the U.S. to prevent 
mass killings and genocide.”(Lake and Whitman, 2006:5). The U.S. national policy 
edicts in recent years reflect Africa’s rise in strategic import. In July 2003, the 
President’s African Policy stated that “promise and opportunity sit side by side with 
disease, war, and desperate poverty” and that this “threatens both a core value of the 
US--preserving human dignity—and our strategic priority—combating global terror” 
(Bush quoted in Penn, 2008:118).  In 2003, President Bush launched the President’s 




Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)109, which was then the largest single 
effort by any nation targeting a specific disease. The program sought to establish and 
scale up HIV/AIDS prevention, care and treatment programs. According to the 
PEPFAR program website, “during its first phase, PEPFAR supported the provision 
of treatment to more than two million people, care to more than 10 million people, 
including more than four million orphans and vulnerable children, and prevention of 
mother-to-child treatment services” (El-Sadr et al, 2012). Under President Bush, this 
program was criticized for its emphasis on abstinence based prevention, but on the 
whole this initiative was an unprecedented attack against the AIDS pandemic (see 
www.pepfar.gov).  
Still prompted by the events of 9/11, the US Congress sponsored an African policy 
review in 2004, taking into account the special humanitarian, security and 
developmental needs of Africans. This review was conducted by the Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies and overseen by Secretary Powell (Kansteiner and 
Morrison, 2004:np). The Policy review identified five factors that had shaped the US 
interests in Africa over the preceding decade (Ibid). These factors are violent 
extremism, strategic natural resources and growing African market, China’s growing 
influence in the continent, porous maritime security and ungoverned space. In line 
with this policy directives, President Bush in 2004, replaced ACRI with the Africa 
Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA)110, which focused on training 
trainers and on programs tailored to individual country needs. ACOTA, like its 
predecessor, was based on bilateral agreements between the United States and 
recipient states, but it also allowed for the possibility of support to regional and sub-
regional organizations. Perhaps ACOTA’s most significant innovations were the 
                                         
109 The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) is the U.S. Government initiative 
to help save the lives of those suffering from HIV/AIDS around the world. This historic commitment 
is the largest by any nation to combat a single disease internationally, and PEPFAR investments also 
help alleviate suffering from other diseases across the global health spectrum. PEPFAR is driven by a 
shared responsibility among donor and partner nations and others to make smart investments to save 
lives. PEPFAR is the cornerstone and largest component of the U.S. President’s Global Health 
Initiative. With a special focus on improving the health of women, newborns and children, the Global 
Health Initiative’s goal is to save the greatest number of lives by increasing and building upon what 
works and, then, supporting countries as they work to improve the health of their own people. 
110 The mission of Africa Contingency Operations Training & Assistance (ACOTA) is to enhance the 
capacities and capabilities of its African Partner Countries, regional institutions, and the continent’s 
peacekeeping resources as a whole so that they can plan for, train, deploy, and sustain sufficient 
quantities of professionally competent peacekeepers to meet conflict transformation requirments with 
minimal non-African assistance. 




inclusion of training for offensive military operations and the provision of weaponry 
to undertake these operations, although there is no evidence that any of the weaponry 
had been delivered by the end of 2008. The inclusion of offensive training in 
ACOTA can be explained by the trend towards more robust peace operations. Unlike 
previous programmes, ACOTA also moved away from the ‘one size fits all’ 
approach. Under this initiative, training modules have been tailored to suit each 
recipient state, thereby taking into consideration the varied needs among African 
countries (Hardy, 2005:43-4). But the absence of uniformed US personnel in 
implementing the training programmes has been a major shortcoming. Some 
recipient states have objected to working with private security firms.  
In 2005, President Bush targeted another deadly disease with the launch of the 
President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI)111. The PMI had the initial goal of reducing 
malaria-related deaths by 50 percent in 15 focus countries. Malaria places a huge 
burden on Africans, causing millions of adult deaths every year and significant 
reductions in productivity. Results on the PMI website show that the program has 
major effect in reducing prevalence of malaria, child mortality and related deaths 
(www.pmi.gov). The Bush administration’s African foreign policy did not stop with 
health initiatives. Bush led the push for the G-8 nations to demand the multi-lateral 
debt relief initiative (MDRI)112, which encouraged the IMF, World Bank and the 
U.S. to reduce the debt burden of highly indebted poor countries. According to the 
African Development Bank, as of 2009 the MDRI relieved debt for 21 African 
countries (www.afdb.org/en/about-us/africa-development-fund-adf/debt-relief-
initiatives/). In 2004, Bush also successfully passed reforms that converted poor 
country debt into grants (Engler, 2005:np). Additionally, Bush tackled security 
issues. The US President was one of the first world leaders to label the conflict in 
                                         
111 Launched in 2005, the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) strives to reduce the intolerable burden 
of malaria and help relieve poverty on the African continent. The goal of PMI is to reduce malaria-
related deaths by 50 percent in 19 countries in Africa that have a high burden of malaria by expanding 
coverage of four highly effective malaria prevention and treatment measures, especially to the most 
vulnerable populations: pregnant women and children under five years of age. These interventions 
include insecticide-treated mosquito nets (ITNs), indoor residual spraying (IRS) with insecticides, 
intermittent preventive treatment for pregnant women (IPTp), and prompt use of artemisinin-based 
combination therapies (ACTs) for those who have been diagnosed with malaria. 
112 The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) provides for 100 percent relief on eligible debt 
from three multilateral institutions to a group of low-income countries. The initiative is intended to 
help them advance toward the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which are 
focused on halving poverty by 2015. 




South Sudan genocide. Although Bush received criticism for not recognizing the 
indictment of Omar al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court, he did put in place 
sanctions on oil coming from the Republic of Sudan in order to pressure a peace deal 
(Congressional Record, V. 152, Pt. 14, September, 2006).  
In 2006, President Bush released another National Security Strategy (NSS)113. In the 
preamble, he begins portentously and controversially:  
America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy 
required by the grave challenge we face—the rise of terrorism 
fuelled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully 
revealed to the American people on September 11, 2001. This 
strategy reflects our most solemn obligation: to protect the 
security of the American people (White House, National 
Security Strategy, 2006:1). 
 
Here, the President clearly states that the current war is not the prototype of inter-
State war, but rather of what he has called the on-going “war on terror”, or as the 
Pentagon has more recently called it, the “long war”. The assertion that there is an 
on-going war leads the President to repeat the controversial legal claims on the use of 
force made earlier in the 2002 National Security Strategy, and in particular to a 
reaffirmation of the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence.  In the body of the 
strategic document, the imperativeness of Africa to US interests was clearly stated:  
Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a 
high priority of the Administration… The United States 
recognizes that our security depends upon partnering 
with Africa to strengthen fragile and failing states and 
bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective 
democracies (White House, U.S.NSS 16th March, 
2006). 
This proclamation differed markedly from the 2002 NSS which placed little priority 
on Africa other than to emphasize that Africa is a burden on America and its 
European allies (White House, U.S.NSS 30th September, 2002). Given this 
                                         
113 The National Security Strategy is a document prepared periodically by the executive branch of the 
government of the United States for Congress which outlines the major national security concerns of 
the United States and how the administration plans to deal with them. The legal foundation for the 
document is spelled out in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The document is purposely general in content 
(contrast with the National Military Strategy, NMS) and its implementation relies on elaborating 
guidance provided in supporting documents (including the NMS). 




significant boost to Africa’s position within Bush’s second administration, the 
announcement of AFRICOM was more than a simple administrative exercise to 
correct the untidiness of the boundary arrangements and put right the disjointed 
approach the continent had thus far suffered, but reflected the growing strategic 
importance of Africa within the spectrum of US vital interests. On 10 July 2007 the 
Deputy Commander of EUCOM, General William E Ward, and an African- 
American was nominated by President Bush to be the first Commander of 
AFRICOM (Volman, 2009:45). 
5.2.11 President Obama’s foreign policy toward Africa 
On assumption of office in 2009, President Obama inherited a complex legacy from 
his predecessor. On the positive side there had been significant increases in US 
financial assistance through PEPFAR, MCC and other aid and development 
programmes, a growing awareness of the strategic importance of Africa to the US 
and the need to build closer government-to-government relationships with African 
states. However the Bush security agenda, not least the creation of AFRICOM, had 
awakened long held suspicions of a return to a neo-colonialist or Cold War style 
interference by the US which was perceived as a threat to the growing sense of 
confidence amongst African leaders to determine the future of their continent without 
outside interference (Vines and Cargill, 2010:54).  
On his first trip to Africa in July 2009 Obama sought to reassure when speaking to 
the Ghanaian Parliament “Our Africa Command is focused not on establishing a 
foothold in the continent, but on confronting these common challenges to advance 
the security of America, Africa, and the world”(Obama, July 11th,2009)114. Obama 
pledged to make Africa a higher priority and to base policy less heavily on power 
and more on principles, prosperity and peace (Bullock, 2010:61). The fact that both 
President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton went to Africa in the first year of the 
administration, the first time this has ever happened, provided substantiation for the 
administration’s claim of higher priority (Jentleson, 2010:392). The rebalancing of 
the US approach to Africa focussed on putting the State Department’s understaffed, 
under-resourced and under-valued Africa Bureau back on track and back in charge, 
                                         
114 Obama, B. 2009. Obama’s Speech in Ghana: President addresses the Ghanaian Parliament in 
Accra. Washington DC: Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, July, 11. 




able to provide the coordination and oversight of the myriad of initiatives and US 
agencies with an interest in Africa. In addition experienced ‘Africa-hands’ were 
placed in senior positions in the State Department.  Notably, Susan Rice, who had 
served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs under President Clinton, 
was appointed as the US Ambassador to the UN (Ibid). 
 In April 2010 the Obama administration launched the first ever high-level bilateral 
talks with the AU, with Secretary Clinton and the National Security Advisor General 
Jim Jones hosting the event in Washington DC. US Attorney General Eric Holder 
followed up on this initiative by addressing the AU summit in Kampala115. In May 
2010, President Obama signed into law the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act. According to the U.S. 
Department of State, the U.S. strategy aims to assist the governments of Uganda, 
Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan, as 
well as the African Union and United Nations to “mitigate and end the threat posed 
to civilians and regional stability by the LRA116.” (Whitehouse gov., 2010). 
The strategy outlines four key objectives for U.S. support: 
 increased protection of civilians 
 the apprehension or removal of Joseph Kony and senior LRA 
commanders from the battlefield 
 the promotion of defections and support of disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters 
  It also requires President Obama to develop a comprehensive, 
multilateral strategy to protect civilians in central Africa from LRA 
attacks and take steps to permanently stop the rebel group's violence 
                                         
115 AFRICAN UNION SUMMIT: Attorney General Eric H. Holder delivered remarks to the AU 
Summit Kampala. He praised the work of the body, saying, "President Obama recognizes the growing 
importance of the African Union; he understands that a stronger Africa means a stronger America; and 
he appreciates the work that you are leading to strengthen political and economic cooperation across 
this continent." 
116 The Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act was a 2010 act of 
Congress promoted by the Obama administration that makes it American policy to kill or capture 
Joseph Kony and to crush his Lord's Resistance Army rebellion. According to the President, "the 
legislation crystallizes the commitment of the United States to help bring an end to the brutality and 
destruction that have been a hallmark of the LRA across several countries for two decades, and to 
pursue a future of greater security and hope for the people of central Africa 




 The provision of continued humanitarian relief to affected 
communities. 
Obama’s debut National Security Strategy published in May 2010 made much of the 
significance of Africa to America’s interests emphasizing the importance of long-
term development, control of epidemic disease and improving the resilience of the 
poorest states to  the effects of climate change and strengthen food security (NSS, 
2010:35). The NSS also stressed the requirement to provide support to help African 
states improve the capacity of their security and rule of law sectors and the clear 
statement that the US intended to meet any attempts by al-Qaeda or its terrorist 
affiliates to establish safe havens in ‘At-Risk States” with “growing pressure” 
naming Somalia, the Maghreb and the Sahel as areas of existing concern. A central 
theme of the NSS was the importance of “Strengthening the National Capacity” 
through “A Whole of Government Approach” reinforcing one of the original 
premises for the creation of AFRICOM (White House:NSS, 2010:14). In August 
2010 during the ninth AGOA Forum On US-sub-Saharan Africa Trade and 
Economic Cooperation, a new partnership agreement was signed between the AU 
and USAID to advance prosperity, peace and stability (White House: President’s 
Engagement in Africa, 2010). 
According to the then AFRICOM commander, General Carter F. Ham, the U.S. 
military contributions to countering the LRA are “best done through support, 
advising and assistance, rather than U.S. military personnel in the lead actually 
conducting the operations to try to find Kony and capture him117. We are an enabling 
force to facilitate and advance the capabilities of the African forces.” (See: 
https://africom.wordpress.com/2012/03/23/q-and-a-africom-general-carter-ham). The 
US military role is in support of a combined effort that involves the U.S. embassies 
in the affected countries, U.S. Agency for International Development’s programs, as 
                                         
117 In accordance with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) Disarmament and Northern Uganda 
Recovery Act, Obama’s administration deployed approximately 100 U.S. military personnel in 2011, 
to forward locations with the national militaries of the region, living and working side-by-side with 
their military peers as guests in African camps run by African security officials. Their mission is 
focused on finding ways to enable Uganda, CAR, DRC, and South Sudan to more effectively 
collaborate, coordinate and synchronize their efforts to remove the threat of the LRA . The U.S. 
advisors seek to strengthen cooperation among the national militaries, assist them to collaborate more 
effectively, and enhance their capacity to improve operational planning. The number of the US 
military personnel was later increased to 300. 




well as contributions from nongovernmental organizations. The collective intent is to 
supplement host nation efforts with advice and assistance that maximizes the flow of 
information to, and synchronizes the activities of, host nation efforts. U.S. military 
forces can enable intelligence fusion, facilitate more efficient means for delivering 
and managing logistics, and offer improved staff coordination capabilities118.  
In June 2012, President Obama approved Presidential policy directives that outline 
his vision for sub- Saharan Africa.  The stated pillars of the United States (US) 
strategy towards Africa are to strengthen democratic institutions, to spur economic 
growth, trade and investment, advancement of peace and security and, the promotion 
of opportunities and development by promoting food security and transforming 
Africa’s public health system (U.S.STRATEGY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA, 2012)119.The achievement of these stated goals is incumbent on the third 
goal which AFRICOM is expected to spearhead. 
5.3 U.S. strategic interests in Africa 
Various factors have been identified as the major drivers of U.S. policy toward 
Africa. Scholars like Klare (2004), Ploch (2009), Burgess (2008), Esterhuyse (2008), 
Forest and Crispin (2009) and Keenan (2010) have all concurred that factors such as 
violent extremism, terrorism, strategic minerals, global trade, China’s growing 
influence and maritime security are significantly responsible for the renewed U.S 
impetus in the continent. 
5.3.1 Strategic minerals and global trade  
For centuries, African continent have been viewed by  Western governments and 
business interests as a source of natural resources ripe for extraction. While states 
and other dominant actors in the global North have made linking the exploitation of 
                                         
118 President Obama sends more Special Operations forces and aircraft to Uganda to aid in the search 
for African warlord Joseph Kony in central Africa. U.S. personnel will provide only information, 
advice, and assistance to the African Union military task force that is looking for Kony and members 
of his organization, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The new aid includes at least four CV-22 
Ospreys, and some 150 Air Force Special Operations members and other airmen to fly and maintain 
the aircraft, reports The York Times, March 23, 2014 ppA7. 
119 The new U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa provides a proactive and forward looking 
vision grounded in partnership.  The new strategy sets forth four strategic objectives, and commits the 
United States to elevate its efforts on the first two of these four pillars: strengthening democratic 
institutions and spurring economic growth, trade and investment. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2012/06/14/fact-sheet-new-strategy-toward-sub-saharan-africa 




the region’s unmatched natural wealth to human development a public relations 
standard practice, the economic benefits of mining and other resource industries still 
flow overwhelmingly away from the African (Bullock, 2010:37). Whatever the 
public rhetoric, U.S. policymakers consider resource extraction an issue of 
geopolitical security. Unfettered access by U.S-based companies and multinational 
corporations to minerals such as uranium, diamonds, gold, bauxite and copper is 
considered a vital “strategic” interest. Although Africa is rich in these and other 
elements, the most coveted natural resource on the continent, without a doubt, is oil. 
With large reservoirs of high quality “sweet” crude found especially in countries 
around the Gulf of Guinea, Africa has risen rapidly as a U.S. national security 
priority. The view that access to African oil must be advanced as a “vital interest” of 
the U.S. was first publicly developed in a 2002 white paper produced by the oil 
business experts, consultants and U.S. policymakers making up the African Oil 
Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG)120, a project of the neo- conservative “Jerusalem” a 
based think tank, of the Institute for Advanced Strategic and International studies 
(Crawley, 2003).  
The AOPIG’s report argues that “African oil is not an end but a means: to both 
greater U.S. energy security and more rapid African economic development.” The 
AOPIG’s first proposal for African energy security is the expanded pursuit by 
“participating companies” of “all the oil available in the region.” Among its policy 
recommendations to this end are expanded land privatization, debt cancellation 
highly conditioned upon free market structural reforms and the establishment of a 
regional unified U.S. military command for the African continent (Johnson, 2002:5). 
Subsequently, the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Walter Kansteiner, said, 
African oil is of national strategic interest to the United States, and it will increase 
and become more important as we go forward (Crawley, 2002). The former 
                                         
120 The African Oil Policy Initiative Group, a lobby group comprising oilmen and various arms of the 
US government, has urged the Bush administration to declare the Gulf of Guinea, the epicentre of the 
region's offshore oil wealth and expected to become the world's leading deepwater oil production 
centre within 5-10 years, "an area of vital interest" to the US. US steps up Africa campaign, US 
Undersecretary of State for African Affairs, Walter Kansteiner, concedes that West Africa "has 
become a strategic interest" and the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG) has been set up to 
bring together US government and private sector interests (Kansteiner and Morrison quoted in Ploch, 
2010). 
. 




US Ambassador to Chad asserts that for the first time, the U.S national interest and 
that of Africans are converging (Klare and Volman, 2006:108). 
According to 2011 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) data, Sub-Saharan 
Africa and North Africa accounted for about 12 percent of U.S. oil imports 
(Ghazvinian, 2007).  In October 2007, U.S. oil imports from Africa for the first time 
surpassed those from the Middle East and this figure is projected to increase to 25 
percent by the year 2025. The U.S considerable interest in African oil particularly in 
gulf of Guinea has been influenced by a number of factors (Cohen and Rafal, 2007). 
Proximity to the United States, high quality, and low sulphur content make African 
oil an attractive source of energy to the United States, and it should be even more so 
in the future (National Intelligence Council, 2004). 
Besides oil, trade between the US and Africa has increased significantly since 1990 
and the emergence of a significant African voting bloc in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) which held a third of the votes is a new factor that could impact 
US worldwide trading interests both positively and negatively (Bullock, 2010:19). 
Countries like Angola and Algeria were and continue to be significant suppliers to 
the US with Nigeria the largest African supplier providing nearly 10% of the US 
requirement (US Department of Energy, 2011).   However, the US government plan 
to replace 75 percent of its oil imports from the Middle East by 2025 has suffered 
setback as a result of instability, including attacks on pipelines and oil facilities in the 
Niger Delta periodically reduce output by over 25% with consequent effects on 
World Oil prices. The oil theft and piracy in the gulf of Guinea and insurgencies in 
the Sahel coupled with Islamist militarism have aggravated the situation creating 
humanitarian catastrophes (Ploch, 2011:16-18). 
5.3.2 Violent extremism and terrorism  
One of the fundamental challenges facing Africa in the post-Cold War era is upsurge 
in violent extremism/terrorism. The sharp increase in terrorist activities is a result of 
many factors. Africa was a recruiting ground for jihadists during the Soviet-
Afghanistan war. By the end of the war, hundreds of North and West Africans who 
were recruited during the 1979-1989 jihads against the Soviet in Afghanistan started 
returning home. The arrival of these “Afghan Arabs” to their countries of origin 




infused burgeoning local Islamist groups, such as the Algerian Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA), and the Nigerian Taliban which has metastasized to Boko Haram with an 
uncompromising radical outlook, coupled with a set of external connections and 
expertise (Hunt, 2007:32). This upsurge had led to significant increase of terrorist 
activity. The litany of transnational terrorist activities by al- Qaeda-affiliated groups 
in Africa, including social conflicts in which combatants or militants use terrorist 
tactics, underscores the presence of local, regional, and worldwide terrorism on the 
African continent.  
Such activities range from the terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya in 1998; Casablanca, Morocco in 2003 and 
2007; Uganda and re-occurring attacks in Kenya. In addition, challenges posed in 
Nigeria by the dreaded Boko Haram Islamists in the north and militant groups in the 
south-south and al-Shabaab militancy in Somalia return focus towards the African 
continent. There is on-going concern about the activities of al-Qaeda and its 
franchises on the continent. The vast majority of African Moslems do not adhere to 
Salafist Islam. Many deliberately hold themselves apart from what they consider to 
be radical tendencies in the “East,” including Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, sub-
Saharan Africa has not been entirely insulated from trends elsewhere in the Middle 
East. Islamic revivalism has been on the upswing since the 1970, and in the past two 
decades political Islam has become a popular vehicle of opposition to increasingly 
undemocratic and corrupt regimes. External sponsorship of mosques, religious 
schools, and scholarships for locals to study religion in countries such as Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan and Iran has helped conservative strands of Islam gain a foothold 
(Ibid). 
This influence has been particularly evident in countries like Mauritania and Nigeria 
that lack a strong central government or have a less rigidly doctrinal tradition of 
Islam. Simultaneously, the global audience and appeal of al-Qaeda’s message have 
dramatically expanded since the September 11 attacks resulting in exponential 
growth in the number of adherents to al-Qaeda’s ideology. Although virulent anti-
Americanism has been notably absent in North Africa traditionally, the U.S. invasion 
of Iraq and one-sided media coverage of American detention and interrogation 
policies have lent credence in the region to the al-Qaeda narrative, which seeks to 




portray isolated American actions as a coordinated war against Islam (Hunt, 
2007:39). Together, these trends have created a current of cultural Islamization and 
on the margins have increased al-Qaeda’s attraction among certain segments. The al-
Qaeda leadership has pursued a strategy of feeding on local grievances, supporting 
many local causes that have little to do with Islam, integrating them into broader 
ideologies, and linking disparate conflicts through globalized communications, 
finance and technology (Kilcullen, 2004:16). These aggrieved and disenchanted 
groups in the wider global jihad will subsequently be unleashed against Western 
interests.  
 The strategy’s success has been demonstrated by a series of attacks in some African 
countries that are considered to be US partners such as Nigeria, Kenya, Mali, 
Morocco, Algeria, Uganda etc (Kansteiner and Morrison, 2004:122). Despite many 
successful host nation security efforts and U.S.-supported military interventions 
against these aforementioned groups (among others), terrorists or violent extremists 
continue to function actively in Africa.  It is argued that Africa’s vast ungoverned 
spaces, including porous borders in Northern Africa, the Trans-Saharan region and 
Somalia, especially badly governed areas or those with the lack of state capacity or 
political will to exercise control elsewhere, offer sanctuary to extremists and 
insurgent groups to recruit, indoctrinate, train, equip, transit, and mount operations 
including smuggle and traffic in drugs, persons and weapons (U.S.DoS, 2007:12). 
The Trans-Saharan region’s remoteness and harsh desert climate discourage effective 
assertion of central government control. As such, terrorist organizations are 
constantly on the move in the area, but they maintain less permanent facilities and a 
more small scale presence in sparsely populated areas (Zaied, 2009:41).  
For example, Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (GSPC) focused its 
major attacks on Algeria; it continued to operate almost uninterrupted in the vast 
ungoverned Sahel region, crossing difficult-to-patrol borders between Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, and Chad to recruit extremists within the region for 
training and terrorist operations in the Trans-Sahara and, possibly, for operations 
outside the region (U.S.DoS, 2007:13). Similarly, the large areas in Somalia where 
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) lacks capacity to exercise control offers 




uninterrupted sanctuary to al Shabaab to focus on carrying out attacks against Somali 
citizens (Ibid). 
5.3.3 China’s growing Influence  
China is perhaps the fastest growing energy consumer in the world; in 2003 China 
passed Japan to become the world’s number two consumer of petroleum behind the 
United States (Wonacott, 2003:31). Once self-sufficient in petroleum production, 
China now imports 3.7 million b/d of oil from its daily consumption of 7.5 million 
b/d (USCC, 2007). During the last five years, energy demand growth has been, on 
average, 13 percent per year (USCC, 2007). This trend is likely to continue. 
Manufacturing accounts for 60 percent of energy consumption in China and 28 
percent of that is from the fast growing iron and steel sector (USCC, 2007). Lax 
environmental standards, government subsidies and its innate profitability will likely 
ensure little change of this consumption pattern. Moreover, affluence will drive an 
upsurge in transportation related petroleum consumption. Vehicle ownership in 
China is expected to reach 140 million by 2020, a significant increase from the 25 
million vehicle owners in 2007. By 2025 as China’s population increases another 123 
million people, total oil consumption will be over 14 million b/d and China will 
likely import an additional 7.2 million b/d of foreign oil (Hughes and Bankus, 2009). 
The source of China’s oil imports is, therefore, of significant strategic importance 
and a focal point for China’s state owned energy companies and its diplomatic corps. 
The politically unstable Middle East, led by Saudi Arabia, Iran and Oman, accounts 
for 44 percent of China’s oil imports. Africa, led by Angola is the second largest 
single source of Chinese oil supply. South Sudan and Nigeria account for 32 percent 
of oil imports. Additionally, Russia supplies 11 percent of Chinese oil imports, via 
rail (International Energy Agency, 2007). 
Africa, with over 120 billion barrels of petroleum reserves, remains strategically 
imperative to China’s growing economy.  China’s mineral import diplomacy has also 
benefitted African countries substantially. China’s state enterprises identify states 
with significant natural resource reserves and work closely with Chinese diplomats to 
design an engagement program with apropos economic and diplomatic benefits. 
China’s African Policy is rooted in development and “mutually beneficial 
cooperation” (People’s Republic of China, 2006). A natural ally based on its long-




term role as champion of the developing world, China can offer debt forgiveness, 
bilateral trade agreements, development packages, and grant aid. China often 
packages its diplomatic, defense, and development aid into synchronized and 
synergistic offerings. Unlike the United States, which ties its developmental aid to 
democratic reforms, fiscal transparency, and human rights, China insists only upon 
the isolation of Taiwan. The pursuit of this overriding objective is unambiguous and 
explicit: “The One China principle is the political foundation for the establishment of 
China’s relations with African countries and regional organizations” (People’s 
Republic of China, 2006). China explains this One China concept as a respect for 
African states’ autonomy in creating their own development programs, and a desire 
for their support in establishing a “new and rational economic order” (Cook, 2008, 
106). 
 China’s provision of massive amounts of aid and direct foreign investment to Africa 
was viewed by some experts as a threat to US Security as China’s influence as 
competing power could lessen the influence of the US in Africa (Chau, 2007:18).  
Chinese direct investment in Africa had grown dramatically from about US$50 
million annually between the mid-1990s and 2002 to US$100 million in 2003 and 
US$430 million in 2004. In addition to providing direct investment, China also 
cancelled in excess of US$10 billion in bilateral trades from African countries 
(Hanson, 2008). 
 During his February 2008 visit to Ghana in response to a question from the press 
about the increasing role of China in Africa President Bush remarked “…inherent in 
your question is that I view China as a fierce competitor on the continent of Africa – 
no I don’t” (White House Press Office, February 20th, 2008). Nevertheless there were 
those within the US government and influential Washington think-tanks who were 
becoming increasingly alarmed by the growing efforts of the Chinese to widen 
access to Africa’s resources and increased economic and political influence across 
the continent. The fact that China had invested considerable resources and engaged at 
the highest levels including visits by President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen 
Jiabao was cited as evidence of a Chinese ‘Grand Strategy’ that would undermine US 
security interests in Africa (Bullock, 2010:56). Another and more longstanding 
aspect of Chinese assistance to the African continent comes in the form of medical 




assistance. Sometimes called “Health Diplomacy,” teams of Chinese doctors have 
been rendering medical aid on the continent since 1964 to complement regular 
medical personnel exchanges and technical training for medical professionals. 
China’s medical assistance to Africa has also produced a robust program for the 
prevention of infectious diseases to include malaria and HIV/AIDS. This assistance 
includes training seminars and conferences, and supplying entire medical units as 
part of their military contingent to UN peacekeeping operations on the continent 
(Hughes and Bankus, 2009:5). 
 5.3.4 Maritime security in Africa   
Maritime security is an amorphous focus area. According to Potgieter (2009:7), 
Maritime security is concerned with preventing illicit activities in the maritime 
domain. It could be directly linked to a specific country and national security efforts, 
but it can also include regional or international efforts to enforce maritime security.  
Africa’s maritime domain at different period in its history has been attractive to a 
variety of external interests. During the colonial era and the subsequent Cold War 
era, the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Guinea, Suez Canal and the Persian peninsula were 
hotbeds for superpower rivalries and channels through which natural resources were 
transported to Europe. In this contemporary period, Africa’s vast natural resources 
and revenues from it coupled with the growing population and the expanding market 
have once again raised the continent’s profile in the geopolitics of world resource 
endowment. The maritime security off Africa is an important issue to the US, EU, 
and NATO. The Horn of Africa is a choke point for shipping as the internationally 
important and busy maritime trade routes around it link the Indian Ocean to the Suez 
Canal. However, these routes are seriously threatened due the dire security situation 
in the Horn of African region. For over three decades, peace and stability have 
evaded the region as countries in the region have been ravaged by conflict. The Cold 
War interests of the Super Powers added to the turbulence of the region as these 
conflicts became interrelated, with factions in various countries obtaining and 
providing support across national borders (Oyebade and Olao, 1998:162). Djibouti, 
bordering Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, is strategically located on the busy shipping 
lane through the Bab al Mandeb Strait, linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden 
and is a transhipment location for imports and exports of the East African highlands 




(Potgieter, 2009:8). With utter civil lawlessness in the region’s coast, banditry, 
piracy, abduction and oil theft have become the order of the day while policing along 
the coast and harbours disappeared (Meredith, 2005:469). For example, between 
early 2005 and April 2006 45 attempted hijackings and 19 successful hijackings took 
place around Somalia (UK Maritime Trade Operations, 21 September, 2006).  
According to the International Maritime Bureau, during the first nine months of 
2007, 36 actual and attempted pirate attacks were recorded in the seas around the 
Horn of Africa (off the coasts of Somalia, Djibouti and Yemen).  Most of these 
attacks (26) were off the coast of Somalia.  It is 18% of the international total and 
more than doubles the figure for the same period 2006 (OXFAM, 19 November, 
2007). Hijacking ships for ransom is the most common form of piracy and of the 29 
attempted hijackings between January and September 2007, nine were successful. 
The increase in piracy is ascribed to the fact that coastal and port surveillance are 
virtually completely absent, the defeat of the UIC in December 2006, and the poverty 
and desperation of the Somali people (Ibid). Between January and June 2009, Africa 
ranked higher with about 66 percent of the world’s 240 reported incidents. The Gulf 
of Aden had 86 incidents, and became the world’s epicenter for maritime piracy and 
armed robbery at sea. Other places in Africa are Somalia – 44 incidents, Red Sea – 
14 incidents, and Nigeria – 13 incidents, including Tanzania and Kenya. Despite the 
strong international naval presence along the transit corridor in the Gulf of Aden and 
elsewhere around East Africa, pirates have conducted attacks beyond the 200 
nautical miles (n miles) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). For example, one incident 
occurred on November 29, 2009 at about 800 n miles off the Somali coast where 
pirates hijacked Maran Centaurus, a Greek-flagged very large crude carrier (VLCC) 
containing two million barrels worth $162 million. About $7 million in ransom was 
paid for the release of the vessel and hostages and with the availability of this ill-
gotten money, weapons and private armies among others become easily funded 
(Coolman and Mohamed, 2010). Also, the international shipping industry becomes 
affected thanks to high- risk insurance premiums, among other costs. Oil theft and oil 
infrastructure sabotage are also a significant feature in the resource-laden GoG, 
particularly in the Nigeria’s Niger Delta area. The oil is stolen by criminals either 
attacking secondary pipelines to the main pipelines of an oil company, blowing-up 




pipelines, or through connivance with government and oil company officials. 
According to the UN Office of Drug and Crime (UNODC), about 10 percent of oil in 
Nigeria is stolen every year, reducing the production capacity to about two thirds 
when sabotage and violence are included (Aning and Pokoo, 2013). The result is an 
upward surge in oil prices, including pollution of the waterways by spillages caused 
by sabotage. In addition, as with piracy, criminals acquire sophisticated weapons 
with which to challenge the security agencies. These activities destabilize the 
economy of the region.  
5.4 The emergence of USAFRICOM 
An Integrated Process Team (IPT) consisting of representatives from the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, State Department and USAID, was 
formed and met for the first time in November 2006 (Forest and Crispin, 2009:8). In 
late December 2006 rumours circulating about the prospects of a new command were 
confirmed, albeit inadvertently, by the then US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral 
Mike Mullen when he mentioned the issue during a visit to US Navy personnel in 
Naples “The President, on the 15th of December, made the decision to stand Africa 
Command up”(Schogol, 2006: 29). The White House remained silent on the issue 
until 6 February 2007 when President Bush announced the formation of a tenth 
COCOM to be called Africa Command (AFRICOM), with Initial Operating 
Capability (IOC) 1 October 2007 as a subordinate command under EUCOM and Full 
Operating Capability (FOC) 1 October 2008 as a standalone COCOM. AFRICOM 
have responsibility for the entire African Continent with the exception of Egypt 
which remains within CENTCOM’s area owing to the country’s importance to the 
Middle East. Bush highlighted a number of apparently uncharacteristic non-military 
features in his statement announcing the new Command “…promote our common 
goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in 
Africa.”(White House 6th February, 2007). 
5.4.1 AFRICOM’s stated mission and objectives  
AFRICOM’s mission statement, as approved by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, states 
that United States Africa Command, in concert with other US government agencies 
and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-




to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as 
directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of US foreign 
policy (Secretary of Defense May 2008). Since the creation of AFRICOM in 
February 2007, its mission statement has gone through several iterations and 
modifications that ranged in emphasis from humanitarian-oriented activities to more 
traditional military programs (http://www.africom.mil.asp). Arguably, these changes 
were as a result of concerns raised that AFRICOM would engage in activities that are 
traditionally the mission of civilian agencies and NGOs, including assuming 
leadership over directing all USG efforts, as well as concerns about militarization of 
U.S. foreign policy. So far, the current mission statement has stood the test of time. 
AFRICOM’s primary aim in accordance with U.S. foreign policy and national 
security objectives is, to advance the United States' national interest in the continent 
of Africa by strengthening the defense capabilities of African partners so that they 
are increasingly capable of providing for their own defense and contributing more 
broadly to regional stability and security. According to General Ham, the US is 
convinced that when African nations are increasingly stable and secure, conflict is 
deterred; the opportunities for economic growth, the development of good 
governance, the provision of humanitarian needs are best able to occur (AFRICOM, 
2009:10). Specifically, AFRICOM’s theatre strategic objectives are to: 
 Defeat the Al-Qaeda terrorist organizations and its associated networks 
  Ensure peace operations capacity exists and continental peace support 
operations effectively fulfill mission requirements 
 Cooperate with identified African states in the creation of an environment 
inhospitable to the unsanctioned possession and proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) capabilities and expertise 
 Improve security sector governance and increased stability through military 
support to comprehensive, holistic, and enduring USG efforts in designated 
states; and  
  Protect populations from deadly contagions (AFRICOM, 2010:31).  
5.4.2 AFRICOM’s organizational structure  
As earlier noted, from inception, AFRICOM was structured with a greater 
interagency involvement and coordination with the DoS, USAID, and other 




government agencies, including a larger non-DoD civilian staff, than has been 
traditional with other COCOM’s. The organizational structure establishes the chain 
of command from which information and decision making flows, and also indicates 
the flow of tasking and operational control to the Commander. Below the position of 
the AFRICOM Commander, are the Deputies to the Commander for Civil-Military 
Activities (DCMA) and for Military Operations (DCMO). The DCMA is a non-DoD 
civilian (a Senior Foreign Service Officer) who directs AFRICOM’s civil-military 
plans and programs in support of other U.S. agencies’ activities, including policy 
development, resourcing, program assessment, and implementation of various 
security cooperation initiatives consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives. The 
DCMO is the DCMA’s military equivalent, responsible for the implementation and 
execution of the command’s military-to-military programs and operations. While 
both Deputies exercise supervisory authority for the civilian and military personnel 
in their respective offices, the DCMO will also exercise command authority in the 
Commander’s absence (Ploch, 2009:8). 
Further down the hierarchy of the organizational structure are the levels of authority 
and tasking of other personnel including seven Directors who oversee various 
departments of the command. Other AFRICOM subordinate elements comprise four 
service component commands: U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) located in Vicenza, 
Italy; U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF) in Naples, Italy; U.S. Air Forces, Africa 
(AFAFRICA) in Ramstein Air Base, Germany; and U.S. Marine Corps Forces, 
Africa (MARFORAF) in Stuttgart, Germany; as well as one sub-unified functional 
command, U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA); and the 
CJTF-HOA (AFRICOM, 2010:33). These elements contribute to AFRICOM’s 
mission through bilateral and multilateral application of the full spectrum of their 
forces capabilities, including civil affairs, information operations, crisis response, 
campaign planning, and conduct of Theatre Security Cooperation (TSC) activities, 
among others (AFRICOM, 2010:32-36).   
 Perhaps in line with its unique organizational structure, AFRICOM’s decision 
making and coordination mechanisms are based on variations of simple, divisional, 
professional, and adhocracy configurations of diverse elements, some of which are 
permanent, standing, on-call, or ad hoc at different levels of the structure. For 




example, the direct supervision and strategic guidance provided by the commander 
depicts a simple configuration at the AFRICOM headquarters level. The divisional 
configuration is depicted in the arrangement of the service components, including 
SOCAFRICA, CJTF- HOA, and other elements that are semiautonomous with the 
AFRICOM Commander exercising operational control over their activities through 
their individual commanders (AFRICOM, 2009:31). These components execute their 
functions based on their expertise and in line with standard operating procedures 
(SOPs). Professional configuration is expressed by DoD health professionals who 
rely on their skills for coordination. As for adhocracy, the Civil Affairs assets work 
in a highly flexible way in meeting new and rapidly changing reconstruction projects 
to match the desires of host nations. Despite these configurations and coordination 
mechanisms, the U.S. Ambassador exercises overall leadership and authority, 
including providing some resources in terms of manpower and funding for the 
implementation of AFRICOM’s activities in each of the partner countries (Ibid).  
AFRICOM and its service components have about 4,400 assigned personnel and 
forces. About 2,400 of these personnel are based in Europe, and the remaining 2,000 
personnel (400 staff and 1,600 forces) have been assigned to CJTF HOA in Djibouti. 
In addition, AFRICOM estimates between 3,500 to 5,000 rotational forces deploy on 
the continent during a major exercise. In essence, AFRICOM, including the service 
components, has no assigned forces, but relies on the Global Force Management 
(GFM) and Request for Forces System (RFS) administered by DoD for any 
additional forces. 
5.4.3 AFRICOM’s programs and exercises in Africa  
1. At the attainment of Unified Command Status (UCS) in 1st October, 2008, 
AFRICOM inherited a total of 172 missions, activities, programs and exercises in 
Africa that had previously been shared by its predecessors (AFRICOM, 2009:5). 
However, these programs and activities are purported to represent a shift from 
traditional war fighting toward building the security capacity of partner African 
militaries to provide security for their own countries and the continent as a whole, 
which furthers U.S. foreign policy objectives. Some of these programs and activities 
include U.S. support to countering transnational and extremist threats, Operation 




Enduring Freedom Trans- Sahara (OEF-TS), CJTF-HOA, and OOV; Africa 
Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) under the GPOI; 
building maritime security capacity through the APS; IMET; Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs; HIV/AIDS programs, 
and Humanitarian Assistance (HA) (AFRICOM, 2010:12-31). Some technologies 
used as integration mechanisms are: controlling management systems 
(communication systems that connect DoD to DoS and other USG agencies), 
performance measurement systems for evaluations, resource allocation procedures 
used to request for forces, and fiscal responsibility processes for contracting office. 
Other technologies used for its Information Operations including website initiatives 
such as Maghrebia.com and the AFRICOM’s OOV to counter extremist messaging. 
AFRICOM conducts a variety of exercises, operations and security cooperation 
activities in collaboration with some African states so as to build the capacities of 
partnering states military forces to effectively address security threats. The programs 
fall under security cooperation 121(see http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do). This 
study will briefly highlight some of the operations and exercises under these 
programs. 
5.4.3a Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program 
The Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program is 
funded and managed by the U.S. Department of State. The initiative is designed to 
improve African militaries’ capabilities by providing selected training and equipment 
necessary for multinational peace support operations. U.S. Africa Command supports 
the ACOTA program by providing military mentors, trainers, and advisors at the 
request of the State Department. ACOTA provides a full range of peacekeeping 
training and instruction tailored to match a country’s needs and capabilities. The 
program focuses on sub-Saharan African soldiers from partner nations who are 
scheduled to participate in a peace support operation or who are designated to be in a 
standby mode to do so. ACOTA benefits its partners by training African soldiers on 
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topics including convoy escort procedures, refugee management, and small-unit 
command skills; overseeing exercises for battalion, brigade, and multinational force 
headquarters personnel; providing equipment to partner nations, including mine 
detectors, field medical equipment, uniforms, and water purification devices; 
conducting refresher training periodically to ensure that trained units maintain their 
capabilities; and training African trainers, who in turn train their own nation’s 
soldiers in peacekeeping skills (Franke, 2007:8-11). 
5.4.3b Africa Deployment Assistance Partnership Team (ADAPT) 
The Africa Deployment Assistance Partnership Team (ADAPT) is a “Theatre 
Logistics Engagement Activity” that helps build deployment capacity for African 
partners who conduct peacekeeping, counterterrorism, or humanitarian relief 
operations in Africa. Funded by the Department of State, the ADAPT program aims 
to enhance the projection capabilities of African militaries to support mission 
requirements. ADAPT works with existing organizations, such as the United Nations 
and African Standby Forces, and complements other endeavours, such as African 
Partnership Flight and Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance 
(ACOTA). Training through ADAPT has resulted in more effective deployments to 
critical peacekeeping missions, including the African Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM), UN Mission in Sudan (UMISS), and the UN Mission in Cote d’Ivoire 
(UNOCI) (Boutellis and Williams, 2013). 
5.4.3c Africa Partnership Station (APS) 
Africa Partnership Station (APS) is U.S. Naval Forces Africa’s (NAVAF) flagship 
maritime security cooperation program. The focus of APS is to build maritime safety 
and security by increasing maritime awareness, response capabilities and 
infrastructure. Through APS, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and NAVAF 
conduct engagement activities with international partners and governmental/non-
governmental organizations to enhance African partner nations’ self-sustaining 
capability to effectively maintain maritime security within their inland waterways, 
territorial waters, and exclusive economic zones. As a maritime security cooperation 
program, APS seeks to improve capabilities with partner naval forces using four 
“pillars” to increase maritime safety and security: Develop Maritime Domain 




Awareness—maintaining a clear picture of the maritime environment; Build 
maritime professionals; Establish maritime infrastructure; Develop response 
capabilities while building regional integration. These four pillars are addressed 
through a regional and comprehensive approach (US Africa Command Fact Sheet 
January, 2012). 
5.4.3. d The African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) program 
The African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) program enables 
African partner nations to build maritime security capacity and improve management 
of their maritime environment through real world combined law enforcement 
operations. Typically the operations employ an African host nation’s own law 
enforcement boarding team, along with a U.S. Coast Guard boarding team, operating 
from a U.S. Coast Guard or U.S. Navy vessel. Many African coastal nations rely on 
fishing for food and as a significant contributor of revenue and jobs to local 
economies. Some reports have shown Africa loses upwards of $1 billion each year to 
illegal fishing. Trafficking of narcotics, people, and weapons, as well as 
environmental crimes that take place in African waters negatively impact a nation’s 
economy and stability. AMLEP supports the U.S. foreign policy goals of peace, 
security, and development by providing direct support to African maritime security 
forces to build their capacity and assist them in enforcing their national laws122. 
5.4.3. e The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program 
The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program provides funds 
for international personnel to attend U.S. military professional training programs. 
The IMET program specifically targets current and future military and civilian 
leadership in African nations. The overall objective of the IMET program is 
threefold: to further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually 
beneficial military-to-military relations; to provide training that augment the 
capabilities of participant nations’ military forces; and to increase the ability of 
foreign military and civilian personnel to instill and maintain democratic values. The 
IMET program exposes foreign students to U.S. professional military organizations 








and procedures and the manner in which military organizations function under 
civilian control. The program introduces students to elements of U.S. democracy 
such as the U.S. judicial system, legislative oversight, free speech, equality issues, 
and U.S. commitment to human rights. IMET’s mandatory English-language 
proficiency requirement establishes a baseline of communication skills for students 
to attend courses. Lastly, IMET training graduates fill key leadership positions in 
military of many African nations (US Africa Command Fact Sheet March 2, 2012). 
5.4.3. f National Guard State Partnership programs 
The State Partnership Program is a key U.S. security cooperation tool that facilitates 
cooperation across all aspects of international civil-military affairs and encourages 
people-to-people ties at the state level. It directly supports DOD objectives and 
theatre campaign plans by building relationships that enhance global security, 
understanding and cooperation. There are currently eight State Partnerships between 
the United States and Africa: California/Nigeria; New York/South Africa; North 
Carolina/Botswana; North Dakota/Ghana; Michigan/Liberia; Utah (South 
Carolina)/Morocco; Vermont/Senegal; Wyoming/Tunisia123. 
5.4.3. g Pandemic Response Program (PRP) 
In partnership with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. 
Africa Command has worked since 2008 to establish a Pandemic Response Program 
(PRP) aimed at assisting African militaries to develop influenza pandemic response 
plans that are integrated into their country’s overall national response plans. The 
potential for a pandemic influenza event in Africa is high due to the level of cross-
border travel and trade. The healthcare systems within the majority of African 
nations are vulnerable to any excess capacity that may result from such a pandemic. 
Militaries can play key roles in the event of a pandemic, working in collaboration 
with other governmental, non-governmental and international organizations to 
maintain security provide logistical support for food, medicine and other 
commodities, maintain communications, and provide augmented medical care. PRP 
strives to improve the capacity for regional stability in the event of a complex 
emergency such as a pandemic event. Towards these ends, PRP provides training and 
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technical assistance and identifies, and at times purchases, limited equipment needed 
for selected countries. 
Although USAID is the U.S. lead agency for the pandemic response preparedness 
program, Congressional appropriations have also been made available through 
USAID to enable Department of Defense Combatant Commands (COCOMs) to 
develop military-to-military engagement programs as a key component of such a 
response. Military Pandemic Response Plans is a “Country-level” military pandemic 
response (contingency) plans to support national plans which are developed in 
coordination with USAID, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (IFRC) and other organizations in each country. There is also a 
“Pandemic Preparedness Training Programs” which involves response training and 
exercise programs focus on exercising military Pandemic Influenza (PI) response 
plans, developing military pandemic rapid response teams, training military health 
personnel in PI control and case management, training military security personnel in 
quarantine operations, and/or developing military public response campaigns. They 
also include national, provincial, and regional table-top exercises, in collaboration 
with appropriate civilian authorities and in coordination with USAID. The program 
also assists with legal doctrine development, policy, and procedural frameworks to 
ensure the military plays an appropriate role in the event of a pandemic124. 
5.4.4 AFRICOM’s activities in Africa 
The study briefly examined some of the exercises and activities conducted by 
AFRICOM. Most of these activities are performed in collaboration with the US- 
African partners, Western nations and international organizations (Intergovernmental 
and non-governmental organizations). Below is a list of the activities. 
5.4.4a Africa Endeavour 
Exercise African Endeavour is a U.S. Africa Command’s annual 10-day 
communications exercise focuses on interoperability and information sharing among 
African partners. The first Africa Endeavour was held in 2006 in South Africa. Past 
exercises have taken place in Nigeria (2008), Gabon (2009), Ghana (2010), The 








Gambia (2011), Cameroon (2012), Zambia (2013), and Germany (2014)125.The 
exercise's primary objective is to increase the command, control, and 
communications capacities (C4) of African nations by encouraging interoperable 
tactics, training, and procedures and creating documented standards that support 
interoperability. This allows U.S. partner nations to provide critical C4 support to the 
African Union and African Standby forces involved in humanitarian assistance, 
disaster relief, peacekeeping missions, etc. Africa Endeavour has trained more than 
1,450 communications specialists. Participants in the 2012 exercise, held in Douala, 
Cameroon, hailed from 36 nations. The 2012 exercise included a public affairs 
workshop for the first time. Seventeen public affairs officers from 14 nations and the 
African Union participated in three days of training, then operated as public affairs 
officers during the exercise scenario126. 
5.4.4b Exercise Flintlock 
Exercise Flintlock is an annual regional exercise among African, Western, and U.S. 
counterterrorism forces, which has taken place since 2006. It is a Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed and U.S. Africa Command-sponsored.  Joint-Special 
Operations Task Force-Trans Sahara-conducted Special Operations Forces exercise. 
Occurring in nations across the Sahel region of Africa, the exercises are planned by 
Special Operations Command-Africa to develop the capacity and collaboration 
among African security forces to protect civilian populations. Flintlock participation 
has included ground and air forces from over 16 countries across a broad spectrum of 
operations. The exercise is designed to foster regional cooperation to enable U.S. 
African partners to stabilize regions of North and West Africa, reducing sanctuary 
and support for violent extremist organizations. Exercise Flintlock provides 
increased interoperability, counterterrorism, and combat skills training while creating 
a venue for regional engagement among all TSCTP nations. Past participants include 
Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
South Africa, Canada, Tunisia, Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, 
United Kingdom, and the United States. Flintlock 2014 includes Burkina Faso, 
Canada, Chad, France, Mauritania, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Senegal, United 
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Kingdom, the United States and the host nation of Niger. The 3 weeks exercise 
which started from February 2014 focused on building partner capability to 
strengthen stability across the Sahel region of Africa (AFRICOM  February 24, 
2014).  
5.4.4c Atlas Accord  
Atlas Accord, an annual-joint-aerial-delivery exercise, is hosted by U.S. Army 
Africa. The exercise brings together U.S. Army personnel with militaries in Africa to 
enhance air drop capabilities and ensure effective delivery of military resupply 
materials and humanitarian aid. The 2012 exercise took place in Mali. U. S. service 
members joined troops from six partner nations with the purpose of sharing their 
knowledge of aerial resupply and recovery of as part of exercise Atlas Accord 2012 
in Mali. During the 2012 exercise, members of the 19th Special Forces Group 
(Airborne) conducted pathfinder training to locate suitable drop zones, cleared the 
area to ensure the safety of local residents, marked the drop zones for the aircraft and 
recovered supplies. The focus of the exercise was to deliver supplies to people who 
may not have access to normal supply lines due to natural disasters or other difficult 
circumstances. The pathfinder training during Atlas Accord can potentially help 
future joint operations between partner nations to deliver humanitarian supplies 
safely to those in need127. 
5.4.4d Cutlass Express 
Exercise Cutlass Express is an exercise sponsored by U.S. Africa Command 
(AFRICOM), and focuses on addressing piracy through information sharing and 
coordinated operations among international navies. Cutlass Express 2011 took place 
at sea in the vicinity of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Mombasa, Kenya; and Seychelles, 
with coordination among regional maritime operations centres. Samuel B. Roberts 
provided at-sea U.S. warship platform participation while several Commander, U.S. 
Naval Forces Europe and Africa/U.S. 6th Fleet staff personnel also participated as 
exercise planners and trainers. Exercise Cutlass Express is yet another pillar that 
demonstrates U.S. and participant-nation commitment to regional stability and 
maritime security, with participating nations including Djibouti, Mauritius, 
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Mozambique, Tanzania, The Seychelles, Uganda and the United States128. In 
November 18, Maritime forces from East Africa; the United States and European 
nations concluded exercise Cutlass Express 2013. The objective of the exercise was 
to increase regional cooperation, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)/information 
sharing, and improve communications and interoperability among participating 
forces in order to counter piracy and maritime threats129. 
5.4.4e Eastern Accord 
Eastern Accord is a military exercise focusing on humanitarian aid/disaster response 
with East African nations. The 10-day training exercise, which helps build 
partnerships with USARAF and the East African military forces, is designed to help 
USARAF and East African participants improve their capability to respond to 
regional security threats posed by Violent Extremist Groups and to more effectively 
counter the associated Violent Extremist Ideology130. The 2014 exercise was carried 
out with the objective of building partnerships with Tanzania and other East African 
military forces to increase interoperability within East Africa, increase African 
partner nations' ability to counter violent extremism and to increase the readiness of 
U.S. forces to operate in austere conditions131. 
5.4.4f Medlite 
Medlite is multinational training to enhance medical capabilities and readiness for 
U.S. and African forces operating in central Africa. Medlite is a U.S. Air Forces 
Africa exercise conducted in Botswana during Southern Accord, focused on teaching 
the Botswana medics not only to load patients for aeromedical evacuation, but also to 
treat them during the flight. The goal of Medlite is to enhance the capabilities of the 
U.S. and African partners to work together by introducing the U.S. aeromedical 
evacuation system of patient movement to the Botswana defense force military 
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medical personnel. The exercise consisted of classroom instruction, an Aeromedical 
evacuation training scenario and culminated with a mass casualty exercise132. 
5.4.4g Natural Fire 
Natural Fire was first held in Kenya in 1998, with U.S. partnership. Since then, it has 
been held every two years in East Africa. In 2000, it grew to include Tanzania and 
Uganda, as well as the U.S. and Kenya -- a significant step for the EAC alliance. In 
2006, Natural Fire expanded to include field training and humanitarian assistance. 
Since then, the exercise has grown to feature five partner states, with the addition of 
soldiers from Burundi. Exercise In 2010, the exercise involved five East African 
partner states -- plus partners from the U.S. military -- in October 2009 in northern 
Uganda. Soldiers from Kenya, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and the United 
States opened the 10-day exercise, which focused on humanitarian and civic 
assistance, disaster relief and regional security. Roughly 550 U.S. personnel and 133 
military personnel from each of the five partner nations took part. Altogether, there 
were nearly 1,220 participants. U.S. Army Africa, (USARAF), the land component 
of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), is co-leading the exercise with the Ugandan 
military. USARAF is committed to partnering with African nations to enhance 
mutual understanding and increase stability, security and peace on the continent133. 
5.4.4h Obangame Express 
Obangame Express, conducted by U.S. Naval Forces Africa, is an at-sea maritime 
exercise designed to improve cooperation among participating nations in order to 
increase maritime safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea. It focuses on maritime 
interdiction operation, as well as visit, board, search, and seizure techniques. The 
guided-missile frigate USS Simpson (FFG 56) completed two days of participation 
for Exercise Obangame Express 2012. For its part in Obangame Express, Simpson 
acted as a boarding vessel with role players and trainers for teams from five countries 
- Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe, and Spain. U.S. and European 
partners conduct exercises with North African maritime and land forces to increase 
regional maritime awareness and improve maritime security in Phoenix Express. It is 









one of four African regional "Express" series exercises that are designed to test skills 
obtained from participating in bilateral and Africa Partnership Station (APS) training 
in a regional maritime exercise. In 2013, the exercise (OE-13), focused on counter-
piracy and maritime security operations wrapped up in the Gulf of Guinea. OE-13 
provided African, European and Atlantic partner maritime services the opportunity to 
work together, share information and refine methods in order to help Gulf of Guinea 
maritime nations better monitor and enforce their territorial waters and exclusive 
economic zones. The participants in this exercise conducted training which improved 
the interoperability between maritime forces of the participating nations, as well as 
the skills of individual sailors134. Maritime partnerships and maritime security and 
safety are increasingly important in the Gulf of Guinea region to combat a variety of 
challenges including maritime crime, illicit trafficking and piracy. 
5.4.4i Sahara Express 
Saharan Express is a maritime training exercise which started in 2012 and was held 
in Dakar, Senegal. The exercise involves 12 countries' navies, coast guards and army 
paramedic pre-sail conference and 10 ship commanders. The second phase of the 
exercise involved 12 nations. These nations are Cape Verde, France, Gambia, Cote 
d'Ivoire; Liberia, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. This exercise is one of four regional maritime 
exercises in Africa, an international security cooperation initiative facilitated by 
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa. The aim is to strengthen global 
maritime partnerships through training and collaborative activities to improve 
maritime safety and security in Africa. The aim of exercise Saharan Express is to 
develop participant nations' capabilities to monitor and enforce their own territorial 
waters and exclusive economic zones135. Should these participants meet in the future 
to conduct combined peacekeeping or humanitarian operations, or to counter 
trafficking in drugs, people, or weapons in the Atlantic Ocean, they will be better 
able to respond and work together136. 
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135 See http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/exercises/saharan-express 
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 http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/article/10500/saharan-express-2013-concludes-in-senegal 




5.4.4j Southern Accord 
This is a joint exercise intended to enhance U.S. and African forces' capabilities in 
the areas of humanitarian/disaster relief operations, peacekeeping operations, and 
aeromedical evacuation in sub-Saharan Africa. The first exercise took place in the 
Republic of Botswana in 2012, with more than 1,200 military personnel from 
Botswana and the United States attending the opening ceremony. The ultimate goal 
was increased cooperation, which will in turn increase stability and security across 
the continent. Southern Accord 2014137, more than 220 officers and NCO's from 10 
countries converged on the Malawi Armed Forces College to share knowledge and 
exchange ideas. Led by U.S. Army Africa, the U.S. Africa Command-sponsored 
exercise included several days of instruction from the U.N. Integrated Training 
Service and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and 
simulated the deployment of a peacekeeping force in a realistic, challenging 
scenario138. 
5.4.4k Western Accord 
This is sponsored by U.S. Africa Command and led by Marine Forces Africa. The 
2012  multi-lateral training exercise, which took place in Dakar, Senegal, included 
live-fire and combat marksmanship training, peacekeeping operations, disaster 
response, intelligence capacity building, as well as a humanitarian-civic assistance 
project that provided primary medical and dental assistance to more than 2,000 
residents of the local population. The exercise increased U.S. and African nations' 
interoperability and understanding of each other's capabilities and proficiency, 
enhancing the ability to operate together in limited crises response and overseas 
contingency operations. In partnership with Senegal and the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS), U.S. Army Africa conducted U.S. Africa 
Command’s Exercise Western Accord 2014 to enhance ECOWAS' ability to provide 
mission command capability to support regional peace operations. Training focused 
on developing the ability to plan, deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy a rapid 
deployment force in response to a regional crisis. Western Accord 2014139 is a key 
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138 See http://www.africom.mil/tags/exercise-southern-accord 
139See http://www.africom.mil/search?term=Western+Accord+2014 




element in a broader series of military-to-military activities to demonstrate the strong 
partnership between the U.S and western regional African partners, and all of the 
participating militaries. In an on-going partnership, the U.S. along with 16 other 
countries participated in Exercise WA 2014 in Dakar, Senegal from June 16-27. 
During part one of the exercise, ECOWAS and partnering nations received 
academics that took them through the UN standards for mission analysis and focused 
on collective tasks, functional, and staff procedures in support of Command and 
Control of a peacekeeping operation based on real world events. During the 
command post exercise (the second part of the exercise), they prepared and executed 
their plan to move forces into a contested area, defeat the threat, and restore basic 
services and the rule of law while setting the stage for national reconciliation140. 
5.4.4l Phoenix Express 
The exercise is organized by U.S. and European partners in collaboration with North 
African maritime and land forces to increase regional maritime awareness and 
improve maritime security141. Phoenix Express is one of four African regional 
"Express" series exercises that are designed to test skills obtained from participating 
in bilateral and Africa Partnership Station (APS) training in a regional maritime 
exercise. Phoenix Express 2014 marked the ninth year of the exercise. The 2014 
exercise was designed to improve cooperation among participating nations to help 
increase maritime safety and security in the Mediterranean Sea. One of the goals of 
PE2014 was to build communication between North African and European partners 
so that there is a stronger united force in the Mediterranean Sea. At the same time, 
the training provided will help enhance maritime security. During the 2014 edition of 
Phoenix Express, an Algerian boarding team member fast ropes out of a Greek 
helicopter onto the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center 
(NMIOTC) ship "Aris" during the pre-sail phase of Exercise142. 
5.4.5 The DoD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP) 
The HIV/AIDS epidemic is devastating and has negatively affected many militaries 
and other uniformed organizations worldwide by reducing military readiness, 
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limiting deployments, causing physical and emotional decline in infected individuals 
and their families, posing risks to military personnel and their extended communities, 
and impeding peacekeeping activities. In response to this threat, the White House 
urged DoD to participate in the LIFE Initiative and focus on prevention 
programming in sub-Saharan Africa143. Since 1999, the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD) has been involved in HIV/AIDS prevention to reduce the incidence of HIV in 
foreign militaries through the DoD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP)144. The 
Partner Military HIV/AIDs Program (PMHAP)145 is U.S. Africa Command’s 
program to implement DHAPP objectives. At its inception, U.S. Africa Command 
declared its commitment to support the fight against HIV/AIDS and acknowledged 
HIV as a potential threat to Africa’s regional security and stability by adopting the 
vision to “Eliminate new HIV cases in Partner Nation Militaries.146”  
The objective of PMHAP is to support capacity building and development of 
HIV/AIDS policy within African militaries. AFRICOM’s strategic security 
engagement objective is to assist African partner military’s leadership with reducing 
the yearly incidence of HIV in their militaries. Over the years, DHAPP has 
successfully engaged over 80 countries in efforts to combat HIV/AIDS among their 
                                         
143 On July 19, 1999, the Administration announced a new Initiative to address the global AIDS 
pandemic. This 
Initiative is supported by an amendment to the Fiscal Year 2000 budget proposal signed by the 
President and submitted to Congress for its consideration. A central feature of this LIFE Initiative is a 
$100 million increase in US support for sub-Saharan African countries and India, which are working 
to prevent the further spread of HIV and to care for those affected by this devastating disease. This 
additional funding is a critical step by the United States Government in recognizing the impact that 
AIDS continues to have on individuals, families, communities and nations responding to the 
imperative to do more. 
 
144Seehttp://www.med.navy.mil/sites/nhrc/dhapp/countryreports/Documents/yearly08/fullreport08.pdf 
145 AFRICOM’s PMHAP is executed and implemented by DHAPP. The program is funded through 
the DHAPP Program Office using congressional supplements via the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, Health Affairs (OSD (HA)) Defense Health Program; the Department of State (DoS), Office 
of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) using the Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR), and the Department of State using the HIV/AIDS Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
program.  Activities include: prevention training; support for orphans and vulnerable children affected 
by HIV/ AIDS; counseling and testing services; HIV/AIDS treatment; laboratory infrastructure; 
strategic information; policy analysis and system strengthening; training in prevention of mother and 
child transmission; and training in medical procedures.  Palliative care including basic health and 
support for HIV-infected clients and their families as well as the prevention and treatment of 









respective military services. DHAPP is collaborating with the US Department of 
State, Health and Human Services, US Agency for International Development and 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in the President’s Emergency Plan 
for AIDS Relief. DHAPP’s goal is to maximize program impact by focusing on the 
drivers of the epidemic specific to the military, and to support the development of 
interventions and programs that address these issues. Pursuing HIV/AIDS activities 
with foreign militaries is clearly tied to security interests, regional stability, 
humanitarian concerns, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping efforts due to the impact 
of HIV/AIDS as a major destabilizing factor in developing societies. DHAPP 
employs an integrated bilateral and regional strategy for HIV/AIDS cooperation and 
security assistance. Using country priorities set by the US Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy and by the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator, DHAPP 
implements bilateral and regional strategies in coordination with respective 
Combatant Commands and PEPFAR Country Support Teams to offer military to 
military HIV/AIDS programs assistance. DHAPP supports defense forces in the 
following areas: HIV prevention, care and treatment for HIV infected individuals and 
their families, and strategic information (US Africa Command Fact Sheet, March 
2012). 
5.4.6 AFRICOM’s operations in Africa 
Besides these programs, activities and exercises, U.S AFRICOM is currently 
involved in two major operations in the continent. These operations are “Onward 
Liberty” and “Counter LRA Operation”. These operations support the development 
of capable, professional partner military forces, and are integrated and coordinated 
with the DOS, U.S. Chiefs of Mission, and other international partners. 
5.4.6a OPERATION ONWARD LIBERTY 
The 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement147 that brought an end to the Liberian 
civil war called for the United States to lead the restructuring of the Armed Forces of 
                                         
147 Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Republic of 
Liberia and Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and the Movement for Democracy in 
Liberia. The Agreement called for the establishment of a post-war transitional government (National 
Transitional Government of Liberia) which would consist of 76 members: 12 each from the three 
warring parties; 18 from political parties; seven from civil society and special interest groups; and one 
from each of Liberia's 15 counties. The warring parties, the opposition parties and civil society groups 




Liberia (AFL). After consultations with Liberian authorities, a program was put in 
place that led to the complete rebuilding of the army from the ground up. Principally 
executed by U.S. Government-funded contractors, along with a small number of U.S. 
military personnel, the initial effort led by the U.S. State Department, 2005-2009, 
involved demobilizing the old AFL, rehabilitating three military bases, then 
recruiting, vetting, training and equipping a new AFL of about 2,000 men and 
women from across the country. After the contractors departed and the Government 
of Liberia assumed operational control of the AFL. In January 2010, U.S. Africa 
Command (AFRICOM), through U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa (MARFORAF), 
established OOL to provide U.S. military personnel to assist with the mentorship and 
training of the AFL. Operation Onward Liberty (OOL)148 is a U.S. military-led team 
who mentor and advise the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)149 in order to develop a 
national military that is responsible, operationally capable, respectful of civilian 
authority and the rule of law, and is a force for good among the Liberian people. 
OOL’s goal is to assist the AFL in building a professional and capable military force 
that can effectively provide and contribute to the overall security environment in 
Liberia. OOL currently has approximately 50 personnel assigned, currently 
comprised of military members from the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Army’s 
Michigan National Guard and the U.S. Air Force, and vary in rank. OOL team 
members fulfill deployment tasking of anywhere between six and 12 months. The 
main goal of each team member is to serve as a mentor/advisor to a counterpart (or 
counterparts) within the AFL chain of command. 
                                                                                                                   
agreed to share ministerial portfolios and employment opportunities in the cabinet and parliament and 
elections were to be held no later than 2005. 
148See  http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/operations/operation-onward-liberty 
149 The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) are the armed forces of the Republic of Liberia. Founded as 
the Liberian Frontier Force in 1908, the military was retitled in 1956. For virtually all of its history, 
the AFL has received considerable materiel and training assistance from the United States. For most 
of the 1941–89 period, training was largely provided by U.S. advisers, though this assistance has not 
prevented the same generally low levels of effectiveness common to most of the armed forces in the 
developing world. For most of the Cold War, the AFL saw little action, apart from a reinforced 
company group which was sent to ONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the 1960s. This 
changed with the advent of the First Liberian Civil War in 1989. The AFL became entangled in the 
conflict, which lasted from 1989 to 1996–97, and then the Second Liberian Civil War, which lasted 
from 1999 to 2003.The AFL is in the process of being reformed and retrained after being completely 
demobilized following the second civil war. The AFL currently consists of two infantry battalions, 
and a small Liberian National Coast Guard, which is being reformed. The Liberian Government has 
requested that a Nigerian Army officer serve as head of the military during the transitional period. 




This operation is a U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense 
initiative designed to continue the United States' support to the government of 
Liberia and its on-going efforts to transform its military. It is a five-year commitment 
of continued support and partnership, with mentors cycling through on six-month 
temporary duty assignments and some service members electing to do yearlong 
assignments. For the AFL itself, the current organization consists of an Infantry 
Brigade, Coast Guard, Logistics Command, an Armed Forces Training Command 
and a headquarters element. The AFL hopes to establish a robust recruiting, vetting 
and separation policy to ensure its ranks are constantly being supplied with new, 
eager soldiers as well as experienced commissioned and non-commissioned officers 
who are able to lead effectively150. 
5.4.6.b Counter-LRA Operation 
 According to the U.S. Department of State, “Counter-L R A Operation” aims to 
assist the governments of Uganda, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, and South Sudan, as well as the African Union and United Nations to 
“mitigate and end the threat posed to civilians and regional stability by the LRA151. 
The strategy outlines four key objectives for U.S. support: 
 Increased protection of civilians 
 The apprehension or removal of Joseph Kony and senior LRA 
commanders from the battlefield 
 The promotion of defections and support of disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters 
 The provision of continued humanitarian relief to affected communities 
To that end, the decision, announced Oct. 14, 2011, to send U.S. military advisers to 
assist the forces that are countering the LRA forms one part of the United States’ 
                                         
150
 http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/operations/operation-onward-liberty 
151 The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), also known as the Lord's Resistance Movement, is a militant 
movement which has been described variously as being quasi-Christian, "Christianist," extremist 
Christian, or as a new religious movement and or a cult which operated in northern Uganda and South 
Sudan. Originally known as the United Holy Salvation Army Uganda Christian Army/Movement, its 
stated goals include ruling Uganda according to the Ten Commandments. Since 2005 there have been 
claims that the group has entered the Democratic Republic of Congo, and in 2007 it was reported that 
it was in Central African Republic. The LRA has been accused of widespread human rights violations, 
including murder, abduction, mutilation, child-sex slavery, and forcing children to participate in 
hostilities. 




overall continuing effort to achieve these strategic objectives. The U.S. military role 
is in support of a combined effort that involves the U.S. embassies in the affected 
countries, U.S. Agency for International Development’s programs, as well as 
contributions from nongovernmental organizations. The collective intent is to 
supplement host nation efforts with advice and assistance that maximizes the flow of 
information to, and synchronizes the activities of, host nation efforts. U.S. military 
forces can enable intelligence fusion, facilitate more efficient means for delivering 
and managing logistics, and offer improved staff coordination capabilities. After 
deployments in 2011, approximately 100 U.S. military personnel are in forward 
locations with the national militaries of the region, living and working side-by-side 
with their military peers as guests in African camps run by African security officials. 
Their mission is focused on finding ways to enable Uganda, CAR, DRC, and South 
Sudan to more effectively collaborate, coordinate and synchronize their efforts to 
remove the threat of the LRA. The U.S. advisors seek to strengthen cooperation 
among the national militaries, assist them to collaborate more effectively, and 
enhance their capacity to improve operational planning. 
According to General Carter F. Ham, the former AFRICOM commander, the U.S. 
military contributions to countering the LRA are “best done through support, 
advising and assistance, rather than U.S. military personnel in the lead actually 
conducting the operations to try to find Kony and capture him. We are an enabling 
force to facilitate and advance the capabilities of the African forces152.” 
Besides the these programs, exercises, activities and operation, AFRICOM is 
engaged in a panoply of aid projects with an eye toward winning a war of ideas in the 
minds of Africans and so beating back the lure of extremist ideologies, from that 
of Boko Haram in Nigeria to Somalia’s al Shabab.  These civil-military operations, 
or CMOs, include “humanitarian assistance” projects like the construction or repair 
of schools, water wells and waste treatment systems, and “humanitarian and civic 
assistance” (HCA153) efforts, like offering dental and veterinary care. The CMO 
                                         
152
 https://africom.wordpress.com/2012/03/23/q-and-a-africom-general-carter-ham/ 
153 Examples of HCA projects include: a .Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in 
rural, isolated, or underserved areas of a country, including education, training, and technical 
assistance related to the care provided. Units conducting these activities must ensure that they do not 
drastically exceed the standard of care already provided by the HN. Providing care that exceeds the 




benevolence is designed to influence foreign governments and civilian populations in 
order to “facilitate military operations and achieve U.S. objectives.”  According to 
the Pentagon, humanitarian assistance efforts are engineered to improve “U.S. 
visibility, access, and influence with foreign military and civilian counterparts,” 
while HCA projects are designed to “promote the security and foreign policy 
interests of the United States.”  In the bureaucratic world of the U.S. military, these 
small-scale efforts are further divided into “community relations activities,” like the 
distribution of sports equipment, and “low-cost activities” such as seminars on solar 
panel maintenance or English-language discussion groups. Theoretically at least, add 
all these projects together and you’ve taken a major step toward winning Africans 
away from the influence of extremists.  But are these projects working at all?  Has 
anyone even bothered to check? 
5.5 Conclusion 
 The trend of US foreign policy towards Africa has generally been to treat the 
continent with benign neglect. In some countries, notably Egypt, Ethiopia, South 
Africa and the earlier Zimbabwe, U.S. policy has been mildly constructive.  
Regardless of the unending rhetoric on democracy, human security projection and 
good governance, the United States found itself financing leaders whose regimes 
slowly became repressive, corrupt and unpopular. The US role in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Angola, Somalia, Uganda and Ethiopia during the Cold War and 
in apartheid South Africa demonstrate that the U.S. can cooperate with leftist leaders 
as long as these governments will not imperil U.S. interests. The US military forays 
in Africa have led to a disproportionate development of military institutions relative 
to the instruments of civil rule thereby impacting negatively on the human security of 
African people. The US has continued to fund African armies through various DoD 
programs such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, African 
Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Programme and US Foreign 
                                                                                                                   
standards of the HN or USAID projects may undermine the HN government and can negatively affect 
perceptions toward the United States if the populace expects follow-up visits or improved services 
from the HN or additional development assistance from USAID. When HCA activities involve direct 
patient or animal care, units conducting the engagement must be mindful of and take steps to mitigate 
unintended consequences of such engagement, including: discrediting national and local governance; 
discrediting national and local medical providers and facilities; and the economic displacement caused 
by such activities. b. Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems. c. Well drilling and 
construction of basic sanitation facilities. D. Rudimentary repair and construction of public facilities 




Military Financing with increased support flowing to DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Uganda. In recent years, however, brutal responses by African 
militaries against their citizens have been recorded. The Nigerian army’s brutal 
response to Boko Haram has transformed the sect into a regional terror force. 
Similarly, according to a recent United Nations report, the Congolese army’s 391st 
Commando Battalion, formed with US support and trained for eight months by US 
Special Operations Forces, later took part in mass rapes and other atrocities. Another 
long-time recipient of US support, the Ethiopian army, was involved in abuse in 
2012, following an attack by gunmen on a commercial farm. In response, according 
to Human Rights Watch, members of Ethiopia’s army raped, arbitrarily arrested and 
assaulted local villagers. The Ugandan army has been the primary US proxy when it 
comes to policing Somalia regardless of Ugandan President’s dictatorial tendency. 
However, its members were implicated in the beating and even killing of citizens 
during domestic unrest in 2011 (Human Rights Watch World report, 2010). 
The US global war on terror (GWOT) has impinged on the human security of 
African people. In 2001, according to the global terrorism database of the National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University 
of Maryland, there were 119 terrorincidents in sub-Saharan Africa. By 2011, there 
were close to 500 cases.  A recent report from the International Centre for Terrorism 
Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies counted 21 terrorist attacks in the 
Maghreb and Sahel regions of northern Africa in 2001. Under the current Obama 
administration, the figures have fluctuated between 144 and 204 annually. Similarly, 
an analysis of 65000 individual incidents of political violence in Africa from 1997 to 
2012, assembled by researchers affiliated to the International Peace Research 
Institute, found out that “violent Islamist activity has increased significantly in the 
past 15 years, with a particular sharp increase witnessed from 2010 onwards”. The 
overthrow of Gaddafi in Libya by an interventionist coalition including the US, 
France and the United Kingdom similarly empowered a host of new militant Islamist 
groups. Libya has become a fertile ground and new hub for militants arriving from 
the Arabian Peninsula and other places in the Middle East as well as elsewhere in 
Africa to recruit fighters, receive training and recuperate. The crisis in Mali, the rise 
of Boko Haram in Nigeria, the coup in CAR and the violence in the Africa’s Great 




Lakes region and the Horn of Africa are ipso facto, the outcome of Libyan 
disintegration and subsequent failure. Regardless of the relative amounts and the 
quality of official aid injected into the continent through laudable programs such as 
ACRI, CIPA, AGOA, PEPFAR, ACOTA and PMI, there is general notion that the 
aid has had anything to do with any serious search for an improvement of the social 
and economic problem that have confronted the Africa. From the Washington’s Cold 
War intervention in Africa, one can argue persuasively that US involvement in 
Africa has often aggravated African plights.  
In the next chapter, the study will present the research findings through the empirical 




















The previous chapter presented a systematic analysis of United States foreign policy 
toward Africa vis-à-vis the emergence of AFRICOM, its programs, activities and 
exercises.  This chapter presents and analyses the data that was collected from 
various institutions and the study participants. The overall aim of the survey was to 
collect data from AFRICOM staff, African senior military commanders in strategic 
command positions, members of diplomatic community, security experts, scholars 
and postgraduate students in the field of critical security studies, strategic studies, 
politics and international studies. Data collected through the use of questionnaires 
were cleaned, edited and coded before being analysed using the software package 
SPSS version 18. The results of the survey are presented in descriptive and 
inferential format, using tables and statistics. In addition data collected from 
interviews was categorized, coded and analysed using thematic analysis.   
The fieldwork component of this study investigated and scrutinized the activities, 
objectives, impact, efficiency, co-ordination and political agenda of AFRICOM, and 
their consequences for human security in Africa with particular  reference to to its 
intervention in security situations in Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and Uganda. The 
results of the fieldwork  are organized and presented according to the research 
questions outlined in chapter one section 1.3.3. The main research questions were as 
follows:  
 What are the U.S. National Security interests and Strategy in Africa? 
  What are the implications of AFRICOM for human security in Africa?   
 Whose security interests will AFRICOM serve?  




 Will increased US military activities in Africa assist the AU’s strategic 
objective of promoting peace and human security or will it contribute to 
instability? 
  How can AFRICOM intervention in Africa ameliorate the human insecurity 
in Africa?  
This chapter is divided into seven sections. Section one (1) contains the demographic 
information about the respondents and the characteristics of the interviewees while 
section two (2) to six (6) contain the presentation of the data, discussion, interview 
excerpts and analyses of the data presented from research question one (1) to 
research question five (5). The last section (7) of this chapter contains the conclusion. 
6.2 The Demographic Information 
The researcher was able to elicit useful information concerning this study from the 
respondents involved. Three hundred questionnaires were administered to seven 
categories of respondents. Out of these numbers, one hundred and twenty five (125) 
copies of the questionnaire were administered to military officers in Nigeria and 
South Africa as well as senior military officers from several African countries who 
were randomly selected, thirty seven (37) copies of the questionnaires for scholars 
and security experts, twenty five (25) copies of the questionnaire for diplomats and 
policy makers, thirty two (32) copies of the questionnaire for postgraduate students, 
nineteen (19) copies of questionnaires for members of the press, seventeen (17) 
copies of the questionnaires for members of non-governmental organisations, and 
twenty three (23) copies of the questionnaires were administered to lecturers in 
various universities in Nigeria and South Africa. One hundred and twenty-five (125) 
copies of questionnaires were administered to the members of the military because 
AFRICOM is a military command that relates chiefly with African military 
institutions and personnel. The response rates for military officers, scholars and 
security experts, diplomats and policy makers, students, press, NGOs and lecturers 










Table 6.1: Demographic information of the respondents. 
Demographics Variables  Frequency Percentage 
Specialization Military 102 38.6 
Scholar & Security Expert 37 14 
Diplomats & Policy Maker 25 9.5 
Students 32 12.1 
Press 19 7.2 
NGO 17 6.4 
Lecturers 23 8.7 
Missing data 9 3.4 
Total 264 100 
Religion  Christianity 189 71.6 
Islam 57 21.6 
African Traditional Religion 10 3.8 
Others 2 0.8 
Missing data 6 2.3 
Total 264 100 
Source: Field data (2014) 
6.2.1 Nationalities of respondents 
Though the study took place in Nigeria and South Africa, questionnaires were 
administered to respondents across the continent of Africa so as to reflect the 
perceptions of Africans in general of the implications of AFRICOM for human 
security in Africa. Ninety-seven (97) respondents were drawn from Nigeria, sixty-
four (64) respondents from South Africa, seventeen (17) respondents from Kenya, 




thirteen (13) respondents were from Sudan, twelve (12) respondents from Mali, 
South Sudan, Somalia and Chad have nine (9) respondents respectively, eight (8) 
respondents from Rwanda, while Ghana and Central African Republic have seven (7) 
respondents each, Bangladesh has four (4) respondents while Cote d’Ivoire, 
Cameroun, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Benin, 


























Table 6.2: Nationalities of the respondents (N=264) 
 
Nationality Nigerian 97 36.7 
South African 64 24.2 
Kenyan 17 6.4 
Sudanese 13 4.9 
Malian 12 4.5 
South Sudanese 9 3.4 
Somalian 9 3.4 
Chadian 9 3.4 
Rwandan 8 3.0 




Bangladesh 4 1.5 
Ivorian 1 0.4 
Republic of Benin 1 0.4 
Cameroun 1 0.4 
Zambian 1 0.4 
Tanzanian 1 0.4 
Ethiopia 1 0.4 
Congolese 1 0.4 
Uganda 1 0.4 
 
Source: Field data (2014) 





Figure 6.1: Nationalities of the respondents (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014). 
6.2.2 Specializations of the respondents 
This section presents the specializations of the respondents involved in the study. 
The picture shows that 102 (38.6%) copies of the questionnaire were returned by 
military officers out of 125 copies of the questionnaire sent earlier, 37(14%) copies 
of the questionnaire were returned by scholars and security experts out of 40 copies 
of the questionnaire sent, 25 (9.5%) copies of the questionnaire were returned by 
diplomats and policy makers out of 29 copies of the questionnaire sent, 32 (12,1%) 
copies of the questionnaires were returned by the students out of 37 copies of the 
questionnaires sent, members of the press returned 19 (7.2%) copies of the 


























questionnaires out of the 20 copies of the questionnaires sent, 17 (6.4%) copies of the 
questionnaires were returned by the members of non-governmental organisations out 
of 20 copies of the questionnaires sent and the lecturers returned 23 (8.7%) copies of 
the questionnaires out of 29 copies of the questionnaires sent. 264 copies of 




Figure 6.2: Specialization of the Respondents (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014). 
In consideration of the thematic field of the study, AFRICOM as a component of 
DoD, falls under the state-centric security paradigm while human security falls under 
humanitarian development-security discourse. The nature of the study requires 
informed respondents and interviewees who are experts in the following fields:  
African affairs, strategic studies, public policy, politics, critical security studies, 
international relations and foreign policy analysis. These requirements informed the 






















the characteristics of respondents who were involved in the study in terms of age, 
gender, marital status, education level and occupation.   
In addition to the 264 questionnaires collected, 14 (100%) interviewees were drawn 
from senior military officers, diplomats, security experts and scholars from 
AFRICOM, Nigerian Armed Forces, South African Defence Force, ECOWAS, 
South African Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Nigerian Institute of 
International Affairs (NIIA), African Union, Institute of Security Studies (ISS), and 
African Partnership Stations (APS). 
6.2.3 The age distribution of respondents 
Questionnaires were administered to respondents from the age of 20 years and above. 
From 20-30 years were 34 (12.9%), respondents between the ages of 31-40 years 
were 26 (9.8%), and respondents between the ages of 41-50 year were 136 (51.5%) 
while respondents above the age of 50 years were 68 (25.8%). Total 264 (100%). 
 
 
Figure 6.3:  Pie Chart Representation of Age Distribution of the Respondents 
(N=264) 















6.2.4 The gender distributions of the respondents 
The gender distribution of the respondents is as follows: Male 234 (88.6%);  Female:  





Figure 6.4 below shows the gender of the respondents (N=264). 
Source: Field data (2014). 
6.2.5 Educational levels of the respondents 
As earlier emphasized, the nature of the study requires informed respondents; 
however, a few of the respondents had Senior Secondary School Certificate and 
National Certificate in Education. These categories of respondents have gained 
wealth of experience from their long years of meritorious service, courses attended 
and training acquired in their professions. In this study second degree represents 











Figure 6.5:  The figure below highlights the educational qualifications of the 
respondents (N=264)  
Source: Field data (2014) 
 
Among the fourteen (14) interviewees, six (6) have PhDs while the remaining eight 
(8) have Master’s degree in their  respective disciplines. 
According to Babbie and Mouton (2001:261), the overall rate of response is a guide 
to the representativeness of the sample respondents. If a high response rate is 
achieved, there is less chance of significant response bias than in a low rate. Babbie 
and Mouton (2001:261) further claime that the consensus is that a response rate of 50 
per cent is adequate for analysis and reporting. A response of 60 per cent is good, 
and a response rate of 70 per cent is very good. Therefore following Babbie and 
Mouton’s (2001:261) advice the researcher was satisfied with the response rate for 
the number of completed copies: of the two hundred and sixty four questionnaires 
received from seven categories of respondents and the interview schedules 
completed by three categories of interviewees.  
6.3 Section Two: Data presentation and analysis  
6.3.1 Research Question 1: To critically evaluate the United States national security 

































In an attempt to provide empirical answers to research question one (1): The 
researcher posed some questions to respondents involved in the study. In the 
characterization of the US foreign policy toward Africa, the responses were as 
follows: 123 (46.6%) responded positively that the US policy toward Africa is good, 
34 (12.9%) responded negatively while 83 (31.4%) were undecided and 24 (9.1%) 
abstained from the question totaling 264 (100%). 
 
Figure 6.6 below shows the appraisal of US policy toward Africa (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014). 
The responses were further categorized in accordance with the respondents’ 
specializations so as to discover whether there were variations in the pattern of 
response and if there were, to identify the reasons behind these variations.  
Of the 92 (100%) senior military personnel asked to characterize  US foreign policies 
toward Africa, 54 (58.7%) affirmed that  US-African policies are good while 10 
(10.9%) said that  US-African policies are bad and 28 (30.4%) were undecided. 
Nineteen (19) career diplomats and policy makers representing (76%) out of the 25 
(100%) approved US foreign policies toward Africa, 2 (8%) felt that US policies 
toward Africa have negatively impacted the continent while 4 (16%) were 
undecided. Among scholars and security experts 16 (50%) believed that  US foreign 
policies toward the continent are good while 6 (18.8%) see  US policies in Africa 
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were undecided 15 (51.7%) while 9 (31%) agreed that the policies of the US toward 
Africa are good and 5 (17.2%) faulted US policies toward Africa.  Seven (7) 
members of the press (41.2%) agreed that the US policies toward Africa are good 
while 3 (17.6%) disagreed with US policies toward Africa and 7 (41.2%) were 
undecided. Out of 15 (100%) NGOs who responded to the question, 7 (46.7%) 
approved US policies toward Africa while 2 (13.3%) disapproved and 6 (40%) were 
undecided. Among the lecturers who responded, 8 (38.1%) approved while 8 
(38.1%) were undecided and 5 (23.8%) disapproved of US policies toward Africa. 
The result above shows that large majority of the diplomatic community, senior 
military officers, NGOs, press, scholars and security experts approved US foreign 
policy toward Africa.  
Clustered bar chart showing responses by specialization 
 
Figure 6.7 shows the responses by different specializations involved in the study. 





































Chi-Square Test   
N = 232 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.870 12 0.155 
Likelihood Ratio 17.088 12 0.146 
Linear by Linear Association  4.014 1 0.045 
 
Interview report: As indicated in chapter one of the study, a combination of methods 
was used to collect data. Although the quantitative method was dominant, the 
qualitative method was used as a complementary method. The aim was to utilize the 
qualitative data to buttress the quantitative findings. The interview schedule that was 
administered is presented as appendix 2. The results of the interview conducted are 
reported in detail and the excerpts are reported in appendix 3. 
Fourteen (14) interviewees were asked to appraise US national security interests and 
strategy toward Africa. Nine (9) interviewees stated emphatically that US national 
security interests in Africa are threefold namely: (i) To secure strategic mineral 
resources which the US needs for the growth of her military industrial complex (ii) 
To establish a military foothold in Africa so as to deny terrorist organisation 
expanses of ungoverned space or safe havens to carry out terrorist activities against 
US interests and (iii) To counter China’s growing interests in Africa. Two (2) of the 
interviewees insisted that the interests of the US in Africa are vast, ranging from 
deepening democracy and engendering development to helping Africans create 
responsible and representational governments that will provide human security and 
promote the general wellbeing of Africans. The two (2) interviewees elaborated that 
various US administrations have invested enormous funds in Africa through laudable 
programmes to enhance the human security capabilities of African people, citing 
programmes such as AGOA, PEPFAR and ACOTA. However, three (3) interviewees 




see US foreign policy toward Africa as the projection of the US national interests on 
Africans which will seriously undermine the human security situation in Africa.  
The researcher wanted to examine whether US interests in the continent will promote 
of human security? Out of 264 questionnaires collected, 101 (38.3%) affirmed that 
the interests of the US will bolster the human security needs of Africans while 126 
(47.7%) believed that US interests in the continent will undermine the human 
security needs of Africans, 37 (14%) respondents abstained. The reason for the 
increase in the number of opposition to US interests is that the respondents that were 
undecided in the first question (see fig.6.6 and table 6.1) answered question 2 and 
most of them felt that US interests in Africa will work at cross purposes with the 
promotion of human security in the continent. 
 
Figure 6.8: Appraisal of the impact of US policy on human security in Africa 
(N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
 When the respondents were categorized according to specialization, 47 (52.8%) 
senior military officers said that the interests of the US in Africa will promote human 
security while 19 (59.4%) scholars and security experts said that US interests in 
Africa will undermine the human security of African people. A majority of the 
diplomats, policy makers, lecturers, press, NGOs and an overwhelming number of 
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security of Africans. The African military support for US interests can be viewed 
from the acquired status of African military institutions since the emergence of 
AFRICOM. Emphasis has been on bolstering the military capacities of African 
states. However, the clustered bar chart below shows that beside the military, other 
specializations were unanimous in stating that US interests in Africa will undermine 
the human security of African people. 
 
Figure 6.9 above shows the responses of the respondents according to specialization 
(N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
Chi-Square Test   
N = 232 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.623 6 0.467 
Likelihood Ratio 5.716 6 0.456 
Linear by Linear Association  1.969 1 0.161 
 
Of the fourteen (14) interviewees, there is general consensus among ten (10) that 
Africa was neglected by various US administrations. Two (2) interviewees stated that 
the Africa’s strategic ascendency in the US policy radar resulted from the late 
discovery of a quantifiable amount of strategic energy, notably oil in the Gulf of 






















for altruistic reasons, the turbulence in the Middle-east is impeding  US energy 
requirements and since oil has been discovered in the Gulf of Guinea that is even of a 
higher grade, Africa has become the newest bride”. However, seven (7) of the 
interviewees noted that since the inception of President George W Bush Jnr’s 
administration, the US has invested hugely in some notable programmes that have 
enhanced the human security of African people. One (1) respondent in particular 
argued that regardless of the so called laudable programmes, the US policy of 
selective engagement made the US abdicate her responsibility when much is 
expected from her. This respondent cited the US role in the Rwandan genocide of 
1994 and the Liberia civil war of 1990s as examples. 
The next question sought to ascertain the views of the respondents on the US 
government’s current efforts to assist Africa in the area of human security 
enhancement. 
 
Figure 6.10: Respondents appraisal of US human security efforts in Africa (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
In figure 10 above, 79 respondents (29.9%) affirmed that current efforts by the US  
to ameliorate the human security situation in Africa  are laudable while 175 
respondents (66.3%) believed that the current US efforts can neither promote nor 
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The researcher observed that all the specialized groups were of the opinion that the 
US government has not made adequate efforts to assist Africans. Overwhelming 
majority of lecturers (81.8%), students (80%) and members of the press (77.8%) 
concurred that the US government has not made serious efforts to address the human 
security pathologies in Africa. See figure 6.11 below: 
 
 
Figure 6.11 above shows the views of  specialized groups  (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014)   
Chi-Square Test   
N = 232 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.671 6 0.461 
Likelihood Ratio 5.950 6 0.429 
Linear by Linear Association  2.929 1 0.087 
 
When the same question was posed to the 14 interviewees, seven (7) responded that 
current efforts by the US to ameliorate human insecurity in Africa are laudable; 
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developmental institution has led to the securitization of the US foreign policy 
toward Africa as every issue is viewed from a military prism. Two (2) of the 
interviewees affirmed that the current US efforts in promoting  human security in 
Africa are highly welcome in  light of the emerging threats of violent extremism, 
trans-border crime and increasing rate of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of 
Guinea. These two respondents cited AFRICOM’s military-to-military training with 
African partners as one of the major contributions of the US government in the 
promotion of human security in Africa. Five (5) interviewees argue that the US’s 
current efforts in Africa will create human security crises. These interviewees cited 
the UN-NATO intervention in Libya which has turned the formerly wealthiest state 
in Africa in 2010 into a fragile or failed state, with consequences which have spilt 
over to the entire Sahel region. 
In figure 6.12, the researcher wanted to know the respondents appraisals of President 
Barack Obama’s National Security Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa that was 
released in 2012. 
 
Figure 6.12 shows respondents appraisal of President Obama’s National Security 
Strategy toward Africa (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
Figure 6.12 above shows the respondents appraisals of President Obama’s 2012 












Yes No Don't Know Missing data
The appraisal of President Obama's 
policy directive towards Africa 
(National Security Strategy 2012) 




follows: 77 (29.2%) favoured the policy to enhance the human security of Africans 
while 147 (55.7%) saw the policy as antithetical to the promotion of human security 
in Africa. 2 (0.8%) were undecided and 38 (14.4%) abstained from the question. 
As the responses were categorized according to specialization, the researcher 
observed that 88.5% of the students felt that President Obama’s policy directives 
toward Africa were unfavourable to the continent, 75% of NGOs and Lecturers 
agreed with these students and 70.6% of the press, 67.7% of scholars and security 
experts, 56.5% of the diplomat/policy makers and 55.8% of the military personnel 
expressed similar views. See figure 6.13 for details.  
 
Figure 6.13 shows the clustered bar chart of responses according to the specialization 
(N=264) 
































N = 232 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.849 12 0.310 
Likelihood Ratio 15.612 12 0.210 
Linear by Linear Association  1.969 1 0.161 
 
Four (4) out of the fourteen (14) interviewees favoured President Obama’s policy 
directives toward Africa however, two (2) out of these four (4) are members of 
AFRICOM’s staff. Eight (8) interviewees were against the 2012 National Security 
Strategy toward Africa, citing the ineligibility of most African countries to access the 
benefits from AGOA due to certain conditionalities, and the harsh effects of Neo-
liberal policies on many African economies. One (1) respondent noted that “Given 
the social background of President Obama, many Africans expected the current 
administration to help the continent develop in the area of technological 
advancement through the inflow of foreign direct investments (FDI)”. However, one 
respondent absolved President Obama of all blame on the underdevelopment of the 
continent, granting him the accomplishment of setting benchmarks for African 
countries to benefit from programmes, such as AGOA, ACOTA and World 
bank/IMF HIPC initiative. 
In the next question, the researcher investigated whether African expectations of 
Obama’s administration were met. Figure 6.14 below depicts how President Obama 
has fared in meeting the expectations of Africans. 
 





Figure 6.14: Appraisal of how Obama administration has fared in meeting the 
expectations of Africans (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
Figure 6.14 above presents the respondents’ level of expectations that President 
Obama has been able to meet. Fourteen respondents (5.3%) believed that President 
Obama’s policy has met the expectations of African people while two hundred and 
twenty-six (85.6%) that President Obama has not met the expectations of African and 
twenty-four (9.1%) abstained from the question. 
The categorization of the responses by specialization shows that across the groups, 
there was a general consensus that President Obama has not met the expectation of 
Africans. Both the lecturers and NGOs completely agreed that President Obama has 
failed drastically to meet the expectation of African people while 94.4% of the 
military, 93.9% of the scholars and security experts, 92% of diplomats and policy 
makers, 89.3% of the students and 88.9% of the press concurred that Africans 
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Figure 6.15 indicates cross tabulation of responses in accordance with specialization 
(N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
 
Chi-Square Test   
N = 232 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.602 6 0.596 
Likelihood Ratio 6.593 6 0.360 
Linear by Linear Association  0.361 1 0.548 
 
Among the fourteen (14) interviewees, two (2) declined to comment on whether 
African expectation in Obama’s administration has been met. Ten (10) interviewees 
insisted that President Obama policy toward the continent has fallen short of the 
expectations of African people.  However, three (3) out of these ten (10) interviewees 
were quick to point out that US policy under either President Obama or any other 
president is based on the concept of national interests. I They pointed out that it was 
erroneous for Africans to expect too much from President Obama because he was 
94,4 
88,9 






















given his presidential mandate by American people to pilot the US to prosperity and 
not Africa. Two (2) respondents stated the Obama administration has to a large 
extent satisfied the aspirations of African people even though many US laudable 
programmes are still on-going in the continent. One (1) respondent retorted that 
when it comes to hard security that will benefit the interests of the US government 
and her trans-national corporation that is where Obama’s administration responded 
speedily. Examples cited were the USAFRICOM led UN/NATO intervention in 
Libya and the US/French supported intervention in Mali. The respondent pointed out 
that human insecurity in Africa hinged on the harsh socio-economic conditions in the 
continent which drive  Africans into violence and conflict. The respondent concluded 
by asking whether the military option dovetails with human security benefits for 
Africans? The next question sought to identify the respondents’ perception of the US 
government’s global war on terror (GWOT) that commenced immediately after the 
events of 9/11. A question was posed whether the US Government’s War on Terror 
is justified. 
 
Figure 6.16 shows the respondents appraisal of US government’s global war on 
terror (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
Figure 6.16 above demonstrates justification of US government’s global war on 
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global war on terror while 46 (17.4%) disapproved the US led global war on terror, 
34 (12.9%) were undecided and 10 (3.8%) abstained from the question. 
The clustered bar chart below shows that apart from the students, lecturers and the 
press, majority of other specialized groups agreed that the US global war on terror 
(GWOT) is justified. The overwhelming majority of scholars and security experts 
(80%), military (78.6%), diplomats and policy makers (72%) and NGOs (68.8%) saw 
the global war on terror as inevitable while the press (52.6%), lecturers (50%) and 
students (43.3%) all agreed that the global war on terror is not justifiable. 
 
Figure 6.17 above explains the cross tabulation of the responses from various study 
groups (N=264). Source: Field data (2014) 
 
Chi-Square Test   
N = 245 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 24.315 12 0.018 
Likelihood Ratio 23.830 12 0.021 

























There is a significant difference in the occupation/specialization categories and their 
perceptions of whether or not the US Government Global War on Terror (GWOT)  is 
justified. X2 (df = 12, N=245) = 24.315, exact p = 0.018. 
Among the fourteen (14) interviewees presented with the same question, six (6) 
respondents acknowledged the US war on terror as positive steps in the right 
direction to curb terrorism and radical Islam.  One (1) respondent stated that the 
advent of international terrorism is not subject to negotiation because modern 
terrorism has transcended that they are no longer interested in earthly placation. 
Nevertheless, he faulted the approaches adopted by US in the execution of the war, 
citing the use of drone which is a non-discriminatory weapon that cannot separate the 
civilian population from terrorists. Five (5) interviewees believed that the global war 
on terror has aggravated the human security situation in Africa, citing the 
proliferation of Jihadist terrorist groups in the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa. 
One (1) respondent emphasized that the US global war on terror had transformed 
local salafist jihadist groups to al-Qaeda in the Islamic maghreb (AQIM), making it a 
franchise which  has given birth to splinter groups such as Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s 
Katibat, al-Murabitun, the movement for unity and jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), 
Boko Haram and Ansaru.  This mutation has resulted in the crisis of human security 
in the Sahel region. Another respondent bemoaned the war on terror. He stated that 
the global war on terror has led to gross violation of human rights of Africans. 
According to him, “Nobody cares about extra-judicial killings and sometimes, while 
citizens are agitating for good governance and better living conditions, corrupt 
African leaders with US support, clamped down on them and tagged these citizen 
terrorists simply to avoid their responsibilities”. He concluded by asserting that the 
amalgamation created by the notion of terrorism prevented governments in Africa 
and the US from addressing generic issues of human security. 
6.4 Section Three: Presentation of data and analysis 
6.4.1 Research Question 2: What are the implications of AFRICOM for human 
security in Africa?   
The researcher carried out an empirical investigation of the implications of 
AFRICOM for human security in Africa by posing two fundamental questions to the 




respondents and the interviewees respectively.  The first question was to establish the 
motivations behind the establishment of AFRICOM. 
 
Figure 6.18 above shows reasons advanced by the respondents for the establishment 
of AFRICOM (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
Figure 6.18 demonstrates the responses of the respondents on the motivation for the 
establishment of AFRICOM. Responses were as follows: 130 (49.2%) of the 
respondents believed that AFRICOM was established for the exploitation of African 
resources and to counter violent extremists whose activities would otherwise hinder 
the flow of these resources to the United States, 72 (27.3%) saw AFRICOM as a 
benign institution that will promote the human security of African people, 56 
(21.2%) were undecided while 6 (2.3%) chose not to answer the question.  
The clustered bar chart reveals majority of the respondents from the NGOs (70.6%), 
scholars and security experts (66.7%), diplomats and policy makers (60%) believed 
that AFRICOM was established for the exploitation of Africa’s natural resources 
while 45.5% of the military, 47.8% of the lecturers, 36.8% of the press and 35.7% of 
the students agreed with the view that AFRICOM was created for ulterior motives. 
Figure 19 below cross tabulates the opinion of respondents according to 
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Figure 6.19 indicates groups’ perceptions of motivation for AFRICOM (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
Chi-Square Test   
N = 249 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 32.293 12 0.001 
Likelihood Ratio 32.225 12 0.001 
Linear by Linear Association  0.632 1 0.427 
 
There is a significant difference in the occupation/specialization categories and their 
opinions that AFRICOM was created for the exploitation of African natural 
resources.  X2 (df = 12, N=249) = 32.293, exact p = 0.001. 
Of the Fourteen (14) interviewees presented with the question, ten (10) strongly 
agreed that AFRICOM’s establishment was motivated by the US desire to secure a 
source of strategic minerals and the need to gain a foothold in the continent. 
However, the convergence of US and African interests may be a coincidence but the 
point is that no country will ever go to a place where it doesn’t have national 























reasons. They argued that US strategic interests in Africa were addressed on a 
peripheral basis through three different commands.  Creating AFRICOM to address 
and harmonize solely African issues is a noble gesture.  One (1) interviewee stated 
that the US has military bases in every part of the world: hence, Africa should not be 
an exception considering the fact that interests have become globalized. 
Further, the researcher wanted to access the level of AFRICOM acceptability among 
Africans therefore, the respondents were presented with this question: Is AFRICOM 
generally accepted by Africans? 
 
 
Figure 6.20 above indicates AFRICOM acceptability by African (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
The responses in figure 6.20 show that 23 (8.7%) agreed that Africans accepted the 
establishment of AFRICOM for Africa, 151 (57.2%) said that AFRICOM 
establishment in Africa was vehemently resisted while 72 (27.3%) were undecided 
and 18 (6.8) avoided the question. 
The clustered bar chart of the groups’ responses indicates that beside students (36%), 
members of the press (47.4%) and lecturers (52.2%) whose large population 
remained undecided, the responses from other specialized groups such as scholars 
and security experts (78.4%), NGOs (76.5%), military (62.6%) and diplomats and 
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very low indicating that Africans were not pleased with the establishment of a 
Unified Combatant Command (UCC) for Africa. See cross tabulation of groups’ 
perception in figure 6.21 below. 
 
Figure 6.21 above describes different groups perceptions of AFRICOM acceptability 
(N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
Chi-Square Test   
N = 237 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 24.052 12 0.020 
Likelihood Ratio 22.760 12 0.030 
Linear by Linear Association  1.984 1 0.159 
 
There is a significant difference in the occupation/specialization categories and their 
opinion of whether AFRICOM was generally accepted by Africans.  X2 (df = 12, 
N=237) = 24.052, exact p = 0.020. 
From the interviewees, there was a high level of consensus among nine (9) that 

























nine (9) were that AFRICOM is an appendage of US imperialist expansion in Africa 
and that Africans were not consulted before its establishment. Another reason was, 
that AFRICOM as a component of DoD has a war fighting orientation which will re-
invent the gun-boat diplomacy of Cold War era. Two (2) interviewees saw  
AFRICOM as the right organisation for coordinated US efforts and mission 
effectiveness in Africa while the remaining three (3) argue that although AFRICOM 
was not welcome, the convergence of interests here is that AFRICOM will also help 
to deal with the security situation in this region which might otherwise, impede  
regional socio-economic arrangements.  
The researcher wanted to know the factors that impede on the human security needs 
of the continent by asking the study respondents to identify the major human security 
pathologies that have inhibited African people from pursuing their aspirations. 
Respondents were also given options to choose more than one factors. Figure 22 
below indicates that bad governance is seen as the major driver of human insecurity 
(178) followed by corruption (132), poverty (80), ethno-religious violence (55) 
insecurity (38), Neo-colonialism (34), weak institutional mechanism (20), poor 
education (19) and terrorism (20).  
 
Figure 6.22 above describes the respondents’ perceptions on the major human 
security challenges faced by Africans (N=264) 













In your view, what are the major 
challenges facing Africa? 




Of the fourteen (14) participants interviewed on the major human security challenges 
facing the continent, ten (10) suggested that the fundamental human security 
challenges in Africa are socio-economic challenges such as poverty, unemployment, 
hunger and harsh neo-liberal policies that come in form of austerity measures. Three 
(3) participants said that bad governance and corruption are the epicentres of human 
security challenges in Africa while two (2) interviewees stated that Africa lacks 
military professionalism. A participant commented that “African governments are 
dealing with their human security challenges by demilitarizing their militaries and 
their societies” He concluded by stating that the fusion of the idea of human security 
into the military de-capacitates African militaries from dealing with African security 
problems. 
After identifying the major human security challenges facing African people, the 
researcher went further to find out whether AFRICOM is rightly positioned to 
address these challenges. Therefore, the study respondents were asked about the 
efficacy and the preparedness of AFRICOM to confront and address the enumerated 
challenges. The responses in figure 23 indicate that 13 (4.9%) agreed that AFRICOM 
is the solution to the human security challenges in Africa while 187 (70.8%) were of 
the opinion that AFRICOM is not the solution to the human security pathologies in 
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Figure 6.23 above depicts the participants responses on whether AFRICOM is the 
solution to African human security challenges (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014)  
The responses were further categorised into specialization and presented in a 
clustered bar chart. Figure 24 below indicates that among the senior military 
personnel, 3 (3.1%) agreed that AFRICOM is the solution to the human security 
challenges in Africa while 75 (77.3%) disagreed with AFRICOM as the human 
security solution of Africa and 19 (19.6%) were undecided. Among scholars and 
security experts questioned, 31 (83.8%) stated that AFRICOM is not the solution to 
the human security challenges in Africa while a participant (2.7%) said that the 
solution lies with AFRICOM and 5 (13.5%) were undecided. When diplomats and 
policy makers were asked to respond to the question, 18 (75%) affirmed that Africa’s 
human security solution lies with AFRICOM while 3 (12.5%) disagreed with the 
view and 3 (12.5%) were undecided. Fourteen (50%) students disagreed with 
AFRICOM as the possible solution to African human insecurity challenges, a student 
(3.6%) sees AFRICOM as the solution while 13 (46.4%) were undecided. Among the 
members of the press, 13 (68.4) disagreed that AFRICOM is the solution to Africa’s 
security challenges while 1 (5.3%) sees AFRICOM as the solution and 5 (26.3%) 
were undecided. Thirteen (76.5%) NGOs see AFRICOM as the right institution to 
proffers solution to African security problems while 2 (11.8%) thought otherwise and 
2 (11.8%) were undecided. Beside fifty-three respondents who were undecided 
representing (21.6%), the clustered bar chart shows that an overwhelming majority of 
the respondents - precisely 180 (73.5%) - were of the view that AFRICOM is not the 
solution to African human security challenges while 12 (4.9%) see AFRICOM as the 
solution. 





Figure 6.24 above depicts the cross tabulation of groups’ responses on whether 
AFRICOM is the solution to the human security challenges in Africa (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
Chi-Square Test   
N = 247 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 19.938 12 0.068 
Likelihood Ratio 17.526 12 0.131 
Linear by Linear Association  0.236 1 0.627 
 
Of the fourteen (14) participants interviewed, twelve (12) stated categorically that 
AFRICOM is not the solution to the theatre of human insecurity in Africa however, 
seven (7) out of these twelve (12) were quick to add that AFRICOM can play a 
secondary role. Two (2) interviewees said that with the globalization of threats and 
its far-reaching consequences, AFRICOM is better equipped to respond to crisis and 

























6.5 Section Four: Data presentation and analysis 
6.5.1 Research Question 3: Whose security interests will AFRICOM serve? 
The researcher sought to identify the nature, scope and objectives of AFRICOM 
activities on the continent so as to determine whose interests AFRICOM was 
established to serve in Africa. Respondents were asked whether the military to 
military training and exercises organized and sponsored by AFRICOM for African 
military partners are in the best interest of the continent.  109 (41%) responded 
positively that AFRICOM’s military training and exercises with African partners are 
in the best interest of Africans, 73 (27.7%) expressed their fear that these training 
and exercises will negatively affect the continent, 72 (27.3%) were undecided while 
10 (3.8%) chose not to answer the question. Those who responded negatively argued 
that military empowerment constitutes a serious impediment to Africa’s nascent 
democracies. For respondents who reacted positively,  it meant that the capacities of 
the African security forces will be enhanced to respond promptly and effectively to  
emergent human security threats in the continent. 
 
 
Figure 6.26 above indicates the responses of the respondents on AFRICOM’s 
military training and exercises with African military partners (N=264) 
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The clustered bar chart for groups’ appraisal of AFRICOM’s military-to-military 
training with African military partners shows that approvals from the NGOs (52.9%), 
diplomats and policy makers (52%) and Military (51%) were above average while 
scholars and security experts (45.6%), lecturers (40.9%) and press (29.4%) were 
below average. Students were completely against the training. 
 
 
Figure 6.27 depicts the cross tabulation of groups’ views on AFRICOM’s military-
to-military training with African military partners (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
 
Chi-Square Test   
N = 249 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 32.293 12 0.000 
Likelihood Ratio 32.225 12 0.000 
Linear by Linear Association  0.632 1 0.019 
 
There is a significant difference in the occupation/specialization categories and their 























African militaries is in the best interest of Africans.  X2 (df = 12, N=249) = 32.293, 
exact p = 0.000. 
Of the fourteen (14) interviewees, twelve (12) affirmed that the AFRICOM’s 
military to military training and exercises are necessary for capacity building and up-
grading of military equipment. Seven (7) out of these twelve (12) were quick to 
remark that in addition to the training and exercises, AFRICOM should partner with 
relevant US agencies to improve the living conditions of African military personnel. 
Two (2) respondents argued that since 2002 the US government has been investing 
about $120 million every year on the capacity building of African military partners 
through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)  aimed at defeating 
terrorist organizations by: strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities, 
enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region’s security forces, 
promoting democratic governance, discrediting terrorist ideology, and reinforcing 
bilateral military ties with the United States. From 2006, the fund was increased to 
$500 million annually with the overall goals to enhance the indigenous capacities of 
governments in the Pan-Sahel region of Africa (Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Burkina 
Faso and Niger, as well as Nigeria and Senegal) to confront the challenge posed by 
terrorist organizations in the region. One (1) respondent concluded by asking, “How 
can one explain the inability of African militaries to confront insurgencies and 
terrorist activities?” 
Next, the researcher wanted to examine the capacity of African governments and 
security forces to provide human security and their readiness to mitigate threats to 
insecurity. Figure 6.28 below presents the respondents appraisal of African 
governments ability to provide human security for Africans. 
 





Figure 6.28: Appraisal of the ability African governments and African security forces 
to provide human security to Africans (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
 
The researcher noted that 142 (53.8%) affirmed that African governments and their 
security apparatuses are capable of providing human security for Africans in the 
absence of AFRICOM, 83 (31.4%) doubted the efficacy of African governments and 
their security institutions to cater for the human security needs of the continent while 
35 (13.3%) were undecided and 4 (1.5%) omitted the question. 
The study observed that beside members of the press (36.8%) and students (35.7%) 
who were critical of African governments’ abilities to provide human security for 
Africans in the absence of AFRICOM, other specialized groups such as diplomats 
and policy makers (64%), military (61.8%), scholars and security experts (59.5%), 
NGOs (58.8%) and lecturers (47.8%) believed in the abilities of African 
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Figure 6.29 above describes different groups approval of African governments 
capabilities to provide human security in the absence of AFRICOM (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
Chi-Square Test   
N = 249 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 18.474 12 0.102 
Likelihood Ratio 17.487 12 0.132 
Linear by Linear Association  5.030 1 0.025 
 
Of fourteen (14) security specialists interrogated, thirteen (13) stated categorically 
that African governments and their security apparatuses lack capacities to respond to 
post Cold War threats and provide human security  for Africans. Five (5) 
interviewees cited lack of funding, inability of African governments to upgrade 
obsolete equipment to modern standard and corruption as the bane of African 
security forces. One (1) respondent pointed out that South African Armed Forces, for 
instance, have witnessed progressive reductions in defence budgets since President 
Thabo Mbeki’s administration while another respondent cited the inability of the 





















African governments’ failure to protect lives and properties of African people. One 
(1) respondent said that African governments and  security forces are adequately 
prepared and well equipped to provide human security  for Africa. He, however, 
deplored the overbearing influence of the Western nations which has negatively 
affected African security forces. One (1) respondent stated emphatically, “Africans 
governments and military forces do have the capacities. In the past, ECOMOG 
ventured into Liberia and Sierra-Leone and solved complex human security problems 
when no one was prepared to venture into those countries and they did remarkably 
well regardless of the enormous challenges of insecurity problematique.” Another 
respondent concluded by saying “I don’t think that any country can fight terrorism, 
insurgency, and other emergent threats alone, these threats require collaborative 
efforts”. With adequate training and proper logistics, Africans can respond to threats 
and mitigate them. 
Further, respondents were asked if AFRICOM’s activities in Africa are in line with 
its avowed objectives of mitigating threats and promoting human security in the 
continent. See figure 6.29 below for responses. 
 
 
Figure 2.29 above demonstrates respondents appraisal of AFRICOM adherence to 
human security promotion in Africa (N=264) 
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The researcher observed that 46 (17.4%) concurred that AFRICOM’s activities are in 
line with  its stated objective of promoting human security in Africa, 138 (52.3%) 
felt that AFRICOM has deviated from her its avowed goal of promoting human 
security in Africa, 66 (25%) demonstrated no opinion while 14 (5.3%) chose not to 
attempt the question. 
The clustered bar chart indicates that all the specialized groups under study were 
unanimous in affirming that AFRICOM is not performing her purported 
responsibility of human security enhancement in Africa, 65.2% of the diplomats and 
policy makers, 62.2% of scholars and security experts, 57.6% of military, 52.9% of 
NGOs, 50% of the press, 44% of students and 40.9% of lecturers all agreed that 
AFRICOM is not performing  its stated role of human security enhancement. See 
figure 29 below for description.  
 
 
Figure 6.29 above explains different groups’ views on whether AFRICOM is 
performing her stated objective of human security enhancement in Africa (N=241) 























Chi-Square Test   
N = 241 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 28.159 12 0.005 
Likelihood Ratio 31.074 12 0.002 
Linear by Linear Association  11.520 1 0.001 
 
There is a significant difference in the occupation/specialization categories and their 
perception on whether AFRICOM is performing its stated objectives of human 
security enhancement in Africa.  X2 (df = 12, N=241) = 28.159, exact p = 0.005. 
Of the fourteen (14) interviewees, eleven (11) stated that  AFRICOM’s objective of 
human security promotion is defeated because it lacks capacity for such role. One (1) 
respondent retorted “there is no military convergence that can be adaptable in 
addressing the human security threats in Africa. Africans emphasize the problems of 
poverty, droughts, inter-groups conflicts and the problem of governance as major 
threats to human security but the US of course, does not look at it from that 
perspective”. One (1) respondent blamed the Western Neo-liberal policies 
popularized by the US as the fundamental reason behind gross marginalization and 
inequality in Africa. One (1) interviewee argued that AFRICOM is a hybrid 
command incorporated with other US government agencies such as the State 
Department, Trade and Commerce, Health etc. AFRICOM was structured to plan 
and implement programmes and activities to addresses human security challenges. 
The respondent cited the involvement of AFRICOM in building schools, 
constructing roads, digging boreholes and providing health care delivery. 
Nevertheless, all the interviewees admitted that AFRICOM can be helpful to some 
extent in mitigating the threats to human security.   




6.6 Section Five: Data presentation and analysis 
6.6.1 Research Question 4: Will increased US military activities in Africa assist the 
AU’s strategic objective of promoting peace and human security or will it contribute 
to instability?   
In this section the researcher wanted to find out whether the increased US military 
activities in Africa will either assist the AU’s strategic objective of promoting peace, 
stability and human security or undermine the AU peace initiatives. Three critical 
questions were posed to the respondents  to determine the validity of AFRICOM’s 
activities to the AU’s objectives of promoting peace and security in the continent. 
Respondents were asked whether the creation of AFRICOM has enhanced the 
capacity of African Union and other sub- regional organizations in Africa. Figure 17 




Figure 6.30 shows the appraisal of the study respondents on the impact of 
AFRICOM on AU’s capacity enhancement in the provision of human security in 
Africa (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014)  
 
The responses were as follows: 65 (24.6%) believed that the establishment of 
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provide human security for Africans, 119 (45.1%) thought otherwise that AFRICOM 
has undermined the capacity of AU and sub-regional organizations to provide human 
security in the continent, 68 (25.8%) were undecided while 12 (4.5%) abstained from 
the question.  Figure 18 below indicates the clustered bar chart of respondents 
perceptions on whether the establishment of AFRICOM has enhanced the capacities 
of African Union (AU) and other sub-regional organizations to promote peace, 
stability and human security in the continent. 
 
 
Figure 6.31 highlights the responses of the participants according to their 
specializations on the capability of AFRICOM to bolster African regional 
organization in the promotion of human security (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
With the exceptions of the students and the press whose undecided populations 
(56%) and (44.4%) respectively, majorities in other specialization see AFRICOM as 
a threat to the mandate of African regional organizations  to promote  peace, stability 
and human security in Africa. While 10 (58.8%) of the NGOs and 14 (56%) of 
diplomats and policy makers believed that AFRICOM will undermine the efforts of 

























Chi-Square Test   
N = 241 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 23.325 12 0.025 
Likelihood Ratio 22.334 12 0.034 
Linear by Linear Association  5.325 1 0.021 
 
There is a significant difference in the occupation/specialization categories and how 
their perception on  whether the creation of AFRICOM has enhanced the capacity of 
African Union and other Sub- regional organizations in Africa.  X2 ( df = 12, N=241) 
= 23.325, exact p = 0.025. 
Results of the interviews indicated that seven (7) interviewees argued against the 
possibility of AFRICOM assisting African regional bodies to promote human 
security, four (4) narrated that the ECOWAS and AU experiences in Cote d’Ivoire 
and Libya respectively show that the US in particular and Western nations in general 
are working at cross purposes with the AU goal of promoting human security in 
Africa. Five (5) interviewees expressed their confidence in the ability of AFRICOM 
to support regional peace efforts.  However, they suggested that it should be 
corroborative efforts devoid of direct interference or meddling in African affairs. 
One (1) respondent lamented that the US covert operations in Libya under the guise 
of “R2P” (Responsibility to Protect) have created instability in the Sahel region. He 
noted, “The AU insisted on a negotiated settlement to the Libyan debacle but the US 
was hell-bent on regime change and the end result is fragility of the Libyan state with 
overarching consequences”. 
The researcher wanted to find out whether the recent intervention of the US in Africa 









Figure 6.32 demonstrates the opinion of the respondents on whether US intervention 
in Africa serves the best interests of the continent (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
The responses were as follows: 42 (15.9%) felt that the US intervention in Africa 
serves the best interests of Africans, 127 (48.1%) see US intervention in Africa as 















Yes No Undecided Missing data
The US Government intervention in 























Figure 6.33 above is a clustered bar chart that shows the views of various 
respondents in accordance with their specialization/occupation on whether the US 
governments interventions in African countries are for the interest of Africans 
(N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
The responses show that 46 (46%) of the military were against US government 
intervention in Africa on the ground that the intervention will exacerbate human 
insecurity in the continent while 20 (20%) of the military argue in favour of US 
interventions in Africa and 34 (34%) were undecided, 19 (51.4%) of scholars and 
security experts faulted the US government intervention in Africa while 6 (16.2%) of 
the scholars and security experts welcomed the intervention and 12 (32.4%) were 
undecided, 16 (64%) diplomats and policy makers see the US government’s 
intervention  as serious impediments to African progress while 6 (24%) diplomats 
and policy makers see the intervention as humanitarian gestures that protect the 
interests of Africans and 3 (12%) were undecided. Majorities of the press 10 
(52.6%), students 14 (43.8%), NGOs 8 (47.1%) and lecturers 10 (43.5%) were all 
against US government intervention in Africa on the grounds that it will undermine 
the interests of Africans. 
 
Chi-Square Test   
N = 253 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 22.123 18 0.227 
Likelihood Ratio 24.988 18 0.125 
Linear by Linear Association  0.179 1 0.672 
 
Of the fourteen (14) interviewees, twelve (12) agreed that US intervention and 
increased involvement, particularly military commitment,  may be deleterious to the 




interests of Africans. And given the problems that continue in Somalia, Kenya, Mali, 
Libya, Sudan, the DRC and Nigeria, Africa does not appear to have benefitted from 
US intervention. Nonetheless, the U.S. and other Western countries may be able to 
make major strides toward improving the prospects for peace and stability if they can 
bring commercial investment in Africa. Two (2) respondents argued strongly in 
favour of US intervention as the panacea for  human security deterioration in Africa, 
insisting that there are convergences of interest which the US intervention is set to 
address.. 
The respondents were further asked to appraise the UN-NATO led “Operation 
Odyssey Dawn” in Libya and also to determine whether the US government 
exercised undue influence in the intervention. Figure 21 below depicts the perception 
of the respondents concerning the UN-NATO intervention in Libya in 2011.  
 
 
Figure 6.34 depicts respondents perception on the UN-NATO led intervention on 
Libya in 2011 (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
The responses were as follows: 63 (23.9%) felt that the UN-NATO intervention in 
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intervention in Libya was bad and inimical to human security enhancement in Africa, 
60 (22.7%) were undecided while 3 (1.1%) chose not to attempt the question. 
 
Figure 6.35 above depicts the clustered bar chart of groups views on the US-NATO 
intervention in Libya (N=252) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
The categorization of responses by specialization/occupation shows that 20 (19.8%) 
military officers supported the US-NATO intervention in Libya while 52 (51.5) 
military officers felt that the intervention was bad and 29 (28.7%) were undecided. 
The responses from scholars and security experts indicate that 9 (25%) supported the 
US-NATO intervention in Libya while 21 (58.3%) faulted the intervention in Libya 
and 6 (16.7%) were undecided, 9 (36%) diplomats and policy makers said that the 
US-NATO intervention in Libya was good while 14 (56%) said that the intervention 
was a bad move and 2 (8%) were undecided. The students, press, NGOs and lecturers 
voted 18 (56.3%), 11 (57.9%), 8 (50%) and 12 (52.2%) respectively against the US-
NATO intervention in Libya while 3 (9.4%), 4 (21.1%), 7 (43.8%) and 6 (26.1%) 
voted in favour of US-NATO intervention in Libya. 
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Chi-Square Test   
N = 252 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.755 12 0.159 
Likelihood Ratio 17.984 12 0.116 
Linear by Linear Association  1.722 1 0.189 
 
Of the fourteen (14) interviewees, five (5) stated that the intervention was necessary 
to avert President Qhadafi’s attempt to murder his people, citing United Nations 
Security Council’s Resolution 1973 (2011) as the mandate of the operation. Eight (8) 
interviewees argued that the intervention in Libya was conjured by the US 
government and France under the guise of international humanitarianism 
masquerading under NATO so as to gain access to Libyan strategic energy resources. 
A respondent stated that since the demise of Qhadafi in 2011, Libya has since 
descended into chaos transforming the entire region into a zone of conflict. Two (2) 
emphasized that human insecurity in today’s Libya is worse by far than that of Libya 
under Qhadafi and yet the US and NATO have refused to act. He concluded by 
saying that US governments often profess a stronger interest in Africa than their 
actions would imply. , they tend to expres their regret when not in the White House. 
He cited the example of Bill Clinton calling the non-intervention in Rwanda's 1994 
genocide his greatest regret as president, or Sen. Barack Obama calling for more 
assertiveness in the Democratic Republic of Congo, or DRC, and Sudan six to eight 
years ago. But, in fact, now is the time to reassess this long-standing American 
anathema to military involvement in Africa's terrible wars. Another respondent cited 
President Barack Obama address on March 28, 2011, when he spoke to the American 
people about Libya and why the United States (U.S.) must engage militarily as 
opposed to diplomatically. The U.S. led by AFRICOM (the U.S. Military Command 
in Africa that enforces U.S. foreign policy), initiated the bombing of Libya ostensibly 
to enforce a United Nations (U.N.) mandated No-Fly Zone.  




The rationale for the U.S. intervention in Libya is to protect vulnerable civilians from 
mass slaughter by the Libyan regime. One has to question why the U.S. has pursued 
a military path to ‘protect’ civilians in Libya, especially considering that there is a far 
greater humanitarian crisis unfolding in the heart of Africa. The question generates 
greater concern when one considers that President Obama has had diplomatic tools at 
his disposal to help alleviate the human suffering in the Congo but has not used 
them. 
The researcher further probed the respondents’ opinions of  US intervention in 
Uganda and Central African Republic. The responses  are presented in figure 20 
below.  
 
Figure 6.36 depicts respondents views of US government intervention in Uganda and 
CAR (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
The responses to figure 20 above were as follows: 93 (35.3%) welcomed the US 
government intervention in Uganda and Central African Republics as necessary for 
addressing the human insecurity pathologies in that region, 66 (25%) said that the 
interventions were bad and hence, undermine the human security of the region, 97 
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Figure 21 below is a clustered bar chart of specialization/occupational responses 
(N=264) 
 
Source: Field data (2014) 
The clustered bar chart in figure 21 above reveals that out of the 102 (100%) military 
personnel questioned about the implication of the US government’s intervention in 
Uganda and CAR, 39 (38.2%) agreed that the interventions are very good, 21 
(20.6%) disagreed with the interventions in Uganda and CAR, arguing that the 
protracted conflict and human suffering in the region are s direct consequences of 
such intervention; 42 (41.2%) declined to answer the question. Sixteen (45.7%) 
scholars and security experts supported the US intervention in Uganda and CAR 
while 9 (25.7%) disapproved and 10 (28.6%) remained undecided. Ten (40%) 
diplomats and security experts expressed satisfaction about the US government 
intervention in Uganda and CAR while 7 (28%) expressed dissatisfaction with the 
intervention and 8 (32%) were undecided. Seven students (23.3%) expressed 
satisfaction with the US government’s intervention in Uganda and CAR while 8 
(26.7%) disapproved of the intervention and 15 (50%) were undecided. Among the 
Press, 6 (31.6%) supported US military intervention in Uganda and CAR while 7 
(36.8%) rejected the intervention on the grounds that they were western-oriented and 
do not take into cognisance the peculiarities of the conflicts in those regions; 6 
(31.6%) were undecided. Seven NGOs (46.7%) expressed their support for the US 
20,6% 


















government’s intervention in Uganda and CAR, citing the nefarious activities of the 
LRA as raison de’tre for such intervention; 5 (33.3%) disagreed with the intervention 
and 3 (20%) were undecided. Five lecturers (23.8%) supported the US intervention 
in Uganda and CAR and 8 (38.1%) expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
intervention while another 8 (38.1%) were undecided. 
Chi-Square Test   
N = 247 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.374 12 0.497 
Likelihood Ratio 11.656 12 0.474 
Linear by Linear Association  0.093 1 0.761 
 
Of the fourteen (14) interviewees, eleven (11) said that the intervention in Uganda 
and CAR were to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and to arrest its 
notorious leader, Joseph Kony. Two (2) interviewees argued that the US government 
intervention in Uganda and CAR will have worsened the human security situation in 
the Great Lake region as crises of diverse magnitudes have continued unabatedly. A 
respondent suggested that diplomacy should be pursued instead of military 
engagement.  
The researcher wanted to find whether the US government intervention in DRC has 
met the expectations of African people. Hence, the respondents were asked to 
appraise the level of US government involvement in DRC and its consequence for 
human security improvement. See figure 22 below for responses. 
 






Figure 6.37 demonstrates the respondents perceptions of the US Government’s 
efforts to ameliorate  human insecurity in DRC (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
The responses were as follows: 14 (5.3%) felt that the US government has made 
adequate efforts to mitigate human insecurity in the DRC, 52 (19.7%) believed that 
the US government’s efforts to address human security issues in DRC are  far below 
the expectations of Africans, 187 (70.8%) of the study participants were undecided 
while 11 (4.2%) chose to ignore the question. 
In figure 6.38 below the clustered bar chart shows the categorization of the responses 
by specialization/occupation with regard to the US government’s efforts in 
addressing human insecurity in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Nine military 
personnel (9.1%) said that the US government has made adequate efforts to 
ameliorate human insecurity in DRC while 72 (72.7) insisted that the US government 
has abdicated its responsibility to protect (R2P) and alleviate human suffering in 
DRC and 18 (18.2%) abstained from the question. Twenty-five scholars and security 
experts (71.4%) blamed the US government for its inertia in Congo debacle while 10 
(28.6%) were undecided. Two diplomats and policy-makers said that the US 
government has made appreciable efforts towards the resolution of Congo crisis 
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and 3 (12%) were undecided. Only one student (3.3%) supported the US 
government’s efforts in Congo while 21 (70%) believed that the US government is 
part of the problem and 8 (26.7%) were undecided. Only one member of the Press 
approved the US government’s effort in Congo while 14 (77.8%) disapproved and 3 
(16.7%) were undecided. None of the NGOs and the lecturers approved of the US 
government’s effort in DRC. Fourteen NGOs (87.5%) and sixteen lecturers (76.2%) 
expressed their disapproval of the US government’s inaction toward the protracted 
conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 
Figure 6.38 above shows the categorized specialized/occupational responses 
(N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
Chi-Square Test   
N = 244 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.296 12 0.504 
Likelihood Ratio 14.645 12 0.261 


























Of the fourteen (14) interviewees, nine (9) felt that the US government has 
contributed to the resolution of the protracted conflicts in DRC however; more is 
expected from a superpower. Three (3) of the interviewees argued that the on-going 
conflict in DRC was triggered by Rwanda and Uganda - who are prominent US allies 
in the region - when they invaded Congo in 1996. One (1) interviewee retorted “The 
US and France intervened in Libya under the guise of moral responsibility to protect 
the vulnerable. The global community must question the lack of action on the part of 
the US and the coalition when it comes to the millions dead in the Congo”. One (1) 
interviewee angrily stated that “The 2008 UN Group of Experts Final Report on the 
Democratic Republic of Congo documented, among other things, satellite phone 
records for members of one of the rebel groups responsible for destabilizing the 
Congo, the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP)”. The CNDP 
was in communication with the Rwandan Defense Force high military command and 
the Rwandan presidency. Given the body of evidence of Rwanda’s complicity in 
support of the CNDP  which was destabilizing the Congo, global pressure had begun 
to be applied, but not from the US, France and Great Britain. Instead of following the 
lead of Sweden and Netherlands, the US pursued a backdoor deal that would result in 
a rapprochement between President Kabila and President Kagame while allowing 
Rwandan troops to enter Congolese soil once again. In essence the US backed a 
personal back door deal as opposed to an institutional transparent approach, which 
would have better served the prospects for long-term peace and stability in the 
region. 
 Another respondent argued that the U.S. has a diplomatic tool at its disposal that can 
make a difference in the region, the Obama Law, Public Law 109-456. This law, 
written by Obama and enacted in December 2006, provides the U.S. with the force of 
law to hold accountable Congo’s neighbours that have been destabilizing the country 
since 1996. It received bipartisan support in the senate and was also co-sponsored by 
then-Senator Hillary Clinton. This law also calls for the appointment of a special 
envoy to the Great Lakes region and gives the Secretary of State the authority to 
withhold aid from neighbouring countries that destabilize the Congo. On October 26, 
2007, U.S. President George Bush met with Congolese President Joseph Kabila in 
the White House. Then-Senator Obama released a statement reminding President 




Bush about his commitment to enforce the newly enacted U.S. law, Public Law 109-
456, and stated that “It’s time the Administration stops ignoring the call by Congress 
to appoint a special envoy to the DRC, and strengthen the U.N. peacekeeping force 
which is working to stabilize the eastern part of the Congo.” Now that Barack Obama 
is President, neither he nor Secretary of State John Kerry, have taken steps to enforce 
this law. Unfortunately, President Obama has demonstrated the same lack of action 
on the Congo as his predecessor, George W. Bush. 
The researcher further posed a question to the study respondents on their views 
concerning US government intervention in Somalia. Figure 24 below depicts the 
respondents’ perceptions. 
 
Figure 6.39 depicts the respondents’ views on the US Government intervention in 
Somalia (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
Responses to figure 24 above were as follows: 108 (40.9%) affirmed that  US 
intervention in Somalia was  the right move to abate humanitarian catastrophes and 
improve human security situation in the war-torn country; 82 (31.1%) saw  US 
intervention as the wrong move which  exacerbated the existing human insecurity 
pathology that has bedevilled the country; 72 (27.3%) were undecided on the 
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The categorization of the responses in accordance with the specialization/occupation 
of the study participants shows that fifty-nine military personnel (58.4%) approved 
the US government’s intervention in Somalia while 22 (21,8%) disapproved and 20 
(19.8%) were undecided. Eighteen scholars and security experts (50%) expressed 
satisfaction with US involvement in addressing the human insecurity quagmire in 
Somalia while 10 (27.8%) were dissatisfied with such involvement and 8 (22.2%) 
were undecided. Ten diplomats and policy-makers (40%) supported the US 
intervention in Somalia while 12 (48%) were against the US intervention in Somalia 
and 3 (12%) were undecided. Five students (15.6%) expressed satisfaction with the 
US government intervention in Somalia while 9 (28.1%) disapproved of the US 
government involvement in Somalia and 18 (56.3%) were undecided. Eight 
pressmen (42.1%) expressed dissatisfaction with the US government intervention in 
Somalia, with another eight (42.1%) undecided, while only three (15.8%) expressed 
their support. Five NGOs and lecturers (29.4% and 21.7% respectively) expressed 
their support for the US government intervention in Somalia while 9 (52.9%) and 10 
(43.5%) expressed their dissatisfaction with the intervention. Figure 25 below shows 
the clustered bar chart. 
 
Figure 6.40 depicts the categorization of specialization/occupational responses  to the 
US government’s intervention in Somalia (n=264) 























Chi-Square Test   
N = 253 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 45.402 12 0.000 
Likelihood Ratio 45.244 12 0.000 
Linear by Linear Association  18.112 1 0.000 
 
There is a significant difference in the occupation/specialization categories and how 
they perceive US government intervention in Somalia.  X2 (df = 12, N=253) = 
45.402, exact p = 0.000. 
Of the fourteen (14) interviewees, ten (10) concurred that the intervention was a 
moral gesture that should be commended.  However, three (3) interviewees argued 
that foreign intervention in Somalia has bloody and disastrous precedents. One (1) 
respondent cited, as a major cause of human insecurity, the US-backed Ethiopian 
invasion in 2006-9 against the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) which resulted in the 
displacement of millions of Somalis and precipitated the rise of al-Shabaab which 
splintered from the moderate ICU during the course of the war.  Another interviewee 
stated that “current developments in Somalia, however, go far beyond a domestic 
humanitarian problem; the country sits at a tense intersection between various 
competing motives and objectives”. Within the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
alone, there is substantial evidence of competing ulterior motives between 
participating states. Aside from the official imperative to ‘secure’ Somalia and assure 
the stability of the TFG, Kenya, according to one (1) respondent, has the additional 
aim of creating a semi-autonomous buffer zone in Jubaland, to be controlled by a 
Kenyan puppet regime. He continued “On the other hand, it has been speculated that 
part of Ethiopia’s motive in intervening in Western Somalia is to assert control over 
the contested Ogaden region and establish proxy regimes in the country, raising the 
spectre of further Balkanisation of the country”. Today, international intervention has 
similar high-stakes for ordinary Somalis, notwithstanding Western objectives of 




‘stability’. It seems highly unlikely that stability and autonomy for Somalis will 
come about within historically disastrous schemes of liberal intervention. 
6.7 Section Six: Data presentation and analysis 
6.7.1 Research Question 5: How can AFRICOM intervention in Africa ameliorate 
human insecurity in Africa? 
In this section the researcher critically examined the relationship between AFRICOM 
and human security in Africa by investigating  the impact of AFRICOM programs 
and intervention in human security  problematics in Africa.  
The researcher wanted to find out whether there is a relationship between AFRICOM 
and human security. The respondents were asked to express their opinions on 
whether a relationship exists between AFRICOM and human security in Africa. See 
figure 6.41 below for responses. 
 
 
Figure 6.41 indicates the assertions of the respondents on the relationship between 
AFRICOM and human security in Africa (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
The following were responses: 117 (44.3%) affirmed that there is a relationship 
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relationship exists, 65 (24.6%) expressed no opinion while 21 (8%) ignored the 
question. 
The responses were further categorized according to specialization/occupation. The 
study shows that forty-eight military personnel (50%) concurred that a relationship 
exists between AFRICOM and human security in Africa while 23 (24%) said that 
there is no relationship between AFRICOM and human security in Africa and 25 
(26%) were undecided whether relationship exists or not. Eighteen scholars and 
security experts (52.9%) agreed that a relationship exists while 8 (23.5%) disagreed 
with the existence of any relationship between AFRICOM and human security in 
Africa and another 8 (23.5%) were undecided. When policy-makers and diplomats 
were consulted by the researcher, 9 (40.9%) believed that a relationship exists while 
8 (36.4%) said that there is no basis for relational existence and 5 (22.7%) were 
undecided. Eleven students (40.7%) said that a relationship exists while 7 (25.9%) 
doubted the possibility of any relationship and 9 (33.3%) were undecided. Seven 
members of the press (41.2%) affirmed that a relationship exists while 5 (29.4%) 
were negative on the possibility of any relationship between human security in 
Africa and the existence of AFRICOM and another 5 (29.4%) were undecided. Ten 
NGOs (62.5%) affirmed the existence of a relationship, while 3 (18.8%) see no 
possibility for a relationship and another 3 (18.8%) were undecided. Twelve lecturers 
(52.2%) see the existence of a relationship between AFRICOM and human security 
in Africa while 5 (21.7%) expressed doubts and 6 (26.1%) were undecided. 
Figure  6.42 below is a clustered bar chart that demonstrates the-specialization/ 
occupational responses of the study participants (N=264) 
 





Source: Field data (2014) 
Chi-Square Test   
N = 235 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.473 12 0.973 
Likelihood Ratio 4.351 12 0.976 
Linear by Linear Association  0.001 1 0.978 
 
Among fourteen (14) security experts interviewed, ten (10) agreed that a relationship 
does exist between AFRICOM and  human security in Africa; three (3) out of these 
ten (10) added that AFRICOM’s role in the human security agenda of Africa remains 
secondary considering the fact that socio-economic problems constitute the major 
impediments to human security enhancement in Africa. One (1) participant stated 
that a serious relationship exists between AFRICOM and human security in Africa. 
This participant cited the Command’s military-to-military capacity building and 
engagement with African partners as necessary for human security promotion in 
Africa while many of AFRICOM’s programs such as (MEDCAP, Partner Military 
HIV/AIDS, Pandemic Response, and VETCAP) focus on human security related 
issues; they are directed at the African military forces. One (1) respondent said that 
50% 52,90% 


















even though AFRICOM may not be addressing human security issues in the broader 
population it is, however, building the African military’s capacity to address and 
prevent instability and conflict.  Hence it is serving both continental and US security 
interests. Two (2) interviewees insisted that there is no relationship between a 
Unified Combatant Command (UCC) in the mode of AFRICOM and human security 
in Africa. One participant said that the only relationship that could exist will be for 
AFRICOM to turn African soil into a battlefield. 
 
The researcher probed further to establish whether there are links between UN 
approved NATO intervention in Libya in 2011, in which the US government and 
AFRICOM in particular played a pivotal role, and the human security crisis   in the 
Sahel region. Below are the analyses of the responses, the presentation of the bar 
chart, the clustered bar chart, chi-square and the opinions of the interviewees. 
Figure 6.43 below shows the participants’ responses on how the UN/NATO 
intervention in Libya has fuelled insecurity and instability in the Sahel region. 
 
 
Figure 6.43 shows the views of the study respondents on the links between UN-
NATO intervention in Libya and the crisis in the Sahel region (N=264) 
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Figure 28 indicates the following responses: 179 (67.8%) saw the escalated crisis in 
the Sahel as the resultant effect of the UN-NATO intervention in Libya, 38 (14.4%) 
felt that the crisis in the Sahel is unconnected to the 2011 UN-NATO intervention in 
Libya while 47 (17.8%) were undecided on the impact of the intervention. 
The specialization/occupational responses indicate the following: Sixty-nine military 
personnel (67.6%) agreed that the UN/NATO intervention in Libya was the reason 
for the crisis of human security in the Sahel while 18 (17.6%) felt that the 
intervention had nothing to do with the current crisis in the Sahel and 15 (14.7%) 
were undecided. Twenty-nine scholars and security experts (78.4%) said that the 
present human security quagmire in the Sahel was the outcome of the UN/NATO 
intervention while 3 (8.1%) argue that there was no correlation between the human 
security crisis in the Sahel and the UN/NATO intervention and 5 (13.5%) were 
undecided. Eighteen diplomats and policy-makers (72%) traced the Sahel crisis to 
the UN/NATO intervention and 3 (12%) were undecided. Fifteen students (46.9%) 
said that the crisis in Sahel is incumbent on NATO intervention while 7 (21.9%) 
thought otherwise and 10 (31.3%) were undecided. Thirteen NGOs (76.5%) and 
seventeen lecturers (73.9%) respectively suggested that the UN/NATO intervention 
was to a large extent responsible for the deterioration of human security in the Sahel 
region while an NGO and a lecturer argue that the intervention was not responsible 
for the deplorable human security condition in the Sahel. 
 
Table 6.3 shows the occupational responses of the study participants on the links 
between the UN/NATO intervention in Libya and the human security crises in the 










Links between the UN/NATO 
intervention in Libya and the 
current crises in the Sahel region? 
Yes  No Undecided Total 
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Military 69 67.6 18 17.6 15 14.7 102 100 
Scholar & Security Expert 29 78.4 3 8.1 5 13.5 37 100 
Diplomat & Policy Makers 18 72 4 16 3 12 25 100 
Students 15 46.9 7 21.9 10 31.3 32 100 
Press 10 52.6 3 15.8 6 31.6 19 100 
NGO 13 76.5 1 5.9 3 17.6 17 100 
Lecturing 17 73.9 1 4.3 5 21.7 23 100 
Within group 171 67.1 37 14.5 47 18.4 255 100 
Source (Field data, 2014). 
 
Chi-Square Test   
N = 255 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 21.804 18 0.241 
Likelihood Ratio 21.655 18 0.248 
Linear by Linear Association  0.123 1 0.726 
 
 Of the fourteen (14) interviewees, twelve (12) agreed that UN-NATO intervention in 
Libya was the major driver of human insecurity in the Sahel, citing the invasion of 
Mali by the Tuaregs, the strengthening of Boko Haram insurgency, the increased al-
shabaab attacks in Somalia and Kenya as spill-over effects of that intervention. Four 
(4) of the interviewees said the intervention produced tens of thousands of refugees 




in Niger, Chad, and the countries of North Africa, as well as some in Europe, 
creating further strain on food-insecure communities and governments with limited 
resources. One interviewee said that the US government orchestrated the intervention 
and that it led to the exacerbation of anti-Washington sentiments in communities far 
beyond the proverbial “Arab street” for example, many people strongly disagreed 
with NATO’s decision to intervene. Another participant said that the economic 
damage stemming from the loss of remittances from workers in Libya to 
communities south of the Sahara formed part of the deplorable human security 
situation in the Sahel. One respondent argued “Had Qadhafi remained in power, a 
Tuareg rebellion may well still have broken out in Mali at some point, but events did 
not have to play out in this way and to take the particularly chaotic form they did”. 
A respondent argued forcefully that the intervention against Qadhafi was a political 
mistake and he questioned the legal basis within the American system for authorizing 
American involvement in the Libyan intervention. He noted that the intervention 
exemplifies a double standard which generates world-wide cynicism  about US 
motives in general.  One can accept these arguments or not; I believe the political 
argument stands on its own. 
One respondent stated “Although political correctness might prevent them from 
saying so, I imagine some who supported the intervention in Libya feel that the 
regional consequences matter little. Mali, though formerly upheld as a model of 
‘African democracy,’ is usually seen as geopolitically peripheral, as are Niger and 
Chad”. He continued:  
Whatever chaos results there, supporters may still feel the intervention was 
worthwhile. And I believe that some American elites, even if they express 
concern about ‘anti-Americanism’ overseas, would not substantially adjust 
major policy decisions to take into account how those decisions might affect 
perceptions of Washington in Kano, or Nairobi, or Jakarta. The political 
consequences of the intervention that I cite will not necessarily trouble such 
thinkers and that probably warrants a post of its own. 
Finally there is the moral argument. To say that the intervention was a 
mistake opens me up to accusations that I am an apologist for Qadhafi, for 
dictators, for violence against civilians. I am not. Those accusers I would 
point back to the question of double standards, to situations past and present 
when Washington dismissed calls for intervention. Those who use the 
language of absolute morality in American politics are often relativists 
cloaking their specific interests and preferences in a mantle of righteousness – 




I look elsewhere for the sources of my moral vision. And I would point the 
accusers to the consequences. We have heard, with Iraq and with Libya, that 
interventions would be neat and straightforward. The aftermath of 
interventions has been anything but. I do not believe that the intervention in 
Libya was primarily motivated by Western thirst for Libyan oil but a serious 
analysis of the consequences of the intervention must take into account the 
fact that many people around the world believe that was the primary 
motivation. Perceptions matter even if one disagrees with them. 
 
The researcher wanted to extrapolate the relationship between the establishments of 
AFRICOM and increased terrorist activities in Africa. Therefore, responses were 
elicited to determine this finding. See figure 6.44 below. 
 
 
Figure 6.44 represents perceptions of the study respondents on the relationship 
between AFRICOM and increased terrorist activities in the continent (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
Responses to figure 6.44 were as follows: 63 (23.9%) said that the increased terrorist 
activities in Africa are  a result of AFRICOM establishments in Africa, 123 (46.6%) 
said that the increased terrorist activities in Africa are unconnected to the 
establishment of AFRICOM, while 69 (26.1%) were undecided and 9 (3.4%) chose 
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The clustered bar chart in figure 6.45 indicates the responses of different 
specializations under the study. 
 
Figure 6.45 above indicates the occupational responses on the correlation between 
the creation of AFRICOM and increased terrorist activities in Africa (N=264) 
Source: Field data (2014) 
Chi-Square Test   
N = 247 Value df Sig 
Pearson Chi-Square 18.065 12 0.114 
Likelihood Ratio 18.324 12 0.106 
Linear by Linear Association  0.046 1 0.831 
 
The result from the clustered bar chart in figure 6.45 above shows the following: 
Nineteen military personnel (18.6%) believed that the theatres of human insecurities 
in the continent were engendered by the establishment of AFRICOM in Africa while 
56 (54.9%) argued that terrorist activities were pervasive in Africa before the 
establishment of AFRICOM and 27 (26.5%) were undecided. Eleven scholars and 
security experts (30.6%) see a correlation between  increased terrorist activities in 






















while 19 (52.8%) said that there is no linkage between the increased terrorist 
activities in Africa and the establishment of AFRICOM and 6 (16.7%) were 
undecided. Six diplomats and policy-makers (24%) agreed that the increased terrorist 
activities in Africa were as a result of the establishment of AFRICOM while 16 
(64%) argued that terrorism is ubiquitous in Africa even before the advent of 
AFRICOM, citing incessant tribal wars and ethnic conflicts as acts of terrorism.  12 
(46.2%) students were undecided while 8 (30.8%) said that there is no relationship 
between the creation of AFRICOM and increased terrorist activities in Africa.  
However, 6 (23.1%) argued that the increased terrorist activities in the continent 
were engendered by the establishment of AFRICOM. Six members of the press 
(21.1%) associated the increased terrorist activities in Africa with the advent of 
AFRICOM while 8 (42.1%) said that there is no linkage and 7 (36.8%) were 
undecided. Six NGOs (37.5%) said that the establishment of AFRICOM heralded the 
increase of terrorism in Africa while 5 (31.3%) maintained that there is no 
relationship between increased acts of terrorism in the continent and the 
establishment of AFRICOM; another 5 (31.3%) were undecided. Eight lecturers 
(34.8%) affirmed that AFRICOM is responsible for the increased terrorist activities 
in Africa while 8 (34.8%) argue that AFRICOM is not responsible for increased 
terrorism in Africa and 7 (30.4%) were undecided. 
Of the fourteen (14) security experts interviewed, one (1) was of the strong opinion 
that the establishment of AFRICOM triggers violent “blowback” in the continent. 
For example, “the decision by the US government to maintain an enormous, 
permanent military presence in Camp Lemoire, Djibouti and drone base in Niger is 
now widely viewed as a major source of virulent anti-Americanism in the Horn of 
Africa and Sahel region”. Seven (7) interviewees were of the view that US military 
presence is a major driver of insecurity in the continent. Two respondents argued that 
the US troops sent to Sahel to hunt down (AQIM) have worsened the situation there: 
at the end of the day there was proliferation of Jihadist terrorist groups in the Sahel 
from Ansaredeen to MUJAW to Boko Haram and host of others. To think that 
military solution will ensure the security of Africans is erroneous. Five (5) 
interviewees said that terrorism has been in existence in Africa even before the 




establishment of AFRICOM citing diverse conflict situations in Africa as acts of 
terrorism. 
6.8 Conclusion  
This chapter presented analyses of the field data from the questionnaires distributed 
to the study respondents and the interviews. The responses from the study 
participants show that the US government established AFRICOM as a vehicle to 
secure strategic minerals from Africa and to counter violent extremism which is 
likely to undermine the US national security interests if unabated. However, the 
study equally shows that contrary to popular opinion, many Africans are not hostile 
to AFRICOM:  most respondents and interviewees agreed that African governments 
and militaries lack the capacity to address the pathology of human insecurity in the 
continent. However, they were quick to add that a western oriented security 
paradigm in the mode of AFRICOM can at most play a secondary and supportive 
role such as capacity building and the provision of necessary logistics. Most of the 
respondents and interviewees argue that the fundamental requirements for human 
security enhancement in Africa are good governance and improved trading 
opportunities in global market.  











CONCLUSION, SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides a summary of the study, findings and recommendations of the 
study, based on the data presentation, interpretation and analysis in the last chapter. 
The chapter is conceptually organized based on the research questions. The overall 
summary of the findings and recommendations regarding research questions one, 
two, three, four and five are presented. Despite the differences in answers elicited 
from the study’s respondents and interviewees, the findings contained material that 
was pertinent to the research questions. The purpose of the study was to investigate 
the set objectives, activities, prospects and challenges of AFRICOM for human (in) 
security in Africa. Hence, the study sought: (1) to critically evaluate United States 
national security policy and strategy in Africa, (2) to determine the place of 
AFRICOM in  US National Security Strategy towards Africa, (3) to determine the 
nature and scope of AFRICOM activities on the continent, (4).to establish the likely 
effect of AFRICOM‘s activities on human security in Africa and, (5) to critically 
examine the relationship between AFRICOM and human security in Africa. The 
final chapter discusses the contributions of the study to policy, practice and theory.  
It also maps out future research directions. It begins with a summary of chapters    
7.2 Summaries 
Chapter one provided the context of the study through a discussion of the following 
aspects: the increasing strategic geo-political and economic significance of Africa to 
the USA and other parts of the globe. This growing importance is reflected in the US 
intensifying competition with China and other countries for access to African 
resources and influence in this region. The subsequent creation of a unified 
combatant command (UCC) under the auspices of bringing peace, security, 
democracy and economic growth to Africans belied the fact that AFRICOM as a 
component of DoD was created in response to Africa’s strategic imperatives to the 
US, namely, its natural resource wealth, its burgeoning population, expanding 
markets, the ungoverned space which affords terrorist organizations the freedom to 




recruit and China’s growing influence. The chapter discussed the avalanche of 
criticism that accompanied the creation of AFRICOM and its implications for human 
(in) security in Africa. The statement of the problem is anchored on the question of 
whether it is possible   for AFRICOM, a component of DoD that is both state-centric 
and militaristic in nature, to improve human security conditions in to Africa, bearing 
in mind that human security emerged to address and possibly ameliorate the 
inadequacies and the pathologies of the traditional security conceptualization which 
AFRICOM reflects. The research objectives, research questions, hypotheses, 
significance of the study and delimitations of the study are all factored into this 
chapter. Likewise, the chapter briefly discussed research methodology and methods 
employed in the study. The study combined both quantitative and qualitative 
methods. In order to obtain good measures of validity and reliability, two data 
collection methods were employed. Questionnaires and interview schedule were used 
to collect data. The elements of analysis were military officers, scholars and security 
experts, diplomats and policy makers, students, members of the press, NGOs and 
lecturers. The data collected was analysed using descriptive statistics supported by 
SPSS for quantitative data, and thematic analysis for qualitative data. The method 
and procedures used are explained in more depth in chapter one. The aim of this 
introductory chapter was to provide the background of the study and set the stage for 
the formulation of the research questions and the organization of the study. 
Chapter two reviewed the extant literature on security, Africa, US foreign relations 
toward Africa and the creation of USAFRICOM. Security is seen as a 
multidimensional concept, comprising various dimensions such as physical security, 
health security, political security, food security etc. All aspects of security are, 
however, tightly connected to each other and have various implications for the 
overall security situation. The chapter conceptualized and contextualized security in 
its different ramifications, tracing the evolutionary trends in security from the 
primordial era to the contemporary period. The chapter examined the transformation 
of security from its dual dominant approaches namely: the realist state-centric 
paradigm which privileged the state as a major actor, container and provider of 
security based on the assumptions that a state possesses a will to survive and a will to 
power. Security is seen as a derivative of power in pursuance of national interests.  




However, the idealist approach maintains that security is beyond the realist notions 
of armies, gun and war. The Westphalia trajectory of historical development and the 
post 1945 European evolution gave impetus and prominence to the statist 
conceptualization of security. Hence, security has been equated with state security or 
national security. The state-centred security concept rests on two basic premises: 
first, that most threats come from the outside, and second, these threats are primarily 
of a military nature, and thus, call for military solutions (Ayoob, 1995:5). However,  
the drastic decline in inter-state wars, the rise of religious extremism, state sponsored 
terrorism, the sharp increase in intra-state conflicts and the emergence of 
globalization which have engendered the withering of state powers and the erosion of 
national sovereignties have made it impossible for states to meet the demands for 
security from other elements within their territorial jurisdictions.  
More so, the assumption that individual states are comparatively invulnerable to the 
emergence of crises in neighbouring or strategically important regions has been 
flawed. The quest for security arrangements that will adequately address the post-
Cold War threats has led to diverse conceptualizations such as international security 
which underpin the primary responsibilities of states as major actors in the 
international system to provide security to their respective population, common 
security which seeks to mitigate the security dilemma by organizing security policies 
in coordination with others to maximize mutual as opposed to unilateral security 
arrangements. Against this background, the pronouncements on reinventing security 
have found a common chord with the idea of human security as enunciated by the 
Commission on Global Governance and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP).  In 1994, the UNDP called for a broadening of the traditional-
militarist concentration on state security to embrace the dimension of human security 
and the security of the planet. Human security recognizes that global security extends 
beyond the protection of borders, ruling elites and exclusive state interests to include 
the protection of the people, whereby extreme socio-economic needs, disease, 
systemic crime, gross marginalization and massive oppression may all constitute 
central threats to security (Boot and Vale, 1995: 296-297).  
More radical, revolutionary and significant than is available in most underpinnings of 
human security is their insistence on understanding insecurity and achieving security 




as complex, holistic processes that require not merely the amelioration of particular 
needs, or defence of human beings against discrete threats contained in time and 
place, but on-going structural transformation based on ideas of emancipation, social 
justice and human progress. However, a country like Canada, which is one of the 
major exponents of human security, has evinced a strong predilection for co-option 
of human security to statist agenda as primacy of providing the metaphor for national 
identity and international citizenship. Human beings, especially in Africa, remain 
vulnerable to a compendium of security threats, practices and processes. For 
example: poor governance, politically oppressive regimes, civil conflict, terrorism, 
global economy, malnutrition, health hazards, corruption, human rights abuse, 
gender violence, and discrimination, environmental degradation and natural 
calamities. Securing these objects (human beings) requires collaborative efforts. 
The chapter also emphasized the uniqueness of Africa’s security problems which 
differ remarkably from the Western oriented security calculus. The security problems 
faced by most African countries are largely bound up with processes of state-
building (Ayoob, 1995:21). These processes are generally confined to internal 
debates on the legitimacy of the ruling regimes, since ruling elites tend to secure their 
powers by repression rather than by provision of political and socio-economic 
services which could foster social integration and stability (Aza and Moon cited in 
Debiel, 2004:2). Hence, the application of the realist historically conditioned 
definition of security to the analysis of Africa’s situation created major intellectual 
and conceptual problems. While Africans emphasized the problems of poverty, gross 
marginalization in global trades, political and institutional under-development, the 
Western security challenges are predicated on cybercrimes and super power rivalries. 
Africa’s integration into the global economy is a necessary step in the march toward 
stability throughout the continent. Economic reform is one of the most critical 
priorities if Africa human security records are to be improved. The chapter agrees 
that the concept of security has been much contested today. Various security 
conceptualizations have informed national policy and global nuances. The static 
focus on security has shifted towards a broadening of security to include 
environmental, political, economic, health and social consideration in addition to the 
militaristic conceptualization. 




Chapter two further reviewed the catalogue of threats in Africa which engendered the 
creation of AFRICOM and the avalanche of criticism generated by the US command 
both from Africans and non-Africans. The creation of AFRICOM represents a shift 
from the US large scale invasions of the Third World countries to a more diplomatic 
and economic pressuring and posturing. From its inception, AFRICOM has faced an 
identity crisis. Its purported humanitarian mandate was a guise to promote American 
interests through military, diplomatic and economic means. The command’s mission 
statement reads: “AFRICOM, in concert with other US government agencies and 
international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-
military programs, military sponsored activities, and other military operations as 
directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of US foreign 
policy”154. AFRICOM reflects security threats as perceived by American leaders,  
and aims  to prevent Africa from becoming a haven for international terrorist 
organizations.  Regardless of the seemingly lofty declarative purposes of AFRICOM, 
many African heads of state responded with trepidation, expressing their feelings that 
an increased US military presence on the continent will further escalate tension 
between nations in Africa and hinder sovereignty.  
Nearly all African leaders have been sceptical about the establishment of the military 
command on African soil. Moreover, several African states have vehemently 
criticized the plan to locate AFRICOM in Africa. This refusal by African countries to 
host AFRICOM despite belated US diplomatic overtures occasioned a temporary 
change of plan with respect to its location.  Hence,  it is presently situated in 
Stuttgart, Germany. The chapter closed with the extrapolation of political realism, 
securitization theory and human security paradigm as the frameworks of analysis. 
These theories were used in the study’s analysis because of their interconnectedness 
and analytical relevance to the study.  Political realism justifies the asymmetric and 
lopsided relationship between the US government and African governments which 
engendered the imposition of AFRICOM on Africans without adequate consultation 
with the AU and sub-regional organizations. Securitization theory asserts that 
successfully securitized subjects receive disproportionate amounts of attention and 
resources compared to unsuccessfully securitized subjects, thus causing more real 
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human damage. The theory describes the process of state actors transforming 
subjects into matters of 'security': an extreme version of politicization that enables 
extraordinary means to be used in the name of security. Many human security 
challenges in Africa have been securitized. These issues do not necessarily represent 
issues that are essential to the objective survival of a state, but rather represent issues 
where someone was successful in constructing an issue into an existential problem. 
Securitization studies aim to understand "who securitizes (securitizing actor), on 
what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not 
least, under what conditions. Human security challenges such as poverty, HIV/AIDS, 
ethno-religious crises, religious extremism and ungoverned spaces have been 
successfully securitized in many African countries thereby legitimizing extraordinary 
means to solve these perceived problems.   These means  include declaring a state of 
emergency or martial law, mobilizing the military or undue interference in other 
sovereign  territories. Furthermore, these successfully labelled security problems 
have insulated these subjects and made them to be considered as illegitimate subjects 
for political or academic debate.  
On the other hand, human security paradigm emphasizes the elimination of unjust 
social relations, including unequal gender relations and the reformulation of 
international relations in terms of the “multiple insecurities” stemming from 
environmental degradation, structural violence and poverty, rather than the abstract 
threats to the integrity of states, their interests and core values. 
Chapter three examined the causes and consequences of human (in) security in 
Africa. Western colonialism laid the foundation for the human (in) security 
pathologies in Africa. The major impact of colonialism in African is that it brought 
about the under-development of African territories in many different ways. It is 
usually argued in favour of colonialism that it brought western education and hence 
western civilization to the shores of Africa which by implication is a positive 
contribution towards African development. This argument will appear to be true on 
the surface level or superficially, but if it is subjected to critical analysis, it will 
reveal the hollowness or emptiness of colonial education which is partially 
responsible for the Africa’s underdevelopment. The colonial education was not 
rooted in African culture and therefore could not foster any meaningful development 




within the African environment because it had no organic linkage. Furthermore, 
colonial education was essentially literary; it had no technological base and therefore 
was antithetical to real or industrial development. The poor technological base of 
most of the present day African states, which has been responsible for their 
underdevelopment, stems from their poor foundation of education laid by the 
colonialists. Colonial education essentially aimed at training clerks, interpreters, 
produce inspectors, artisans, etc., which facilitated the exploitation of Africa’s rich 
resources. Colonial education brought about distortion and disarticulation in African 
indigenous pattern of education which was rooted in African technology. This has 
aptly been shown in the unsuccessful attempt at the so-called technological transfer, 
which is more of a myth than a reality. Another important impact of colonialism was 
the disarticulation of African economies. Colonialism distorted African patterns of 
economic development in many different ways. There were disarticulations in 
production of goods, markets, traders, transport, provision of social amenities and 
patterns of urbanization etc. The colonialists introduced a pattern of international 
division of labour which was to the disadvantage of Africans.  
They assigned to Africa the role of production of raw materials and primary products 
for use by their industries at home. Africans were not allowed or encouraged to go 
into manufacturing. The only industries Africans were encouraged to build were 
those that would facilitate in the processing of the raw materials for export.  African 
raw materials were bought at a very low price while manufactured goods from 
abroad were sold at expensive prices. This situation accounted for the 
impoverishment of most Africans. There was also disarticulation in the type of goods 
produced by Africans. The colonialists compelled Africans to concentrate on the 
production of goods meant for export. Africans were not encouraged to produce 
goods required by the local population. This made many Africans abandon the 
production of food items required to feed the teeming and growing population. The 
outcome was food shortage and escalation in food prices. The present day situation 
where Africans now import their food is a carry-over from colonialism. The point 
being stressed here is that colonialism distorted the satisfaction of local needs in 
terms of food production and other requirements in preference to production and 
satisfaction of foreign needs especially the industries. Poverty in Africa can be 




originally traced to the colonial dispensations when the continent was raped of her 
vital human and material resources. Colonialism linked and ensured the continuing 
linkage of African political economies as appendages to Western interests thereby 
perpetuating the sustained dependence of African states. 
It integrated African trade and economy prematurely into the world market and 
international trade. It is a known fact that before a local economy fully integrates 
itself into the world economy or trade, it must have developed adequately its internal 
dynamics and forces of production. The consequences of premature integration is 
that such economy will be hijacked by the more advanced ones; and the vagaries in 
international trade will make the country concerned a perpetual debtor. Furthermore, 
premature integration cannot absorb shocks from the international market and will 
never enjoy trade balance or comparative advantage. The export-import orientation 
pattern of African economy introduced by colonialism does not allow for accelerator 
and multiplier effects necessary for economic advancement and development. 
Colonialism also brought about disarticulation in the provision of social amenities 
and the urbanization pattern in Africa. Most of the few social amenities provided 
during the colonial period were concentrated at a place. This made most people 
migrate from the rural areas where these amenities were virtually non-extent to 
colonial urban centres where they could be found. The consequence of this was the 
struggle for and over-use of these amenities and the attendant overcrowding of the 
urban areas and the problems of urbanization. The consequent problems of 
disarticulation of provision of amenities and urbanization include rural urban 
migration, overcrowding, filthy and slum environments, poor hygienic conditions, 
spread of epidemic disease, social vices, tribal and ethnic problems etc.  The 
management of the above problems created by colonial distortion and disarticulation 
of amenities and urbanization has remained a single most important problem 
confronting African states today.  
Another important impact of colonialism in Africa was the emergence and 
institutionalization of classes and class struggle in the socio-economic and political 
life of the people. Colonialism aided a clear emergence and development of classes 
in Africa. These classes include comprador bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, proletariat 
and the peasant. The African petty bourgeoisie serve as the conveyor belt through 




which the colonialists exploited and siphoned the economy of African countries. The 
indigenous elites were nurtured by the political culture of the colonial state and had 
been accustomed to identifying the state as the only purveyor of financial resources 
and favours. Instead of changing colonial institutions, laws and values for the better, 
African ruling elites and leaders entrenched deeply compromised governance 
systems. The newly independent governments were often highly centralized and 
strongly dominated by one political leader and his political, ethnic or regional 
faction. 
Colonialism laid the seeds of political crisis when it disrupted pre-colonial political 
structures that worked for Africans for centuries and imposed alien system, reshaping 
the map of Africa across pre-existing ethnic groups, states and kingdoms. It caused 
widespread social disruption and displacement.  African states were artificial 
creations and many are too small to be viable. Western multi-party democracy 
imposed by colonial powers divided the country into ethnic interests. The end of 
colonialism entrenched neo-colonialism. Powerful countries and transnational 
economic institutions become aggressively involved in the exploitation of the less 
powerful countries. In this sense, ‘Neo-colonialism’ implies a form of contemporary, 
economic Imperialism. In other words, powerful nations behave like colonial powers, 
and this behaviour is likened to colonialism in a post-colonial world. In lieu of direct 
military -political control, neo-colonialist powers are said to employ economic, 
financial, and trade policies to dominate less powerful countries. Those who 
subscribe to the concept maintain this amount to a de facto control over less powerful 
nations (see Immanuel Wallerstein's World Systems Theory cited in Offiong, 
2001:71-73).   
Both former colonial powers and other economically powerful states maintain a 
continuing presence in the economies of former colonies, especially where it 
concerns raw materials. Stronger nations are thus charged with interfering in the 
governance and economics of weaker nations to maintain the flow of raw materials at 
prices and under conditions which unduly benefit developed nations and trans-
national corporations. African countries suffered severe economic imbalances due to 
deteriorating terms of trade, commodity prices and debt burden which led to 
structural adjustment and stabilization programs.  Intellectuals such as Kwame 




Nkrumah (1965) and Jean-Paul Sartre (1964) argue that neo-colonialism historically 
supplemented (and later supplanted) colonialism. Scholars point to the fact that 
Africa today pays more money every year in debt service payments to the IMF and 
World Bank than it receives in loans from them, thereby often depriving the 
inhabitants of these countries from actual necessities. This dependency, they 
maintain, allows the IMF and World Bank to impose neo-liberal Structural 
Adjustment Plans upon these nations. SAPs, largely consisting of privatization 
program, results in deteriorating health, education, an inability to develop 
infrastructure, and in general, lower living standards (Bradshaw and Huang, 
1991:335-342). This point is well echoed by the United Nations Secretary-General's 
Special Economic Adviser, Professor Jeffrey Sachs, who heatedly demanded that the 
entire African debt (approximately $200 billion) be forgiven outright and 
recommended that African nations simply stop paying if the World Bank and IMF do 
not reciprocate155. The effects of these neo-liberal policies are loss of employment as 
a result of winding down of local industries and acute poverty which has created 
crises of human security in many African countries. 
Chapter four scrutinized the human security challenges in selected African countries 
and the AU response to these challenges. Some countries in the Sahel region and the 
Horn of Africa where human (in) security and political instability have been 
pervasive were reviewed. Countries such as Mali, Nigeria and Libya were explored 
in the Sahel while countries like Somalia, Sudan/South Sudan and Central African 
Republic were also explored. As pointed out in chapter three, human (in) security 
plays a central role in the security-crisis situation in the Sahel region. The current 
challenges in Sahel region are tightly connected to human and political security, both 
as a cause and a consequence of the regional and national instability. We can find 
common trends among all countries in focus. Mali, Nigeria and Libya are all facing 
internal political instability and bad leadership, which is further complicated by a 
lack of democratic traditions, colonial history, and experiences of repressive military 
regimes. While we can certainly look on democratization of Sahel from many 
different aspects, the current undemocratic situation mixed with strong pressure 
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towards more inclusive government, certainly adds to the instability of the region. As 
for the security point of view, political changes have indeed brought new aspects of 
threats and many new actors.  
While the countries have become more inclusive to some extent, political change 
also presented new opportunities for various ethnic groups, following their own goals 
and interests. However, taking into consideration everything stated before, the 
replacement of military dictators by elected civilians was not all that citizens wanted. 
They wanted, above all, a government that would prove to be better than military 
rule; one that would respect their rights while continuing to provide security. 
The Human Security Situation in Mali 
The current conflict Mali is not new. Northern Mali is originally the homeland of the 
Tuaregs, a people whose position in the Sahel was turned upside down by French 
colonialism. The Tuaregs who once controlled the inter-Saharan trade routes and saw 
themselves as ‘masters of the desert’ suddenly became minorities in several new 
states, and in Mali in particular, a minority ruled by the population they previously 
had viewed as inferior and historically had directed slave raids towards. The Tuareg 
problem is a Gordian knot, and ever since Mali became an independent state, the 
Tuaregs have recurrently rebelled. The first Tuareg rebellion took place in the early 
1960s, the second in the early 1990s, and as the National Pact of 1992 failed to 
produce tangible results on the ground, a new rebellion emerged in 2006. This was 
relatively small until armed Tuaregs, many of whom had lived in Libya for years, 
started to return to Mali following the fall of the Gaddafi regime. Their arrival gave 
the rebellion new momentum and yet another Tuareg rebel movement was formed, 
the Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). Whereas Tuareg 
separatism previously had been a facade for other demands concerning power and 
positions, MNLA declared full independence of Azawad. The issue was no longer 
increased access to the spoils of the Malian state, but to break away. 
 Human Insecurity in Nigeria 
In Nigeria,  Boko Haram’s seven year old insurgency has pitted neighbour against 
neighbour, cost more than 18,000 lives, displaced more than half a million, destroyed 
hundreds of schools and government buildings and devastated an already ravaged 




economy in the North East, one of Nigeria’s poorest regions. It overstretches federal 
security services, with no end in sight, spills over to other parts of the north and risks 
reaching Niger and Cameroon, weak countries poorly equipped to combat a radical 
Islamist armed group tapping into real governance, corruption, impunity and 
underdevelopment grievances shared by most people in the region. Boko Haram is 
both a serious challenge and a manifestation of more profound threats to Nigeria’s 
security. Unless the federal and state governments, and the region, develop and 
implement comprehensive plans to tackle not only insecurity but also the injustices 
that drive much of the troubles, Boko Haram, or groups like it, will continue to 
destabilise large parts of the country. Yet, the government’s response is largely 
military, and political will to do more than that appears entirely lacking. Most 
Nigerians are poorer today than they were at independence in 1960, victims of the 
resource curse and rampant, entrenched corruption. Agriculture, once the economy’s 
mainstay is struggling. In many parts of the country, the government is unable to 
provide security, good roads, water, health, reliable power and education. The 
situation is particularly dire in the far north. Frustration and alienation drive many to 
join ‘self-help’ ethnic, religious, community or civic groups, some of which are 
hostile to the state. It is in this environment that the group called Boko Haram 
(usually translated loosely as “Western education is forbidden”) by outsiders 
emerged. It is an Islamic sect that believes corrupt, false Muslims control northern 
Nigeria. The group and fellow travellers want to remedy this by establishing an 
Islamic state in the north with strict adherence to Sharia (Islamic law).  
The Human Security Crisis in Libya 
The worsening situation in the Sahel region can be attributed to the collapse of 
Gaddafi’s regime. The influx of refugees from Libya to the neighbouring counties 
created humanitarian challenges to the Sahel states. The Libyan economy under 
Gaddafi’s regime was very strong and therefore supported some the Sahel states such 
as Chad, Mali and Niger that were threatened by drought, poor harvest and state 
fragility. In addition, Libya had considerable investments in these counties which 
provided gainful employments for their citizens and ameliorated human security 
challenges. The strong Libyan economy had also attracted workers from these 
countries. Following the demise of the Gaddafi government and the escalation of 




instability, the number of returnees from Libya to Niger, Chad, Mali and Nigeria 
created instability in the region because labour migration to Libya acts as a key 
source of income for the development of neighbouring communities. The loss of 
remittances has had an especially adverse effect on these countries, particularly in 
light of their looming food crises. The influx of traumatized and impoverished 
returnees has not only disturbed social structures in receiving countries, but has also 
impacted the humanitarian situation in countries that already face food and nutrition 
crises, poverty, unemployment, limited access to social services, weak state 
institutions, diseases and effects of natural disasters such as drought 
(George,2012:4). 
In addition to returnees, large quantities of weapons and ammunition smuggled out 
of Libya are being used to create instabilitys and insecurity in neighbouring counties.  
These weapons reinforced the military capabilities of Salafist separatist groups and 
Boko Haram. Unsecured weapons storage facilities that were previously guarded by 
the Libyan government are the main source of the outflow. The unhindered 
movement of these weapons across state borders by former fighters who were either 
members of the Libyan army or mercenaries participating in the Libyan conflict, has 
led to the proliferation of arms, to the benefit of arms traffickers and terrorist and 
other armed groups operating in the region (Stohl,2012:4). 
The state of Human Security in Somalia 
In Somalia, the human security crisis is ever changing. The country experienced a 
civil war in the 1980s and state collapse, clan factionalism and warlordism in the 
1990s.  Over the last ten years the conflict has metamorphosed from clan rivalry to a 
conflict between Islamic insurgents and the Transitional Federal Government. 
Conflict has also arisen between Somalia and Ethiopia over Ogadem region and 
other border issues. It has been a complicated and mutating crisis involving various 
external actors. State collapse in the early 1990s was a result of various internal and 
external factors.  Internally, a civil war was instigated in 1988 by the attacks of the 
Somali National Movement which resulted in the death of tens of thousands and the 
displacement of over six-hundred-thousand Somalis. Moreover, the central 
government was divided and weak. Externally, the European colonial powers had left 




a state divided into five regions: wars with neighbouring countries had a damaging 
effect on Somalia. Additionally, Somalia’s collapse accelerated during the closing 
stages of the Cold War:  as Somalia’s importance to the West lessened, so did the 
foreign aid which was sustaining the country.  Due to the culmination of these 
multiple factors, state collapse was imminent; however, it was the removal of Siad 
Barre, the long standing leader of Somalia, by the United Somali Congress (USC) in 
1991, which engendered state collapse and its consequential anarchy and violence. 
The early 1990s were marked by clan-based warfare due to factions trying to gain 
control of towns and assets; filling the vacuum of power which yielded from the 
collapse of the central government.  The warfare caused the displacement of over a 
million people and devastating disruptions to food supplies, which resulted in a fatal 
famine that caused around 250,000 deaths. The Somali crisis gained the attention of 
the international community in 1992, when the UN negotiated a ceasefire between 
Ali Mahdi Mohammed and General Mohammed Farah Aideed, the two main 
belligerents in Mogadishu. The UN operation (UNOSOM), which was supported by 
the US forces, was important in turning the attention of the world to the crisis and in 
saving lives by securing food supplies for  those most vulnerable to starvation. It was 
also crucial for it facilitated some local agreements which improved security, led to 
the reopening of the airport of Mogadishu and pumped huge resources into the 
economy. However, the mission was unsuccessful in bringing peace to the country 
and in ending the famine. The mission has also been criticized for fuelling the war 
economy and for becoming embroiled in the conflict with General Aideed, which 
resulted in the notorious shooting down of the US black Hawk helicopter in 
Mogadishu and the deaths of eighteen US soldiers leading to the withdrawal of the 
US forces. 
The departure of the UN mission to Somalia in 1995 resulted in the continuation of 
clan rivalry which had been partially frozen during their presence.   People turned to 
traditional institutions to end violent confrontation and to establish a transitional step 
to developing trans-regional polities. The most successful of these traditional 
processes took place in secessionist Somaliland; however, in 1998 the Puntland 
Federal State of Somalia also became autonomous. In southern Somalia a variety of 
institutions took form such as Sharia courts and district councils which provided 




‘governance without government’. The Somalis took full advantage of the lack of 
global deregulation of trade to establish successful businesses, especially in the field 
of telecommunications, and to conduct money transfers. The Somali participation in 
“Salafi commercial networks, and an increase in Islamic charitable funding, spurred 
the growth of Islamic organizations including welfare charities, Sharia courts and 
Islamist movements156”. 
The international community began to refocus on Somalia in the new millennium.  
The Djibouti government hosted a peace conference in 2000 which led to the Arta 
agreement that produced a transitional government. This government employed a 
consociate structure which included the four major clans proportionally into the 
government.  However, soon after the conference the transitional government 
became associated with the powerful Mogadishu clans and the business class, 
comprising mostly Wahhabi Islamists, which led many to speculate about the 
government’s links with the militant Islamists. Subsequently an opposing coalition 
called the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) was formed and 
led by Adbullahi Yusuf. 
IGAD, who had earlier supported some of the peace-making efforts in Somalia, 
decided in 2002 to reconcile the transitional government and the SRRC. The 
transitional government was succeeded by The Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) in 2004, which saw Somalia’s power shift from Mogadishu, the Hawiye clan 
and Islamists to the federalist Darood coalition, backed by Ethiopia, with Abdullahi 
Yusuf chosen as the new transitional president. In the same way as the previous 
transitional government the TFG failed to be a government of national unity. Indeed, 
the power was concentrated in a narrow clan coalition and Yusuf’s decision to 
immediately request military backing from the African Union (AU) to help him 
establish his authority alienated the constituency in Mogadishu. On the other hand, 
had Yusuf not requested military force from the AU the TFG would not have 
survived the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). 
The ICU gained public support due to its establishment of security in Mogadishu and 
it threatened the TFG by providing an alternative political system which was better 
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able   to provide public services to the community than the TFG. As mediation 
efforts by the Arab League were unsuccessful, the Ethiopian military, with Western 
backing, entered Somalia in 2006. They pushed the ICU out of Mogadishu and in its 
stead installed the TFG who had lost control of the capital. In 2007 AU peacekeepers 
were deployed to Mogadishu to shield the government’s institutions. The next few 
years were followed by resistance from the militant youth movement of the ICU who 
felt resentment because of the imposition of a victor’s peace; this insurgency 
contributed to further economic downturn and major internal displacement. Notably, 
this resulted in the radicalization of a new generation of Somalis. 
In 2008, when UN mediated talks between the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-
liberation of Somali (ARS), a timeline for Ethiopian withdrawal was agreed, Yusuf 
resigned and Sheikh Ahmed took his position as president. “The withdrawal of 
Ethiopian forces and the establishment of a new ‘unitary’ TFG created an 
opportunity to establish a moderate Islamist government in Somalia that had 
considerable backing from Somalis and the international community” (Bradbury and 
Kleinman, 2010). However, nine months later Somalia was in even greater turmoil 
than before because Al Shabaab, under the leadership of Ahmed Godane, denounced 
the agreement signed in Djibouti as betrayal by the ARS and declared its support for 
al Qaeda in 2010. The TFG, even with foreign backing from Kenya, has been 
incapable of combating Al Shabaab forces that control much of south central 
Somalia. Ultimately, the military occupation, rising jihadism and violent insurgency 
has reversed the incremental political and economic progress which was achieved in 
2008. The crisis in Somalia has undergone a series of metamorphoses creating 
deplorable human security conditions in the last three decades and although periods 
of progress have occurred it seems that Somalia is as far away from peace and 
development as  it was after the collapse of the central government in the early 
1990s.  Therefore, in order for any peace-making attempt to be fruitful, unlike some 
of the interventions thus far, it is imperative to understand this complex history and 
the present state of affairs. 
 
 




Human Security in Sudan/South Sudan 
In Sudan/South Sudan, two decades of civil war until 2005 brought destruction and 
human displacement, disrupted markets and caused a lack of investment in 
infrastructure. By 2012, only four per cent of South Sudan’s land was being 
cultivated.  During the civil war, armed groups used starvation as a weapon of war. 
In 1998, 100,000 people died in Bahr El Ghazal in a famine caused by failing rains 
compounded by conflict – or more precisely the intentional destruction of agriculture 
and markets, diversion of food aid, denial of humanitarian access, and armed groups 
holding the population hostage.   
In 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was meant to end all such atrocities. It 
ended the north–south war, but left many deep tensions unresolved, including within 
what became South Sudan. Before and after independence in 2011, the new 
country’s leaders and the international donor community focused on building the 
new state and its institutions, and repairing relations between South Sudan and 
Sudan. Far less priority was given to resolving local conflicts and ingrained 
animosities, tackling the proliferation of arms, or providing basic services for all of 
South Sudan’s people.  As a result, some groups felt they lacked a stake in the 
‘peace’ or independence that had been won. In 2011, South Sudan was still one of 
the poorest nations in the world. The battle against poverty and food insecurity was 
always going to be immensely difficult and long. South Sudan’s new government did 
not prioritize much-needed investment in agriculture, infrastructure (such as roads 
and storage facilities), and basic services. In 2013, it spent only six per cent of its 
budget on health and education, and just 0.7 per cent on agriculture. It spent 55 per 
cent on security and law enforcement.  Despite this, 2013 saw the highest agricultural 
production for some years, though more than a third of the population still did not 
have enough to eat. Indeed, before conflict erupted in December 2013, South Sudan 
was making progress – albeit fragile and uneven – against hunger. In 2012, crop 
production in the traditional sector was six per cent above the five-year average, 
while it was 22 per cent above this average in 2013. The pervasive hunger and 
poverty created a human security crisis and escalated the conflicts between different 
ethnic nationalities.  




Human Insecurity in Central African Republic 
Since gaining independence from France over 50 years ago, the Central African 
Republic has been plagued with instability that has seen 8 presidential coups in its 
short history. The most recent conflict began when fighting broke out in the country 
in December 2012 when Séléka rebels launched an offensive against then President 
François Bozizé. The conflict escalated further when the rebels successfully ousted 
the president and took control of the capital Bangui on 24 March 2013. The Séléka 
fighters placed their leader, Michel Djotodia, at the head of the new transitional 
government; however, Djotodia has since disbanded the Séléka and attempted to 
integrate them into the national army.  Internal armed conflict has existed in the 
country since at least March 2014 and there have been reports of widespread 
breaches of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses engendering 
human security crisis.  
In addition to this, there are widespread reports of violence against civilians, 
including sexual violence against women and children, torture, illegal arrests and 
detentions and looting. Due to the on-going fighting and instability,  the transitional 
authorities are unable to do anything to stop these atrocities. Fighting has been 
mostly concentrated in the capital of Bangui, but in recent months, conflict has 
escalated to more rural areas as well. In the small population of 4.6 million, there are 
very few that have been unaffected by the conflict. Humanitarian aid is slow in 
coming, as even aid workers have been subject to attack. The scale of devastation is 
staggering and cannot continue to be ignored. A report from the UN Secretary 
General dated the 15th of November claimed that over 400,000 persons are internally 
displaced and a further 66,000 have officially registered as refugees in neighbouring 
countries in the past year. Since then, Amnesty report that there are now 614,000 
people internally displaced – a further 200,000 persons in the space of a month. The 
Secretary General’s report also claims that over 1.1 million people are food insecure. 
There is a real fear that the CAR is facing a human security crisis of unimaginable 
proportion as its agriculture industry makes up 53% of its GDP and has been largely 
ruined by this conflict (McKenna, 2013). 




The conflict in the CAR first began to attract international attention in October 2013 
when the UN approved a peacekeeping mission to protect UN workers in the 
country. However, by this point, the conflict was already well advanced and there 
had been peacekeepers on the ground for many months. MICOPAX, run by the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has had 400 soldiers on 
the ground in the CAR to help consolidate peace in the country. In addition to this, 
France has had troops stationed at the airport in Bangui to protect its interests in its 
former colony. A few months later, the African Union announced plans to deploy a 
peacekeeping force of up to 3,600 soldiers in CAR under the name MISCA 
(McKenna, 2013). This led to the UN Security Council issuing a resolution on 10th 
October 2013, in which, among other things, it asked the Secretary General to 
prepare a report looking at the possibility of international support for MISCA. The 
office of Ban Ki-moon published this report on 15th November expressing support 
for MISCA and indeed the possibility of establishing a UN-led peacekeeping force if 
the situation so requires. 
On December 5th 2013, the UN Security Council authorised the AU peacekeeping 
mission MISCA under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  The force is authorised to use 
all necessary measures to protect its mandate, which includes protection of civilians 
and restoration of security in the country. The force is initially deployed for a period 
of 12 months from the 19th of December; when it is due to take over from 
MICOPAX. The AU has since agreed to boost the number of peacekeepers to 6,000 
and France sent a further 1,600 troops following the clashes in Bangui at the start of 
December. 
The major concern in CAR is that the racial tensions could escalate and spread to 
neighbouring countries, or, indeed, result in genocide within the Republic. As 
Deputy Secretary General Jan Eliasson recently said, “The CAR is becoming a 
breeding ground for extremists and armed groups in a region that is already suffering 
from conflict and instability… If this situation is left to fester, it may degenerate into 
a religious and ethnic conflict with longstanding consequences, a relentless civil war 
that could easily spill-over into neighbouring countries157.” There is a concern that 
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the peacekeepers have taken too long to come and will not be able to do enough to 
prevent it worsening, as it clearly has in the past few months. The Séléka rebels who 
seized power in March have consistently attacked Christian communities and 
churches, which have led to Christians forming self-defence militias known as the 
anti-Balaka forces to retaliate against them. In addition to this, there is evidence of 
Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army operating in the country. The fighting between 
these two factions is showing no sign of letting up and as Peter Bouckhaert from 
Human Rights Watch said this week, “the brutal killings in the Central African 
Republic are creating a cycle of murder and reprisal that threatens to spin out of 
control… the UN Security Council needs to act quickly to bring this evolving 
catastrophe to a halt” (Human Rights Watch, December 18, 2013). There is a real 
danger that the ethnic and religious tensions will escalate and as long as the two 
factions continue to fight, the human security situation on the ground will continue to 
worsen. MISCA is undoubtedly a positive step forward in hopefully preventing the 
Central African Republic from becoming a failed state like Somalia, but the outlook 
still appears bleak. The people of the Central African Republic have desperately 
needed the help of the international community for months and it seems like only 
now has it remembered that they exist. 
The AU’s RESPONSES TO HUMAN SECURITY CHALLENGES IN AFRICA 
The guiding principles for the AU’s responses  to the human (in) security quagmire 
that bedevill the continent were the Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes 
in Government (2000) and the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2002), which 
prohibited unconstitutional changes in government. The drafters had not foreseen the 
possibility of democratic uprisings, although these had occurred in Sudan (1964 and 
1985) and non-violent demonstrations and civil society mobilization had hastened 
the democratization of many African countries after 1990. But the AU did not use 
these principles to buttress the status quo, but rather to stress the democratic nature of 
the uprisings and the continuities with the democratization wave in sub-Saharan 
Africa of the late 1980s and early 1990s. While the AU, like other international 
players, did not anticipate these developments, it nonetheless reacted creatively. 
Indeed, the AU exhibited the necessary flexibility, basing its response not on a 
dogmatic interpretation of the existing texts, but rather on the need to contribute to 




the attainment of the overall AU objective of consolidating democracy and 
promoting human security in the continent.  
In Sudanese civil war, the African Union force in Darfur was radically inadequate to 
the task of protecting civilians and humanitarian operations. Nor can the AU begin to 
provide the security that will allow for a resumption of meaningful agricultural 
production in Darfur, leaving millions entirely dependent upon international food 
aid. The African Union failed to demonstrate either the military capacity or the 
political will necessary to protect Darfur’s acutely vulnerable civilian populations 
and critical humanitarian operations. Most conspicuously, the AU has not demanded 
of Khartoum an explicit mandate for civilian protection, but has suggested instead 
that its forces will create a de facto mandate. While this has proved true on a very 
limited scale, with heroic measures on the part of some AU officers, too many 
officers and troops are without sufficient motivation. As a result, the epidemic of 
rape and sexual violence continues throughout Darfur; smaller-scale but immensely 
threatening violence (including "banditry") abounds; insecurity continues to displace 
as many as 3 million Darfuris; and humanitarian organizations are forced ever closer 
to withdrawing in the face of intolerable risks to their operations.  
In Libya, as in other countries affected by the ‘Arab Spring’, the AU based its action 
on the need to contribute to the achievement of the overall objectives sought by the 
union, namely peace, stability, democratic governance, respect for human rights, 
justice, prosperity and unity. The African leaders welcomed the developments in 
Tunisia and Egypt, stressing that they provided an opportunity for member states to 
renew their commitment to the AU agenda for democracy and governance, to inject 
additional momentum to efforts being exerted in this regard and to implement socio-
economic reforms adapted to each national situation. For a number of reasons, the 
democratic revolution in Libya followed a different path from those of Tunisia and 
Egypt. From the very start, the AU made it clear that any solution to the crisis had to 
be based on the fulfilment of the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people for 
democracy, respect for human rights and good governance. The AU strived to secure 
a Libyan consensus on the establishment of inclusive transitional institutions that 
would manage the country until such a time that election are held. This clearly 
implied Colonel Qaddafi’s relinquishing power to those new institutions. The AU’s 




ultimate objective was to avoid war. As a regional organisation, diplomacy is the 
main weapon and the use of force is always a last resort when all other options have 
been exhausted (Ping, 2011). While the Arab world, Europe and the United States 
tended to view the 2011 Libyan uprising as a turbulent version of Tunisia’s 
democratic uprising, sub-Saharan African leaders saw the contest between Gaddafi 
and his rivals as a variant of the Chadian wars, threatening lawless mercenaries that 
could easily spill across borders (de Waal, 2013). 
African leaders found Gaddafi erratic, egotistical and frequently offensive, but many 
were leery of forcible regime change, fearing that what followed could be worse. 
Warnings about possible fallout from the Libyan conflict were repeated in statements 
by the African Union Peace and Security Council from March 2011 onwards (ibid). 
The AU consistently spoke of an “inclusive transition” to democracy in Libya, 
meaning a process in which Gaddafi would step aside peaceably. Meanwhile, the 
U.S., France and Britain were following a different track, and driving UN policy. A 
week later, the UN Security Council met to consider the escalating crisis and 
especially the threat to Benghazi. The three African countries on the Security 
Council (Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa) all voted for Resolution 1973. If just one 
had abstained the resolution would not have passed. The resolution refers to the AU 
efforts in its preamble section, including calling for a ceasefire and noting the 
decision of the AU “to send its ad hoc High Level Committee to Libya with the aim 
of facilitating dialogue to lead to the political reforms necessary to find a peaceful 
and sustainable solution.” But the operative provisions of Resolution 1973 were 
different entirely (de Waal, 2012). 
Among the countries under review, the absence of true national integration among 
these countries in the Sahel and Horn of African regions constitute favourable 
grounds for identity-based demands that, depending on the circumstances and the 
evolution of the balance of power between the state and the groups contesting the 
state, can be minimal or extreme (Asefa, 2009). The countries in these regions are 
populated by Muslim and Christian. These countries are fundamentally faced with 
two types of threats namely, rebellions of identity and rebellions of autonomy or 
secession. These identity-oriented demands were further exacerbated by reaction 
against the processes of economic and cultural standardization that accompany 




globalization. We can find common trends among all the countries in focus. They are 
all facing internal political instability and bad leadership, which is further 
complicated by a lack of democratic traditions, colonial history, and experiences of 
repressive military regimes. While we can certainly look on democratization of these 
countries from many different aspects, from the security point of view, political 
changes have indeed brought new aspects of threats and many new actors 
Chapter Five (5) deals with  United States foreign policy in Africa and the 
emergence of AFRICOM.  US foreign policy is generally based on real politik 
analysis of US interests.  U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa have long been 
carried out by multiple U.S. government agencies. The primary actors are DoS; 
USAID; DoD; and country ambassadors. Other agencies include: Departments of 
Health and Human Services; Justice; Treasury; Energy; Commerce; Agriculture; 
Homeland Security (DHS); Trade and Development Agency (TDA); National 
Institute for Health (NIH); Centres for Disease Control (CDC); and Millennium 
Challenge Corporation. The DoD, DoS and USAID are the three main elements of 
US foreign policy apparatus. DoS oversees several programs that relate to the 
promotion of democracy, narcotics control and international law enforcement, 
terrorism, weapons proliferation, and non-UN peacekeeping operations, including 
oversight of PEPFAR through the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator. “USAID is 
responsible for most of the bilateral development assistance, including economic 
growth, global health, and democracy programs, [and] Title II of P.L. 480 food 
assistance158”. DoD is responsible for foreign military financing and training 
programs, support for international peacekeeping operations, healthcare, and 
humanitarian assistance, among others.  
These US foreign policy programs are not codified in a single document but mostly 
bilateral in nature (country specific). All programs are under the policy guidance of 
DoS and, in some cases, under its direct authority, the diverse and sometimes related 
objectives of the many implementing aid agencies operating within the African 
environment raises questions on whether these agencies are working at cross-
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purposes or duplicating each other’s work.  Africa has very often been treated as a 
low priority foreign policy backwater compared to the time, effort and resources 
dedicated to many other regions considered by Washington to be of greater concern 
even though the US/Africa relationship dates back to the slave trade and the 
associated repatriation of emancipated slaves by ‘Colonization Societies’ to the 
African West coast commencing in 1815 to Sierra Leone. The US was late getting 
involved in African government’s affairs. The US Department of States did not have 
an African desk until Kennedy administration. During the de-colonization process, 
the US government’s position regarding the growing African independent 
movements was ambiguous at best. The thrust of US policy then was to avoid any 
serious political commitment anywhere in Africa especially commitment that will 
result to confrontation with her European allies. In the 1970s, US foreign policy 
toward Africa was shaped by Cold War rivalries with the former Soviet Union. The 
US was especially concerned about preventing the former Soviet Union from gaining 
a foothold in the newly emerging independent African states and the desire to secure 
the preservation of Western political ideas and institutions. The US typically gave 
preference to those African states believed to lean toward the West rather than 
toward the communist world. At the end of the Cold War in 1991, the perceived risk 
of communism spreading into Africa became less threatening and the US drastically 
reduced the amount of attention it paid to Africa. During the decade between the end 
of the Cold War and September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, US foreign policy toward 
Africa was fundamentally altered by four major events which triggered the global 
war on terror (GWOT). 
The first major event was the US involvement in “Operation Restore Hope” which 
was launched in December 1992. The mandate of the mission was to avert human 
security catastrophes by providing humanitarian aid to Somalia people However, an 
attempt by the US special operation forces to capture Somali opposition leader 
General Mohamed Farrah Aidid ended tragically after the battle of Mogadishu that 
left 18 American Soldiers dead and 73 wounded. This led the US to withdraw all of 
its troops from Somalia. The second major event was the 1994 Hutu led government 
genocide on its Tutsi minority leaving 800,000 people dead. The United States did 
not intervene militarily in the conflict even though it was known that terrible acts 




were being committed.  The US inaction was attributed to its failure in Somalia. The 
simultaneous bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam in 1998 
which left over two hundred people dead and as many as 5,000 wounded was the 
third major event. This led the US military strike a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan 
that was believed to be making ingredients for chemical weapons. More significantly 
the strike revealed that the US believed that Africans had links to larger terrorist 
networks across the Middle East and that African countries serve as a recruiting 
ground for terrorists, that young, angry marginalized and anti-American youths could 
be mobilized against US interests. Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks, the Bush administration launched the global war on terror which 
encapsulated Operation Enduring Freedom (Horn of Africa) and Operation Enduring 
Freedom (Trans-Sahara).  
The global war on terror is focussed on combating terrorism and violent extremism. 
The US perception is that al-Qa’ida has syndicated its ideology and violence, its 
affiliates and adherents in Africa and Arabian Peninsula have become increasingly 
networked and adaptable in their recruiting, training, financing and operations. 
Violent extremist organizations, insurgents and criminal organizations are exploiting 
weak governance and under-governed spaces and remain determined to harm the 
United States, her partners and allies. Hence, the creation of a Unified Combatant 
Command (UCC) in the mode of AFRICOM is to protect American interests in 
Africa. AFRICOM protects and advances vital US national security interests in 
Africa, including the protecting the security of the global economic system, 
preventing catastrophic attacks on the homeland, protecting American citizens 
abroad (AFRICOM Posture Statement, 2011).  
The United States African Command initiates programs and conducts military-to-
military training and exercises that built defence institutional and operational 
capabilities and strengthen strategic partnerships. AFRICOM utilizes operations and 
security cooperation engagements to foster multilateral cooperation and build 
capacities of African partners (DoD Authorization, 2013). 




7.3 Summary of Research findings 
(i). The findings of the study revealed that colonial legacy was the architect of human 
security pathologies in the continent.  Human (in) security challenges existed in pre-
colonial African society, however, the intensities were low and the means of 
resolving them were localized and adequate.  
(ii). The balkanization of Africa by Western imperialist countries is a major source of 
conflict in Africa as state boundaries were arbitrarily demarcated without recourse to 
diverse ethnic nationalities that were yoked together. A number of African countries 
have at different times since independence been in conflict with each other over 
common boundaries. These conflicts have centred on trans-boundary minorities, 
trans-boundary resources, unclear frontiers, and the contestation or difficulty of 
implementing existing colonial and post-colonial boundary agreements ( Nguendi-
Kome, 2012:3). 
(iii). The vulnerabilities and human security pathologies in Africa were further 
aggravated during the Cold War era as proxy wars were openly fought and supported 
by the two super-powers. While some obnoxious regimes and rebels were funded and 
supported, some promising African leaders were overthrown and in extreme cases, 
killed. Threats and risks which hardly emanate from Africa nevertheless had decisive 
implications in shaping politics, economies and society while violations of rights and 
political instability were intricately woven around a framework of security founded 
on the dominant global geo-political rivalry.   
The Cold War security frameworkbifurcated the world in an east-west divide into 
which Africa, Asia and Latin America were often induced. The assimilation of 
Africa’s security problematique within the east-west divide provided an expressive 
platform for domestic groups and individuals outside the state to air their grievances 
while African regimes found the framework convenient for visiting oppression on 
opponents. Regimes that tried to take independent lines also found their hold on 
power becoming  precarious.  (Abutudu 2005:104). The incorporation of African 
states into the east-west security networks provided an automatic conflict 
relationship among countries which hardly had any historical or material basis for 
such antagonism. 




(iv). The Western oriented security permutation has failed to either address or 
ameliorate the emerging threats in Africa as its applications at various times and in 
many circumstances have proved inadequate for solving the insecurity quagmire in 
the continent. The crises facing many African states are built on an accumulation of 
intersecting issues including race, class, nation, deprivation, socio-economic needs, 
and gender among others.  
(v). In Africa, there is no clear demarcation between national security and human 
security as many governments’ emphasis is not  security of their peoples.  . For them, 
state security translates to the preservation of their persons, privileges, perquisites, 
and system of rule, which guarantees all their benefits. Many African leaders and 
politicians pay more attention to the perquisites of office than the human security of 
their peoples, hence, the referent object of security is neither the state nor the citizens 
but the personalities of the leaders as opposition in domestic politics and criticisms of 
public policies become “threats” to national security. 
(vi). The African military that is constitutionally empowered to act as unbiased 
umpire and to protect the territorial integrity of African state has more often than not 
exhibits its strength in repressing the same citizens that it was constituted to protect. 
Even though the logic and theory of its existence claim protection of the citizens 
from external attack as their basis, history and contemporary evidence point to the 
logic and practice of their existence as the brutalization and repression of the 
citizenry in the name of national security thereby giving credence to the import of 
securitization theory in the analogy of this study. In the hands of authoritarian rulers 
bent on perpetuating themselves in office, the military has been used to silence the 
opposition and subjugate the people. With the support of the armed forces African 
rulers are impatient with dialogue and consensus formation as a strategy of 
policymaking and implementation. Therefore, the consequence of the dominant 
Western security construct in Africa is the transformation of the state into a source of 
citizen insecurity. 
(vii). Hence, the overbearing Western state-centric security conceptualization of 
Africans has engendered the destruction of the state and the perpetuation of the reign 
of terror and chaos. The people are bewildered and afraid due to acute deprivation 




and marginalization. They are confused, alienated and helpless. And have no one to 
turn to and nowhere to go to find much needed safety and security. The state which 
was ostensibly created for the good and the wellbeing of the citizens and their 
cherished values, has failed woefully as it has turned from protector to violator of 
their security using the guise of national security to justify its impunity.  
(viii). The unilateralism of African governments in policymaking, the activities of the 
multinational corporations, particularly oil trans-nationals that seem to exploit and 
pollute the environment with impunity and treat the protests and interests of local 
communities with heavy handedness, trans-border criminality that involves the 
activities of small arms and drug traffickers, smugglers are some of the dangers that 
threaten the human security of African peoples.  
(ix). However, the most important threat to the human security of Africans is the 
arrogance of the African government, its penchant to project state power as personal 
and group power, its hostility to dialogue in preference for dictation in the 
governmental process and its partisanship in the implementation of policies. This 
governmental posture inevitably creates a critical mass of alienated and desperate 
enemies who confront the government in various ways including, in the final 
analysis, with arms with its attendant human security consequences. 
(x). Almost all armed conflicts occurring in Africa are intra-state in nature rather 
than inter-state. These armed conflicts involve militias, armed civilians and 
guerrillas, separatist movement contesting the autonomy of the state as well as 
soldiers. Small arms are the major cause of battle deaths and according to Nnoli 
(2006:238), as many as 90% of the casualties are civilians, who die largely from the 
hunger and disease which occur as a result.  
(xi). The inability of most African leaders to provide effective leadership, allocate 
resources equitably and manage social conflict has significantly weakened state 
structures both territorially and institutionally thereby creating the crisis of 
ungoverned space. This crisis  is further exacerbated by serious environmental 
challenges that threaten sustainable development in the continent with far-reaching 
adverse impact on human health, food security, economic activity, physical 
infrastructure, natural resources as well as national and global security.  




(xii). The skewed neo-liberal policies, lopsided trade regimes and economic 
partnership agreements (EPAs) of the Western-dominated international economic 
system are other factors that have undermined the human security of Africans. The 
EPAs represent unequal and, ipso facto, exploitative trade relations. EPAs have 
served the interests of the West to the detriment of African local industries, and have 
thus exacerbated poverty in Africa combined with the rash of IMF/World Bank 
intrusion by way of structural adjustment programmes. The severity of deprivation 
engendered by the imposition and enforcement of structural adjustment programmes 
compounded the weakness of African states. The sharp drops in living standard of 
African people as a result of SAPs and the mass hunger that followed increased the 
number of the marginalized and excluded them from life supporting economic 
activities providing a steady supply of the poor for recruitment as terrorists and foot 
soldiers. More so, those who protest their increasing misery were visited with state 
repression. The acute deprivation heightened competition among the dominant elites 
for dwindling state’s resources and this situation has invariably led to eruption of 
violence and human security deterioration. 
(xiii). Despite the forgoing scenario, Africa has never been central to US foreign 
policy. The United States government has vacillated from the policy of ‘selective 
engagement’ in the Cold War era (when it selectively engaged those countries where 
it felt that US national interests were at stake) to the policy of ‘disengagement’, at 
least on the short run. However, with the event of 9/11, the rise and spread of 
international terrorist threats, the US government has dithered from the policy of 
disengagement to ‘global war on terror’ (GWOT). The overall thrust of the policy is 
to combat terrorism and violent extremism. At the same time, Africa has 
dramatically shifted in the US policy radar. The continent’s ascendency in strategic 
value is as a result of various discoveries of strategic energy resources. These 
discoveries have elicited a dramatic change in the United States’ Africa policy from 
‘benign neglect’ to an increasing interest. During a press conference preceding his 
2008 Africa trip, President Bush expressed the strategic change in unequivocal 
terms: “Africa is also increasingly vital to our strategic interests. We have seen that 
conditions on the other side of the world can have a direct impact on our own 
security” (Bush cited in Mboup et al, 2009:89).   




The most visible manifestation of that dramatic shift has been the creation of a 
combatant command dedicated to Africa. AFRICOM, unfortunately, faced 
widespread mistrust on the continent.  The cacophony of voices on the location, 
actual character and mandate of the command is quite remarkable. Media headlines 
across the continent reflected Africans’ reluctance towards the new command.  From 
its inception, AFRICOM has faced a crisis of identity. Its purported mandate is to 
promote American interests through military, diplomatic, and economic means. The 
command’s mission statement reads: “AFRICOM, in concert with other U.S. 
government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security 
engagement through military-to-military programs, military sponsored activities, and 
other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African 
environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.”  
The US policymakers enthused that AFRICOM will not only enhance the efforts to 
bring peace and security to the people of Africa, it will also “promote our common 
goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in 
Africa.” This depiction of the continent as being increasingly relevant to US geo-
strategic imperative is presumptuous. AFRICOM’s dual nature is exposed upon an 
examination of U.S. economic interests on the continent. The interpretation of 
economic chalice the US attaches to AFRICOM is richly laced with the suggestion 
that America has suddenly been moved, out of philosophical inspiration, to meet 
Africa’s disease, poverty and misery. Within the US policymaking circle, the 
assumptions are that Africa as a whole is vulnerable as a breeding ground and 
incubation site for international terrorist groups and that international terrorism 
thrives amidst poverty and underdevelopment which are prevalent in present day 
Africa. The US government cites the growing number of failed or failing states, large 
terrain of ungoverned and under-governed space, non-transparent and faulty 
institutional structures, endemic corruption and poor governance as justifications for 
the imposition of a US military command on Africans. These scenarios were 
captured in 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States when it declared 
that:  
….weak states can pose great threat to our national 
interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor 




people terrorists and murderers. Yet, poverty, weak 
institutions, and corruption can make weak states 
vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within 
their borders…..In Africa, promise and opportunity sit 
side by side with disease, war and desperate poverty. 
This threatens both a core value of the United States-
preserving human dignity and our strategic priority-
combating terror, American interests and American 
principles, therefore, lead in the same direction: we will 
work others for an African continent that lives in 
liberty, peace and growing prosperity (NSS, 2002).  
These theatres of insecurity that pervade the continent will obstruct the exploitation 
and exploration of African mineral resources if unabated. As of 2006, U.S. imports 
of African oil reached 921 million barrels, just under 20 percent of total U.S. 
consumption; this figure surpassed oil imports from the Middle East, meaning Africa 
is the largest source for U.S. oil outside the American continents.  Additionally, U.S. 
imports from Africa grew by 51 percent since 2000, while imports from the Middle 
East fell by about five percent. The third prong of AFRICOM’s mission, 
humanitarian aid and development, is the most complex.  AFRICOM is the first 
American military command to include other U.S. government agencies in the DoD 
planning process. Aside from the need to counter violent extremism and secure 
strategic mineral resources, the US government is threatened by the increasing 
participation of China in Africa.  
 (xiv). China has clear political as well as economic objectives in Africa. Since 2001, 
China’s pursuit in the continent has rapidly expanded into the economic arena, 
focusing on Africa’s rich natural resources to fuel China’s domestic economic 
growth. China’s growing economic presence in Africa is hardly altruistic and is 
guided by the principle of “mutual benefits” to both sides. Under the framework of 
“resources for development,” Beijing mobilizes its vast state financial resources to 
invest broadly in infrastructure projects across Africa and extract natural resources in 
return (Yun, 2013). 
 A second factor in China’s Africa policy is that it is not solely focused on access to 
natural resources. The need for such access is of course at the top of its economic 
agenda. It has thus made major loans to oil producing Angola, bought control of two 
major copper mines in Zambia, and sought oil and mineral concessions or resource-




related trade agreements across the continent. Angola is now its largest sources of 
imported oil. China owns some 40% of Sudan’s major oil company and is investing 
in pipelines and other support for the industry. China is a major importer of African 
timber, often at serious cost to the environment. But today there are at least 800 
Chinese companies operating in Africa, with Chinese government support, and they 
range across the economy. It seems clear that China sees in Africa broad economic 
potential. It sees Africa as potentially a source of food imports that would lessen 
dependence on western countries. China is not deterred from investments and other 
activities in countries accused of major human rights violations, such as Sudan and 
Zimbabwe, limiting the potential for UN sanctions and other international pressures 
on those regimes (Yun, 2013). 
 In international forum, China has more consistent support from the African bloc 
than does the United States. Commercially, China uses practices that disadvantage 
U.S. companies. For example, China often will combine a bid for oil or mineral 
concessions with promises of some aid projects, a practice which the U.S. is 
forbidden to do under rules of the Development Advisory Committee of the OECD, 
to which China does not belong. China also undermines some practices and 
principles of other donors (Jane, 2012). For example, against World Bank rules, 
China has African countries collateralize its loans with commitments of future oil or 
other mineral exports.  Given that African states are uncomfortable with trade 
liberalizations, privatization and democratization requirements of the United States, 
many African governments view Beijing consensus as practical path to the 
continent’s development. 
(xv). There is no rationale for the establishment of a unified combatant command for 
developmental and humanitarian assistance in the Africa considering the fact that  
previous US established programmes such as ACOTA and TSCTI provide a sound 
vehicle for achieving AFRICOM’s purported objectives. The usefulness of these 
programmes begs the following questions: (a).Can a component of DoD in the mode 
of AFRICOM be truly as benign and contributory (socially and economically) as 
suggested by the United States’ declaration about AFRICOM?  (b). Why impose a 
combatant command structure on the putative beneficiaries without due consultation 
with them? (c). Similarly, if the actual concern is to counter violent extremism and 




deny terrorist organizations ungoverned space in Africa, why not seek to address the 
root causes of African predicaments instead of giving them peripheral attention? (d). 
How can AFRICOM pursue US national interests, while at the same time 
safeguarding both the strategic and human security interests of African people? (e). 
And finally, how do African security challenges impact on the United States and 
what are the commensurate levels of strategic and military intervention to address 
these? 
(xvi). Many African governments welcome the United States intention to bring 
peace, security and development to the people of Africa, citing that the combinations 
of these three factors facilitate  the promotion of human security. Nevertheless, the 
security that is promoted by the US is narrowly defined, and peace becomes an 
illusion, even when conflict appears to have been resolved as exemplified by the 
Libya debacle. 
 In retrospect, the US/NATO intervention in Libya was an abject failure, judged even 
by its own standards. Libya has not only failed to evolve into a democracy; it has 
devolved into a failed state. Rather than helping the United States combat terrorism, 
as Qaddafi did during his last decade in power, Libya now serves as a safe haven for 
militias affiliated with both al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham 
(ISIS). The Libya intervention has harmed other U.S. interests as well: undermining 
nuclear non-proliferation, chilling Russian cooperation at the UN, and fuelling 
Syria’s civil war. On the other hand, the pattern of powerful countries turning a blind 
eye on the human rights records of those in control of the countries where their 
economic and strategic interests are at stake, fuels the beliefs in imperialist-type 
intents. 
(xvii). The official rhetoric on AFRICOM seems to suggest that the US is no longer 
guided by a pursuit of its strategic-military interests; instead ‘soft power’ is seen as 
an integral part of foreign policy calculation. However, there continues to be a lacuna 
between promise and practice in US policy. The US intervention in Libya (Operation 
Odyssey Dawn) in 2011, albeit in consultation with other countries to avert 
humanitarian catastrophe, clearly demonstrated to some critics that despite the public 




commitment to the promotion of human security in Africa under R2P doctrine, 
American involvement was driven mostly by geo-strategic imperatives. 
(xviii). The responses from the interviews and the questionnaires show that many 
African countries are collaborating with AFRICOM especially on military-military 
training, exercises and operations. However, the human security dilemma in Africa 
requires multidimensional solution as the challenges cannot be mitigated militarily 
though the military can form part of its solutions. At present, African military lacks 
the capacity to respond adequately to the human security quagmire in the continent 
and given the emergence of new threats and the escalation of old conflicts that 
threaten to engulf various African regions in humanitarian crises as well as political 
imbroglios, the US military presence appears to be unavoidable.  
7.4 Recommendations 
No doubt the human (in)security in many African states  is at crisis stage and 
therefore,  comprehensive engagement is needed.   
(i). The intrusion of colonialism and arbitrary boundary demarcation which have 
created flash point for conflicts can be resolved by the AU through regional 
integration. The traditional use of hard power in addressing the human security 
challenges in Africa cannot yield positive results since the root causes of the 
problems stemmed from socio-economic conditions of dislocation, deprivation, 
exclusion and by the benign neglect and scrounging relationship that historically 
enabled, coddled and protected corrupt and self-centred leaders to do their bidding 
throughout the continent. What looks like a national security question today, may in 
fact tomorrow prove to be rooted in changing economies, environments and societal 
evolution. 
(ii). The integration of Africa’s security into the “East- West Security Calculus” 
should be revisited as Africa’s security challenges differ remarkably from Western 
security challenges. There is urgent need for the reconceptualization of African 
security considering the fact many threats in Africa emanate from the inability of the 
state managers to equitably allocate resources for the common good of the citizens. 
Africans should rather be projected as the referent objects of security instead of the 
state. 




(iii). African militaries should be highly professionalized and their roles should be 
clearly articulated to address the contemporary challenges facing the continent. 
Significant steps have been taken in this regard at the regional level to develop 
normative instruments to prevent military intervention in the political processes of 
African states. These include frameworks, such as the African Union’s (AU) 
“Common African Defence and Security Policy,” the “Framework for an African 
Union Response to Unconstitutional Changes,” the Southern African Development 
Community’s “Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security Cooperation,” and the Economic Community of West African States’ 
(ECOWAS) “Draft Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces.” The evolution 
of these explicit regional standards reflects a growing recognition of the need to 
improve the institutional culture of militaries on the continent. If upheld, these 
standards will have far-reaching implications for Africa’s political development. 
(iv). There should be a synergy between the government, civil society organizations 
and the informed public in the formulation and implementation of public policies and 
elected government officials should be held responsible for their actions and 
inactions. While acknowledging the strides taken by the AU in the establishment of 
NEPAD, African Peer Review Mechanism and African Union Stand-by force, these 
organs do not hold African leaders accountable for offences committed while in 
office and the regional and sub-regional organizations are constrained by enormous 
challenges to respond effectively and timeously in addressing humanitarian crises in 
Africa. The capacity of regional security apparatus in addressing the human security 
challenges in the continent is stressed despite the political consequences of 
globalization. 
 (v). Institutional capacities should be enhanced through strict adherence to the rules 
of law, respect for the right of citizens, equality before the law and leaders should be 
compelled to be accountable to the citizens. Africa faces the future with much 
trepidation. Although a lot of hopes and expectations are invested in the current 
process of democratic change and its capacity to engineer good governance, 
however, the possible outcome of the process remains uncertain and open to 
conjecture. What is clear from the historical experiences of other countries and 
regions of the world is that democracy and good governance are not given; rather 




they are products of the concrete political struggles waged by the dominated groups 
in the society.  
Africa’s increased strategic value and the unprecedented importance that it gives to it 
with regard to tangible United States’ interests offer an opportunity for recasting 
their relationship into a transparent, principled, and mutually beneficial partnership. 
Many observers believe that Africans would readily welcome a strategic partnership 
with the United States, if the mistrust accumulated since the end of the Cold War is 
eliminated and if they have the conviction that this partnership would be beneficial 
for them as well. A new era in the relations between Africa and the United States is 
feasible, but it requires a strategy that considers both perspectives and works actively 
at identifying and eradicating motives of reluctance and mistrust. As Richard L. 
Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. declared before the United States Congress:  
America should have higher ambitions than being 
popular, but foreign opinion matters to U.S. 
decision-making. A good reputation fosters 
goodwill and brings acceptance for unpopular 
ventures. Helping other nations and individuals 
achieve their aspirations is the best way to 
strengthen America’s reputation abroad 
(Armitage and Nye Jr., 2007:12). 
(vi). To improve and extend the frontiers of human security records in Africa, it is 
imperative for the United States government to engage those inhibitive foreign policy 
directives that foul up the atmosphere in its relations with Africa. There is an urgent 
need to move from market fundamentalism and unilateral militarism to recognition 
of interdependence with African countries and there should be sustained multilateral 
cooperation. The global war on terror has created unintended consequences as anti-
American sentiments and hatred in many African countries especially in countries 
with dominant Muslim population has increased. The US government should of 
necessity disengage from its extreme of pre-emptive doctrine and narrow military 
responses to understanding that concerted collaboration with African Union and the 
sub-regional organizations is the panacea for increased common security. 
(vii). There should be a paradigm shift from focusing exclusively on violent enemies 
to paying attention to less conventional threats that negatively impact on the human 
security of African people such as epidemics, climate change, natural disasters, 




economic disequilibrium, marginalization, deprivation and exclusion. Such shift will 
therefore necessitate an interrogation of the sources of insecurity of African states, 
institutions, businesses and citizens’ experience. The US government should rethink 
the idea of its values as the centrepiece of its foreign policy in Africa because such a 
pursuit is of little or no use in countries with highly mobilized ideological and 
religious extremism.  
(viii). In responding to the current waves of terrorism and radical Islamism in the 
Sahel and Horn of Africa, it is germane to have a lucid grasp of the agential and 
structural (dis)contents that informed its emergence. The militarist approach toward 
violent extremism, insurgency and political jihadism ignores the essentialist, 
psychological and political perspectives of the problem. This has so far obscured a 
nuanced and holistic engagement of the threats. The US government should diversify 
its military spending in Africa to accommodate diplomatic initiatives and 
humanitarian gestures. Development assistance, aid and humanitarian assistance 
should revert back to the DoS and USAID while AFRICOM should continue with 
security operations. 
(ix). The US government should establish a collaborative framework with African 
regional, sub-regional organizations and civil society organizations for broader 
dialogue rather than to privilege expansion through AFRICOM. The US government 
and AFRICOM in particular should embrace and support the concept of ‘African 
solutions to African problems’. African countries do want to partnership with the 
United States government and other members of the international communities to 
address the enormous human security challenges that pervade the continent and to 
enhance their human resource capacities and acquire equipment to combat emerging 
threats that have undermined the wellbeing of African people. 
 (x). Peacekeeping operations require a civilian, developmental approach that 
recognises the complex links between poverty, humiliation, despair and violence. 
Underlying and unresolved social, economic and political issues simmering in many 
African countries call for concerted efforts to prevent an escalation of violence. 
AFRICOM should begin a broader dialogue with  civil society organizations in 
Africa and various stakeholders including members of  academia instead of limiting 




the engagement with the state leaders and military personnel. There should be 
collaborative partnership between the US government and African governments to 
address the root causes of terrorism and violence. This approach should transcend 
building African states’ security capacities to incorporate good governance, effective 
strategies to eradicate poverty and deliberate partnership between civil society 
organizations, peace keeping community and international partners.  
(xi). There is need to link peacekeeping operations in African conflict zones with 
post-war planning. The death of Gadaffi in Libya signalled the withdrawal of 
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